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ABSTRACT 
 
TITLE:  The utilisation of ubuntu can promote accountability in public officials and 
state institutions as well as give effect to social solidarity in South Africa. 
AUTHOR:  Nadeem Salie  
DATE:            1 February 2018 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary thrust of my work is to cast aside vacuous claims about ubuntu whilst emphasising 
the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu. The state is duty-bound to give effect to socio-
economic rights as enshrined in the Constitution. Ubuntu, with reference to its communal 
obligations’ focus, could serve to facilitate the realisation of critical socio-economic rights as 
well as forge social solidarity. It is submitted that public officials that embrace ubuntu, as 
defined by an unwavering focus on communal obligations, will give effect to their duties (as 
provided for in the Constitution) as a means to create a just and caring nation-state. 
METHODOLOGY 
This is a mixed-methods study which delves into specific aspects of public law, anthropology 
and political philosophy. Political philosophy is explored as a means to develop a nuanced 
understanding of ubuntu whilst the anthropology discipline is utilised in order to develop a firm 
grasp of the lived reality of vulnerable groups. 
There is a specific focus on Constitutional Court jurisprudence (as pertaining to the 
progressive realisation of socio-economic rights as well as ubuntu) and the relevant 
international law obligations of the Republic of South Africa (i.e. the 2015 ratification of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).   
FINDINGS 
An exploration of political philosophy sheds light on the political landscape within which ubuntu 
is deployed and serves to confirm that to discuss ubuntu is to engage in a political act. The 
discipline of anthropology can make a telling contribution to the application and reception of 
law by providing textured insights of the lived reality of vulnerable groups. 
The Constitutional Court should utilise the minimum core obligation approach as a means to 
provide critical determinate content for key socio-economic rights. Furthermore, the 
Constitutional Court should embrace an oversight role in ensuring that the state does in fact 
progressively realise the subsistence rights of vulnerable groups.    
Ubuntu can in fact mesh with a human rights regime. This thesis serves to confirm the manner 
in which ubuntu, understood as an unwavering focus on communal obligations, can promote 
the accountability of public officials in South Africa (as well as foster social solidarity) by 
facilitating the progressive realisation of constitutionally guaranteed socio-economic rights. 
However, the expectations demanded of ubuntu should be tempered in the absence of an 
economic transition to fundamentally transform the living conditions of vulnerable groups.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introductory outline 
The inspiration for this thesis came about as a result of my exposure to 
the inner workings of a state-owned enterprise between 2010 and 2015. 
I was initially appointed as a legal advisor but subsequently assumed a 
management position in the risk and compliance arena. It is in this latter 
role that I bore witness to a worrying trend of damaging lapses in 
accountability. I consequently sought to explore mechanisms that would 
bolster accountability and contribute to the betterment of society.  
It is for the abovementioned reasons that this thesis will explore how the 
utilisation of ubuntu can promote accountability amongst public officials 
and within state institutions as well as give effect to social solidarity in 
South Africa. The reality is that ubuntu is used widely in South Africa and 
has tangible political and ethical potency.1 The primary thrust of my 
engagement with ubuntu is to showcase the communal obligations’ 
focus of ubuntu which is at the core of ubuntu philosophy.2 In this regard 
there will be a specific analysis of the accountability of the state in 
progressively realising socio-economic rights as enshrined in the 
Constitution.3 The state is duty-bound to advance socio-economic rights 
(and in so doing give effect to interconnected and interdependent civil 
and political rights) as well as strive to realise the aspirational aims in the 
Constitution so as to create a sanctuary for all people living in South 
Africa.      
The utilisation of the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu will give 
effect to a just and caring community through an innate understanding 
that all members of a nation-state are interconnected and 
                                                             
1 Cornell D ‘Exploring ubuntu-tentative reflections’ available at 
www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
2 Bowler DA 'Concluding reflections: the fierce urgency of now' in Praeg L & Magadla 
S (eds) Ubuntu: Curating the Archive (2014) 197 (hereafter Concluding reflections). 
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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interdependent.4 Thus, ubuntu (as defined below) can in fact mesh with 
a human rights regime. 5  It should be noted that public officials that 
‘embrace’ ubuntu or are ‘imbued with ubuntu’ should be understood to 
mean those public officials that have an unwavering focus on communal 
obligations and seek to give effect to continuous humanising acts6 as a 
means to create a just and caring nation-state. Consequently, those very 
same officials will strive to give effect to their official duties (with 
reference to their mandated functions in terms of the relevant sections 
of the Constitution and with special emphasis on the realisation of socio-
economic rights) as a means to discharge their communal obligations. 
Ubuntu could play a critical role in promoting accountability on the part 
of the state (as represented by duly appointed public officials) in so far 
as giving effect to socio-economic rights (and aspirational values) as 
enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, if ubuntu could play a pivotal role in 
shaping a just and caring nation-state, in which the interdependence and 
interconnectedness of members living side by side is recognised and 
celebrated, then it follows that ubuntu can make a meaningful 
contribution to forging social solidarity7 in South Africa. 
1.2 Brief definition of ubuntu 
Ubuntu is a Zulu word that has been linked with the Tswana word botho 
to form the value known as ubuntu-botho and it has found traction in that 
very form which is indicative of it being a ‘South African expression in 
the complexity of its meaning’.8  
Metz proposed that the definition of ubuntu in which ‘a person is a person 
through other persons’ could be rendered clearer by defining ubuntu as 
meaning that ‘a person becomes a real person through communal 
                                                             
4 Cornell D & van Marle K ‘Exploring ubuntu-tentative reflections’ in Cornell D & 
Muvangua N (eds) Ubuntu and the Law-African Ideals and Post-Apartheid 
Jurisprudence (2012) 362 (hereafter Exploring ubuntu).  
5 Praeg L A Report on Ubuntu (2014) 136 (hereafter Report on Ubuntu). 
6 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 20. 
7 Social solidarity is to be understood as people living side by side in a manner in which 
all people are treated as having equal worth on the basis of our shared humanity.  
8 Cornell D ‘Ubuntu and subaltern legality’ in Praeg L & Magadla (eds) Ubuntu: 
Curating the Archive (2014) 167 (hereafter Subaltern legality). 
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relationships’.9 However, it is important to note that the routinely quoted 
meaning of ubuntu as ‘a person only becomes a person through other 
people’ is the product of people engaging with each other on a daily 
basis rather than an engagement by people with an inert concept called 
‘community’.10 Furthermore, ubuntu is deemed to encompass the key 
values of group solidarity, compassion, respect and human dignity but 
at its core it seeks to impart humanity and morality.11 However, the rich 
promise of ubuntu is not fully grasped at present as it possesses 
untapped potential in highlighting, shaping and enforcing the obligations 
of public officials and state institutions as well as its ability to foster social 
solidarity.12  
Ubuntu will be comprehensively defined in Chapter 2, with specific 
reference to the present day political landscape, as a means to 
undertake a properly situated and nuanced discussion of ubuntu. Praeg 
persuasively argues for the contextualisation of the ubuntu discussion 
so as to recognise that to speak about ubuntu is first and foremost a 
political act.13 A critical feature of this same discussion is the manner in 
which communal obligations flow as a rule from ubuntu and that 
benevolent coercion (in terms of which members are pressured to 
conform to community ideals) is ever-present in all talk of ubuntu.14 
Furthermore, there is a compelling need to cast aside vacuous claims 
about the unique and/or magical qualities of ubuntu as it undermines the 
legitimacy of the role that ubuntu could play in nurturing our shared 
humanity.15 It is for the abovementioned reasons that this thesis will 
                                                             
9 Metz T ‘Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa’ (2011) 11 
African Human Rights Law Journal 537 (hereafter Ubuntu as a moral theory). 
10 Cornell D ‘Exploring ubuntu-tentative reflections’ available at   
www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
11 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR (CC) para 308 (hereafter 
Makwanyane). 
12 Bohler-Mϋller N ‘Some thoughts on the ubuntu jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court’ in Cornell D & Muvangua N (eds) Ubuntu and the Law: African Ideals and 
Post-Apartheid Jurisprudence (2012) 370 (hereafter Ubuntu jurisprudence). 
13 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 5. 
14 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Introduction. 
15 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Introduction. 
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maintain an unwavering focus on the core element of ubuntu which is 
herein defined as giving effect to communal obligations.  
Praeg utilises the form ‘ubuntu’ to ‘refer to the living practice’ and 
‘Ubuntu’ to ‘refer to the abstract postcolonial articulation of the practice 
as philosophy’.16 However, the distinction between ‘ubuntu’ and ‘Ubuntu’ 
will not be observed in this thesis apart from engaging with the political 
philosophy insights as offered by Praeg in Section 2.4. 17 The 
aforementioned distinction by Praeg has considerable merit in so far as 
providing the necessary context in nuanced political discussions. 
However, this does not significantly detract from the primary focus of 
ubuntu (as understood and defined in this thesis) as giving effect to 
communal obligations. I would submit, in any event, that ‘ubuntu’ rather 
than ‘Ubuntu’ should be utilised (if compelled to choose between the two 
forms as proposed by Praeg) as the communal obligations focus 
advanced in this thesis is the true embodiment of a living praxis. 
Furthermore, the distinction between ‘ubuntu’ and ‘Ubuntu’ is not 
observed in Constitutional Court jurisprudence nor in legal circles (at 
present) and it is best to avoid confusion in this regard. Thus, ‘ubuntu’ 
rather than ‘Ubuntu’ will generally be utilised in the text outside of 
engagement with the political philosophy material as advanced by Praeg 
in Section 2.4 as previously noted. 
This thesis will seek to ascertain the obligations that flow as a rule when 
deploying and/or embracing ubuntu. This could entail the state meeting 
the critical needs of its most vulnerable citizens/groups which could in 
turn serve to foster social solidarity. In this vein Justice Mokgoro seeks 
to redefine citizenship in her Khosa and Others v Minister of Social 
Development (Khosa)18 ruling by ensuring that our constitutional values 
reflect not only a just community but a caring one as well.19 Furthermore, 
it should be noted that embracing ubuntu gives rise to a deep-seated 
                                                             
16 Praeg L & Magadla S ‘Introduction’ in Praeg L & Magadla S (eds) Ubuntu:   
Curating the Archive (2014) 3 (hereafter Introduction). 
17 Praeg L & Magadla S ‘Introduction’ (2014) 3.  
18 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) BCLR 
569 (CC) (hereafter Khosa) para 65. 
19 Cornell D & van Marle K ‘Exploring ubuntu’ (2012) 362. 
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awareness of the interdependence and interconnectedness of human 
beings and in this manner also serves to forge social solidarity.  
It should be noted that any nuanced discussion of ubuntu will as a rule 
explore the relevant insights offered by anthropology as well as (political) 
philosophy.20 Thus, the compelling contribution by Praeg (as related to 
political philosophy) is specifically acknowledged (and consequently 
explored) in this thesis. In addition, this thesis also explores specific 
aspects of the anthropology discipline as a means to develop a firm 
grasp of the lived reality of vulnerable people in any given society. Thus, 
this thesis will explore anthropology and political philosophy so as to 
fashion definitive insights into the manner in which law is experienced 
on the ground. In addition, the deployment of ubuntu to promote 
accountability amongst public officials (as well as bolster the reception 
of law in South Africa) will also be analysed.  
1.3  A problem statement pertaining to the plight of vulnerable groups   
in South Africa 
The following passage by Chaskalson P in Soobramoney v Minister of 
Health, KwaZulu-Natal (Soobramoney) 21  contains an illuminating 
account of the state of the nation in 1997, yet it remains an apt 
description of present day life in South Africa:  
‘We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. 
Millions of people are living in deplorable conditions and in great 
poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate social 
security, and many do not have access to clean water or 
adequate health services. These conditions already existed when 
the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, 
and to transform our society into one in which there will be human 
dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new 
                                                             
20 Cornell D & van Marle K ‘Exploring ubuntu’ (2012) 362. 
21 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (hereafter 
Soobramoney). 
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constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to 
exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.’22      
In light of the above quote, it should be apparent that the state (in a 
contemporary context) should play a more effective role in giving effect 
to the minimum social and economic well-being of individuals as required 
by the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Thus, public 
officials that discharge their constitutional obligations in the required 
manner and with the necessary diligence (and in so doing demonstrate 
their accountability) can greatly improve the lives of citizens (with a 
specific prioritisation of the urgent needs of vulnerable people). 
Consequently, this serves to demonstrate the concrete link between the 
accountability of public officials and the (possible) improvement in the 
quality of lives of vulnerable groups. It is of pivotal importance to focus 
on the Constitutional Court jurisprudence on socio-economic rights as 
well as our international law commitments with specific reference to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘International Covenant’ or ‘ICESCR’).23  This is necessary so as to 
grasp the nature and extent of the duties owed by the state in devising 
(and subsequently) implementing benchmarked sectoral targets to 
progressively alleviate the suffering of vulnerable groups.     
The harsh reality is that the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights is unlikely to yield any permanent, wholesale improvement in the 
living conditions of the most vulnerable groups in the immediate or 
foreseeable future in South Africa (without the introduction of a powerful 
catalyst that is) if regard is had for the performance of the state since the 
advent of democracy. It is submitted that ubuntu, if properly framed and 
deployed, can serve to colour and give effect to the socio-economic 
rights and aspirational values as enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, an 
analysis of Constitutional Court cases focusing on ubuntu will be 
                                                             
22 Soobramoney (1998) para 8.  
23 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993 available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html (accessed on 31 July 2016) 
(hereafter International Covenant). 
7 
 
 
undertaken (both in defining ubuntu and deliberating on its role in a 
constitutional democracy) so as to provide the necessary legal context 
for a nuanced discussion about the (possible) contemporary role of 
ubuntu in South Africa.  
Ubuntu, in light of its communal obligations’ focus, serves to animate the 
urgency attached to the realisation of socio-economic rights (in providing 
for the pressing needs of vulnerable groups) in the shortest possible 
time. Also, there is a need for the public to develop a better 
understanding of their constitutionally guaranteed rights (with a specific 
focus on socio-economic rights that can fundamentally change the lives 
of vulnerable people). Thus, the duties of the state as related to 
information dissemination24 will be explored as a function of prioritising 
the urgent needs of vulnerable people. Furthermore, there is a critical 
need to secure a suitable platform for vulnerable citizens to engage with 
ordinary public officials as a means to provide the local representatives 
of the state with insight as to the issues of deprivation as endured by 
vulnerable groups within their communities. This may include lobbying 
those same (ordinary) public officials as a means to drive beneficial 
changes from the bottom up.    
Zulu believes that the realisation of the dream in attaining the common 
good (which is defined in this thesis as the creation of a just and caring 
society) is that much more difficult to achieve due to the absence of a 
‘coherent value consensus’ regarding the moral duties owed by public 
officials.25 It is my firm belief that ubuntu is well suited to fulfil the role of 
providing the ‘coherent value consensus’ required to ensure that public 
officials and state institutions faithfully discharge their respective 
obligations against a clearly defined standard.26 The aforementioned 
‘coherent value consensus’ role of ubuntu can be meshed with the 
Constitution as the supreme law of the land as contained in section 2 of 
                                                             
24 Please see Section 3.4.1. 
25 Zulu P A Nation in Crisis: An Appeal for Morality (2013) 30 (hereafter A Nation in 
Crisis).  
26 Zulu P A Nation in Crisis (2013) 30. 
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the Constitution.27 This in turn will give rise to the consequent duties 
borne by public officials to give effect to the realisation of socio-economic 
rights (as well as shaping a deep-seated awareness of the 
transformative nature of the Constitution) in seeking to dismantle the 
legacy of apartheid.28   
1.4 Sojourn at the Department of Anthropology at the University of 
Copenhagen  
My sojourn, as a visiting PhD Researcher in the Department of 
Anthropology at the University of Copenhagen (between February 2015 
and September 2015) provided me with a nuanced perspective of 
accountability, integration and social solidarity as experienced in 
Denmark. I was also exposed to the manner in which law is interpreted, 
implemented, revised and resisted on the ground as well as the 
perceived limitations of law. There was a specific focus on exploring the 
lived reality of vulnerable groups in Denmark (i.e. the specific challenges 
faced by immigrants and refugees with regards to integration in that 
social solidarity is understood by the majority of Danes as signifying 
sameness rather than embracing differences) as compared to 
vulnerable groups in South Africa.29  
1.5 The methodology utilised in the preparation of this doctoral thesis 
This is a mixed-methods study which delves into specific aspects of 
public law, anthropology and political philosophy. The aforementioned 
study will offer a nuanced critique of ubuntu.  
Comparisons are drawn between Denmark and South Africa in relation 
to the manner in which the aforementioned states engage with specific 
vulnerable groups. There is a specific focus on vulnerable groups in 
South Africa who are determined to secure access to critical socio-
economic rights while the specific focus in relation to Denmark is 
analysing the manner in which refugees and immigrants engage with the 
                                                             
27 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
28 Roux T ‘Understanding Grootboom-a response to Cass R. Sunstein’ Forum 
Constitutional 12:2 (2002) 43 (hereafter Understanding Grootboom). 
29 Please see Chapter 4.  
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Danish welfare state and explore ways of negotiating a life of purpose in 
a land where social solidarity is equated with sameness (rather than 
embracing difference). There is also a comparison drawn between the 
respective states of South Africa and Uganda and their specific approach 
to combating HIV Aids as a means to explore the accountability and 
political will of the respective states.    
The primary sources of information will be relevant Danish and South 
African case law and legislation. The secondary sources of information 
(in relation to studies in Denmark, South Africa and Uganda) will be 
books, relevant articles in journals, newspapers and reputable internet 
sites.  
There is a specific focus on socio-economic rights as well as ubuntu (i.e. 
its role in a contemporary context) in relevant Constitutional Court 
jurisprudence so as to better appreciate the nature and extent of the 
obligations owed by the state in relation to the socio-economic rights 
enshrined in the Constitution.    
An exploration of the international law obligations of the Republic of 
South Africa as related to the ICESCR is undertaken.30 In this regard the 
recent ratification of the ICESCR will be analysed so as to better 
appreciate the additional duties borne by the Republic of South Africa 
under international law.31  
The abovementioned seven month sojourn at the University of 
Copenhagen in 2015 provided me with definitive insight regarding the 
contested nature of the political construction that is ‘integration’ (as well 
as its perpetual link with the concept of social solidarity) and the plight of 
immigrants and refugees in Denmark. Also, I attended a semester 
course on Legal Anthropology as a means to familiarise myself with key 
anthropology concepts and themes. Furthermore, I was fortunate to be 
mentored by a number of anthropology professors at the University of 
                                                             
30 International Covenant http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html, (accessed 
31 July 2016). 
31 International Covenant http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html, (accessed 
31 July 2016). 
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Copenhagen. The aforementioned one-on-one structured engagement 
sessions with various professors proved to be an extraordinary platform 
to expand my knowledge of anthropological concepts as related to the 
core concept of ‘lived reality’ as well as the reception of law on the 
ground. However, it is critical to note at the outset that this thesis should 
in no way be construed as encompassing a fully-fledged anthropology 
research project.   
1.6 The aims and objectives of this doctoral thesis 
The primary focus in this thesis is to shed light on the nature and extent 
of the duties of the state (and by implication the duties of the relevant 
public officials and state institutions as representatives of the state) in 
giving effect to socio-economic rights as an expression of its 
accountability to the public.  
The underlying objective of this thesis is to ascertain the manner in which 
ubuntu, understood as an unwavering focus on communal obligations, 
could promote the accountability of public officials so as to fashion a just 
and caring nation-state. Thus, the basic premise that will be explored is 
that greater accountability on the part of public officials (in faithfully giving 
effect to the relevant constitutional provisions coupled with embracing 
the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu) will shape a just and caring 
society in which social solidarity ideals will be forged and sustained. The 
broader objective will be to advance a nuanced approach in bolstering 
the content and reach of those same constitutionally protected rights (in 
the shortest possible time) so that vulnerable groups can derive the 
maximum possible benefit from those same rights.  
This body of work aims to advocate a better understanding of political 
philosophy so as to develop a nuanced understanding of the contribution 
that ubuntu could make in a contemporary context as well as promoting 
insight about the manner in which anthropological insights (with specific 
reference to the concept of ‘lived reality’) can enhance our understanding 
of the interpretation, application and resistance to law on the ground. 
Furthermore, this thesis will seek to maintain a specific focus on 
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transforming the lived reality of vulnerable groups so as to make a 
meaningful contribution to the betterment of society. 
1.7 Summary 
This chapter sought to demonstrate the definitive link between the 
accountability of public officials in giving effect to socio-economic rights 
(as enshrined in the Constitution) and ubuntu (understood as embracing 
the primacy of communal obligations). This chapter also cast light on 
how the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights will serve to 
forge social solidarity through striving to treat all people as having equal 
worth. Furthermore, the exploration of specific aspects of political 
philosophy as well as anthropology is essential in developing definitive 
insights into ubuntu (and the application of law) in a contemporary 
context.  
Ubuntu will be analysed in Chapter 2 so as to cast aside vacuous claims 
in order to fashion an enlightened understanding of ubuntu. 
Furthermore, Chapter 2 will provide the necessary insight in negotiating 
the political landscape within which ubuntu has been deployed so as to 
grasp the manner in which the definition and nature of ubuntu is 
constantly contested and revised.  
It should be noted that Chapter 3 is divided into Part A and Part B. Part 
A of Chapter 3 is focussed on the accountability of the state to give effect 
to the progressive realisation of critical socio-economic rights. The 
relevant provisions of the Constitution, which serve to inform the 
accountability of the state, are explored. The international law 
commitments of the Republic of South Africa (with specific reference to 
the ratification of the International Covenant) are also explored. 
Furthermore, the minimum-core obligation approach, as advanced by 
Bilchitz32, is analysed at length.  
Part A will also explore the pressing need on the part of the state to give 
effect to the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights as a means 
to cast light on the nature and extent of the duties owed by the state to 
                                                             
32 Please see Section 3.5. 
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the public. Furthermore, the manner in which ubuntu can mesh with an 
individual human rights regime is highlighted.  
Chapter 3 (Part B) will focus on the socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court and the role of the Court as the guardian of 
the Constitution. Part B maintains an unwavering focus on the need for 
the Constitutional Court to provide the state with determinate content for 
key socio-economic rights so as to ensure that the state has the 
necessary guidance in meeting the critical needs of vulnerable groups. 
The role of ubuntu is explored in Part B in relation to the manner in which 
ubuntu can make a critical contribution in colouring and augmenting the 
accountability of public officials.  
Chapter 4 serves to explore the concept of social solidarity with specific 
reference to the manner in which refugees and immigrants experience 
life in Denmark. This is contrasted with the manner in which social 
solidarity is likely to find traction in South Africa and the manner in which 
ubuntu could consolidate and sustain social solidarity principles.  
Chapter 5 provides a basic exploration of key anthropology themes in 
order to demonstrate how anthropology can strengthen our 
understanding of law through shedding light on the manner in which law 
is applied/interpreted/resisted on the ground.   
Chapter 6 sets out the key findings of the thesis as well as providing a 
number of recommendations.  
There is also an Annexure (1), as prepared by a medical doctor, which 
provides illuminating insights as to the lived reality of a patient requiring 
renal dialysis.  
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CHAPTER 2: A CRITICAL EXPLORATION OF THE NATURE AND 
POTENTIAL OF UBUNTU 
2.1      Introduction 
The previous chapter sought to demonstrate the definitive link between 
the communal obligations focus of ubuntu and the accountability of 
public officials in realising constitutionally guaranteed socio-economic 
rights as a means to forge and (subsequently) sustain social solidarity 
ideals.  
This chapter will seek to describe and analyse ubuntu as well as explore 
its utilisation in present day South Africa. In this regard it is imperative to 
negotiate the political landscape within which ubuntu has been deployed 
so as to develop a nuanced understanding of what is in fact meant (and 
implied) when one speaks about ubuntu in a contemporary context. 
Furthermore, the aforementioned analysis will include detailed 
observations concerning the reception and utilisation of ubuntu in the 
relevant Constitutional Court cases so as to outline its perceived role 
(and purported usefulness) in a constitutional democracy. 
It is critical to note that ubuntu is a contested concept which is shaped 
by the dominant political discourse.33 Nonetheless, it is my contention 
that communal obligations is a core component of ubuntu and a public 
official that embraces ubuntu will be duty-bound to contribute to the 
realisation of a just and caring society. The act of ‘embracing’ ubuntu or 
being ‘imbued with ubuntu’ (as previously explained) should be 
understood as giving effect to continuous humanising acts34 which pay 
homage to the interconnectedness and interdependence of all members 
of the nation-state. Thus, a public official that has in fact embraced 
ubuntu will seek to remove hazards which imperil the lives of vulnerable 
groups (i.e. fellow members of the community/nation-state).  
                                                             
33 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Introduction. 
34 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 20.  
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It is submitted that seeking to transform the lives of vulnerable people 
through embracing ubuntu (on the part of public officials) meshes neatly 
with the aspirational and transformative goals of the Constitution as 
enshrined in the Preamble and the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.35 
However, it is prudent to consider whether the values of ubuntu can 
conflict with the values as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 36  The 
aforementioned contemplation is deemed necessary despite claims by 
a number of Constitutional Court Justices that ubuntu does indeed 
support the application of the Bill of Rights as well as colour the 
interpretation of the aforementioned document.37 In addition, it is queried 
on what basis ubuntu is viewed as being compatible with the Bill of 
Rights in its entirety in the absence of a persuasive explanation and/or 
supporting documentation.38 In this regard Himonga, Taylor and Pope 
highlight that group solidarity could well be in conflict with fairness (as a 
value) at the individual level. 39  Thus, contemporary ubuntu-inspired 
jurisprudence is viewed as providing scant indication of the manner in 
which ubuntu could influence the outcomes in difficult cases as 
compared to a situation in which ubuntu was not available as a legal 
concept.40  
Nonetheless, Himonga, Taylor and Pope advocate understanding 
ubuntu in terms of communalism which encompasses individual rights 
and autonomy so as to pave the way for recognising universal human 
rights in African cultural contexts without discarding key characteristics 
of ubuntu such as interdependence, dignity, solidarity and 
responsibility.41 The aforementioned insight aims to forge a nuanced 
understanding between the ‘communal morality’ with which ubuntu is 
imbued and ‘the legitimacy of universal individual rights’.42 Himonga, 
                                                             
35 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
36 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections on judicial reviews of ubuntu’ (2013) (16) 5 
PELJ 418 (hereafter Reflections). 
37 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 418. Please see Makwanyane 
(1995) para 224.  
38 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 418. 
39 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 418. 
40 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 418. 
41 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 420.  
42 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 420. 
15 
 
 
Taylor and Pope emphasise that for ubuntu to make a compelling 
contribution in transforming South African jurisprudence it will be 
necessary for the courts to in fact grapple with the interplay between 
communal morality and individual rights as a means to pinpoint the role 
(and possible contribution) of ubuntu in different scenarios and in so 
doing lessen the likelihood of ambiguity.43 In this regard Justice Sachs 
offers a fitting insight as follows:  
‘I believe that we should incorporate ubuntu into mainstream 
jurisprudence by harnessing it carefully, consciously, creatively, 
strategically, and with ingenuity so that age-old African social 
innovations and historical cultural experiences are aligned with 
present-day legal notions and techniques if the intention is to 
create a legitimate system of law for all South Africans’.44  
It is important to bear in mind that civil, political and socio-economic 
rights are interconnected and interdependent (as previously stated) and 
that a focus in this thesis on the realisation of critical socio-economic 
rights will provide a platform for the expression and realisation of civil 
and political rights as well. Furthermore, giving effect to the 
aforementioned body of rights (including civil and political rights) will 
promote social solidarity by virtue of the state treating all people as 
possessing equal worth.        
Ubuntu is deemed to facilitate peace and social harmony by providing 
insight as to how to give effect to sharing in a communal setting.45 Also, 
ubuntu as an ethical concept is always integral to a social bond and 
provides a moral framework for people that are compelled to live side by 
side.46  This is why the aspirational aspect of ubuntu entails striving 
                                                             
43 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 420. 
44 Sachs A ‘Towards the liberation and revitalisation of customary law’ (1999) in 
Cornell D & Muvangua N (eds) Ubuntu and the Law: African Ideals and Post-
Apartheid Jurisprudence (2012) 319. 
45 Cornell D ‘Is there a difference that makes a difference between ubuntu and dignity’ 
Woolman S & Bilchitz D (eds) in Is This Seat Taken? Conversations at the Bar, the 
Bench and the Academy about the South African Constitution (2012) 236 (hereafter 
Is there a difference). 
46 Cornell D ‘Is there a difference’ (2012) 236. 
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together to achieve the public good and a shared world. 47  The 
aforementioned reference to a ‘shared world’ should be understood as 
shaping a vision in which interconnected and interdependent members 
live side by side in a just and caring nation-state. Furthermore, Cornell 
rightfully believes that ubuntu is a transformative ethic at its core by 
virtue of it being an integral part of our social reality and this in turn 
explains its suitability to drive social solidarity in South Africa.48  
Cornell and van Marle support the view that an understanding of 
anthropology is required to grasp the potential of African philosophy and 
legal theory. 49  Consequently, any attempt to analyse ubuntu and 
deliberate on its importance as a political and ethical ideal requires an 
interdisciplinary approach to trace the outline of the debate.50 It should 
be noted that ‘tracing the outline of the debate’ refers to casting aside 
the myopic insights routinely offered up concerning ubuntu (i.e. ubuntu 
being defined as boundless forgiveness and/or limited to political 
reconciliation) so as to acknowledge and embrace the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu. Thus, an exploration of relevant themes in 
political philosophy51 and anthropology52 are critical building blocks in 
analysing and shaping the debate of what ubuntu is as well as its 
inherent potential.53 Consequently, it will be argued that ubuntu can 
indeed play a critical role in supporting the transformation of the lived 
reality of vulnerable people in South Africa.  
2.2     An expanded definition of ubuntu 
It is submitted that seeking to define ubuntu has been dogged by 
controversy. However, Praeg seeks to nurture a nuanced and critical 
understanding of ubuntu.54 This is necessary to reconfigure ubuntu so 
                                                             
47 Cornell D ‘Is there a difference’ (2012) 236. 
48 Cornell D ‘Is there a difference’ (2012) 236. 
49 Cornell D & van Marle K ‘Exploring ubuntu’ (2012) 355.  
50 Cornell D & van Marle K ‘Exploring ubuntu’ (2012) 355. 
51 As encompassed in this Chapter as well as in Chapter 4. 
52 As explored in Chapters 4 and 5. 
53 Cornell D & van Marle K ‘Exploring ubuntu’ (2012) 355. 
54 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Introduction. 
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as to shed light on the true meaning and value of ubuntu.55 However, the 
stated objective is not to exhaustively define ubuntu but rather to 
properly situate the discussion so as to highlight the pitfalls of extreme 
positions as to what ubuntu is and could be.56 Furthermore, there is a 
definitive need to strip away inaccurate and vacuous claims concerning 
ubuntu as signifying unlimited forgiveness or its usefulness viewed as 
being confined to political reconciliation.57 
Bennett believes that it is unfortunate that defining ubuntu is based on 
an assumption that it describes an abstract concept or specific 
behaviour.58 In this regard Bennett highlights that ubuntu would be better 
understood if one were to contemplate the manner and specific contexts 
in which the word ‘ubuntu’ was utilised.59 Consequently, an analysis 
proceeding along these lines would assume that one would focus on the 
manner in which ‘past and current users are constructing meanings’ as 
opposed to ‘predetermined, essentialised meanings’ of ubuntu. 60 
Bennett believes that ubuntu is at its core defined by a striving for social 
harmony.61 In addition, Justice Sachs provides insight with regards to 
the constitutional status of ubuntu as follows:  
‘… (It) has an enduring and creative character, representing the 
element of human solidarity that binds together liberty and 
equality to create an affirmative and mutually supportive triad of 
central constitutional values. It feeds pervasively into and 
enriches the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution’.62  
Thus, ubuntu is rightfully viewed as a ‘lived system of norms’.63 Ubuntu 
is ultimately concerned with inclusivity which renders it an ‘ideal 
                                                             
55 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Introduction. 
56 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Introduction. 
57 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Introduction. 
58 Bennett T ‘Ubuntu: an African equity’ (2011) 14 PELJ 31 (hereafter Ubuntu). 
59 Bennett T ‘Ubuntu’ (2011) 14 PELJ 31. 
60 Bennett T ‘Ubuntu’ (2011) 14 PELJ 31. 
61 Bennett T ‘Ubuntu’ (2011) 14 PELJ 35. 
62 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2007 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para 113.  
63 Bennett T ‘Ubuntu’ (2011) 14 PELJ 48.  
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overarching vehicle for expressing shared values’ as a means to 
facilitate the development of a vibrant plural legal culture.64  
The Final Constitution (1996) does not expressly refer to ubuntu. 65 
However, the aforementioned Constitution did recognise customary law 
subject to the provisions of the Constitution.66 In this regard the courts 
are obliged to give effect to customary law ‘when that law is applicable, 
subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with 
customary law’.67 However, ubuntu and customary law is not one and 
the same thing.68 Ubuntu is nonetheless a core component of customary 
law through informing the manner in which African communal relations 
and dispute resolution are handled.69 It is believed that the recognition 
of ubuntu and customary law is intimately linked to the transformative 
nature of the Constitution.70  
It is also believed that the casting of ubuntu as a constitutional value in 
Makwanyane renders it ‘an inherently normative notion’. 71  Thus, 
clarifications sought in defining ubuntu (in a similar fashion to other 
‘ethically-loaded constitutional concepts’ such as dignity and equality et 
al) is inextricably linked with moral questions.72 However, it is important 
to maintain an unwavering focus on devising a largely uncontested 
understanding of ubuntu as a means to undertake critical interpretive 
work (as related to the Bill of Rights) in forging a democratic society 
based on dignity, freedom and equality.73  
In Makwanyane Langa J (as he then was) highlighted the considerable 
degree to which ubuntu overlapped with other critical rights as enshrined 
                                                             
64 Keep H & Midgley R ‘The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a 
consensual South African legal culture’ in Bruinsma F & Nelken D (eds) 
Explorations in Legal Cultures (2007) (hereafter Emerging role). 
65 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 373. 
66 Section 211(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
67 Section 211(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
68 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 373. 
69 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 373. 
70 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 373. 
71 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 380. Please see Makwanyane 
(1995) para 306. 
72 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 380. 
73 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 380. 
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in the Constitution.74 In this regard he made mention of how ubuntu 
coveted life and human dignity.75 Langa J stated that ubuntu served to 
demonstrate that ‘the life of another person is at least as valuable as 
one’s own’ and that ‘respect for the dignity of every person is integral to 
this concept’.76 Furthermore, Mokgoro J held that life and dignity are ‘like 
two sides of the same coin’ and ‘the concept of ubuntu embodies them 
both’.77 Mokgoro J noted with approval that the Preamble to the ICESCR 
emphasises that ‘human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person’78 following which she stated that ‘this, in my view, is not 
different from what the spirit of ubuntu embraces’.79 Thus, ubuntu should 
be viewed as ‘a way of seeing ourselves and of articulating how we 
should behave’. 80  It is noted that the need for ubuntu might be 
scrutinised if the Constitution encompasses other concepts which give 
effect to the same values.81 This specific concern will be addressed later 
in this chapter.82 
There is a demonstrated need to explore ubuntu as a philosophical and 
ethical concept with specific reference to ‘the meaning of law, legal 
obligation and the understanding of the social bond’ so as to fashion a 
better understanding of what ubuntu is and how it can in fact promote 
accountability.83 In this regard the manner in which ubuntu is presented 
in contemporary times (so as to reflect seemingly inherent 
characteristics of both human rights and Christianity discourses) is likely 
to undermine claims of its original content and/or unique perspective.84 
There is consequently a need to exercise caution when seeking to 
advance an argument that the expression of ubuntu is adequately 
                                                             
74 Makwanyane (1995) para 225. 
75 Makwanyane (1995) para 225. 
76 Makwanyane (1995) para 225. 
77 Makwanyane (1995) para 310. 
78 Makwanyane (1995) para 308. 
79 Makwanyane (1995) para 308. 
80 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 389. 
81 Himonga, Taylor & Pope ‘Reflections’ (2013) PELJ 390. 
82 Please see Section 2.7 (re Criticisms of ubuntu).  
83 Cornell D & Muvangua N ‘Ubuntu and the law: African ideals and post-apartheid 
jurisprudence’ (2012) 1. 
84 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 53. 
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captured by a human rights regime even though there is a compelling 
argument for ubuntu to be viewed as the Spirit of Law.85  Ubuntu could 
in fact play a pivotal role in providing constructive insights and criticism 
of the constitutional democracy (and the attendant prioritisation of 
individual human rights) in South Africa.86 However, it is critical to bear 
in mind that ubuntu can in fact mesh with a human rights regime as 
previously stated.   
Mbembe views ubuntu (or human mutuality) as the underlying principle 
of the Constitution.87 Praeg disagrees with the aforementioned view as 
he believes that dignity would be typecast as the underlying principle (if 
such a Grundnorm did in fact exist) and he further believes that the ties 
between ubuntu and the Constitution are ‘infinitely more complex’.88 
Thus, the critical aim in law should not be to exhaustively define ubuntu 
but rather to ascertain how ubuntu (as an expression of our shared 
humanity) can engage with a constitutional democracy (premised on an 
individual rights regime) in a manner which will unleash the 
emancipatory potential of ubuntu.89 Praeg views ubuntu as a marker for 
our shared humanity and believes that humanism/ubuntu is best 
depicted in ‘quasi-transcendental terms’ in that humanism/ubuntu is an 
abstract concept that cannot be comprehensively defined.90 However, it 
is plausible to utilise that same concept to create a better world despite 
the recognition that the utilisation of the aforementioned concept will 
inevitably remain incomplete.91  
I am in firm agreement with Praeg as to exploring the manner in which 
ubuntu can in fact mesh with (as well as enrich) an individual rights 
regime in South Africa. Furthermore, there is a need to guard against 
                                                             
85 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 54.   
86 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 54.  
87 Mbembe A ‘Democracy as a community of life’ (The Johannesburg Salon 4), 
http://www.jwtc.org.za/volume_4/achille_mbembe.htm, accessed 1 August 2016. 
88 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 75.  
89 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 136. 
90 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 189. 
91 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 189.  
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seeking to exhaustively define ubuntu prior to utilising it to advance and 
colour the realisation of key socio-economic rights. 
 2.3    Tracing the history of ubuntu up to and including its application in 
a contemporary context 
Ubuntu is said to be covered in a ‘kaross of mystery’ 92 as it is not 
possible to ‘trace the exact denotation of the word in its vernacular 
origins’.93 Nonetheless, it seems to have first appeared in ‘nation-wide 
public discourse’ in South Africa during the 1920s when it was utilised 
by the Zulu cultural movement, Inkatha, to nurture respect for traditional 
Zulu values.94  
It is necessary to trace the history of ubuntu (since its inclusion in the 
post-amble of the Interim Constitution 95 ) and how its meaning and 
significance as a value/philosophy have been fiercely debated ever 
since.96 This includes the manner in which ubuntu has provided gloss to 
seasoned legal arguments and how it has on occasion been utilised to 
prioritise socio-economic rights over individual property rights.97  
It is a sobering assessment of the contemporary state of affairs that 
ubuntu and African humanism continue to exist on a normative plane in 
that it represents an idealistic view rather than the lived reality of ordinary 
people as governed by the (as yet untransformed) state. 98  It is fair 
comment that African humanism will be derided as ‘a meaningless 
intellectual pastime’ if it is not set to work to transform the actual lives of 
ordinary Africans and in so doing shatter the shackles of poverty and 
other insidious forms of oppression.99 Coertze sheds light on the ‘original 
concept of ubuntu/botho’ and seeks to demonstrate the two subsequent 
                                                             
92 Bennett T ‘Ubuntu’ (2011) 14 PELJ 31. 
93 Bennett T ‘Ubuntu’ (2011) 14 PELJ 31. 
94 Bennett T ‘Ubuntu’ (2011) 14 PELJ 31. 
95 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
96 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 245. 
97 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 245.  
98 Biney A ‘The historical discourse on African humanism: interrogating the 
paradoxes’ in Praeg L & Magadla S (eds) Ubuntu: Curating the Archive (2014) 42 
(hereafter The historical discourse on African humanism).  
99 Biney A ‘The historical discourse on African humanism’ (2014) 42.  
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semantic shifts that fashioned the contemporary understanding of 
ubuntu.100 Ubuntu/botho, in its original form, is viewed as follows:   
• Comprised of both positive and negative qualities in describing 
humanity;101   
• The logic of interdependence, which is rendered visible in practice 
through kinship-based activities, facilitates the reciprocal 
performance of obligations and duties in a perpetual fashion 
within the extended family through a ‘process of enculturation’;102 
and  
• The presence of a measure of constitutive violence is inevitable 
(in all communitarian philosophies) due to the unavoidable 
tension between solidarity and coercion.103   
Furthermore, the research conducted by Coertze has provided a telling 
insight as follows:   
‘There are no proverbs or sayings … in which either ubuntu or 
botho were explained or praised as abstract concepts (but the) 
observance of the abstract qualities of kindness, goodwill and 
high moral standards … were all extolled in concrete situations 
between relatives, friends or persons having common interests or 
speaking the same language’.104  
Praeg believes that this did not imply that there was no ‘abstract 
recognition of our interdependence’ but rather that the tug and pull of 
social interaction was defined by ritual acts of conduct that exemplified 
and resonated with ubuntu.105 Praeg further believes that a broader 
                                                             
100 Coertze RD ‘Ubuntu and nation building in South Africa’ (2001) South African 
Journal of Ethnology 24(4) 113 (hereafter Ubuntu and nation building). 
101 Coertze RD ‘Ubuntu and nation building’ (2001) South African Journal of 
Ethnology 24(4) 113. 
102 Coertze RD ‘Ubuntu and nation building’ (2001) South African Journal of 
Ethnology 24(4) 114.  
103 Coertze RD ‘Ubuntu and nation building’ (2001) South African Journal of 
Ethnology 24(4) 114. 
104 Coertze RD ‘Ubuntu and nation building’ (2001) South African Journal of 
Ethnology 24(4) 115. 
105 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 51.  
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understanding and/or utilisation of ubuntu, so as to go beyond the 
confines of values, expressed in the performance of culturally specific 
acts in a culturally specific environment, came about at a later stage.106 
In this regard the cultural political economy of obligation was severely 
affected by socio-economic changes in South Africa as brought about by 
colonialism and the related twin offerings of industrialisation and 
urbanisation.107Thus, colonialism and urbanisation brought about the 
decimation of a ‘coherent ubuntu praxis’ rather than the cessation of 
ubuntu outside of rural areas in South Africa.108 
Urbanisation and colonialism are consequently viewed as responsible 
for the expansion of traditional ubuntu praxis ‘so that it no longer referred 
to local, kinship-based and visible communities of metaphysical locality, 
but rather to larger, imagined communities of political practice’.109 Thus, 
Coertze believes that the reciprocal nature of ubuntu was (out of 
necessity) broadened to incorporate people working side by side or 
those that lived in the same neighbourhood.110 This was subsequently 
(and inevitably) extended to include all of humanity which represented a 
critical shift in the formulation of ubuntu as an abstract concept. 111  
Consequently, ubuntu was no longer confined to members of a specific 
society giving effect to their reciprocal duties under the guise of a formal 
community of members.112  In time, the definition of ubuntu became 
meshed with individual human rights as well as Christianity discourses 
so as to be understood by people (from all walks of life) who shared a 
common purpose as evidenced by membership of political communities 
(which could include a united nation-state) in celebrating their shared 
humanity.113 
                                                             
106 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 51. 
107 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 51. 
108 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 51. 
109 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 52. 
110 Coertze RD ‘Ubuntu and nation building’ South African Journal of Ethnology 24(4) 
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Himonga believes that the legal theory of ubuntu, as advanced by 
Metz,114 serves to provide an overview of ubuntu understood as ‘as an 
African-inspired and dignity-based moral principle’.115 This flowed from 
Metz’s analysis of Makwanyane116 in which Metz highlighted that the 
three principles of ubuntu are rightdoing, wrongdoing and dignity.117 The 
rightdoing principle consists of two elements in ‘shared ends’ and 
‘solidarity’ and is conceived as the desire to ‘live harmoniously or to 
honour communal relationships’.118 The wrongdoing principle seeks to 
deter/prohibit actions which bring about excessive friction/discord in 
relationships unless it is a response to a foreseeable/actual act of 
discord by another person.119 The third principle seeks to clarify the 
concept of human dignity in detailing that an act is wrong if it 
lessens/undermines the human dignity of the actor as it will reduce the 
ability of that same actor to engage in harmonious relationships.120  
Himonga provides persuasive insights as to the flawed reasoning 
employed by Metz in that Metz advances a radical view of 
communitarianism rather than a moderate view of communitarianism 
(with the latter form recognising individual identity/rights alongside 
communal obligations). 121  A further flaw in Metz’s theory is that 
personhood is seemingly a relative term with one person being capable 
of being more of a person than another.122  The final flaw highlighted by 
Himonga is that she questions why Metz did not canvass the spiritual 
                                                             
114 Metz T ‘Human dignity, capital punishment, and an African moral theory: Toward a 
new philosophy of human rights’ Journal of Human Rights (2010) 81-99 (hereafter 
An African moral theory’).  
115  Himonga C ‘Exploring the concept of ubuntu in the South African legal system’ 
(2011) U Kischel et al Ideologie und Weltanschauung im Recht 16 (hereafter 
Exploring the concept of ubuntu). 
116 Makwanyane (1995). 
117 Metz T ‘An African moral theory’ Journal of Human Rights (2010) 84. 
118 Metz T ‘An African moral theory’ Journal of Human Rights (2010) 84. 
119 Metz T ‘An African moral theory’ Journal of Human Rights (2010) 92.  
120 Metz T ‘An African moral theory’ Journal of Human Rights (2010) 94.  
121 Himonga C ‘Exploring the concept of ubuntu’ (2011) U Kischel et al Ideologie und 
Weltanschauung im Recht 19. 
122 Himonga C ‘Exploring the concept of ubuntu’ (2011) U Kischel et al Ideologie und 
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component of ubuntu in his theory.123 Nonetheless, Himonga advances 
a compelling argument (based on the theory of Metz) that ‘it is un-ubuntu 
for people to live in extreme poverty, and that the state and citizens 
endowed with resources must, therefore, protect vulnerable people from 
this condition against material want’.124   
Menkiti provides additional insight regarding the unique (traditional) 
African world view of humanity as exhibiting three key features which 
require careful contemplation:  
‘the communal group as a rule trumps the lived reality and/or 
aspirations of the individual; the living-dead125 forms an integral 
part of the moral community and the concept of “processual 
personhood” in which full personhood is something which is 
realised after the performance of various acts over an extended 
period of time’.126  
However, it is rightfully contended that processual personhood needs to 
be reimagined so as to reflect that a ‘person with ubuntu’ (as a 
consequence of his/her ritualised transformation through honouring his 
obligations towards other people) is at the very least a rights-bearing 
individual whose full personhood is accepted without question. 127 
Furthermore, it is of critical importance that the concept of auto-violation, 
in which the image of pre-colonial Africa has been recast so as to 
obliterate any traces of individualism and stratification and sustain the 
distorted view of precolonial African societies as comprised of nothing 
but communalism, should be acknowledged.128  Thus, the role of ubuntu 
is not to decimate every trace of individualism but rather to ensure that 
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the individualism which takes hold in a postcolonial African society is not 
constructed in a manner which endangers the legitimate needs of 
vulnerable groups.129  This is in keeping with the belief (as advanced in 
this thesis) that ubuntu, understood as an unerring focus on communal 
obligations, can indeed mesh with a human rights regime in South Africa.  
Consequently, the abovementioned perspectives regarding ubuntu 
serve to illustrate the critical role it can play in forging social solidarity in 
a nation-state in which all people are treated with equal respect. This 
can in part be achieved by prioritising the realisation of the socio-
economic rights of vulnerable people facing threats to their survival at 
the expense of people (that do not face a similar threat to their survival) 
but are willing to make the necessary sacrifices if so required.130 The 
aforementioned sacrifices could include the postponement or 
scuppering of life projects in an environment of supposed moderate 
scarcity.131 
2.4     The political environment in which ‘Ubuntu’ is deployed 
It should be noted that the distinction between ‘ubuntu’ as a living praxis 
and ‘Ubuntu’ as an abstract philosophy will only be utilised in this specific 
section (i.e. Section 2.4) of the thesis so as to explore the political 
landscape as outlined by Praeg.132 In this regard it is submitted that it is 
necessary for public officials to develop an intimate understanding of the 
political landscape (in which Ubuntu is deployed) so as to ensure an 
awareness of the manner in which key concepts are contested and 
revised in the dominant public discourse. It follows that Ubuntu is not 
deployed in a legal vacuum and public officials need to demonstrate a 
clear understanding of the manner in which Ubuntu can strengthen and 
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colour our constitutional democracy through giving effect to key 
constitutional rights. 
Praeg believes that urgent conceptual work is required in defining and 
shaping the contribution that Ubuntu could make in the political and 
philosophical spheres.133 This is necessary in order to contemplate the 
possibility of a present-day political life which is in fact predicated upon 
the founding promise of a shared humanity. 134   Thus, one must 
acknowledge and explore the role of politics and power relations in 
shaping the meaning of Ubuntu in its present day setting.135 I am in 
agreement with Praeg that ‘the problem was never with Ubuntu, but with 
the politics of Ubuntu’.136  Thus, Praeg believes that it is indeed possible 
(and I would submit essential) to reposition/reconfigure Ubuntu in a form 
of critical humanism that would ‘always remain irreducible to the politics 
of the day’. 137  
It is contended that the reduction of Ubuntu to a piecemeal concept of 
the apolitical (and at times the anti-political) points to a motive that is 
either naive or of a sinister turn.138  Furthermore, it is lamentable that the 
underlying assumption of the postcolonial Ubuntu discourse, namely that 
it is a ‘unique philosophy and a sign of African authenticity’, has not been 
recognised.139 This purported naivety can be overcome by being mindful 
of the fact that every discussion about Ubuntu is concerned with relations 
of power so as to secure the recognition of ‘blackness, black values, 
traditions and concepts’ as having ‘equal value to the people for whom 
they matter’.140  
                                                             
133 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 155. 
134 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Preface. 
135 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Preface. Please see Cornell D ‘Exploring 
ubuntu-tentative reflections’ available at www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281, 
(accessed 17 June 2016). 
136 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Preface. 
137 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Preface. Please see Molefe M ‘A Report on 
Ubuntu’ 2 Acta Academica (2014) 160. 
138 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 14. 
139 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 14. Please see Bohler-Mϋller N ‘Ubuntu 
jurisprudence’ (2012) 370. 
140 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 14. Please see Molefe M ‘A Report on Ubuntu’ 2 
Acta Academica (2014) 160. 
28 
 
 
It is of critical importance to embrace the fact that to mention that 
‘Africans have Ubuntu’ is to acknowledge the inalienable right of Africans 
to not be consigned to the periphery but in fact to be an integral part of 
the conversation.141 It is indeed an inescapable conclusion that to speak 
about Ubuntu is a political act which aims to question power relations 
and representation.142  Thus, it is of the utmost importance to recognise 
the link between Ubuntu as a political act and how its content is 
constantly shaped by context.143 Consequently, Ubuntu was viewed in 
the not too distant past (i.e. during the apartheid era) as being without 
value but it has been embraced in present times as depicting our shared 
humanity.144 It is necessary for Ubuntu to be acknowledged as a political 
choice as it has elements of (benevolent) coercion which is the flip side 
of the well-known characteristics of Ubuntu (e.g. seemingly unlimited 
forgiveness as well as embracing reconciliation regardless of the cost) 
which normally takes pride of place in conventional Ubuntu discourse.145   
Furthermore, the ‘sharing of resources’ has been quarantined from the 
ordinary meaning assigned to Ubuntu by politicians in terms of which 
those same politicians view Ubuntu as only constituted by the ‘sharing 
of obligations’.146 This serves to highlight the lack of political will on the 
part of politicians to assume ultimate responsibility for the plight of 
vulnerable groups by preferring a specific (and distorted) understanding 
of the ‘sharing of obligations’. It is submitted that a nuanced 
understanding of the ‘sharing of obligations’ would in fact include ‘an 
appropriate sharing of resources’ so as to give effect to an Ubuntu-
inspired vision of a just and caring nation-state. It is further submitted 
that the aforementioned nuanced understanding of the ‘sharing of 
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obligations’ would ensure the prioritisation of state spending in order to 
give effect to critical socio-economic rights so as to ease the plight of 
vulnerable groups.   
Praeg identifies ‘benevolent coercion, indoctrination and inculcation’ as 
indicative of the constitutive violence that is an integral component of 
Ubuntu.147  Thus, there is a need to acknowledge the tension between 
Ubuntu theorists who seek to disregard the aforementioned constitutive 
violence aspect of Ubuntu as compared to African politicians who exploit 
that very aspect of Ubuntu to instil and promote discipline and/or forge 
coherent political formations.148 Praeg believes that the anti-apartheid 
struggle was fashioned on a political praxis which was imbued with this 
same constitutive violence. 149 Consequently, Ubuntu should be 
embraced in its entirety by accepting both the extraordinary humanism 
and ‘the often brutal nature of the technologies of discipline required for 
its manifestation’.150 Thus, the aforementioned technologies of discipline 
are an integral component of modifying/shaping the behaviour of an 
individual so as to be viewed ‘as being human, having ubuntu’.151  
Praeg prefers to cast Ubuntu as critical humanism and seeks to 
emphasise that the word ‘critical’ refers to the dominant nature of the 
political in any given discussion.152 His views of critical humanism is 
different to that of mainstream Western humanism as his primary focus 
is not the human being as such but rather a clear focus on the workings 
of power that resulted in the exclusion of specific people from being 
viewed as human in the first place.153 In this regard Ramose has stated 
that ‘Africans are an injured and conquered people’ and that this served 
as ‘the pre-eminent starting-point of African philosophy in its proper and 
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fundamental signification’.154 Consequently, any attempt to delve into 
African philosophy or in any way explore Ubuntu is in fact a political 
question.155 Thus, the critical importance of being ever mindful of the 
political dimension of Ubuntu is emphasised as a means to fashion a 
rational and logical framework in exploring and understanding the 
discourse on Ubuntu.156 
It is of pivotal importance to embrace the view that critical humanism is 
a mode of critique rather than an ideology.157  Consequently, Praeg 
seeks to emphasise the lack of an ‘ism’ (or ideology) when referring to 
(critical) humanism as it is indeed more adequately defined in terms of 
continuous humanising acts. 158  Thus, one should dismiss ‘the 
seductions of identity politics’ and highlight that ‘what is unique about 
Ubuntu is not any epistemological, ontological or even axiological 
specificity, but simply the fact of its being an actualised communitarian 
praxis of the humanising’.159 This is a critical insight offered by Praeg as 
it serves to bolster my assertion that at the core of ubuntu (as a living 
praxis) is an unwavering devotion to give effect to communal obligations 
which is tantamount to giving effect to constant humanising acts. The 
specific focus on communal obligations (in this thesis) provides for a 
powerful synergy with the human rights regime in South Africa (as 
enshrined in the Constitution) in embracing the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of people living side by side as well as the manner in 
which civil, political and socio-economic rights manifest as both 
interconnected and interdependent. 
Cornell believes that for Ubuntu to be properly considered is to contest 
the racist standpoint that Ubuntu, as an African belief, cannot make a 
meaningful contribution to a more nuanced understanding of morality 
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and law by virtue of its inherent vagueness and a plethora of ill-defined 
descriptions.160  Furthermore, there is a need to avoid Ubuntu being 
utilised to enforce pervasive inequalities that are present in our 
society.161 Thus, Praeg rightfully contemplates whether we might be 
better served by shelving all talk of Ubuntu (and associated notions of 
social solidarity) until such time as the necessary political and economic 
changes have been ushered in so as to fashion a society in time in which 
talk of Ubuntu is synonymous with a proper distribution of resources.162 
The transformation of praxes into abstract forms has resulted in Praeg 
coining the phrase ‘the logic of interdependence’ to ensure that engaged 
scholars remain vigilant of the politics that are ever-present when praxis 
(i.e. ubuntu) is transformed into an abstract form (i.e. Ubuntu).163 Thus, 
the logic of interdependence serves to cast light on ubuntu as praxis.164 
The ongoing disagreement about Ubuntu is premised on a crucial 
mistake on the part of theorists who fail to draw a distinction between 
ubuntu as praxis (as evidenced by a political economy of obligation in 
which ubuntu praxis is immersed) and the abstract articulation of Ubuntu 
(which is an expression of the aforementioned praxis but shorn of 
context).165 To be described as one ‘who has ubuntu’ is clear recognition 
that you have embraced the logic of interdependence and that you have 
‘lived as belonging’ which is characterised ‘in praxis or in the act of living 
the reality and actuality of that interdependence’. 166  Thus, Praeg 
believes that giving effect to the logic of interdependence is in turn 
premised on embracing a set of values.167   
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In addition, it is necessary to trace the manner in which political 
considerations have shaped the present day meaning and 
understanding of Ubuntu.168  Consequently, the manner in which ubuntu 
has been cleaved from a specific cultural praxis (and subsequently 
reshaped so as to allow Ubuntu to be portrayed as being culturally 
significant for each and every one) should be acknowledged.169 The 
critical implication being that Ubuntu theorists (assembled as a 
collective) can claim that Ubuntu can serve to forge unity on a scale that 
far exceeds the original territory which was shaped by the initial reach of 
the political economy of obligation. 170  It is submitted that this all-
encompassing community/nation-state (with its attendant communal 
obligations) is in fact a central premise of my thesis. Consequently, the 
aforementioned beliefs (as proffered by Praeg) are shaped by two 
assumptions: Ubuntu can be fashioned by distilling the values with which 
ubuntu praxis is imbued and that Ubuntu so forged is distinctive enough 
to be instantly recognisable as African yet general enough to be 
embraced by all in a manner in which its reach extends beyond its 
originating values.171  
It should be noted that ubuntu as praxis is more focussed on sharing 
humanity rather than seeking to dissect the innermost meaning of 
sharing.172 This in turn casts light on the lack of awareness in terms of 
which the present day South African government has structured thinking 
‘between the priority of political freedom (first transition) and the 
realisation of material conditions for the meaningful exercise of that 
freedom (second transition)’.173 
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The view of Ubuntu as espousing forgiveness that knows no boundaries 
would decimate the actual content of Ubuntu as it is submitted that ‘the 
inhumane and the unforgivable are necessary limits that make 
humanism and forgiveness possible’.174 This aforementioned view is 
further advanced by emphasising that the existence of an outer limit for 
forgiveness implies the presence of violence (at those outer limits) in the 
form of policing, benevolent control and coercion.175 This outer limit also 
serves to make it possible to forge a community and fashion a sense of 
belonging (with clearly defined limits).176 In addition, one should firmly 
reject the sentimentalising of Ubuntu so as to ensure that Ubuntu can be 
utilised to demonstrate what is humane and in effect define the outer 
limits of what can be defined as humane.177 The previous discussion with 
regards to accessing and maintaining membership of a community will 
be explored in due course from an anthropological perspective. 178 
Consequently, the aforementioned community contemplates the point of 
no return/the outer limit of belonging as related to an errant member in 
continuing to be regarded as a member of that community.179  
It is submitted that ubuntu (as a living praxis) can play a pivotal role in 
the promotion of accountability amongst public officials and state 
institutions (as well as give effect to social solidarity). However, it is 
critical to understand the political landscape within which ‘ubuntu’ or 
‘Ubuntu’ is deployed so as to ensure that diligent and committed public 
officials can interrogate as well as shape contemporary public discourse. 
This will ensure that those same public officials can harness the full 
potential of the interplay between ‘ubuntu’ and ‘Ubuntu’ in colouring 
overarching political accountability as well as informing sustainable 
social solidarity ideals.  
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2.5      An exploration of the attributes of communitarianism as 
encompassed by ubuntu 
It is of paramount importance to critically explore communitarianism so 
as to ensure that ubuntu (which incorporates communitarian ideals) is 
neither diluted nor shackled by distorted and one-dimensional ‘insights’ 
(as detailed below) of the meaning and potential of communitarianism.  
It is important to recognise that a standing criticism of ubuntu (styled as 
African Communitarianism) by liberals is that of the inherent violence or 
coercion in all forms of communitarianism.180 Praeg argues for the need 
to carefully frame the aforementioned concept of violence as there is a 
need to address the myopic debate between the assumed stark 
differences between liberalism and communitarianism.181 In this regard 
there is a failure (as a rule) to admit the links between individuals in 
liberal circles by virtue of a clearly defined tradition/history and the 
inevitable community associated with it.182 
The communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu has been emphasised in this 
thesis but this does not imply the shunning of individualism. It is 
submitted that ubuntu so defined can in fact mesh with a human rights 
regime as enshrined in the Constitution. This is in keeping with the 
sentiments of Nkrumah who stated that:  
‘…what socialist thought in Africa must recapture is not the 
structure of the “traditional African society” but its spirit, for the 
spirit of communalism is crystallised in its humanism and in its 
reconciliation of individual advancement with group welfare’.183  
The aforementioned insight by Nkrumah is of critical importance in 
highlighting the manner in which an individual human rights regime (such 
as enshrined in the Constitution) can indeed mesh with the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu. Furthermore, the illuminating insight offered 
by Nkrumah resonates with my belief in the manner in which the 
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utilisation of ubuntu (in a contemporary context) can make a compelling 
contribution in safeguarding and advancing the key needs of vulnerable 
groups whilst providing a platform for individuals to live lives of purpose.   
It is believed that the unequal power relations between the West and 
postcolonial African societies will inevitably lead to ubuntu being 
positioned as a form of African humanism and/or as African 
communitarianism.184 Thus, it is of the utmost importance to avoid the 
trap of being seduced by the simplistic notion of African 
communitarianism versus Western individualism in which ubuntu could 
serve as the embodiment of communitarianism and/or the need to 
augment the individualistic narrative.185 It should be noted that what is in 
fact required is embracing the manner in which ubuntu could in fact 
strengthen and deepen our understanding of both communitarian and 
individualistic approaches by shedding light on the ‘interplay between 
rights and obligations’ as experienced by individuals in contemporary 
society.186 It is (correctly) asserted that the perceived contribution that 
ubuntu could make in contemporary times is shaped by the central idea 
that ‘the membership of imagined communities entails duties and 
obligations’.187  
Ubuntu offers one the vantage point in which the community (in its most 
basic form) cannot be viewed as ‘one on one correspondence between 
rights and duty, because I am not at all a person without this 
community’.188 Thus, one should proceed with caution when labelling 
ubuntu as an expression of communitarianism as it gives rise to a 
specific understanding of the constitutive violence of ubuntu. 189  
However, it is important to bear in mind that constitutive violence is an 
integral part of ubuntu and this serves to highlight the manner in which 
the persistent ‘sentimentalising of ubuntu’ has robbed it of specific 
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content and emancipatory potential. 190  In addition, it is important to 
define what is humane (in terms of an outer limit as previously 
discussed) as the constitutive violence can then be embraced as a 
political choice where the protection of individual rights does not prove 
adequate in addressing a demonstrated need.191  
There are indeed pitfalls in adopting an approach where ubuntu is 
routinely utilised as a social standard to espouse communitarian ideals 
at the expense of individual rights.192 This is viewed as contradictory and 
suggestive of a normative consensus that is difficult to demonstrate in a 
country (such as South Africa) which has strong pluralistic tendencies.193 
However, it is necessary to emphasise that ubuntu could play a critical 
role in giving effect to the rights and aspirational ideals enshrined in the 
Constitution. Nonetheless, individualism is favoured in the present day 
constitutional democracy in South Africa (as compared to altruism) and 
this is deemed to be in large part due to the effects of colonialism.194 
Thus, all customs and practices that resonate with altruistic notions are 
cast to the periphery as a rule.195  However, it is submitted that an 
enlightened understanding of ubuntu is critical in shaping bold and 
innovative jurisprudence. This in turn will promote a cohesive national 
identity by prioritising the realisation of the rights of vulnerable groups as 
a means of giving expression to critical altruistic notions whilst 
safeguarding key individual rights. 
2.6      An analysis of case law pertaining to key aspects of ubuntu 
Only specific aspects of pertinent cases will be analysed in order to 
maintain a clear focus on the key aspects of ubuntu as advanced in this 
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thesis. It is submitted that the status of ubuntu was unclear at the advent 
of the constitutional dispensation in South Africa as the Interim 
Constitution 196  provided for ubuntu in the specific context of the 
formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission whilst the Final 
Constitution made no reference to ubuntu.197 Thus, there was a lack of 
clarity as to whether the remit of ubuntu extended beyond issues of 
political reconciliation as detailed in the Interim Constitution.198   
The Court reached a unanimous verdict in Makwanyane as to the 
unconstitutionality of the death sentence in that it was deemed to be at 
odds with the core values of ubuntu.199 Furman noted that even though 
a number of the presiding judges specifically mentioned ubuntu this did 
not detract from the fact that it was only one of a multitude of cogent 
reasons advanced for the prohibition against the continued utilisation of 
the death penalty. 200  Furman believes that the Constitutional Court 
‘could have and would have’ reached the same decision without utilising 
ubuntu.201 The commentary by Van der Walt (that talk of ubuntu was 
merely obiter dicta) is worth considering (at the very least) as he believes 
that the Constitutional Court (with specific reference to the judgment 
delivered by Chaskalson P) was struck by the disproportionate nature of 
the death penalty as a fitting form of punishment when an alternative (as 
well as effective) penalty, in the form of life imprisonment, could be 
instituted.202  
Chaskalson P utilises ubuntu to counter retribution with the latter concept 
counting only as one of the elements considered in determining the 
proportionality test.203 Furthermore, Chaskalson P refers to the adoption 
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of the Constitution in building a secure future for all South Africans and 
refers to the envisaged role for ubuntu as follows:  
‘Although this commitment has its primary application in the field 
of political reconciliation, it is not without relevance to the enquiry 
we are called upon to undertake in the present case. To be 
consistent with the value of ubuntu ours should be a society that 
‘wishes to prevent crime… [not] to get even with them’.204  
Thus, Furman rightfully believes that the utilisation and deployment of 
ubuntu was not at the core of the reasoning employed by the 
Constitutional Court in reaching its decision in the aforementioned 
case.205 
In AZAPO and Others v The President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others (‘AZAPO’) the constitutionality of section 20(7) of the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 was 
challenged. 206  The aforementioned Act established the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and section 20(7) of that same Act 
authorised a conditional grant of amnesty to an applicant that had made 
a full disclosure of any act undertaken in the apartheid era to further a 
political aim.207 The applicants contended that section 27 prevented the 
right to a fair trial as guaranteed by section 22 of the Interim 
Constitution. 208  The AZAPO case was of critical importance as the 
Constitutional Court held that the epilogue (in which ubuntu had been 
included) had a status equal to all other parts/constitutional provisions in 
the Interim Constitution.209  
The temporary suspension of the individual right to justice in the AZAPO 
case was predicated on a belief that only an absolute assurance of 
amnesty would facilitate a process that would recognise the agony of 
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past suffering whilst providing the victims of apartheid the ‘collective 
recognition of a new nation’.210 Thus, Praeg explores the manner in 
which the temporary suspension of an individual right (to justice) was 
required to forge the collective identity of ‘We’ as a means to secure the 
future enjoyment of individual rights.211 Praeg draws attention to the 
manner in which the suspension of the aforementioned individual right is 
counterbalanced by the need to advance a collective ideal. 212  The 
aforementioned insight offered by Praeg serves to highlight the manner 
in which ubuntu could be utilised to ensure that the key needs of the 
vulnerable groups are not cast to the periphery and in time shape 
opportunities for members of those vulnerable groups to live lives of 
purpose. It is submitted that providing for the basic needs of vulnerable 
groups (as well as facilitating life-changing opportunities for individuals 
at the same time) will forge social solidarity in the time to come. 
In conclusion, Cornell and Muvangua offer a critical insight in 
emphasising the need to ‘re-cognise ubuntu (due to it not being 
mentioned in the [Final] Constitution of South Africa) as a grounding 
ideal and justiciable principle in light of the fact that it remained the 
pivotal value of the majority of the people and its continued use at all 
levels of the judiciary’.213 The aforementioned observation by Cornell 
and Muvangua is extremely important as it serves to highlight how the 
utilisation of ubuntu in our constitutional democracy will promote 
inclusivity in that the majority of people are more likely to make sense of 
(as well as engage with) an individual rights regime that does not shun 
communal obligations. 
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2.7     Criticisms of ubuntu as an ideal and/or a value 
2.7.1   Introduction 
Ubuntu is deemed by critics to be too vague to serve any useful 
purpose.214 However, Bennett unequivocally refutes this as he believes 
that ubuntu, as a metanorm, is out of necessity generalised in nature.215 
Bennett believes that ubuntu could be viewed as a value or as a 
‘representation of the right way of living’.216  
A thought-provoking criticism of ubuntu is the manner in which the 
judiciary has utilised ubuntu to portray culture as homogenous and 
served to silence opinions and stifle debate.217 In addition, Cornell has 
stated that commonplace criticisms of ubuntu include that ubuntu is a 
communal ethic which undermines individual autonomy by stressing the 
importance of duties owed to the group.218 Also, ubuntu is viewed as 
conservative due to supposedly supporting patriarchal and authoritarian 
agendas.219  Cornell engages with the abovementioned criticisms by 
highlighting that those same criticisms reflect a critical lack of insight as 
ubuntu cannot be reduced to ‘an ethical ontology of a shared world’ as 
ubuntu requires the active participation of all individuals to realise the 
ethical demand to bring about a humane world.220 Thus, she views the 
abovementioned criticisms as failing to accept the ‘aspirational and ideal 
edge’ of ubuntu. 221  
                                                             
214 Please see Kroeze IJ ‘Doing things with values: the case of ubuntu’ 2 (2002) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 252(hereafter Doing things with values). Please also 
see Keevy I ‘Ubuntu Versus the Core Values of the South African Constitution’ in 
Praeg L & Magadla S (eds) Ubuntu: Curating the Archive (2014) (hereafter Ubuntu 
versus the core values). 
215 Bennett T ‘Ubuntu’ (2011) 14 PELJ 46. 
216 Bennett T ‘Ubuntu’ (2011) 14 PELJ 46. 
217 Cornell D ‘Exploring ubuntu-tentative reflections’ available at 
www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
218 Cornell D ‘Exploring ubuntu-tentative reflections’ available at 
www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
219 Cornell D ‘Exploring ubuntu-tentative reflections’ available at 
www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
220 Cornell D ‘Exploring ubuntu-tentative reflections’ available at 
www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
 221 Cornell D ‘Exploring ubuntu-tentative reflections’ available at 
www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
41 
 
 
I am in firm agreement with the abovementioned views of Cornell as the 
discussion to follow readily demonstrates that general criticisms of 
ubuntu are as a rule one-dimensional and can be easily picked apart. 
That is, if the starting point is one of showcasing the manner in which 
ubuntu (defined in a contemporary context as promoting the primacy of 
communal obligations) is in fact capable of meshing with an individual 
human rights regime.   
 2.7.2 The purported lack of definition, inherent vagueness and vacuous 
nature of ubuntu 
Praeg explores the concept of ‘ubuntu exceptionalism’ by referring to the 
manner in which an ill-conceived idea has taken hold regarding the near 
magical qualities of ubuntu and how it is defined by a humanism that 
knows no bounds. 222  Thus, Praeg laments the fact that a flawed 
discourse about the nature of ubuntu has sullied the endearing message 
of ubuntu in celebrating our shared humanity.223 In a related manner, he 
offers harsh criticism of present day racism couched as a legal demand 
for a detailed definition of ubuntu prior to it being utilised in law.224  It is 
my firm contention that a complete definition of ubuntu is not required 
prior to its utilisation. However, it is necessary to strip away vacuous 
claims while promoting accurate, uncontested insights as related to 
ubuntu (i.e. the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu as well as the 
ever-present constitutive violence so as to develop a nuanced 
understanding of ubuntu.) 
Cornell notes that sceptics of ubuntu had viewed it ‘as an empty signifier 
that has been cynically deployed by its proponents to promote and thus 
capture young black South Africans in the commercialism and 
consumerism of advanced global capitalism’. 225  Cornell rightfully 
questions the accuracy of the aforementioned criticism as ubuntu is used 
                                                             
222 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 217. 
223 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 220. 
224 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 239. 
225 Cornell D ‘Exploring ubuntu-tentative reflections’ available at 
www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
42 
 
 
widely in South Africa and at the very least has ‘political and ethical 
potency’ as previously detailed.226 Ultimately, Cornell states that her 
tentative investigations have highlighted the central role that ubuntu 
plays in shaping ethics and politics through serving as the focal point of 
reference in how those interviewed thought of themselves and their 
perceived obligations to the new South Africa.227  
The sustained criticism of ubuntu in that ‘we cannot invoke what we 
cannot define’ is noted and will be comprehensively addressed in the 
text to follow. 228  In this regard Derrida highlights the concept of 
‘transcendental violence’ which is depicted as the inevitable violence 
visited upon the particularity of a concept (in this case ubuntu) as a 
means to engage in conversation/debate about that specific concept.229 
Furthermore, ‘epistemological genocide’ is deemed to be exerted upon 
all African concepts when interpreted through Western philosophies.230 
Also, the concept of ‘extrapolated approximation’ is explored in which 
ubuntu is equated to another concept and/or viewed as an expression of 
another concept which in no way defines ubuntu itself and instead feeds 
into the sustained criticism that ubuntu is not capable of being defined.231  
Bennett refers to the positioning of ubuntu as a loanword (in the English 
language) which is aptly described as being ‘highly susceptible to 
change, not only because it is novel, but also because it is isolated. Its 
links with the language from which it was borrowed are broken, and it 
has no semantic connections with other words in the language into which 
it has been absorbed’.232 Thus, the loanword would need to find a way 
to stake its claim (for want of a better turn of phrase) alongside 
established legal terms.233 Furthermore, Bennett raises the concern that 
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such a loanword would inevitably ‘be exploited by a range of new users 
to serve ends of their own’.234  
However, Himonga, Taylor and Pope believe that ubuntu (as a concept) 
is not negatively affected by virtue of being debated/explored in a foreign 
language.235 The aforementioned authors offer a compelling insight in 
highlighting that if ubuntu is to drive transformation (in South Africa) then 
it must be capable of being discussed and understood in what could be 
viewed as ‘foreign languages’ (i.e. English and Afrikaans). 236 
Nonetheless, Bennett offers an interesting insight by cautioning against 
seeking to define ubuntu and/or outlining its specific ‘area of operation’ 
too soon as it is at present being interrogated and shaped by the courts, 
legislature and legal scholars and could yield a novel set of values and 
principles for law in time to come.237  
Kroeze has been at the forefront of emphasising the ‘rhetorical 
strategies’ that were on display in the Makwanyane judgment which she 
believed had bedevilled the future invocation of ubuntu in the 
adjudication of legal matters.238 Kroeze attributed the deployment of 
three rhetorical strategies (in the abovementioned court case) to the 
pervasive influence of legal formalism in the deliberation of constitutional 
matters.239 She criticised the court for stating that ‘the values of ubuntu 
are no different from those found in any other civilised society or legal 
system’ which called into question the need for ubuntu to be applied at 
all.240 Kroeze also criticised the manner in which a variety of concepts 
were used to define ubuntu which rendered it indescribably vague and 
led to a ‘concept that simply collapses under the weight of the 
expectations’.241  Finally, Kroeze highlighted the final rhetorical move 
deployed by the court in positioning ubuntu as diametrically opposed to 
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liberalism in which if liberalism is portrayed as advancing individual rights 
then ubuntu is inevitably positioned as embracing collective rights.242 
Consequently, Kroeze believed that ubuntu was confined to a debate 
characterised by ‘liberalist dichotomies and hierarchies’.243 
Praeg referred to the three ‘rhetorical strategies’ identified by Kroeze as 
that of equivocation, generalisation and juxtapositioning and felt that the 
aforementioned ‘rhetorical moves’ were not confined to legal formalism 
as such but in fact shadowed the debate on ubuntu.244 In this regard 
equivocation seeks to dismiss the need for a concept to be critically 
explored by emphasising that the concept in question has no telling nor 
novel insights to offer.245 In addition, generalisation is deemed to be an 
especially destructive mechanism in seeking to strip ubuntu of its 
‘constitutive violence and counter-hegemonic’ demand for a multi-
faceted understanding of justice which would enable the collective will to 
trump individual rights in appropriate circumstances.246 Juxtapositioning 
seeks to render ubuntu impotent by portraying anything with an altruistic 
edge as belonging to a troublesome African axiomatic and thus 
inevitably incompatible with an individual regime of rights.247 However, it 
is my contention that ubuntu (as per the communal obligations’ focus 
advanced in this thesis) is in fact compatible with a human rights regime 
in seeking to give effect to (as well as bolster) the realisation of 
aspirational values and socio-economic rights in order to create a 
sanctuary for all.  
Van der Walt believes that the utilisation of ubuntu in law is problematic 
for three distinct reasons as follows: ‘a lack of conceptual clarity, a lack 
of African particularity and a lack of appropriate cultural context when 
making use of ubuntu in the law’.248 He argues that concepts should be 
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clearly defined prior to being utilised in the law/legal reasoning.249 Van 
der Walt questions the need to utilise ubuntu as he believes that it does 
not contribute anything uniquely African to jurisprudence. 250  Furman 
offers an insightful and decisive rebuttal to the aforementioned criticism 
by Van der Walt by emphasising that politics (rather than an insistence 
upon distinct epistemological themes) should feature prominently in 
selecting appropriate mechanisms (which resonate with the lived 
experience of the people) in governing a society.251  
It is fair comment that ubuntu is being utilised so as to give effect to 
‘something distinctively African’.252 Bennett cites with approval the views 
advanced by Keep and Midgley253 in seeking to incorporate something 
uniquely African ‘into the legal system so as to form a cohesive, plural, 
South African legal culture’. 254  It should be noted that the 
aforementioned legal culture will be coloured by concepts such as 
‘reconciliation, sharing, compassion, civility, responsibility, trust and 
harmony’.255 In this regard Keep and Midgley believe that it is indeed 
possible in part to achieve a pluralist legal culture as there is significant 
overlap between the values as encompassed by Western models of 
human rights and those values that are synonymous with ubuntu.256 
Keep and Midgley have embraced a ‘teleological’ approach in engaging 
with values so as to maintain an unwavering focus on what the specific 
value could ultimately achieve as a means to facilitate the process of 
harmonisation. 257  In addition, the Constitutional Court has routinely 
highlighted the overlap between ubuntu, entrenched rights in the 
Constitution and ‘emerging international legal norms’.258 The application 
of the concept of ubuntu by the judiciary has thus served to highlight the 
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ties between ubuntu and restorative justice. 259  It follows that the 
utilisation of ubuntu (in very different areas of law such as criminal law, 
defamation law and eviction matters) can be explained through the quest 
to give effect to restorative justice ideals.260  
It should be noted that ubuntu, whether defined as a value or legal norm, 
is in no way a ‘technocratic concept’.261 It should further be noted that 
attempts to strictly define and/or box ubuntu are ill-informed.262 In this 
regard a nuanced understanding of ubuntu requires ‘wisdom and open-
mindedness’.263 However, this does not mean that ubuntu is not capable 
of being defined nor that it ‘has a mercurial nature that changes 
according to its context’.264 In this regard Himonga, Taylor and Pope 
believe that ubuntu can be favourably compared with ‘humanity in its 
diversity’ in casting light on the need for humanity to be displayed 
through a celebration of diversity.265  
In addition, Van der Walt is critical of the judgment delivered in 
Makwanyane as he believes that the Constitutional Court had failed to 
ascertain whether traditional communities believed the death penalty to 
be a suitable punishment in the event that specific crimes are 
perpetrated.266 Furman systematically dismantled the aforementioned 
criticism by noting that a person believing in both ubuntu and the death 
penalty did not make the aforementioned concepts ‘conceptually 
compatible’ and one would be well wide of the mark if one believed that 
people only ever held ‘conceptually compatible’ beliefs.267 Furthermore, 
the suggestion that ubuntu could not be applied outside of its cultural 
context was robustly dealt with by Furman who highlighted that 
customary law was by its very nature ‘an evolving tradition’ and that ‘all 
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traditions are perpetual reinventions’.268 Thus, she is correct to conclude 
that the abovementioned criticisms of Van der Walt are ‘both limiting and 
limited’.269 
Bennett notes that a further criticism of ubuntu is redundancy.270 He 
observes that the Constitutional Court has on a number of occasions 
dealt with ubuntu and dignity as if they are largely similar in nature and 
content.271 In this regard it was stated in Makwanyane that:  
‘an outstanding feature of ubuntu in a community sense is the 
value it puts on life and human dignity. The dominant feature of 
the culture is that the life of another person is at least as valuable 
as one’s own. Respect for the dignity of every person is integral 
to this concept. During violent conflicts and when violent crime is 
rife, distraught members of society decry the loss of ubuntu. Thus 
heinous crimes are the antithesis of ubuntu. Treatment that is 
cruel, inhuman or degrading is bereft of ubuntu’.272  
However, it should be noted that any attempt to suggest that ubuntu and 
dignity are one and the same should be resisted.273 Bennett believes 
that ‘the Western conception of dignity envisages the individual as the 
right-bearer, whereas ubuntu sees the individual as embedded in a 
community’.274 However, English believes ubuntu to be ambiguous in 
that it compels one to select between conflicting interpretations of 
ubuntu.275 Consequently, English states that ubuntu cannot be defined 
as both ‘individual human dignity’ and ‘conformity to basic norms and 
collective unity’ at the same time.276 However, there is no persuasive 
reasoning advanced by English to highlight why one should have to 
choose between the aforementioned versions (which are clearly different 
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in nature) in furnishing ubuntu with meaning.277 Furthermore, it should 
be noted that there is nothing peculiar about a normative concept like 
ubuntu giving effect to various values at the same time.278  
Furthermore, it is not viewed as problematic to position ubuntu as 
signifying communal morality even though this would entail ‘co-
responsibility, social justice, compassion, love and sharing’ as a matter 
of course.279 It is critical to note that abstract concepts may be difficult to 
define but this should not be equated with those same concepts being 
treated as empty.280 However, it is of pivotal importance that a legal 
concept is not open-ended to the extent ‘that it can be exploited to serve 
any conceivable purpose’.281 Thus, a normative legal notion should be 
defined with sufficient specificity so as to ensure that different judges 
utilise the concept in a similar/predictable fashion.282  
Praeg believes that the utilisation of ubuntu is required to attain the goals 
of the Constitution as ubuntu provides a nuanced understanding of 
personhood (which is different to that offered by Western jurisprudence) 
and that contradictions (which are deemed to be part and parcel of the 
law) are easier to contend with in an ‘ubuntu-infused jurisprudence’.283  
It is submitted that ubuntu is defined with the necessary precision to be 
utilised in a constitutional democracy in a contemporary context. In this 
regard the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu (as favoured in this 
thesis) serves to demonstrate the clarity with which ubuntu is imbued. 
Furthermore, it is critical to bear in mind that the deployment of ubuntu 
should be welcomed in light of its widespread use amongst the majority 
of people in South Africa.  
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2.7.3 The appropriate allocation of state resources as an expression of    
the core values of ubuntu 
It is my firm submission that public officials who misappropriate state 
funds, so as to provide for their dependents/family relations and deem 
such misappropriation to be an expression of ubuntu, are wilfully electing 
to advance a malevolent distortion of the true meaning of ubuntu. In this 
regard I have had numerous encounters in the Eastern Cape (as the 
nodal point for criminal investigations against corrupt public officials over 
the course of a number of years) in which public officials serve to 
embrace/advance the aforementioned (distorted) version of ubuntu to 
justify their unlawful conduct.  
It follows that it is critical to emphasise that ubuntu should be defined as 
honouring communal obligations (in the broadest possible terms) so as 
to forge a just and caring society in which all members are treated as 
having equal worth. It is submitted that a nuanced understanding of 
ubuntu highlights the importance of giving effect to communal 
obligations (which encompasses the sharing of resources) in the 
broadest possible terms. Thus, the utilisation of allocated state funds to 
meet the needs of an entire community (including the grand-abstraction 
of the nation-state as a whole) is a superior expression of ubuntu and 
decisively trumps any warped notion that a wayward public official might 
have of justifying his/her corrupt conduct through an appeal to ubuntu. 
Thus, I am in agreement with Praeg, in being critical of the African Moral 
Theory as proposed by Metz, to the extent that nepotism could be 
viewed/justified as ‘the logical implication of ubuntu’.284 In this regard 
Metz elects to defend the actions of the state in granting preferential 
treatment to certain individuals that had ‘struggle credentials’ as a means 
of promoting harmony in existing relations before seeking to fashion new 
friendships.285  Praeg rightfully refers to the ill-conceived and flawed 
reasoning of Metz in relation to the supposed ties between ubuntu and 
                                                             
284 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 67. 
285 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 67.  
50 
 
 
nepotism as this serves to distort (as well as undermine) the true 
meaning of ubuntu.  
2.7.4  The persistent association of ubuntu with patriarchy and other 
discriminatory practices 
It is important to ascertain whether a present day ubuntu, stripped of its 
entrenched patriarchal values, is still able to make a telling contribution 
in political and social fields as well as in philosophical circles.286 It is 
consequently questioned whether ubuntu (so stripped) is different and 
can in fact make a difference.287 In this regard Keevy states that ubuntu 
(with specific reference to the patriarchal values it is seen to bolster) is 
alien to the values of a liberal democracy and its emancipatory potential 
is essentially undermined by its own core values.288 The aforementioned 
criticisms are countered by emphasising the failure on the part of Keevy 
to make a pivotal distinction between ubuntu as lived and experienced 
in times past and present day ubuntu philosophy as shaped by a 
postcolonial community. 
Justice Sachs casts light on the manner in which tradition is shaped over 
time as follows:  
‘We do not automatically invoke each and every aspect of 
traditional law as a source of values, just as we do not rely on all 
features of the common law. Thus, we reject the once powerful 
common law traditions associated with patriarchy and the 
subordination of servants to masters, which are inconsistent with 
freedom and equality, and we uphold and develop those many 
aspects of the common law, which feed into and enrich the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. I am sure that 
there are many aspects and values of traditional African law, 
which will also have to be discarded or developed in order to 
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ensure compatibility with the principles of the new constitutional 
order.’289  
It is submitted that the aforementioned insight offered by Justice Sachs 
is of considerable importance as it emphasises that there were practices 
in terms of the common law (e.g. the master-servant relationship) which 
violated the constitutional principle of equality; similarly there will be 
practices in traditional African law that will have to cease (e.g. ingrained 
patriarchal practices as well as processual personhood) or be modified 
to find application in our constitutional dispensation.  
Furthermore, Keevy disputes the notion that ubuntu is consistent with 
the values espoused in the Bill of Rights and refers with approval290 to 
the Bhe judgment in which the Constitutional Court had stated that 
African law is based on:   
‘a deeply embedded patriarchy which reserved for women a 
position of subservience and subordination and in which they 
were regarded as perpetual minors under the tutelage of the 
fathers, husbands, or the head of the extended family’.291  
Keevy specifically focusses on contrasting ubuntu with the 
constitutionally guaranteed (core) rights of human dignity and equality 
as she believes that ubuntu is at odds with core values in the Bill of 
Rights.292 However, it is worth repeating that codified customary law is 
not an accurate reflection of living African law as it has not stayed 
abreast of definitive changes in social conditions. 293  Thus, codified 
customary law could be viewed as propping up patriarchal tendencies 
whilst undermining its communitarian edge.294 
In addition, Keevy views ubuntu as a ‘collective folk philosophy’ in which 
patriarchal dominance (as part of the overarching narrative) ensures that 
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subservient and oppressive views towards women are firmly embedded 
as part of the natural order of things.295 Furthermore, the patriarchal 
nature of ubuntu is viewed as inconsistent with core constitutional values 
as discrimination and subjugation are deemed to feature alongside the 
‘brotherhood’ narrative. 296  In this regard Keevy believes that the 
(alleged) oppressive nature of ubuntu undermines gender equality and 
disregards the dignity of African women.297 Furthermore, the concept of 
the right to equality is deemed to be dramatically different in Western 
jurisprudence as compared to ubuntu and (supposedly) gives credence 
to Keevy’s argument that ‘human rights law is fundamentally at odds with 
traditional African values’.298 Keevy concludes her argument by noting 
that: 
‘as a collective philosophy, ubuntu sustains not only 
communities, extended families, values, beliefs, tradition, 
morals, law and justice in these societies, but also the 
patriarchal hierarchy, discrimination, inequality and 
stereotyping of women, children, homosexuals, lesbians, 
witches, strangers and others.’299  
The flaws in the abovementioned arguments of Keevy are exposed 
through her failure to grasp the nature and extent of the intersection 
between ubuntu and constitutional values. 300  Keevy views matters 
through a ‘binary opposition lens’ in which gays and lesbians are 
depicted as being completely dependent on the rights afforded by the 
relevant constitutional principles.301 This is due to her mistaken belief 
that ubuntu affords the aforementioned vulnerable groups no protection 
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whatsoever whilst patriarchs are (supposedly) determined to manipulate 
tradition so as to undermine the relevant constitutional rights.302 Thus, 
Keevy does not account for a state of affairs in which numerous women, 
gays and lesbians regard themselves as guardians of ubuntu.303  
The extreme criticism levelled at ubuntu, with specific reference to 
Keevy, in which rigid patriarchal values and the coercive tendencies of 
communitarianism are emphasised, fails at the expense of taking a 
measured view of ubuntu as an evolving philosophy in which past 
customs are revised in the present.304 There is a paradox at play in that 
Western modernity can critique the inherent values and associations of 
ubuntu much the same like ubuntu can offer a critique of the 
shortcomings/blind-spots of dominant Western philosophy.305 A case in 
point being the way dignity shapes the revitalisation of ubuntu which is 
mirrored by the way in which the recollection of ubuntu features in the 
reconstruction of dignity.306 I am in firm agreement with the view that a 
failure to recognise the aforementioned complexity and/or interplay 
between the present and the past (in shaping distinct philosophies in the 
present-day context) is suggestive of a ‘passive-aggressive form of 
racism’.307  
Magadla and Chitando seek to ascertain whether ubuntu could in fact 
play a role in reshaping masculine and feminine identities that have been 
altered by colonialism.308 It is necessary, as a starting point, to consider 
what being a man (as well as a woman) entails in this contemporary, 
postcolonial moment.309 Furthermore, attention should be paid to the 
manner in which the engagement between men and women should be 
structured and subsequently executed. 310  In this regard the 
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extraordinarily high levels of sexual and gender-based violence 
necessitates a clear understanding of ‘the violence of male 
hegemony’.311 Thus, gender-based violence in this context is defined as 
‘a display of male power which manifests itself in various forms including 
physical, psychological, cultural, economic and sexual’.312 It is in this 
context that the role of ubuntu, in giving rise to comprehensively revised 
masculine identities, is explored so as to dismantle practices that 
subordinate women.313  
The thought-provoking contribution by Magadla and Chitando offers 
compelling insights with regards to the manner in which ubuntu could be 
utilised to dismantle patriarchal practices (as opposed to contending with 
persistent allegations of ubuntu being synonymous with pervasive 
patriarchal practices). In this regard Magadla and Chitando cast light on 
an extraordinary development in that African feminists are utilising 
ubuntu to protest gender violence as well as crafting solutions to bring 
an end to abhorrent patriarchal practices.  
It is critical to draw a distinction between ‘categories of masculinity’ which 
include ‘dominant, complicit, submissive and oppositional/protest’ forms 
so as to grasp the full import of feminist studies which resist the view that 
men are inclined to exhibit violent behaviour.314 It should be noted that 
sexual and gender-based violence is not a natural component of 
masculinity but rather of a specific type of masculinity called ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’.315 Thus, hegemonic masculinity seeks to advance a global 
ideology in which the subordination of women to men is the overarching 
objective.316 In this regard Morell offers a critical insight in describing 
how hegemonic masculinity seeks to render silent other forms of 
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masculinity and is characterised by ‘misogyny, homophobia, racism and 
compulsory heterosexuality’. 317  Magadla and Chitando note with 
considerable interest that the rallying call to embrace ubuntu so as to 
promote ‘social justice and fluid gender roles’ has met with resistance 
from feminists in South Africa.318 In this regard the specific example of 
Keevy is cited as she believes that ubuntu is synonymous with ‘deep-
seated patriarchy’.319  
The abhorrent outpouring of sexual violence is deemed to denote a 
‘moral vacuum’ in which the destruction of values has been brought 
about by the advent of colonialism and apartheid.320 However, Magadla 
and Chitando believe that ubuntu is well placed to help society reimagine 
the shaping of an ethic of care in which the cultural definition of manhood 
is an integral part of personhood.321 Thus, personhood can be defined 
as being constitutive of community rather than signifying the self. 322 
Consequently, it offers an insightful perspective by employing a 
language that is fully understood (i.e. an ubuntu ethic of care) to 
transform masculinity in a manner that is not premised on Western 
ideals.323  This serves to disarm critics that are keen to tie (African) 
feminism with distorted Western values which are alien to the lived 
realities of African women. 324  Thus, the underlying rationale for 
embracing an ubuntu ethic of care (in this context) is for men to view 
principled and vehement opposition to sexual and gender-based 
violence as an expression of their own value system in which respect for 
women is inseparable from respect for the community/nation.325 The 
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aforementioned insight provides a gilt-edged opportunity for ubuntu to 
dovetail with an individual human rights regime in making a significant 
contribution to reducing widespread sexual and gender violence in South 
Africa.   
In addition, Posel suggests that an appeal to maleness that is premised 
on notions of being both provider and protector is more appealing (in a 
local context) than Western-inspired notions of individual freedom.326 
Consequently, it is my firm view that the abovementioned ‘ethic of care’ 
is an embodiment of the core communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu. 
Thus, the abovementioned ubuntu ethic of care lends itself to being 
adopted/embraced by public officials (both male and female) as a basis 
for prioritising the urgent needs of vulnerable groups. It follows that this 
will occur through an appeal to values that public officials are likely to be 
intimately familiar with (i.e. ubuntu) as opposed to a Western-inspired 
human rights regime. Consequently, it is submitted that the utilisation of 
ubuntu does not only mesh with a human rights regime but can in fact 
colour and bolster the realisation of those same rights.  
In conclusion, Magadla and Chitando are keen to discern the intersection 
between an ubuntu ethic of care and a feminist ethic of care.327 This 
serves to demonstrate that it is misleading and simplistic to presume that 
traditional beliefs and the emancipatory ideals of feminism are as a rule 
incompatible.328 Magadla and Chitando dismiss the views of Keevy who 
believed that the ubuntu debate had only focussed on the positive 
aspects of ubuntu whilst conveniently ignoring its dark side (and the 
manner in which it supposedly undermined the rights of women and 
other vulnerable groups).329  
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Magadla and Chitando endorse the view in which ubuntu is typecast as 
the reimagining of culture as a living tradition (which is practised by all 
members) rather than being the exclusive domain of traditional elders 
and the living-dead.330 A sobering realisation is brought to the fore in that 
ubuntu, as a living tradition, is constantly evolving and strongly 
contested, which lends itself to be utilised by both perpetrators of gender 
violence and those that choose to promote gender justice.331 However, 
it is possible to negotiate a path through which tradition is purged of 
those practices that sustain gender inequality whilst continuing to be 
identified as a guardian of that same tradition.332 Thus, there is indeed 
an opportunity to deploy ubuntu as a means to transform violent 
masculinity (in order to foster social solidarity in the time to come).333  
2.7.5  The ever-present coercive edge of ubuntu 
Ubuntu and African religion are the critical components of African law.334 
African law seeks to restore equilibrium in both the physical and spiritual 
domain by placating the demands of the ancestral spirits. 335 
Furthermore, African law strongly advocates group duties as well as 
endorsing collective shame as a mechanism to deter (potential) 
offenders.336 In this regard Praeg provides valuable insight with regards 
to benevolent coercion (which serves as a marker for the outer limits of 
belonging) and is part and parcel of embracing ubuntu as a political 
choice as previously described. 337  It is inevitable that ubuntu will 
continue to be characterised by contrasting views in either promoting 
‘transcendent humanism’ or being defined by its ‘coercive 
conformism’. 338  However, the constitutive violence that is present in 
ubuntu (or any other communitarian philosophy) should be rendered 
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visible as it represents the logic of coercion as a political choice.339 It is 
important to recognise that a standing criticism of ubuntu (styled as 
African Communitarianism) by liberals is that of the inherent violence or 
coercion in all forms of communitarianism.340  
However, Praeg is quick to dispel any notions of racism in noting the 
coercive mechanisms at play in ubuntu as he views it as the ‘flip side of 
the same coin of interdependence’.341 Thus, Praeg believes that the 
reception of ubuntu has been sanitised so as to portray ‘its constitutive 
violence in the socially acceptable language of desirable outcomes’ as 
per the ‘compulsory reconciliation’ in AZAPO. 342  Furthermore, the 
aforementioned ‘sanitising mechanism’ also sought to strip from ubuntu 
any association with coercive strategies that were deployed so as to 
shape the conduct of individuals in their quest to be viewed as people 
with ubuntu.343  
2.7.6   The utilisation of the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu to 
promote accountability and bolster social solidarity 
It is submitted that the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu should be 
embraced as a political choice in order to colour and sustain our 
constitutional values.  
Ubuntu offers so much more than an unwavering expectation to receive 
equal and fair treatment.344 In Barkhuizen v Napier the court held that 
ubuntu compels the individual to:  
‘…give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each 
member of [the] community. More importantly, it regulates the 
exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-
responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all’.345  
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In this regard Langa CJ in MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 
cites Kwame Gyekye who had stated that: ‘an individual person cannot 
develop and achieve the fullness of his/her potential without the concrete 
act of relating to other individual persons’. 346  Consequently, Praeg 
rightfully believes that ubuntu does not seek to prioritise individual (and 
even collective rights) as much as it seeks to emphasise duties and 
obligations.347  
It is necessary to draw a distinction between association and obligation 
so as to promote a better understanding of ubuntu.348  The spirit of 
association is captured by the phrase ‘I am because we are’ as ‘one’s 
existence is recognised as a function of the existence of others’.349 Thus, 
there is a definitive need to identify and discharge certain obligations as 
a means of sustaining the existence of the concept ‘we’.350  Obligations, 
on the other hand, are to be viewed as a clear manifestation of the 
associations enjoyed by a human being in that:   
‘To have no obligation is not to belong; it is not to be fully and 
socially human. Obligations therefore, are not seen (as the 
Western concept seems to imply) as impositions, claims on one’s 
otherwise better used time and energy, but as a means of 
sustaining one’s place in a network of belonging: that most vital 
attribute of humanity, sociability and, ultimately, being in the 
world.’351  
It is submitted that the aforementioned perspective regarding obligations 
is an extraordinary way to capture the purity of the ideal in giving effect 
to (communal) obligations on the part of any public official as a means 
to promote our shared humanity. Furthermore, association can be 
viewed as a powerful form of communitarianism and the attendant 
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reciprocal obligations depict morally good behaviour (i.e. conduct that 
strengthens the association) and morally bad behaviour (i.e. conduct 
that undermines the functioning and/or existence of the association).352 
It should be noted that what is in fact required is embracing and 
highlighting the manner in which ubuntu could in fact strengthen and 
deepen our understanding of both communitarian and individualistic 
approaches by shedding light on the ‘interplay between rights and 
obligations’ as experienced by individuals in contemporary society.353 
Consequently, it is correctly asserted that the perceived contribution that 
ubuntu could make in contemporary times is shaped by the central idea 
that ‘the membership of imagined communities entails duties and 
obligations’. 354  In this regard, Justice Langa stated that ubuntu 
recognises a person’s status as a human being which entitles one to 
unconditional respect, dignity, value and acceptance.355 However, the 
aforementioned person has a corresponding duty to extend the same 
respect, dignity, value and acceptance to every other member of that 
community. 356  The learned judge continues by stating that ubuntu 
requires the exercising of rights in a manner which emphasises sharing 
and co-responsibility so as to ensure the enjoyment of rights by all 
members. 357  Zulu echoes the sentiments of the abovementioned 
academic contributions by making the observation that ‘human rights’ is 
constantly bandied about in the South African context but ‘obligations’ 
are hardly ever mentioned.358 In this regard it is of paramount importance 
to acknowledge that the concept of (communal) obligations goes hand 
in hand with embracing ubuntu and public officials (as one of the focus 
groups in this thesis) are entitled to enjoy those rights that are afforded 
to them in terms of the Constitution. However, the aforementioned public 
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officials are also duty-bound to come to the aid of vulnerable groups in 
accessing key socio-economic rights.  
However, ubuntu does not give rise to a social bond through an 
underlying imagined social contract but rather it is deemed to be ‘both 
the African principle of transcendence for the individual, and the law of 
the social bond’.359  Thus, it is deemed to be a grave misunderstanding 
of ubuntu to view it as ‘simple-minded communitarianism’ as ubuntu 
denotes a state of being where one comes into the world obligated to 
others much the same like the others are obligated to you (and everyone 
else).360  
Ubuntu is linked with seriti with the latter depicted as the life force which 
binds a community of people to each other.361 This life force is shaped 
by a persistent interchange between personhood and the community at 
large so that the life force of the community is ultimately affected through 
its engagement with every individual in that same community.362  Thus, 
seriti serves to weaken us all if we fail to discharge our obligations in 
providing the necessary care and embracing our roles as duty-bearers 
in the community.363 Consequently, the denial of access to a renal-
dialysis machine to a member of the nation-state due to his inability to 
pay for life-saving treatment (with specific reference to the Soobramoney 
matter) is viewed as a physical loss sustained by the community in being 
‘drained of our humanity’.364   
However, it is my contention that so much more than a display of 
sympathy should be expected (and required) of public officials as these 
same officials are tasked to ease the plight of vulnerable groups by 
securing the progressive realisation of critical socio-economic rights. 
Furthermore, this is consistent with the communal obligations’ focus of 
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ubuntu in creating a society in which vulnerable groups are treated as 
having equal worth through giving effect to continuous humanising acts 
on the part of public officials. Thus, this entails public officials discharging 
the aforementioned duties (i.e. the facilitation of the realisation of socio-
economic rights) in the present time or near future rather than at some 
uncertain point in the distant future. In addition, Coertze offers an 
interesting insight in that: 
‘Neither the traditional nor the acculturative formulation of 
ubuntu or botho imbued the individual with specific rights 
as a human being. To be human, as of old, meant to 
shoulder the concomitant duties and thus to be judged an 
example to others’.365  
Thus, the increased prominence of the human rights discourse provided 
for the granting of rights to all people but neglected to promote a similar 
focus and emphasis on the (reciprocal) duties owed.366 This was a clear 
break from the past where embracing duties on the part of members was 
emphasised as a means to forge/sustain cohesion in group entities.367 It 
is common cause that colonialism served to undermine ‘the political 
economy of obligation as a sustained and coherent praxis’. 368  The 
aforementioned shift was amplified by a further change as brought about 
by the consolidation of a human rights perspective that favoured the 
safeguarding of individual rights above social obligations.369  
It follows that ubuntu should not be viewed as synonymous with a human 
rights regime nor representing communalism in such a fashion as to 
make it impossible to dovetail with a human rights discourse as provided 
for by the Constitution.370 Ubuntu can in fact be articulated so as to 
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present us with a radically different notion of the underlying principle of 
the law which in turn shapes a dramatically altered perspective on rights 
and responsibilities.371 Thus, an obligation could extend beyond what 
would be permitted under social contract theory as the pursuit of a just 
community was an integral component of advancing freedom (and the 
quality of life) for all in that community.372 In addition, it is believed that 
ubuntu would not mimic the possession of rights and their corresponding 
duties which define social contract theory.373 It should be noted that a 
detailed discussion of social contract theory falls outside the scope of 
this thesis but the aforementioned points serve as a brief illustration of 
the true extent of the communal obligations owed upon embracing 
ubuntu. Furthermore, a nuanced understanding of the aforementioned 
communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu serves to shape the conduct of 
interconnected and interdependent members (living side by side) in 
striving to forge a just and caring nation-state.  
 
2.8      Summary  
A key aim of this Chapter is to interrogate ubuntu so as to discern the 
contribution that it could potentially make in a contemporary context. 
Thus, it is submitted that ubuntu could indeed serve to shape the conduct 
of public officials and state institutions (in fostering a deep-seated 
awareness of the primacy of communal obligations) and in so doing 
prioritise the needs of vulnerable groups.  
Furthermore, embracing the values and spirit of ubuntu (on the part of 
public officials) will promote accountability by impacting on the manner 
in which each and every decision is taken so as to reflect a sincere 
concern for the wellbeing of all members of the nation-state. Thus, 
ubuntu is well suited to promote the accountability of public officials (as 
explored in Chapter 3) by shaping a vision of shared obligations so as to 
pursue the urgent realisation of the socio-economic rights as enshrined 
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in the Constitution. In addition, it is my submission that a communal 
obligations’ focus is at the heart of ubuntu and it is subsequently well 
placed to make a significant contribution in our constitutional democracy 
in light of its ability to mesh with a human rights regime as explored in 
Chapter 3. Furthermore, the state is duty-bound to give effect to socio-
economic rights which is in keeping with the communal obligations’ focus 
of ubuntu and is consistent with recognising the interdependence and 
interconnectedness of members living side by side in a just and caring 
nation-state.  
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CHAPTER 3 - PART A (ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR) 
3.1      Introduction 
Chapter 3 is divided into Part A and Part B.374 
Part A is focussed on the accountability of the state with specific 
reference to the progressive realisation of critical socio-economic rights. 
The relevant provisions of the Constitution, which serve to inform the 
accountability of the state, will be explored in due course in this section. 
Also, the international law commitments of the Republic of South Africa 
(with specific reference to the ratification of the International 
Covenant/ICESCR in 2015) will be scrutinised as it serves to draw 
attention to the specific obligations of the state. Furthermore, the 
minimum-core obligation approach, as advanced by Bilchitz, will be 
carefully analysed and expanded upon in this section in light of it being 
fully endorsed in this thesis.  
It follows that Part A will also explore the pressing need to give effect to 
the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights as a means to cast 
light on the nature and extent of the duties owed by the state to the 
public. Furthermore, the manner in which ubuntu can both mesh with an 
individual human rights regime (as well as facilitate the realisation of key 
socio-economic rights) will be examined in this section. 
Chapter 2 sought to provide a nuanced understanding of the role that 
ubuntu could fulfil in a contemporary constitutional democracy. The 
previous chapter also highlighted the manner in which ubuntu could in 
fact mesh with a human rights regime. In addition, Chapter 2 also 
demonstrated the clear link between ubuntu (understood as an 
unwavering focus on communal obligations) and the accountability of 
public officials in relation to the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights.  
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It is submitted that the accountability of public officials and state 
institutions is at the heart of this thesis which serves to explain the 
detailed analyses provided in this Chapter. However, the contribution 
that ubuntu could make in a contemporary context should be 
downplayed in the absence of a radical transformation of the lived reality 
of vulnerable groups in the near future. Thus, this Chapter seeks to 
provide critical insight as to the nature and extent of the duties owed by 
the state to the public as related to the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights. 
It is further submitted that ubuntu, with a specific focus on communal 
obligations as previously stated, can act as a catalyst and play a critical 
role in promoting the accountability of public officials so as to give effect 
to the aspirational values as well as  socio-economic rights as enshrined 
in the Constitution. Ubuntu is well suited to play this role due to its ethical 
and political potency375 and in light of its ability, if properly defined as 
above, to mesh with a human rights regime. Furthermore, public officials 
that ‘embrace’ ubuntu or are ‘imbued with ubuntu’ should be understood 
(as previously defined in Chapter 1) to mean those specific public 
officials that have an unwavering focus on communal obligations and 
seek to give effect to continuous humanising acts.376 This is consistent 
with the spirit and purport of the Constitution in seeking to give effect to 
socio-economic rights (as well as aspirational values) as a means of 
creating a just and caring nation-state.  
In addition, Mureinik advances a persuasive argument in favour of 
constitutionalism in that it nurtures an environment in which all decisions 
taken by those occupying powerful positions (including the legislature) 
have to be justified.377 It should be noted that an unerring focus on the 
aforementioned justification of state action has positive knock-on effects 
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with regards to laws and policies.378 This in turn gives rise to an elevated 
level of accountability which shapes the conduct of public officials in that 
they have to grapple with the underlying reasons in making decisions 
which assist in highlighting flawed decisions. 379  The aforementioned 
insights offered by Mureinik overlap with the views endorsed in this 
thesis in which embracing ubuntu on the part of public officials will lead 
to better decision-making (through agonising over those same 
decisions) as a means to honour the obligations (both in a communal 
and constitutional sense) as owed to vulnerable groups.  
Furthermore, it is of pivotal importance when assessing unconditional 
obligations to ascertain what must be achieved as well as who bears the 
responsibility for making it happen.380 Consequently, it is critical for the 
state, as the custodian of information required for the facilitation and 
realisation of socio-economic rights, to demonstrate the necessary 
accountability by disseminating that same information to the public as 
and when required.381 Thus, public officials who are diligent in their 
duties (and consequently faithfully adhere to the relevant accountability 
principles) will seek to provide critical information to the public on an 
ongoing basis as part of giving effect to a sustainable stakeholder 
engagement strategy. It is submitted that the aforementioned conduct of 
diligent public officials is a manifestation of the communal obligations’ 
focus of ubuntu. This serves to bolster my contention that there is a 
demonstrable and definitive link between ubuntu, accountability and the 
realisation of socio-economic rights.  
3.2      A working definition of accountability as encountered in the 
public sector 
It is noted that the human rights community has moved beyond affirming 
the importance of socio-economic rights and that same community is 
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now focused on innovative and practical ways of enforcing and 
monitoring the advancement of these rights.382 Socio-economic rights 
are deemed to be critical tools for securing social justice and a better life 
for all in South Africa.383 However, the utility of socio-economic rights is 
dependent on all state institutions (as well as civil society organisations) 
embracing the importance of this group of rights despite it being cast to 
the periphery historically.384 Thus, there is a clear need to strengthen the 
core content of socio-economic rights as well as augment practical 
measures (to implement those same rights) as a means of making a 
significant difference in the lives of vulnerable groups living in abject 
poverty.385 It should be readily apparent that knowledge of these rights 
is required in order for them to be claimed by the very people that stand 
to benefit from them. 386  Thus, facilitating increased awareness and 
knowledge of socio-economic rights amongst vulnerable groups is a 
critical challenge for the state, independent commissions and NGOs in 
the human rights arena.387 In this regard the dissemination of information 
will be discussed in due course.388 
It should be noted at the outset that rights have two interrelated yet 
distinct parts.389 The negative component compels the state to respect 
a particular right by not undermining the enjoyment of that same right.390 
The positive component of a right (as to be found in all rights in the Bill 
of Rights) is imbued with the transformative spirit of the Constitution.391 
Thus, the positive aspect of the right to equality obliges the state to 
implement steps to achieve the vision of a society in which all individuals 
                                                             
382 Liebenberg S ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ Chaskalson M et al 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2003) (hereafter Interpretation of 
socio-economic rights). 
383 Liebenberg S ‘Interpretation of socio-economic rights’ (2003) (Section 33.2) 1-3. 
384 Liebenberg S ‘Interpretation of socio-economic rights’ (2003) (Section 33.2) 1-3. 
385 Liebenberg S ‘Interpretation of socio-economic rights’ (2003) (Section 33.2) 1-3. 
386 Liebenberg S ‘Interpretation of socio-economic rights’ (2003) (Section 33.2) 1-3. 
387 Liebenberg S ‘Interpretation of socio-economic rights’ (2003) (Section 33.2) 1-3. 
388 Please see Section 3.4.1. 
389 De Vos P ‘Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality as 
contextual fairness (2001) 17 SAJHR 273 (hereafter Grootboom). 
390 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ (2001) SAJHR 273. 
391 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ (2001) SAJHR 274.  
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are immersed in an environment characterised by equal concern and 
mutual respect rather than being treated equally in a formal sense.392 
Thus, it is of paramount importance to recognise that the right to equality 
is more than just a guarantee of equal treatment as per the various 
decisions of the Constitutional Court.393  
It should further be noted that the search for ‘contextual fairness’ is at 
the centre of the equality jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.394 
The transformative vision of the Constitution obliges the state to forge a 
society in which people can live lives of dignity and are able to realise 
their full potential.395 However, the conduct on the part of the state (to 
realise such a vision) should be both fair and reasonable to those people 
affected by the act or omission. 396  Consequently, it is critical to 
appreciate that equality is also a social and economic issue rather than 
being confined to an abstract and formalistic debate (e.g. seeking to 
ascertain whether the human dignity of an individual has been violated 
in a specific instance).397  
De Vos highlights that a focus on the transformative nature of the right 
to equality provides opportunities to utilise both section 9(3) as well as 
sections 26 and 27 ‘to hold the state accountable for failures to address 
the needs of the socially and economically most vulnerable sections of 
society’. 398  Thus, the manner in which public officials and state 
institutions discharge their respective duties (in a manner embracing the 
spirit of ubuntu) will be explored in order to strive for a situation where at 
least the core399 part of the constitutionally protected socio-economic 
rights could be given effect to at all times. However, the broader 
                                                             
392 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ (2001) SAJHR 274. 
393 Please see Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) (hereafter Harksen v Lane) 
para 54. Please also see City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) 
(hereafter Pretoria v Walker) paras 73 – 81.  
394 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ (2001) SAJHR 275. Please see Harksen v Lane (1998) 
para 54. Please also see Pretoria v Walker (1998) paras 73 – 81. 
395 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ (2001) SAJHR 275.  
396 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ (2001) SAJHR 275.   
397 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ (2001) SAJHR 276.  
398 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ (2001) SAJHR 276.   
399 Please see expanded discussion regarding the minimum core obligation at 
Section 3.5. 
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objective of this thesis will be to provide a novel approach in bolstering 
the content and reach of those same constitutionally protected rights (in 
the shortest possible time) so that vulnerable groups could derive the 
maximum possible enjoyment from them. 
The state has failed to make significant inroads in realising urgent 
subsistence rights400 (comprised of the rights to food, housing and health 
care) on behalf of vulnerable groups in South Africa. It is submitted that 
an ubuntu-inspired approach can both colour and promote the 
accountability of public officials in promoting the realisation of socio-
economic rights. However, it is indeed necessary for the state to 
demonstrate the required political will in fashioning the second 
(economic) transition. This will ensure that we forge a nation-state in 
which all within its borders are provided with the necessary means not 
only to survive but also to live lives of purpose.  
It is important to note that litigation is not the only strategy that could give 
effect to the realisation of socio-economic rights as other strategies 
include lobbying and advocacy of public institutions, ongoing monitoring 
of the advancement of socio-economic rights as well as awareness 
campaigns. 401  Thus, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (‘UNCESR’ or ‘UN Committee’) has repeatedly stressed 
the importance of devising a ‘transparent, participatory national strategy 
and plan of action’ for progressively giving effect to the relevant socio-
economic rights.402 The aforementioned plan should contain ‘targets, 
indicators and benchmarks’ which facilitate the monitoring of progress 
by the public, institutions such as the South African Human Rights 
                                                             
400 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) Introduction. 
401 Liebenberg S ‘Editorial: special edition’ (1999) 1 ESR Review (hereafter Editorial). 
402  General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the 
Covenant), http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079a1.html, (accessed 1 August 
2016) para 12. Please see General Comment No.12: The Right to Adequate Food, 
http:www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838c11.pdf, (accessed 1 August 2016) paras 21 – 
30. Please also see General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d0.html, (accessed 1 August 2016) para 
43(f).   
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Commission (‘SAHRC’) and the government itself.403 Furthermore, it is 
necessary for special attention to be paid to vulnerable groups in the 
formulation and implementation of the aforementioned plan.404 Also, the 
obligation borne by the state to devise a transparent national plan of 
action (to give effect to socio-economic rights) promotes public 
accountability and involvement in the advancement of socio-economic 
rights.405  This in turn provides the platform for ‘targeted, purposeful 
action’ by the state in giving effect to socio-economic rights. 406  In 
addition, accountability is defined in essence as being ‘responsible’ or 
‘answerable to’ which reflects the core duty owed by a public official (as 
the duly appointed representative of the state) to the people of South 
Africa. 407  It is submitted that the aforementioned insights serve to 
provide a nuanced understanding of what is in part expected of an 
‘accountable state’. The Constitution provides additional clarity as to the 
duty owed by the aforementioned public official in that:  
‘This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. 
It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom’.408  
The primary focus in this thesis is to shed light on the nature and extent 
of the duties of the state (and by implication the duties of the relevant 
public officials and state institutions as representatives of the state) in 
giving effect to socio-economic rights as an expression of accountability 
to the public as previously explained. ‘The public’ is defined as all people 
(embracing the extremes of those living in abject poverty and the 
privileged elite as well as everyone in between) that have made South 
Africa their home and have a vested interest in ensuring that all within 
our borders are free from immediate threats to their survival as a 
minimum standard. The aforementioned minimum standard should be 
satisfied as a matter of urgency so that people can live lives of value as 
                                                             
403 Liebenberg S ‘Interpretation of socio-economic rights’ (2003) (Section 33.5) 13.  
404 Liebenberg S ‘Interpretation of socio-economic rights’ (2003) (Section 33.5) 13. 
405 Liebenberg S ‘Interpretation of socio-economic rights’ (2003) (Section 33.5) 13. 
406 Liebenberg S ‘Interpretation of socio-economic rights’ (2003) (Section 33.5) 13. 
407 The Penguin English Dictionary 2ed 9.  
408 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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per their own definition and/or understanding. Thus, there is a need to 
develop clear sectoral benchmarks so as to hold public officials 
accountable and ensure that they realise critical socio-economic rights 
as a matter of urgency. In this regard the critical contribution by Bilchitz, 
relating to the minimum core obligation approach,409 will be explored in 
part through conducting an overview of the relevant socio-economic 
rights jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.  
Praeg notes that it may have more to do with (alarming) indifference 
rather than difference in the lived reality of a contemporary South Africa 
(which is no longer an apartheid state but cannot be regarded as a post-
apartheid state) if one considers how it has failed to give effect to its 
emancipatory potential and rich promise.410 A case in point being the 
absence of basic subsistence rights as required by poverty-stricken 
communities/vulnerable groups. Thus, it is submitted that the state has 
failed to satisfactorily discharge its obligations (in terms of the 
progressive realisation of urgent socio-economic rights) since the advent 
of democracy. In this regard the state has been unable to significantly 
reduce the number of people who continue to live in abject poverty and 
(consequently) have limited access to adequate nutrition, proper shelter 
and suitable health services amongst other things.411  
In addition, the state defends its ‘service-delivery’ track record by 
routinely citing ‘scarce state resources’ as a means to downplay the 
limited realisation of the socio-economic rights regime.412 However, this 
is not consistent with an acceptable accountability standard in the 
absence of the state furnishing detailed information of its available 
resources. Also, there is an urgent need on the part of the state to 
acknowledge its poor track record (in respect of the progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights) and embrace its obligations anew 
                                                             
409 Please see Section 3.5 regarding the Minimum Core Obligation approach.  
410 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) Introduction. 
411 Please see ‘Health and Health Care in South Africa – 20 Years after Mandela’ 
Mayosi BM & Benatar SR New England Journal of Medicine (2014) 371: 1344 – 
1353. Please also see Soobramoney (1998) para 8 and Azapo (1996) para 43. 
412 Please see Soobramoney (1998) paras 21 and 41. Please also see Grootboom 
(2000) para 46. 
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in prioritising the advancement of urgent socio-economic rights which 
should strive to eliminate the suffering endured by vulnerable groups.  
Furthermore, a focus on the realisation of specific socio-economic rights 
will provide insight as to the inherent tension between scarce state 
resources and giving effect to constitutionally protected rights. In 
addition, the manner in which public officials embrace ubuntu could 
facilitate the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. This will 
shed light on an acceptable accountability standard that is to be devised 
and implemented by the state so as to progressively meet the urgent 
needs of vulnerable groups. In this regard the Soobramoney case will be 
extensively analysed as it provides illuminating insights into the 
accountability standard which should, as a rule, be demanded of the 
state when adjudicating on matters concerning the realisation of urgent 
socio-economic rights. Furthermore, the critical role of the Constitutional 
Court in providing determinate content to specific socio-economic rights 
will be examined.  
It is submitted that an unwavering focus on the realisation of socio-
economic rights provides an exemplary platform/reference point to 
assess the track record of the state in demonstrating the necessary 
political will to meet the urgent needs of vulnerable groups. Thus, 
Gordon believes that to embrace ubuntu is to heed the call to insist upon 
accountability that is radical in its very nature.413 It should be noted that 
the aforementioned reference to accountability includes assuming full 
responsibility for every aspect of the inherent emancipatory potential of 
ubuntu as well as the conditions required for that same potential to be 
unleashed.414 Consequently, it is my contention that the aforementioned 
insight offered by Gordon outlines the standard that public officials (who 
have embraced ubuntu) should strive for in forging a nation-state that is 
celebrated for its shared humanity.   
                                                             
413 Gordon L ‘Justice otherwise: thoughts on ubuntu’ in Praeg L & Magadla S (eds) 
Ubuntu: Curating the Archive (2014) 22. 
414 Gordon L ‘Justice otherwise: thoughts on ubuntu’ in Praeg L & Magadla S (eds) 
Ubuntu: Curating the Archive (2014) 22. 
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Furthermore, the In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa415 judgment serves to provide the necessary context with 
regards to the adjudication and fulfilment of socio-economic rights 
alongside civil and political rights. In this regard the Constitutional Court 
held that:  
‘it is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result in 
courts making orders which have direct implications for budgetary 
matters. However, even when a court enforces civil and political 
rights such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair 
trial, the order it makes will often have such implications’.416   
The Court continued as follows:  
‘We are of the view that these rights are, at least to some extent 
justiciable…Many of the civil and political rights will give rise to 
similar budgetary implications without compromising their 
justiciability. The fact that socio-economic rights will almost 
inevitably give rise to such implications does not seem to us a bar 
to their justiciability’.417  
3.3      Constitutional provisions relating to the accountability of public 
officials to facilitate the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights 
A key feature of the South African Constitution is its clear commitment 
to the principle of the interdependency of all human rights (i.e. civil and 
political as well as economic, social and cultural rights). 418 
Consequently, it is noted that the term interdependence attempts to 
capture the idea that values seen as directly related to the full 
development of personhood cannot be protected and nurtured in 
                                                             
415 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 
744 (CC). 
416 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 
744 (CC) para 77. 
417 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 
744 (CC) para 78. 
418 Liebenberg S ‘Interpretation of socio-economic rights’ (2003) (Section 33.1) 1. 
75 
 
 
isolation.419 Thus, this serves to underscore the belief that human beings 
should be treated holistically in order to protect human welfare.420  
Socio-economic rights are viewed as providing for the ‘material 
dimensions of human welfare’.421 Their recognition as human rights is 
derived from ‘an acknowledgement that without food, water, shelter, 
health care, education and social security, human beings cannot survive, 
live with dignity or develop to their potential’.422 Thus, a Bill of Rights that 
prioritises civil and political rights (at the expense of socio-economic 
rights) will become an instrument wielded by the wealthy and powerful 
as a means to protect their privileged position.423 The inclusion of socio-
economic rights in the South African Constitution is an express 
endorsement of the philosophy that countering the effects of poverty is 
‘a matter of fundamental constitutional concern’.424  
The Preamble states that one of the aims of adopting the Constitution as 
the supreme law of the Republic is to ‘improve the quality of life and free 
the potential of each person’.425 It is submitted that a firm grasp of the 
transformative nature of the Constitution is indeed necessary to colour 
and drive the accountability of public officials. In this regard there are 
striking parallels between this enlightened understanding of the 
transformative nature of the Constitution and the communal obligations’ 
focus of ubuntu in creating a just and caring society as previously stated. 
Also, this is consistent with the sentiments of Roux who believes that the 
South African Constitution was set up in such a manner so as to 
dismantle the legacy of apartheid and that justiciable socio-economic 
rights were a critical component in realising this ambitious vision. 426 
                                                             
419 Scott C & Alston P ‘Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational 
Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise’ 
(2000) 16 SAJHR 206 (hereafter Adjudicating constitutional priorities). 
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The Bill of Rights includes an array of civil, political and socio-economic 
rights and it reflects the internationally acknowledged belief that all 
human rights are interdependent and indivisible.427 In this regard it is 
important to bear in mind that different rights find application in support 
of each other as the realisation of a specific right might rely on another 
right being secured first.428 Thus, it should be apparent that a starving 
person will find it near impossible to give effect to his/her freedom of 
speech (i.e. a person that has to endure the physical and emotional toll 
associated with starvation is poorly placed to pursue the realisation of 
other rights).429 Furthermore, the limitations placed on the freedom of 
speech may render it difficult for people to advance their right of access 
to housing (i.e. an inability of vulnerable groups to make themselves 
heard in the appropriate forums will make it near impossible to pursue a 
vision in which adequate housing will become a reality).430  Nonetheless, 
there are differences between civil and political rights as compared to 
socio-economic rights but it is best described as ‘a difference in degree 
rather than in kind’.431 In this regard it is clear that socio-economic rights 
will require additional state action to give effect to them as compared to 
civil and political rights.432  
The aforementioned insights provided by De Vos are critical in 
emphasising the importance of public officials attaching similar 
importance to the realisation of socio-economic rights in comparison to 
civil and political rights. Thus, the accountability standard that should be 
adhered to with regards to the safeguarding and advancement of socio-
economic rights should (at the very least) be no different from that 
applicable to those measures implemented for civil and political rights. 
                                                             
427 De Vos ‘Pious wishes or directly enforceable human rights?: social and economic    
rights in South Africa’s 1996 constitution’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 70 (hereafter Pious 
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428 De Vos ‘Pious wishes’ SAJHR (1997) 70. 
429 De Vos ‘Pious wishes’ SAJHR (1997) 70. 
430 De Vos ‘Pious wishes’ SAJHR (1997) 70. 
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I have interpreted the legal source of accountability of the state as 
flowing principally from the Preamble433 and sections 1434, 2435, 7(2)436, 
8(1)437, 32 (1)(a)438, 195, 196(4)(a)439 and 197(1) 440 of the Constitution. 
It is submitted that an in-depth discussion of sections 195 through 197 
cannot be undertaken in this multi-disciplinary study due to a restrictive 
thesis word count. However, an analysis of section 195 is of critical 
importance as it provides a clear standard with regards to the expected 
conduct and accountability of public officials.  
Section 195 (1) provides that public administration must be governed by 
the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, 
including the following principles:  
(a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and 
maintained.  
(b) Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be 
promoted.  
(c)  Public administration must be development-oriented.  
(d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and 
without bias.  
(e)  People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be 
encouraged to participate in policy-making.  
                                                             
433 The Preamble outlines a vision (in part) as follows: ‘… Believe that South Africa 
belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity…’ and ‘… Improve the quality of 
life of all citizens and free the potential of each person…’ 
434 ‘The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the 
following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms…’ 
435 ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent 
with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’  
436 ‘The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.’   
437 ‘The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state.’ 
438 ‘Everyone has the right of access to any information held by the state;’ 
439 196 (4) (a) The powers and functions of the Public Service Commission are to 
promote the values and principles set out in section 195, throughout the public 
service.  
440 197 (1)  Within public administration there is a public service for the Republic, 
which must function, and be structured, in terms of national legislation, and which 
must loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day. 
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(f)  Public administration must be accountable.  
(g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with 
timely, accessible and accurate information.  
(h)  Good human-resource management and career-development 
practices, to maximise human potential, must be cultivated.  
(i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the 
South African people, with employment and personnel 
management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, 
and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve 
broad representation.   
Section 195 (2) highlights that the above principles apply to:  
(a) administration in every sphere of government;  
(b)  organs of state; and  
(c)  public enterprises.   
It is important to note that section 196, which is concerned with the Public 
Service Commission, provides at subsection (4) (a) that ‘the powers and 
functions of the Public Service Commission are to promote the values 
and principles set out in section 195, throughout the public service’ as 
previously detailed. This serves to emphasise the critical role envisaged 
for section 195 in driving accountability across the public sector in South 
Africa.  
Section 195 will be analysed against the backdrop of scrutinising specific 
aspects of the AllPay and Black Sash cases (properly cited and 
described below). The aforementioned case law provides illuminating 
insights with regards to the key role that could be played by section 195 
in the time to come (in a constitutional democracy) as well as maintaining 
an unerring focus on Constitutional Court jurisprudence as adopted in 
this thesis. Furthermore, a clear and persistent focus on specific aspects 
of the AllPay and Black Sash cases gives effect to (as well as 
consolidates) an overarching theme advanced in this thesis in relation to 
vulnerable groups seeking access to critical services (which should 
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routinely be provided by an accountable state). Thus, access to social 
grants (as dealt with in the AllPay/Black Sash cases) is explored 
alongside access to health rights (Soobramoney and TAC441 cases as 
described and analysed in this chapter) as well as access to housing 
(Grootboom442 case as described and analysed in this chapter).  
In this regard the Court viewed the approximately 15 million people (that 
relied on the payment of social grants) as vulnerable people that lived ‘at 
the margins of affluence in our society.’ 443 It should be noted that the 
South African Social Security Agency (‘SASSA’) had extended an 
invitation to bidders to submit proposals (i.e. Request for Proposals) in 
relation to the payment of social grants on 15 and 17 April 2011.444 The 
Request for Proposals sought to secure a (convenient) payment solution 
whilst minimising the risk of theft and fraud. 445  SASSA ultimately 
concluded a five year contract with Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd 
(‘CPS’) on 3 February 2012 for the payment of social grants.446 
The Court held that procurement disputes which entail the proper 
interpretation and application of section 217 447 of the Constitution ‘raise 
constitutional matters.’448 Justice Froneman noted that ‘procurement so 
palpably implicates socio-economic rights that the public has an interest 
in its being conducted in a fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and 
cost-effective manner.’449 Furthermore, the Court held that the right of 
                                                             
441 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC) 
(hereafter TAC). 
442 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom & Others 
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (hereafter Grootboom). 
443 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, 
South African Social Security Agency 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC) (hereafter AllPay1) 
para 1. 
444 AllPay1 (2014) para 9.  
445 AllPay1 (2014) para 9. 
446 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development and Others (2017) ZACC 8 
(hereafter Black Sash) para 3.  
447 Section 217 (1) provides that ‘When an organ of state in the national, provincial or 
local sphere of government, or any other institution identified in national 
legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a 
system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.’ 
448 AllPay1 (2014) para 4. 
449 AllPay1 (2014) para 4. 
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access to social security for people who are not in a position to support 
themselves, 450 especially children, 451 ‘is implicated.’452  
It should be noted that DCJ Moseneke held in Steenkamp NO v 
Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape that:  
‘Section 217 of the Constitution is the source of the powers and 
function of a government tender board.  It lays down that an organ 
of State in any of the three spheres of government, if authorised 
by law may contract for goods and services on behalf of 
government.  However, the tendering system it devises must be 
fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. This 
requirement must be understood together with the constitutional 
precepts on administrative justice in section 33 and the basic 
values governing public administration in section 195(1).’453  
It is submitted that the aforementioned quotation (as supported by 
Justice Froneman) serves to emphasise the critical role envisaged for 
section 195 in promoting the accountability of public officials.  
The Court held in AllPay1 that:  
‘Once a finding of invalidity … is made, the affected decision or 
conduct must be declared unlawful and a just and equitable order 
must be made.  It is at this stage that the possible inevitability of 
a similar outcome, if the decision is retaken, may be one of the 
factors that will have to be considered.  Any contract that flows 
from the constitutional and statutory procurement framework is 
concluded not on the state entity’s behalf, but on the public’s 
behalf. The interests of those most closely associated with the 
benefits of that contract must be given due weight. Here it will be 
                                                             
450 Section 27 (1) (c) provides that ‘Everyone has the right to have access to social 
security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, 
appropriate social assistance.’ 
451 Section 28 (1) (c) provides that ‘Every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, 
basic health care services and social services.’ 
452 AllPay1 (2014) para 4. 
453 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape [2006] ZACC 16; 2007 
(3) SA 121 (CC); 2007 (3) BCLR 300 (CC) paras 20 - 23. 
81 
 
 
the imperative interests of grant beneficiaries and particularly 
child grant recipients in an uninterrupted grant system that will 
play a major role.  The rights or expectations of an unsuccessful 
bidder will have to be assessed in that context.’454 
The Court subsequently held that the award of the tender to CPS, to 
process the payment of social grants for a period of five years in all nine 
provinces, was constitutionally invalid.455 However, the aforementioned 
declaration of invalidity was suspended until such time as a just and 
equitable remedy could be determined.456 
Justice Froneman highlighted that the current judgment (with reference 
to AllPay2) would contemplate a (suitable) remedy in light of the 
judgment on the merits in AllPay 1. 457  It should be noted that the 
declaration of the constitutional invalidity of the tender (as previously 
outlined in AllPay1 above) was premised on two grounds.458 SASSA had 
neglected to objectively confirm the empowerment credentials as 
claimed/provided by CPS. 459  SASSA had also failed to provide the 
necessary clarity in the second Bidders Notice as to what exactly was 
required of bidders (in relation to biometric verification) which ultimately 
resulted in only one bidder being considered in the second stage of the 
bidding process.460 The Court held that this had rendered the bidding 
process both uncompetitive and incapable of drawing any meaningful 
comparisons (between two or more bidders) with regards to cost-
effectiveness.461 
 
                                                             
454 AllPay1 (2014) para 56. 
455 AllPay1 (2014) para 98. 
456 AllPay1 (2014) para 98. 
457 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, 
South African Social Security Agency (2014) ZACC 12; 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC) 
(hereafter AllPay2) para 1.  
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459 AllPay2 (2014) para 1. 
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The Court noted that the Centre of Child Law as amicus curiae was keen 
to draw attention to the interest of the beneficiaries of social grants 
(especially children) in enjoying uninterrupted payments.462 The Court 
further noted that a significant proportion of social grant beneficiaries are 
in fact children.463 Consequently, the Court was mindful of the need for 
a greater level of scrutiny on its part in relation to an assessment of any 
possible disruption in the payment process where the rights of children 
are at stake.464  
The Court highlighted that the cost of running a new tender process 
could cost between R5 Million and R10 Million but it was necessary to 
provide the relevant context as it served to highlight that this was a 
justifiable price to expend (so as to advance the demands of 
transparency and accountability) in light of the gargantuan (total) cost of 
social grant payments as well as the possibility of a more cost-effective 
solution.465  
The Court drew attention to key constitutional provisions in highlighting 
that section 195 (1) (d) states that ‘The founding values of our 
Constitution include a democratic government based on the principles of 
accountability, responsiveness and openness’ as previously 
described. 466 The Court continued by noting that ‘The public 
administration, which includes organs of state [195 (2) (b)], “must be 
accountable” [195 (1) (f)], and “transparency must be fostered by 
providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information” 
[195 (1) (g)].’467  
It should be noted that CPS had argued that sections 27 (1) (c) and 28 
(1) (c) do not bind it to the extent that it would be compelled to continue 
to provide a public service (on behalf of the state) whilst utilising its own 
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resources (under terms to which it had not assented).468 In this regard 
the Court held that both SASSA and CPS (in light of the function that 
CPS performs in giving effect to the country-wide payment of social 
grants) are organs of state.469  The Court consequently held that CPS 
exercises a public power470 and could be viewed as ‘the gatekeeper’ in 
controlling the access (of the relevant beneficiaries) to social 
assistance.471   
However, the Court held that ‘SASSA remains accountable to the people 
of South Africa’ for the performance of the relevant functions by CPS. 472 
The Constitutional Court subsequently suspended the declaration of 
invalidity in the remedial order in AllPay2. 473  The aforementioned 
declaration was premised on SASSA awarding a new five year tender 
after a robust procurement process or SASSA itself assuming 
responsibility for the actual payment of the social grants when the 
suspended contract concluded with CPS would terminate on 31 March 
2017.474  
The Court ordered SASSA to submit reports as to the progress that had 
been made in devising a new tender process as well as its outcome.475 
SASSA subsequently furnished the Court with a Report in November 
2015 that it had elected on 15 October 2015 not to award a new tender 
as it would assume responsibility for the actual payment of social grants 
in due course and that it would in fact do so prior to the deadline of 31 
March 2017.476 Thus, the Court discharged its supervisory order on 25 
November 2015 in light of the aforementioned assurance provided by 
SASSA.477 However, the relevant officials at SASSA had been aware 
since April 2016 that SASSA would not be in a position to honour the 
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assurance (in being in a position to pay social grants from 1 April 2017) 
as provided to the Court.478 The Minister highlighted that she was only 
informed of the aforementioned failed undertaking (on the part of 
SASSA) in October 2016. 479 
The Court made mention of the admission by the executive arm of 
government of its failure to give effect to its constitutional and statutory 
obligations in providing for the social assistance of its people.480 The 
Court noted that this was made all the more troubling by the fact that the 
government had to rely on a private corporate entity with questionable 
commitment (with specific reference to the transformation of its 
management structures so as to reflect greater representivity of 
previously advantaged groups) to extricate itself from this 
predicament.481 
The Court held that SASSA would not be in a position to assume control 
for the payment of social grants by 1 April 2017 (nor for a considerable 
time period after that).482 It was consequently the intention of SASSA to 
conclude a contract with CPS (outside of the competitive tender process 
as required by section 217 of the Constitution) as a means to facilitate 
the continued payment of social grants.483 Thus, SASSA had effectively 
disregarded ‘two fundamental pillars’ of the remedial order as handed 
down in AllPay 2. 484 Furthermore, SASSA had broken its promise (as 
furnished to the Court in November 2015) that it would be in a position 
to process the actual payments of social grants by 31 March 2017 and 
in terms of which the Court had elected to withdraw the supervisory order 
(as previously explained).485  
The Court held that neither the Minister nor SASSA thought it necessary 
to inform the Court of the aforementioned setbacks until 28 February 
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2017 when SASSA and its CEO lodged an urgent application to secure 
an order permitting it to take additional steps to secure the payment of 
social grants from 1 April 2017. 486 The Court consequently highlighted 
the need for the Minister and SASSA to publically account for their 
conduct.487 In this regard the Court held that ‘accountability is a central 
value of the Constitution’.488  
The Court held that Black Sash had the necessary standing to secure 
direct access on the grounds of (compelling) public interest.489 Justice 
Froneman provided an illuminating insight in stating that the right to 
social assistance provided ‘the bare bones of a life of dignity, equality 
and freedom’ for a multitude of people including children, the elderly and 
the indigent.490  
Justice Froneman granted the South African Post Office (‘SAPO’) 
access as amicus curiae as it provided a powerful perspective on the 
manner in which ‘with sufficient will and energy, the State itself could 
creditably manage the grants distribution process.’491 It is submitted that 
this serves as a fitting reminder of the need for the state to demonstrate 
the necessary political will in advancing the needs of vulnerable groups 
(and in so doing embrace accountability for systematically dismantling 
the wide-ranging deprivation endured by vulnerable groups which is in 
keeping with the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu). 
The Court highlighted that the overwhelming concern was that the right 
of millions of people to access social assistance, in terms of section 27 
(1) (c), was placed in jeopardy.492 The Court held that it was competent 
to intervene under these and similarly (grave) circumstances 493  as 
articulated by Chief Justice Mogoeng elsewhere as follows:  
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‘…It is about the upper guardian of our Constitution responding to 
its core mandate by preserving the integrity of our constitutional 
democracy…’494   
The aforementioned insight offered by Chief Justice Mogoeng could be 
construed as emphasising the critical role of the Constitutional Court in 
ensuring that the state remains accountable for the pressing needs of 
vulnerable groups and is censured in those instances where its conduct 
threatens to undermine constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
The Court subsequently explored the (justifiable) supervision of the 
performance of the contract in light of SASSA’s concrete obligations.495 
The Court subsequently referred to496 the conduct displayed by SASSA 
in AllPay2 as follows:  
‘Before concluding, it is necessary to say something about 
SASSA’s conduct.  SASSA is an organ of state. It is bound 
to the basic values and principles governing public 
administration set out in section 195 of the Constitution.  
As is evident from this judgment, and the merits judgment, 
SASSA’s irregular conduct has been the sole cause for the 
declaration of invalidity and for the setting aside of the 
contract between it and Cash Paymaster.’497  
‘This Court sought further submissions from the parties to 
assist in the difficult task of determining appropriate relief. 
The importance of this is obvious, not only because of the 
vast sums of money involved but more importantly, 
because of the enormous consequences of irregularities 
where the interests of beneficiaries, particularly children, 
play a pivotal role in assessing the appropriate remedy.’498 
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‘Yet, contrary to the obligations it carries under section 
195, SASSA has adopted an unhelpful and almost 
obstructionist stance. It failed to furnish crucial information 
to AllPay regarding the implementation of the tender and 
to Corruption Watch in respect of steps it took to 
investigate irregularities in the bid and decision-making 
processes. Its conduct must be deprecated, particularly in 
view of the important role it plays as guardian of the right 
to social security and as controller of beneficiaries’ access 
to social assistance.’499  
The aforementioned passages, as quoted by the Court in Black Sash, 
serve to confirm the critical role of section 195 in shaping the conduct of 
public officials/organs of state so as to give effect to their duties in a 
manner which will advance constitutionally guaranteed rights.  
Justice Froneman noted the clear inability of SASSA to discharge its 
duties with regards to the performance of the contract, a transparent 
bidding process and developing the necessary expertise in-house to 
process the payment of social grants.500 Furthermore, the Court noted 
that the aforementioned conduct of SASSA demanded ‘explanation and 
accountability’.501 
The Court expressed its displeasure with the conduct of the Minister and 
SASSA who had utilised the discharge of the supervisory order as 
previously issued by the Court as justification for not 
approaching/informing the Court that it would not be in a position to pay 
the social grants itself as per its previous assurance.502 The Court held 
that the material component of the court order remained even though the 
supervisory component of the same order had been discharged. 503 
Thus, SASSA was confined to two specific options in either facilitating 
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the payment of social grants by devising a competitive tendering process 
or processing the payments of social grants in-house after 31 March 
2017.504 Thus, SASSA was in breach of the Court’s remedial order when 
it became aware that it could not pursue either of the aforementioned 
options and in fact contemplated giving effect to steps outside of the 
aforementioned two options.505  
Justice Froneman noted that there was no obstacle (legal or otherwise) 
that prevented the Minister and SASSA from engaging with the Court.506 
This is despite the fact that both the Minister and SASSA had the 
necessary knowledge that compliance with the court order was not 
possible from end August to about October 2016.507 The Court noted 
that the aforementioned inability to safeguard the protection of access of 
grant recipients to continued social assistance justified supervision by 
the Court.508 However, the Court held that more was required (over and 
above the aforementioned supervision of SASSA) in light of supervision 
alone not serving to persuade SASSA to give effect to its constitutional 
mandate.509  
The Court held that the Auditor-General could be viewed as ‘a possible 
independent monitor’ to assist the Court.510 In this regard the Auditor 
General is permitted to ‘audit and report on the accounts, financial 
statements and financial management of any institution that is 
authorised in terms of any law to receive money for a public purpose’ in 
terms of section 188 (2) (b) of the Constitution.511 The Court confirmed 
that CPS is in fact such an institution (in light of the function served by 
CPS in paying social grants (as previously discussed).512  
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The Court subsequently declared that the Minister and SASSA are liable 
for costs in their official capacity but felt compelled to devise an order 
that would explore whether individual conduct materially contributed to 
the current state of affairs.513 However, the Court held that it could only 
scrutinise the conduct of affected parties if they are joined to the 
proceedings in their personal capacities so as to provide them with a 
suitable platform to explain/defend their conduct (and in so doing avoid 
an adverse costs order in their personal capacity).514 The hardened 
stance adopted by the Court, with regards to exploring individual cost 
orders against public officials that display gross negligence and/or mala 
fides, is welcomed as a mechanism to demand that public officials 
maintain a suitable standard in meeting the needs of vulnerable groups.  
The Court held that the Minister, in holding executive political office, was 
ultimately responsible for the crisis and had to account to Parliament in 
terms of section 55515 of the Constitution.516 The order517 by the Court is 
lengthy but it is critical to note that the Court demonstrates a robust and 
expansive approach in relation to supervising the conduct of CPS, the 
Minister and SASSA [as a means to safeguard the right of access to 
social assistance in terms section 27 (1) (c)]. It is submitted that the 
Court placed reliance on Section 195 to highlight the manner in which 
the conduct of SASSA and the Minister had failed to meet the expected 
standard in giving effect to the duties owed to vulnerable people in terms 
of constitutionally guaranteed rights.   
The insights offered below, with reference to present day developments 
in the social grants payment debacle, serve to demonstrate that the 
conduct of SASSA and the Minister needs to be subjected to ongoing 
scrutiny by the Court. In this regard the current newspaper reports 
demonstrate a persistent and alarming lack of accountability on the part 
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of the Minister and SASSA in relation to giving effect to the relevant 
Court orders as well as meeting the critical needs of vulnerable people.  
The current situation (as described below) highlights the importance of 
utilising section 195 to drive the accountability of public officials/organs 
of state. In this regard sections 195 (1) (a), 195 (1) (b) and 195 (1) (f) are 
especially critical in light of the controversy in which the Minister and 
SASSA are currently mired. The alarm was raised that social grant 
payments to 17 million beneficiaries was destined for another crisis as 
SASSA had made no discernible progress in securing the services of a 
new entity to distribute the aforementioned grants (in giving effect to the 
Constitutional Court ruling that a new services provider should be in 
place by 1 April 2018).518  It was of concern that Minister Bathabile 
Dlamini had elected not to appear nor account at the last two sittings of 
the Social Development Portfolio Committee.519 Furthermore, the panel 
of experts appointed by the Constitutional Court (to provide oversight 
with regards to the phasing out of the services rendered by CPS) had 
expressed the view that SASSA had wilfully ignored their requests for 
information/documentation.520 Furthermore, Minister Dlamini had been 
accused of ‘manufacturing a crisis’ by issuing a statement on 30 October 
2017 that SAPO was not capable of offering a comprehensive social 
grants payment solution as a means of ensuring that CPS would remain 
the service provider of choice.521  
It should be noted that the Chief Executive of SAPO, Mark Barnes, 
vigorously disputed the claims by Minister Dlamini (as to the inability of 
SAPO to provide a comprehensive social grants payment solution) by 
referring to an independent assessment by CSIR in which SAPO had 
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yielded a 97% pass rate across 218 performance categories. 522 
Furthermore, Members of Parliament in the Standing Committee on 
Public Accounts (‘SCOPA’) and the Social Development Portfolio 
Committee had expressed dismay at their meeting on 31 October 2017 
(at which Minister Dlamini had in fact been in attendance) in that SAPO 
and SASSA had yet to conclude an agreement despite the fact that just 
5 months remained on the contract with CPS.523  
It should be noted that the Director-General at National Treasury, Dondo 
Mohajane, had briefed SCOPA/Social Development Portfolio Committee 
on 31 October 2017 that he had facilitated 4 meetings between SASSA 
and SAPO in an attempt to break the deadlock. 524  Furthermore, it 
emerged at the same meeting that SAPO had only just been provided 
with the information as to why it was supposedly not able to provide the 
social grants payment service on behalf of SASSA.525 Mohajane also 
expressed the view that there was no comprehensive guidance from the 
relevant (two) cabinet ministers to inform the work of the respective 
negotiation teams of SASSA and SAPO.526   
The abovementioned theme (with regards to the ‘manufacturing of a 
crisis’ by the Minister) was explored further in light of the fact that the 
Minister would seek to initiate a new tender process in claiming that 
SAPO was not capable of providing a comprehensive social grants 
payment solution. 527  The winners of a new tender would likely be 
confirmed only in March 2018 - this would result in ‘a hybrid system’ in 
which the winning bidder in the tender process would not be in a position 
to take over social grant payments prior to the contract of CPS drawing 
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to a close.528 It was noted (with concern) that Minister Dlamini remained 
‘unwilling or unable to make any real effort to remove CPS from the 
highly lucrative tender’.529 Consequently, the state should accept the fact 
that ‘society will return to the courts to have them govern by default 
because the government is derelict in its duties’.530 
Jeff Radebe, the chairperson of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on 
comprehensive social security, highlighted that all co-operation 
agreements between SAPO and SASSA would be concluded by 17 
November 2017. 531  However, the details of the aforementioned co-
operation agreements are yet to be finalised and the hybrid model (as 
proposed by Treasury to include all banks and SAPO in effecting social 
grant payments) is yet to be considered. 532 
The concern was once again raised that no mention was made of the 
entity/service provider that would be responsible for the production of 
new cards, banking services and the cash distribution of grants which 
would be required as part of the hybrid social grants scheme.533 In this 
regard the editorial comment highlighted that ‘it is time for this ridiculous 
display of incompetency to be brought to a halt – beginning with the 
sacking of Bathabile Dlamini.’534 It is difficult to find fault with the call 
raised in the aforementioned editorial piece as Minister Bathabile and 
SASSA have failed to take any decisive steps in the past 8 months to 
give effect to the terms of the latest Constitutional Court ruling. It is 
submitted that there is likely to be significant political fallout in the next 
while in the lead up to the Constitutional Court deadline which serves to 
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emphasise the need to demand a clear standard of accountability on the 
part of public officials as provided for in terms of section 195. 535  
It should be noted that the previous commentary, in relation to the 
dereliction of duty displayed by the Minister and SASSA, serves to 
emphasise the key role to be played by the Constitutional Court in 
enforcing the obligations of the state with reference to section 195 and 
other relevant provisions of the Constitution as previously detailed. In 
this regard it is indeed a positive sign to note that President Ramaphosa 
highlighted the following as part of his State of the Nation address on 16 
February 2018:  
‘Social grants remain a vital lifeline for millions of our people living 
in poverty. We will urgently take decisive steps to comply with all 
directions of the Constitutional Court. I want to personally allay 
fears of any disruption to the efficient delivery of this critical 
service, and will take action to ensure no person in government is 
undermining implementation deadlines set by the court.’ 536 
It is submitted that the sentiments expressed by President Ramaphosa 
are laudable and the hope is that the relevant public officials do in fact 
embrace a better way of doing things so as to alleviate the suffering of 
vulnerable groups. It is further submitted that public officials that 
embrace the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu (as advanced in this 
thesis) will contribute to the creation of a community/nation-state in 
which all people will be treated as having equal worth as previously 
explained. This should be contrasted with the application of section 195 
which at its core demands that public officials are ethical and forge an 
accountable public administration so as to faithfully serve the needs of 
the public. Consequently, it is my firm submission that the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu can mesh with section 195 (as well as an 
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individual human rights regime as previously explained) in shaping 
ethical and accountable public officials that unfalteringly strive to create 
a nation-state in which all people can live lives of purpose. 
The Constitution provides that a court must consider international law 
when interpreting rights which will indeed assist in the realisation of 
socio-economic rights.537 This is in keeping with the international law 
obligations of South Africa. 538  In addition, the Constitutional Court, 
tasked with providing the seminal interpretation of the Constitution with 
reference to section 167(3),539 is ultimately responsible for providing 
insight as to the obligations flowing from enshrined constitutional 
rights.540 Bilchitz notes that the minimum core is defined in terms of 
minimal interests which we all share but vulnerable people are unable to 
attain those same interests and consequently require assistance by the 
state.541  
It is of paramount importance to develop definitive insight as to the 
positioning of the Constitution in our troubled history as well as the 
nature and extent of the rights that are safeguarded in the 
Constitution.542 In this regard De Vos believes that there is significant 
academic support for the idea advanced by Klare that South Africa’s 
Constitution can be viewed as setting up ‘a project of transformative 
constitutionalism’. 543  The aforementioned project serves as a 
comprehensive rejection of the fiction shaped by liberal constitutionalism 
in which the political community is fixed.544 Thus, little or no attention is 
paid to the political, social and economic context within which a 
Constitution was established nor accommodating the fact that the 
context will change over time.545 De Vos is correct in stating that the 
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1996 South African Constitution is far removed from the aforementioned 
political fiction as the South African Constitution is premised on actively 
engaging with the past (which laid the groundwork for its adoption) as 
well as the future which it seeks to shape in part.546 Furthermore, the 
South African Constitution can be viewed as giving rise to a 
constitutional vision styled as a ‘long-term project of constitutional 
enactment, interpretation and enforcement’ which is committed to 
shaping South Africa’s ‘political and social institutions and power 
relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction’.547 
Thus, the Constitution issues an unequivocal rejection of the social and 
economic status quo and strives to give effect to one of its core aims to 
transform society into a more just and fair place in which people would 
be better placed to reach their full potential as human beings.548 
This is consistent with Brand’s belief that the full justiciability of socio-
economic rights (as entrenched in the South African Constitution) is a 
critical and radical innovation and that it played a pivotal role in moving 
Klare to embrace a ‘post-Liberal’ reading of the Constitution which ‘in 
sharp contrast to the classic liberal documents (the South African 
Constitution) is social, redistributive, caring, positive, at least partly 
horizontal, participatory, multicultural, and self-conscious about its 
historical setting and transformative role and mission’.549 Furthermore, 
the South African Constitution seeks to both protect as well as transform 
and the Constitution consequently ‘embraces a vision of collective self-
determination parallel to (not in place of) its strong vision of individual 
self-determination’.550  
It is implicit, in a transformative reading of the Constitution, that the state 
is burdened with both negative and positive obligations and how these 
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same obligations ‘might have to be reconciled with one another within a 
specific context’.551 The contextual interpretation of rights demands the 
contemplation of two types of context.552 Firstly, a considered analysis 
of the relevant Chapter and the Constitution as a whole (as well as the 
scope and meaning of the rights enshrined in the Constitution) which 
may only be ascertained against the backdrop of the social and historical 
context of the country.553 The text contained in the various provisions of 
the Bill of Rights is deemed to burden the state with both negative and 
positive duties (as previously stated) and a fitting example in this regard 
is section 7 which obliges the state not only to respect the various rights 
but also to protect, promote and fulfil those same rights.554 Thus, it is 
incumbent upon the state to progressively give effect to all rights as it is 
apparent that rights do not present ‘as pre-existing entitlements that are 
activated as soon as a justiciable Bill of Rights’ is established.555 The 
state has a constitutional obligation to progressively pursue ‘rights-
based goals’ even though De Vos acknowledges the difficulty (even 
impossibility) of the task ahead.556  
Shue is commonly credited as having first conceptualised a multiple 
obligations structure applicable to all human rights. 557  De Vos, with 
reference to the aforementioned contribution by Shue, believes that the 
(primary) duty to respect human rights is easiest to comprehend as it 
dovetails with the conservative view that the nature of a Bill of Rights 
should serve ‘as a shield against government interference’.558 There is 
a secondary duty on the part of the state to protect citizens against 
political/economic/social acts of exploitation. 559  Thus, the state is 
burdened with a positive obligation to safeguard the specified rights from 
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being infringed by private parties.560 Also, there is a tertiary obligation on 
the part of the state to assist and fulfil human rights (whether it be civil, 
political and/or socio-economic rights). 561  This implies that the 
beneficiary has a right to expect positive action on the part of the state.562 
It should be noted that the ‘duty to promote’ is at times viewed as a 
dimension of the duty to fulfil socio-economic rights and it encompasses 
raising awareness and educational initiatives concerning those same 
rights.563  It is critical to note that when civil and political rights are 
categorised as precise (and their enforcement is deemed to pose no 
difficulty) commentators are as a rule focussed on the first level of 
obligations. 564  However, when socio-economic rights are viewed as 
imprecise and unenforceable, commentators are as a rule focussed on 
the imprecise tertiary level of obligations.565   
De Vos believes that the manner in which the equality clause as well as 
various socio-economic rights are defined firmly point to the 
transformative nature of the various rights in the Bill of Rights. 566  It 
should be noted that even though section 9 (2) provides for equality 
before the law [section 9 (1)] and the prohibition of unfair discrimination 
[section 9 (3)] this will not inevitably (nor swiftly) lead to securing ‘real’ 
equality in our society.567 Thus, the state could elect (or could in fact be 
constitutionally mandated) to implement measures that will bring about 
‘real’ equality (i.e. as related to the concept of substantive equality) in 
the long term.568 Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has highlighted 
the importance of the careful consideration of the historical, social and 
economic context when interpreting the provisions of the Bill of Rights.569 
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Consequently, an understanding of the historical context (which ushered 
in the new constitutional dispensation) is a critical component in 
developing a nuanced understanding of the various rights in the Bill of 
Rights.570 Thus, the legacy of apartheid looms large in seeking to not 
only bring about political transformation (as evidenced by an open and 
democratic society) but also to provide for social and economic 
transformation as a means to give effect to the key values of freedom, 
dignity and equality in a contemporary South Africa.571 Furthermore, the 
dire social and economic conditions prevalent in South Africa serve as 
the backdrop for a nuanced perspective of the Bill of Rights in that there 
are ‘great and unacceptable discrepancies in wealth in the country’.572 It 
follows that the Bill of Rights has to be interpreted in a manner which will 
bring about economic transformation.573 This will in turn give effect to the 
vision of the Constitution to transform society so as to ensure that all 
South Africans can lead a dignified existence and strive to realise their 
full potential.574  
It should be noted that section 172 (1) (b) empowers the court when 
deliberating on a constitutional matter within its power, which includes 
any issue involving the interpretation, protection or enforcement of the 
Constitution in terms of section 167 (7), to make any order that is just 
and equitable. 575 In addition, section 38 stipulates that, whenever a 
fundamental right has been threatened or violated, the Constitutional 
Court may provide any ‘appropriate relief.’ 576 Thus, it follows that the 
Constitutional Court has remarkable latitude in selecting a remedy (in 
any case where a fundamental right has been threatened or violated) so 
long as that remedy is just, equitable and appropriate.577  
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A society is ultimately tasked with bearing the obligations that flow from 
conditional rights even though pinpointing the specific obligations cannot 
be inferred directly from the conditional rights.578  In this regard Bilchitz 
has stated that:  
‘The notion of a society has been used as a shorthand expression 
for the primary collective political grouping that designs, forms 
and enforces rules which govern the distribution of benefits and 
burdens to individuals and thus largely determines the ability of 
individuals to lead lives of value… It is recognised that there are 
collective groupings beyond the nation state with the power to 
formulate and enforce rules that impact significantly upon 
individuals. It is thus also an important project to consider 
responsibilities beyond the nation state’.579   
Thus, the aforementioned collective groupings (beyond the nation-state) 
will be explored in part through a discussion of ‘semi-autonomous fields’ 
as proposed by the anthropologist, Sally Falk Moore.580  
Furthermore, the right to housing as well as the rights to health care, 
food, water and social services provide ‘rights of access to the social and 
economic entitlements’ which serves to confirm that the duty of the state 
is limited.581  Consequently, the limit of the obligation borne by the state 
is illustrated by De Vos by citing an example in which the state would not 
be under a duty ‘to provide individuals with free housing’ but could 
ostensibly be compelled to provide its citizens with adequate access to 
secure housing.582 Also, the constitutional analysis of the Bill of Rights 
normally has two stages - the applicant will need to demonstrate that the 
specific duty to respect, protect, promote or fulfil the obligation flowing 
from a right in the Bill of Rights has not been honoured after which the 
party seeking to uphold the restriction will need to advance persuasive 
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reasons as to why the restriction is justified.583 This second stage allows 
for obligations flowing from specific rights to be legitimately limited by 
virtue of the general limitations clause in section 36 of the Constitution.584  
In addition, the insertion of ‘internal limitations clauses’ in the Bill of 
Rights is viewed as an admission that the state is neither capable of 
realising all of the rights fully nor immediately.585 However, the Final 
Constitution and the ICESCR adopt a similar stance in providing that 
clear obligations flow from rights even when those same rights are 
subject to progressive realisation.586  
3.3.1  The monitoring and enforcement of the progressive realisation of  
socio-economic rights  
I am in agreement with De Vos that an effective monitoring system is 
critical so as to ensure that the state makes significant strides in realising 
socio-economic rights in the shortest possible time.587 Furthermore, the 
Constitution compels the South African Human Rights Commission 
(‘SAHRC’) to demand reports from the relevant organs of state so as to 
assess the implementation of the various socio-economic rights.588  
There is a clear need to devise ‘specific, quantifiable and achievable 
targets, by agreement or negotiation’. 589  The attainment of the 
aforementioned measurable goals should be monitored by the SAHRC 
which in turn reports to Parliament and the public.590 Budlender offers a 
critical insight in agitating for ‘systematic monitoring of outputs and 
outcomes’ rather than whether, in general, rights are being promoted.591 
This clearly demonstrates the need to monitor ‘the mainstreaming of 
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social and economic rights in policy and legislation’ rather than a single-
minded focus on instances of abuse.592 Furthermore, the role of the 
SAHRC should not be confined to that of ‘a conduit of information’ but 
should also aim to analyse and assess whether the measures adopted 
by the relevant organs of state are effective in advancing socio-economic 
rights.593 The SAHRC is viewed as having a critical role to play in forging 
the core content of socio-economic rights as this is deemed essential to 
effectively monitor and enforce socio-economic rights.594 The reality is 
that the organs of state cannot be held fully accountable (for not 
discharging their constitutional obligations as related to socio-economic 
rights) in the absence of clear goals and benchmarks. 595  Thus, the 
SAHRC and the Commission for Gender Equality should collaborate in 
an effective manner so as to ensure that gender-related factors are an 
integral component in the monitoring of socio-economic rights.596  
Furthermore, the SAHRC and the Commission on Gender Equality have 
a critical role to play in monitoring the progressive realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights, providing the state with 
recommendations as and when required and engaging with civil society 
in the preparation of South Africa’s reports to the UN Committee.597 It 
follows that both the Commission on Gender Equality and the SAHRC 
should have an unwavering focus on giving practical effect to ‘the 
principle of indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights’ which 
is in keeping with contemporary trends in international human rights 
law.598 It should be noted that ‘a process-requirement remains for the 
state to monitor the extent of non-realisation’ as well as formulate 
suitable ‘remedial strategies and programmes’ even in those instances 
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where the available resources of the State Party are clearly insufficient 
to achieve the desired standard in relation to the realisation of rights.599  
Also, Kollapen describes the outcomes of the monitoring process which 
the SAHRC should strive to achieve in that the state should embrace a 
nuanced understanding of respecting and advancing socio-economic 
rights through its reflection in policy, legislation, programmes and 
budgetary processes. 600  Kollapen is correct in stating that proper 
accountability will be ensured through striving to reach consensus as to 
the core normative content of socio-economic rights in addition to the 
clear standards/benchmarks for measuring the progressive realisation of 
rights.601  Also, active participation by NGOs is indeed critical in the 
monitoring and enforcement of socio-economic rights.602  
Liebenberg also believes that the SAHRC can play a pivotal supportive 
role in the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights.603 There have 
only been a limited number of socio-economic rights cases heard in the 
Constitutional Court which bolsters her belief in the need for an institution 
such as the SAHRC to be actively engaged in the promotion and 
safeguarding of socio-economic rights. 604  Thus, the information 
generated through the monitoring process and the annual assessment 
of the specific progress of relevant organs of state (in discharging their 
obligations relating to the realisation of socio-economic rights) should 
assist in the selection of appropriate cases for litigation.605 Liebenberg 
believes that there is indeed an opportunity to forge a co-operative 
relationship between the SAHRC and the courts in the enforcement of 
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orders relating to the realisation of socio-economic rights.606 Thus, the 
courts should seek to involve the SAHRC in the supervision and 
enforcement of their decisions/orders involving socio-economic rights.607 
Also, the SAHRC can bring widespread violations of socio-economic 
rights to the attention of the public and the state without always having 
to resort to litigation. 608  Furthermore, the SAHRC can develop an 
understanding of the impact of government programmes on vulnerable 
communities (and whether those programmes are being reasonably 
implemented) by involving both government officials and civil society 
organisations in the information-gathering and dissemination process.609  
I am in complete agreement with Liebenberg as to the enhanced role 
that the SAHRC should assume as a means to hold the state 
accountable in progressively giving effect to constitutionally guaranteed 
socio-economic rights. In this regard the SAHRC is not only mandated 
to take receipt of Reports on an annual basis from relevant organs of 
state610 but is perfectly placed to engage with the state (as well as field 
representations from NGOs as well as the broader public) in striving to 
forge a nation-state in which all people are treated with equal respect.  
Section 7(2)611 [read with section 39] is viewed as illustrating the critical 
importance of information pertaining to international human rights law 
(which has provided content to the positive duties borne by states) in a 
manner consistent with Shue’s ‘four-fold obligations typology adopted by 
section 7(2)’ as previously mentioned.612 In addition, Scott and Alston 
seek to identify the ‘overarching principles and underlying values’ in the 
Constitution that are relevant to purposive interpretation. 613  Thus, 
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section 39 is viewed as providing the values that must inform 
interpretation in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom. 614  Consequently, it is noted that ‘the 
nuanced, complex and onerous nature of the interpretive responsibility’ 
borne by the courts is rendered clear by the manner in which section 39 
(1) (a) is interlinked with sections 7(1)615 and 26.616   
In this regard section 7(1) serves to emphasise that the values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom can be viewed as ‘the ultimate normative 
sources’ of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.617 It is of interest to 
note that the limitations clause618 utilises those same three values to 
ascertain the substantive manner in which rights in the Bill of Rights can 
be justifiably limited.619 Thus, Scott and Alston rightfully believe that ‘the 
constitutional meta-values of human dignity, equality and freedom are 
both the genesis of rights and the basis for the principled limitation of 
those rights’.620  
It follows that any limitation imposed on a right must be in terms of a law 
of general application and is only permissible ‘to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom’.621 Thus, the limitations 
clause plays an important role in relation to all rights (including socio-
economic rights) in the Bill of Rights.622 Consequently, the state would 
have to publically define and justify a proposed limitation (as well as the 
nature and extent of that limitation) if the state sought to reduce its duties 
pertaining to socio-economic rights. 623  This is (correctly) viewed as 
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promoting public accountability in support of a constitutional commitment 
to realise socio-economic rights.624  
The critical importance of the monitoring and enforcement of the 
realisation of socio-economic rights (so as to alleviate the suffering and 
deprivation endured by vulnerable groups) is captured in the insightful 
perspective offered by Biney as follows:  
‘The Western notion of human rights stresses rights which are not 
very interesting in the context of African realities. There is much 
concern with the right to peaceful assembly, free speech and 
thought, fair trial... The appeal of these rights is sociologically 
specific. They appeal to people with a full stomach who can now 
afford to pursue the more esoteric aspects of self-fulfilment. The 
vast majority of our people are not in this position. They are facing 
the struggle for existence in its brutal immediacy’.625   
I am in complete agreement with the sentiments expressed by Biney as 
there is a clear need to maintain an unerring focus on the abhorrent 
suffering endured by vulnerable groups by virtue of not being in a 
position to access key socio-economic rights. It is submitted that this is 
in keeping with the contribution by Brand in casting light on the perpetual 
deprivation endured by vulnerable groups so as to expedite the 
cessation of the aforementioned suffering.626 
3.4      The obligations of state parties’ in relation to the ICESCR  
The Republic of South Africa is duty-bound to honour its international 
law commitments as per the valuable insight offered by De Vos as 
follows:  
‘The body of international standards is of significant importance 
with specific reference to the international human rights 
instruments and in this regard the ICESCR features prominently. 
This serves to advance consistency between the laws and 
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policies of South Africa and its obligations in the international 
human rights arena as well as to provide a legitimate source in 
analysing the nature of the rights and duties imposed on the state 
party’.627  
The ICESCR 628  (also known as the ‘the Covenant’ as previously 
described) is the pre-eminent international treaty safeguarding economic 
and social rights and was adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered 
into force on 3 January 1976.629 
South Africa signed the ICESCR on 3 October 1994 and in so doing 
highlighted its intention to become a party to (and consequently be 
bound by) the ICESCR. 630  South Africa subsequently ratified the 
ICESCR on 18 January 2015 and it entered into force on 12 April 
2015. 631  The ICESCR is the sister covenant to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (‘the ICCPR’) with the latter 
Covenant also previously ratified by South Africa.632 The ICCPR was 
adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 
1976.633   The importance of the ‘normative exchange’ between the 
ICESCR and the ICCPR is specifically noted in that there has been 
general agreement for a considerable amount of time that the ‘right to 
life’ in Article 6 of the ICCPR ‘overlaps with and draws upon the essential 
interests protected by various ICESCR rights such as those respecting 
health’.634 
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The Preamble of the ICESCR is illuminating in sketching a vision of a 
sanctuary for all (which is similar to the Preamble of the South African 
Constitution) in that: 
‘…the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from 
fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are 
created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social 
and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights…’ 
and ‘Realising that the individual, having duties to other 
individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is 
under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and 
observance of the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant.’635  
The UN Committee has noted two aspects in the duty to fulfil.636 The first 
is a duty to facilitate and support communities to secure access to socio-
economic rights.637 The second duty entails providing the relevant goods 
directly, whenever an individual or group is unable for reasons that are 
outside of their control, to secure access to that right.638 The latter aspect 
of the duty to fulfil is aimed at groups that find themselves in especially 
desperate circumstances. 639  It should be noted that all three socio-
economic rights cases heard in the Constitutional Court (i.e. 
Soobramoney, Grootboom and TAC respectively) had been concluded 
for some time before the ICESCR was ratified. Thus, prior to ratification 
the ICESCR was neither binding on South Africa under international law 
nor did it have any direct legal effect in domestic law. However, it did 
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serve as a critical guide under section 39(1)(b) to offer insight as to the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights under our Constitution.640 In this 
regard it is submitted that the General Comments (as issued by the UN 
Committee and described below) provide domestic courts with definitive 
guidance as to the duties of the State Party in terms of relevant 
international law. 
The UN Committee expands on the framework of ICESCR principles by 
publishing General Comments with the latter being described as follows: 
‘These are juridical acts by UN human rights treaty bodies which 
are designed to set out, in relatively succinct form, the content of 
states’ obligations under the relevant treaty with respect to a given 
right, or aspect of a right, or with respect to the treaty as a whole; 
the principles are articulated only after enough experience 
evaluating state reports has been generated for principles to be 
synthesised, articulated and to an extent developed in one easy-
to-access document.’641  
Furthermore, Article 2 (1) stipulates the general obligations in the 
ICESCR as follows:  
‘Each State Party to the Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures’.642  
It is acknowledged that civil, political and socio-economic rights are 
connected and interdependent as previously stated. Shue has provided 
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(as previously discussed) a nuanced account of the aforementioned 
types of rights which served as the basis for its incorporation in the 
ICESCR. Furthermore, the minimum core obligation approach as 
advanced by Bilchitz 643  is a modified version of the ICESCR. 
Consequently, the Republic of South Africa, in ratifying the ICESCR, has 
bound itself to the obligations, goals and standards of the ICESCR and 
will be obliged under international law to conduct itself in a manner that 
does not detract from the spirit of the ICESCR.644  Also, ratification of the 
ICESCR necessitates an alignment of the relevant domestic legislation 
and policies with the obligations imposed by the ICESCR. 645  The 
aforementioned ratification on the part of the Republic of South Africa 
(ostensibly) demonstrates its willingness to advance socio-economic 
rights and is likely to bolster its international credibility in its approach 
towards safeguarding socio-economic rights.646  
Furthermore, state parties to the ICESCR are subject to the reporting 
procedures as provided for by the UN Committee in terms of which the 
realisation of rights (that are safeguarded in the ICESCR) are monitored 
through the evaluation of state reports.647 Thus, South Africa will be 
obliged to furnish the UN Committee with an initial report (setting out 
details of the manner in which it would give effect to the realisation of 
rights as contained in the ICESCR) within two years of ratifying the 
Covenant.648 Thereafter, it would be duty bound to submit reports to the 
UN Committee every five years.649 The ratification of the ICESCR not 
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only serves to confirm South Africa’s commitment to socio-economic 
rights but also demonstrates its commitment to eradicating poverty (as 
well as strengthening development) through drawing on both domestic 
and international resources.650  It is believed that the state reporting 
procedure under the ICESCR will strengthen the culture of accountability 
in South Africa through referencing national and international human 
rights standards.651  
Furthermore, the aforementioned reporting procedure will strengthen the 
efforts of the SAHRC in monitoring the implementation of socio-
economic rights (by the South African government) with regards to the 
numerous challenges that have arisen ‘in relation to approach and 
methodology’ in so far as giving effect to those same rights.652 Those 
same reporting procedures also present national and international 
NGO’s with the opportunity to furnish the UN Committee with ‘shadow 
reports’.653 The purpose of the aforementioned shadow reports is to 
provide a suitable platform for organisations to table their concerns about 
the conduct of the relevant State Party (in giving effect to socio-economic 
rights as provided for in the ICESCR) which in turn could possibly 
influence the recommendations subsequently issued by the UN 
Committee to the relevant State Party. 654  Furthermore, the UN 
Committee prepares Concluding Observations which aim to provide the 
relevant State Party with recommendations that would assist the same 
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State Party to bolster the implementation of the rights safeguarded in the 
ICESCR.655 
The ratification of the ICESCR requires the South African courts ‘to align 
their jurisprudence’ with the obligations as provided for in the ICESCR.656 
Thus, it is implied that the courts would need to protect that which the 
UN Committee has described as the ‘minimum core obligation’ imposed 
by the provisions of the ICESCR.657 Consequently, the State Party would 
need to safeguard the provision of ‘an essential basic floor of socio-
economic rights provisioning such as food, water and social 
security…’658 Thus, the ratification of the ICESCR should facilitate the 
process through which South African jurisprudence ‘develops in 
harmony with the normative standards set by the ICESCR’ in relation to 
socio-economic rights. 659  However, Chenwi and Hardowar make 
mention of the reluctance of the Constitutional Court to adopt the 
minimum core approach which ‘caters adequately for the needs of the 
poor in providing more specific and effective remedies’.660 In this regard 
the Constitutional Court has embraced a reasonableness test in 
evaluating the conduct of the State in meeting its positive obligations 
pertaining to the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution.661 
There is an expectation that the Constitutional Court, in light of the 
ratification of the ICESCR, would need to develop/augment the 
aforementioned reasonableness test so that an obligation is borne by 
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the state to prioritise the protection of basic socio-economic needs.662 
Thus, the ratification of the ICESCR should result in South Africa 
broadening the scope of benefits in relation to the right to education and 
work as a means to more adequately cater for ‘the poor, marginalised 
and vulnerable’.663 
Nonetheless, it will be of considerable academic interest to see how the 
Constitutional Court will contend with the minimum core obligation 
approach (as endorsed by the UN Committee) given that the 
Constitutional Court has previously distanced itself from the minimum 
core obligation approach.664 However, it is deemed necessary to ensure 
that South African jurisprudence is better aligned to the ‘UN Committee’s 
authoritative interpretation’ of the duties borne by a State Party in terms 
of the ICESCR.665 It should be noted that many of the rights provided for 
in the ICESCR are afforded protection through the inclusion of socio-
economic rights in the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution.666 
Also, a number of the aforementioned socio-economic rights (and the 
manner in which they have been formulated) are similar to (and were in 
fact inspired by) the relevant provisions of the ICESCR.667 Furthermore, 
a raft of legislative and policy measures in South Africa serve to protect 
the rights in the ICESCR. 668  Thus, Petherbridge believes that the 
General Comments (as issued by the UN Committee) will play a critical 
role in assisting the courts to negotiate a path of consistency between 
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the relevant domestic law and policies and the obligations borne by 
South Africa under the ICESCR.669  
The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (‘OP-ICESCR’) was adopted by 
the General Assembly on 10 December 2008 (and was opened for 
signature on 24 September 2009).670 The OP-ICESCR duly came into 
force on 5 May 2013.671 Petherbridge believes that South Africa (in 
having ratified the ICESCR) should give immediate consideration to 
signing and ratifying the OP-ICESCR as this mechanism will permit 
individual victims of socio-economic rights abuses to obtain redress in 
the absence of suitable domestic remedies. 672  The OP-ICESCR 
provides for the submission of relevant information, by or on behalf of 
individuals/groups of individuals, to the UN Committee on the back of 
allegations that the relevant State Party has violated rights contained in 
the ICESCR.673  
The UN Committee assumes a quasi-adjudicative role and offers an 
international complaints mechanism which will become accessible 
where domestic remedies have been exhausted or in those instances 
where there have been unreasonable delays in giving effect to domestic 
remedies in relation to Article 3. 674  In addition, if placed under the 
aforementioned examination, the relevant State Party will be subject to 
the scrutiny of the UN Committee through its views and 
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recommendations. 675  The OP-ICESCR also provides for inter-state 
communication mechanisms in terms of which a State Party to the OP-
ICESCR can take another State Party to task for the non-fulfilment of 
obligations that are due under the ICESCR.676 However, this is subject 
to both State Parties having duly recognised the authority of the UN 
Committee to receive and consider communications in this regard.677 
Also, the OP-ICESCR makes provision for an inquiry procedure in terms 
of which the UN Committee can evaluate information and table its 
observations.678 The UN Committee, in terms of the aforementioned 
procedure, may pursue its own inquiry into the conduct of the State Party 
in light of information received that suggest grave or systematic 
violations of the rights safeguarded in the ICESCR.679 However, it is 
dependent upon the State Party recognising the authority of the UN 
Committee.680 The UN Committee is permitted to relay comments and 
recommendations to the relevant State Party in terms of this inquiry 
procedure.681  Thus, ratifying the OP-ICESCR will ensure that South 
Africa is subject to the abovementioned procedures and consequently 
held to a higher standard of accountability which in turn requires a higher 
degree of transparency.682  
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Furthermore, the OP-ICESCR obliges the State Parties to circulate 
copies of the ICESCR, the OP-ICESCR as well as the views and 
recommendations as furnished by the UN Committee.683 It follows that 
substantive knowledge of the obligations borne by the Republic of South 
Africa in terms of the ICESCR (as well as the individual complaints 
mechanisms if the OP-ICESCR is adopted) can be a formidable catalyst 
in elevating the awareness of civil society as to their socio-economic 
rights.684 This can bring about the active participation of civil society in 
holding the government accountable with regards to the progressive 
implementation of socio-economic rights in South Africa.685 It should be 
noted that ratifying the OP-ICESCR will improve the State Party’s 
adherence to the ICESCR as the communication and inquiry procedures 
will encourage that same State Party to fully incorporate the ICESCR 
into its municipal law and policies.686 Thus, South Africa stands to gain 
considerably from the ratification of the ICESCR as it bolsters the 
safeguarding and realisation of socio-economic rights in South Africa.687 
Furthermore, this should compel the state to exhibit an elevated 
standard of accountability in striving to respect, protect and fulfil the 
socio-economic rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.688  
Chenwi and Hardowar believe that the OP-ICESCR should be ratified as 
it promotes an accountability culture as well as empowering ‘poor, 
vulnerable and marginal groups’.689 The ratification of the OP-ICESCR 
will bolster the safeguarding of socio-economic rights ‘through policy, 
legislation and jurisprudence’ as well as demonstrate that South Africa 
has embraced a higher standard of accountability by recognising the 
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authority of the UN Committee to consider complaints and furnish the 
relevant state party with ‘its views and recommendations on addressing 
the challenges identified’.690 The OP-ICESCR can also assist in sourcing 
international assistance for states with significant resource 
constraints.691 This is in keeping with the recognition, as embraced by 
both the ICESCR and the South African Constitution, that the full 
realisation of socio-economic rights ‘is dependent on resources’. 692 
Chenwi and Hardowar believe that ratification of the OP-ICESCR will 
enable South Africa to lead the way in relation to the realisation of human 
rights at the regional level in Africa.693  
The ratification of the ICESCR (as well as the ratification of the OP-
ICESCR in time to come) will not dramatically alter the implementation 
of socio-economic rights in the short term.694 However, it is believed that 
the ICESCR and OP-ICESCR have a pivotal role to play in the realisation 
of socio-economic rights in the ‘medium to long-term’.695 In this regard 
the benefits that can flow from a treaty are reliant on its implementation 
as well as the lobbying power of civil society groups (in holding the state 
party accountable) so as to ensure that the relevant treaty provisions 
give rise to tangible benefits.696   
Petherbridge believes that ratification will consolidate South Africa’s role 
in advancing the rights of poor people and that the individual complaint 
mechanism of the OP-ICESCR ‘promotes a culture of accountability for 
implementing the ICESCR’.697 Thus, the OP-ICESCR is indeed of critical 
importance in safeguarding against future violations as well as ‘fostering 
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the perceptions of social rights as rights, and not simply desirable policy 
objectives’.698 
I firmly agree with the abovementioned authors as to the importance of 
the OP-ICESCR in bolstering accountability on the part of the state to 
advance socio-economic rights. In addition, it is submitted that the state 
should ratify the OP-ICESCR as a matter of urgency – this will serve as 
a credible display of political will on the part of the state to be held to a 
higher standard of accountability in meeting the pressing needs of 
vulnerable groups.   
 3.4.1 The duties of the state in relation to the dissemination of 
information to the public/vulnerable groups 
The possession of information is deemed critical in securing economic 
and social well-being.699 The dissemination of information is recognised 
as a critical (and often extremely cost-effective) way for the State to drive 
the advancement of ICESCR rights.700 It is (seemingly) not at present 
possible to provide every individual in South Africa with the necessary 
health care to safeguard his/her survival but the state must act to 
implement programmes that seek to eliminate a number of the most 
prevalent threats to survival such as malnutrition and HIV/AIDS.701 In this 
regard the Department of Health has to discharge a critical obligation in 
ensuring the development of pragmatic minimum standards for the 
public health care system as a matter of urgency.702  
The state should give effect to its constitutional duties in part through 
articulating clear sectoral goals through a properly considered policy in 
relation to the dissemination of information.703 This includes specifying a 
minimum level of service as well as comprehensive plans and 
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programmes (with indicators, targets and deadlines that can be 
assessed) to progressively increase the quality of health care over 
time.704 Thus, the state would fall foul of its constitutional obligations if it 
failed to meet the aforementioned targets as this would be indicative of 
a failure to progressively realise the right to health. 705 In addition, the 
courts should display the necessary resolve in imposing obligations on 
the state to develop such a plan/strategy (as well as evaluate that plan 
for its effectiveness in achieving the stated goals) as a means to ensure 
that the state progressively realises the right to health care as enshrined 
in the Constitution.706  
Robertson believes that financial, natural, human, technological and 
informational resources are the most critical resources in securing 
ICESCR rights.707 Thus, it is of paramount importance to determine the 
extent of the obligation of the member state to possibly allocate all of the 
resources potentially required to ensure the realisation of ICESCR 
rights.708 The mainstream perspective has always been that the extent 
of the available resources cannot be determined with exclusive 
reference to government budgets. 709  Thus, both central government 
expenditures and international assistance should be considered in 
assessing the maximum available resources of the state. 710 
Furthermore, the voluntary use of private resources is referred to as 
‘creating space’ and could be channelled by the state through the 
possible facilitation of land reform measures (such as land rights and 
agrarian reform) and raising taxes payable in the inheritance, property 
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and net wealth spheres.711  The state could consequently be called to 
account (as to whether it had secured access to all domestic resources 
as well as all available international assistance) in giving effect to 
ICESCR obligations.712   
As previously noted, the UN Committee has provided content to socio-
economic rights as well as the obligations that have to be borne by states 
by way of issuing General Comments.713 In this regard the principles that 
govern the obligations of state parties to the ICESCR are outlined in 
General Comment 3.714 Furthermore, the UN Committee has advocated 
the adoption of a minimum core obligation philosophy as previously 
indicated. 715  It should be noted that General Comment 3 makes a 
distinction between ‘obligations of conduct’ and ‘obligations of result’.716 
‘Obligations of conduct’ are concerned with state parties pursuing a 
course of action ‘reasonably calculated to realise the enjoyment of a 
particular right’.717 ‘Obligations of result’ on the other hand require ‘states 
to achieve specific targets to satisfy a detailed substantive standard’.718 
However, the ICESCR provisions are mostly drafted as obligations of 
result which are only rendered justiciable with difficulty.719 It is for the 
aforementioned reason that the clarification offered by the Limburg 
Principles,720 in relation to the obligations of the state party, is critical.721 
The Limburg Principles were adopted in June 1986 ‘by a group of 
respected international experts, and are regarded as an authoritative 
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guide to the interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’.722 
The Limburg Principles provide that ‘State parties are obligated, 
regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure respect for 
the minimum subsistence rights for all’.723 The Limburg Principles also 
outline that ‘Although the full realisation of the rights recognised in the 
Covenant is to be attained progressively, the application of some of 
these rights can be made justiciable immediately while other rights can 
become justiciable over time.’724  
In addition, the Limburg Principles advocate the advancement of a group 
of ‘near-absolute, core entitlements’ to provide for the basic subsistence 
needs of the most vulnerable people in states that are party to the 
ICESCR.725 Thus, an obligation to meet the needs of the most vulnerable 
people is immediately enforceable and is not dependent on the 
availability of resources except for the poorest countries. 726 
Furthermore, the needs of the most vulnerable people (i.e. those that are 
not able to meet their basic needs/cannot fend for themselves) should 
be prioritised through government intervention.727 It should be noted that 
the majority of the articles in the ICESCR provide specific steps that 
State Parties are required to take in progressively striving to attain full 
realisation of the rights.728 
The Limburg Principles also provide that the ‘progressive realisation of 
the right’ should not be construed as suggesting that the state has 
licence to postpone the realisation of a right to a distant future.729 Thus, 
the term ‘progressively’ as detailed in Article 2 of the ICESCR (which 
provides for the need to ‘achieve progressively the full realisation of the 
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rights’) should not be construed as exempting a state from immediately 
meeting the minimum subsistence needs of its people.730 Furthermore, 
it should be noted that the aforementioned statement/version is the 
favoured interpretation regarding the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights.731  
The abovementioned insights (with specific reference to the Limburg 
principles and the cited sections of the ICESCR) point to an obligation 
on the part of the state to access both public and private resources to 
the extent required to satisfy the ‘core’ entitlements of its people as a 
matter of urgency.732 Consequently, it could be argued that every state 
has to counter a rebuttable presumption that it is capable of providing for 
the subsistence requirements of all of its people if it defined resources 
broadly enough and subsequently launched an aggressive campaign to 
secure the required resources.733  The State Party is deemed to be 
‘under a minimum core obligation’ to give effect to critical levels of rights 
such as ‘basic nutrition, primary health-care, shelter and basic 
education’.734  A failure on the part of the State Party to provide the 
aforementioned basic needs makes it near impossible to lead a dignified 
human existence which is why it is understandably viewed as a prima 
facie breach of the obligations flowing from the Covenant.735 Thus, the 
State Party has ‘an increased justificatory burden to demonstrate’ that it 
has tried its utmost to marshal all of its resources to give effect to these 
minimum obligations.736  
It is a formidable and unenviable task to attempt to assess the 
performance of the state by defining and ascertaining the maximum 
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available resources of the state - a possible way of negotiating this 
challenge is to measure the performance of the state against recognised 
standards of resource utilisation (which is viewed as a reliable indicator 
of compliance). 737  Nonetheless, the underlying purpose of this brief 
discussion is to highlight the nature and (possible) extent of the 
accountability of the state in realising the socio-economic rights of its 
people by demonstrating its unwavering political will to dramatically 
improve the lives of its most vulnerable people. The aforementioned 
political will and accountability on the part of the state will be 
demonstrated by giving effect to the broadest possible meaning of 
available state resources (as well as providing the public with the 
necessary information on an ongoing basis) as a means of giving effect 
to the progressive realisation of critical socio-economic rights.  
The UN Committee has emphasised the usefulness of a state providing 
detailed benchmarks against which its performance in a specific sector 
can be assessed. 738  It would be difficult, in the absence of the 
aforementioned benchmarks, to determine the level of progress the state 
is making in discharging its duties to advance socio-economic rights.739 
This is in keeping with the accountability standard sought by Bilchitz in 
championing the minimum core obligation approach to advance urgent 
subsistence rights.740  Consequently, the relevant State Party should 
take steps that are ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted’ in discharging the 
obligations provided for in the ICESCR. 741   Thus, there will be an 
expectation on the part of State Parties’ that they furnish the UN 
Committee with details as to the measures adopted as well as the 
underlying reasons for those same measures to be viewed as the most 
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‘appropriate’ given the particular circumstances. 742  In this regard it 
should be noted that legislation is not mandatory but it should be viewed 
as serving a critical need.743 However, there are certain instances where 
legislation is indeed necessary to achieve a specific result (as pertaining 
to the realisation of a right).744  
The State Party is also required to take ‘other measures’ necessary to 
give effect to its obligations.745 This is due to the fact that the enactment 
of legislation alone is often not sufficient to achieve the desired result.746 
Thus, the state has a substantial challenge to overcome in seeking to 
justify an infringement of a concrete duty (with reference to an internal 
limitations clause) in the absence of legislative enactments and ‘other 
measures’.747  The State Party should consequently take decisive steps 
to realise rights as ‘expeditiously and effectively as possible’. 748 
Furthermore, the State Party is obliged to refrain from implementing 
retrogressive measures.749 However, in the event that the State Party 
seeks to give effect to a retrogressive measure, then it would entail ‘the 
most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by 
reference to the totality of rights provided for in the Covenant and in the 
context of the full use of the maximum available resources’. 750  In 
addition, the drafters of the ICESCR intended for the phrase ‘to the 
maximum of its available resources’ to be construed as resources that 
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are to be found both within a State as well those accessible through the 
international community by way of cooperation and assistance.751  
The critical insight offered by De Vos in highlighting that ‘there is no need 
for courts to abdicate their responsibility as there are clear rules and 
practices to give content to this right in line with international human 
rights norms’ cannot be faulted. 752  Yet, that is ostensibly what the 
Constitutional Court has done on a number of occasions which has 
effectively undermined the realisation of those same rights. In this regard 
the discussion by Roux, relating to the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 
offers illuminating insights.753  
It is my contention that public officials should embrace ubuntu as a 
conscious political choice so as to honour communal obligations. This is 
critical in realising an accountability standard which is aligned to our 
international law obligations (i.e. ICESCR commitments) and specifically 
modified so as to give effect to the constitutionally guaranteed 
subsistence rights in the Constitution (i.e. giving effect to the minimum 
core obligation approach as proposed by Bilchitz).754  
Section 39 specifically requires that international law must be considered 
in interpreting the Bill of Rights (as previously stated) but it does not 
expressly provide the manner in which the courts should give effect to 
this provision.755 However, section 233 provides additional clarity as to 
the substantive interpretive role of international law as follows: ‘When 
interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law 
over any interpretation that is inconsistent with international law’. 756 
Furthermore, the aforementioned section has striking similarities with the 
final two paragraphs of General Comment 9 which is an expression of 
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international human rights law and is aligned with the law of the 
ICESCR.757 Consequently, Scott and Alston state that:  
‘Within the limits of the appropriate exercise of their 
functions of judicial review, courts should take account of 
the Covenant rights where this is necessary to ensure that 
the State’s conduct is consistent with its obligations under 
the Covenant. Neglect by the courts of this responsibility is 
incompatible with the principle of the rule of law, which 
must always be taken to include respect for international 
human rights obligations.’758  
Furthermore, the aforementioned authors rightfully emphasise that ‘It is 
generally accepted that domestic law should be interpreted as far as 
possible in a way which conforms to a State’s international legal 
obligations’.759 Thus, when a domestic decision-maker is faced with a 
choice between an interpretation of domestic law that would place the 
State in breach of the Covenant and one that would enable the State to 
comply with the Covenant, international law requires the choice of the 
latter.760 Also, guarantees of equality and non-discrimination should be 
interpreted, to the greatest extent possible, in ways which facilitate the 
full protection of economic, social and cultural rights.761  
Consequently, Scott and Alston believe that the duty to progressively 
give effect to human rights includes the obligation to advance a specific 
prioritisation of a core minimum entitlement without delay.762 Thus, the 
aforementioned authors are keen to emphasise that to interpret the 
principle of progressive realisation as inconsistent with immediate 
obligations to give effect to critical safeguards ‘would be, in effect, to 
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conceptualise duties to ensure positive rights as never capable of being 
violated, as constantly receding into the future’.763 This is a critical insight 
as it speaks to the accountability of the state to realise critical 
subsistence rights immediately (or in the near future) as well as testing 
the political will of the state in prioritising the urgent needs of vulnerable 
groups.  
In conclusion, the Constitutional Court should at the very least exercise 
the option to assess whether the procedural requirements of the 
obligation to give effect to human rights progressively has been adhered 
to by the state and whether:  
‘the obligation to compile the required information to 
ascertain the nature and extent of the need accurately; the 
obligation to devise benchmarks so as to confirm the 
minimum entitlements in their societal context; the capacity 
to accurately analyse information as a means to determine 
which people and groups have the greatest demonstrated 
need; and the need to draw up targeted plans of action 
(linking service delivery objectives both to the raising of 
financial resources and budgetary allocations) so as to 
progressively cater for the needs of everyone while 
providing for the needs of the most disadvantaged groups 
and those experiencing acute suffering on a priority 
basis’.764  
In this regard, General Comment 1 provides considerable detail as to the 
procedural obligations that are so critical in giving effect to substantive 
rights and stipulates that State Parties may not plead financial hardship 
as a defence in failing to devise/implement this procedural framework.765 
Thus, the aforementioned insight informs the firm expectation that the 
public can harbour in relation to a State Party professing to prioritise the 
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urgent needs of vulnerable groups as a vivid demonstration of its political 
will (in striving to forge a just and caring nation-state). Furthermore, it is 
submitted that the relevant General Comments provide State Parties 
with definitive clarity on the manner in which critical socio-economic 
rights should be prioritised and subsequently realised in an environment 
of scarce resources.  
3.5     The minimum core obligation approach in relation to subsistence 
rights in the ICESCR 
It should be noted at the outset that there is an unfaltering focus on the 
minimum core obligation approach in this thesis. It is my firm contention 
that the minimum core obligation approach provides a powerful and 
transparent mechanism to compel the state to do so much more in 
meeting the critical needs of vulnerable groups in South Africa. In 
addition, General Comment 3, as issued by the UN Committee, provides 
a persuasive account as to the suitability of the minimum core obligation 
approach in bringing about beneficial change for vulnerable groups.766 
Furthermore, the minimum core obligation approach as advanced by 
Bilchitz is specifically endorsed in this thesis. This is as a result of 
Bilchitz’s unrelenting insistence on the state driving the realisation of 
critical socio-economic rights – this should be in line with guidance (that 
should be on offer) by the Constitutional Court through developing critical 
determinate content for socio-economic rights. Furthermore, it is 
submitted that the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu finds 
expression in the underlying philosophy of the minimum core obligation 
approach in seeking to stave off threats to vulnerable groups in the 
community/nation-state.  
The minimum core obligation approach serves to cast light on the duties 
owed by the state to its people which resonates with the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu in highlighting the duties owed by a member 
(to every other member of the community/nation-state) as a means to 
forge and sustain a viable community/nation-state. Thus, it is submitted 
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that the minimum core obligation approach will serve to facilitate the 
progressive realisation of those same critical subsistence rights in the 
shortest possible time. It is noted that the aforementioned minimum core 
obligation has met with resistance in various quarters (including relevant 
Constitutional Court judgments). However, it will be interrogated in this 
thesis as a means to benchmark a suitable accountability standard for 
public officials to give effect to their duties in relation to the progressive 
realisation of urgent socio-economic rights. 
Bilchitz believes that the interpretation (and enforcement) of socio-
economic rights is best served by utilising a revised version 767 of the 
minimum core approach as endorsed by the UN Committee in its 3rd 
General Comment.768 Bilchitz emphasises the need for further bolstering 
of the minimum core approach (as adopted by the aforementioned UN 
Committee) in order to consolidate the underlying rationale of the 
normative approach and to explore the full implications of the 
approach.769   
It follows that one should distinguish ‘between the two thresholds of 
interests that individuals have’ so as to give priority to the realisation of 
the first threshold.770 Consequently, the state would need to provide 
extremely persuasive justification to defend its inability to meet the most 
basic needs of its people in the event that the state is unable to meet the 
first threshold. 771  Furthermore, a nuanced understanding of the 
normative basis of socio-economic rights can make a telling contribution 
in assisting judges and ‘other actors in society’ to ascertain the content 
of these rights and facilitate their constructive enforcement.772 Thus, a 
modified minimum core approach (with the relevant political and 
philosophical underpinnings suitably intact and properly justified) 
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provides a sound framework within which to interpret socio-economic 
rights. 773  Furthermore, a ‘thin’ theory of good is advocated as 
complemented by an assortment of experiences and purposes that 
individuals value and strive to attain.774 
The first rationale underlying the minimum core obligation approach is 
that of the principled minimum core which is consistent with the minimum 
core obligation as explored in this thesis and refers to ‘minimum 
essential levels of the right’.775 It should be noted at the outset that the 
minimum core obligation does not ‘encompass the resources to live a 
decent life or a dignified life in a community, but rather the basic 
resources that allow people to move beyond starvation, thirst and 
homelessness’.776  This should be contrasted with the second rationale 
(underlying the minimum core obligation approach) which seeks to 
remedy the absence of practical benchmarks to assess the performance 
of the state in addressing the specific needs of the people.777 In this 
regard the principled minimum core can readily provide the appropriate 
benchmark in respect of food, water and housing.778 A case in point 
being the relative ease with which the amount of food required to prevent 
malnutrition can be determined.779   
Furthermore, Bilchitz believes that it is likely that the provision of the 
required amount of food (to avoid malnutrition) is achievable within 
current resource constraints.780 Thus, it is my contention that the state 
should be held to account as to why it does not put an end to malnutrition 
immediately if it is indeed within its power to do so. In this regard it is my 
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firm belief that the state should at the very least demonstrate that it has 
marshalled all of its resources (as well as given effect to a coherent plan 
of action) in seeking to end malnutrition.  
The proposed minimum core obligation theory is consequently able to 
differentiate between interests that are coloured by varying degrees of 
urgency and is able to pinpoint ‘two different thresholds of need’.781 
Consequently, section 26 is used as an example to demonstrate that 
section 26(1) 782  should be viewed as a conditional right (to an 
interest/entitlement) but that resource scarcity represents a tangible 
threat to achieving that conditional right.783 In addition, section 27(1)(b) 
stipulates that everyone has the right to sufficient food while section 
28(1)(c) guarantees children the right to basic nutrition as previously 
described. The minimum core philosophy (as applied to the 
aforementioned rights) will ensure that all people are able to secure 
sufficient food to ensure their survival against the threat of starvation.784 
The state (in terms of the second threshold of the minimum core 
obligation) would need to ensure that all people have sufficient food to 
meet their comprehensive nutritional requirements so that those same 
people can direct their efforts to living lives of purpose.785   
Consequently, it is contended that the Constitutional Court should 
embrace the minimum core approach (as modified by Bilchitz in drawing 
on the fundamental approach/principles of the ICESCR) 786  so as to 
provide determinate content to socio-economic rights and insist upon the 
state providing clear, benchmarked targets with regards to the 
realisation of pressing subsistence rights. The Constitutional Court is 
best placed to provide the state with concrete guidance in order to realise 
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socio-economic rights as well as to insist upon judicial supervision if the 
circumstances warrant such an approach.787  
It should be noted that De Wet is routinely cited as an outspoken critic 
of the minimum core obligation approach.788 De Wet believes that the 
assumption (with regards to the attendant financial implications not 
undermining the separation of powers doctrine) to be valid only if there 
is consensus as to the core content of basic nutrition, shelter, basic 
health care and social services.789 Furthermore, De Wet believes that 
the rights enshrined in s28(1)(c) cannot be enforced (without falling foul 
of the abovementioned division of state powers) due to the prohibitive 
financial costs which would have to be incurred by the state. 790  In 
addition, De Wet believes that the right to basic nutrition can only be 
achieved at great cost to the state in light of an ever increasing 
population.791 Thus, De Wet disputes the views of De Vos who has 
asserted that children’s rights are directly enforceable.792 Also, De Wet 
believes that De Vos has not considered the ‘complexities’ relating to the 
application of the separation of powers doctrine 793nor the prohibitive 
costs that would have to be borne by the state.794  
I submit that the abovementioned insights offered by De Wet flow from 
a flawed understanding of the minimum core obligation approach. It is 
my contention that the approach of De Wet (in respect of the minimum 
core obligation approach) is myopic as it undermines the ability of the 
Constitutional Court to facilitate the progressive realisation of urgent 
socio-economic rights as enshrined in the Constitution. Also, De Wet’s 
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interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine demands excessive 
deference on the part of the judiciary to the executive and legislature. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the Constitutional Court has a critical 
role to play in holding the other branches of government to account with 
respect to giving effect to critical subsistence rights. 
Bilchitz has sought to assess the performance of the South African 
government in giving effect to its obligations (relating to socio-economic 
rights) by scrutinising the relevant judgments of the Constitutional Court. 
The Constitutional Court is deemed to have erred by embracing a 
reasonableness approach (as opposed to a minimum core approach) as 
related to socio-economic rights.795 Bilchitz has focused his attention on 
the rights to food, housing and health care which he has, as previously 
indicated, described as ‘subsistence rights’.796 A critical shortcoming of 
the reasonableness approach, as adopted by the Constitutional Court in 
dealing with socio-economic rights, is the ‘failure to provide much 
determinate content to such rights’.797  It is clear that the provision of 
determinate content is necessary to define the nature of the right and to 
develop a suitable accountability benchmark so as to determine the 
extent of the obligation owed by the state.798  
A modified ‘minimum core’ interpretation of socio-economic rights is 
capable of providing the necessary legal basis for advancing the 
prioritisation of the aforementioned critical interests of vulnerable 
people.799 Consequently, it is indeed possible to address the needs of 
people living in abject poverty in South Africa (in the not too distant 
future) if there is a determined focus on prioritising the needs of 
vulnerable groups.800   
Roux notes with interest that many South African legal academics had 
expressed concern that the Constitutional Court had not endorsed the 
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minimum core content approach which was viewed as ‘an abdication of 
its responsibility’ in giving effect to socio-economic rights. 801  In this 
regard Roux believes that ‘much of the force of this criticism falls away 
once legal academics have accepted that the approach of the 
Constitutional Court in socio-economic rights cases has been to forge a 
review standard that permitted it greater flexibility in managing the 
relationship with the political branches.’ 802 However, it should be noted 
that Roux does not display an exacting focus on the deprivation to be 
endured by vulnerable groups in light of the state failing in its duties to 
give effect to critical socio-economic rights. Nonetheless, it should 
suffice at this point to highlight that Roux does indeed provide a 
compelling account of the considerations at play in shaping the decision-
making of a relatively new Constitutional Court in a fledgling 
democracy.803  
A justification is advanced for the conditional rights enjoyed by every 
individual and how those same rights are transformed into unconditional 
rights if compelling normative and pragmatic factors are met.804 Thus, 
the state is tasked to embrace an ‘all-things-considered consequentialist 
judgment’ in identifying the unconditional obligations it owes its people 
so as to realise a vision in which it treats all individuals with equal 
importance. 805  A theory of rights serves to emphasise that our 
obligations to others are predicated upon recognition of their urgent 
interests and embracing their lives as being of equal importance to our 
own.806 Also, a single-minded focus on obligations is (ostensibly) viewed 
as neglecting to emphasise the bond between ourselves and others who 
have interests that are of pivotal importance and how those same 
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interests ultimately serve to confer obligations on us. 807  However, a 
focus on obligations ensures that the agent and the required conduct are 
scrutinised.808 A case in point being the manner in which public officials 
should come to the aid of vulnerable groups so as to discharge their 
duties as enshrined in the Constitution. Consequently, it is my contention 
that embracing ubuntu entails the honouring of communal obligations as 
a rule and that we are consequently connected to every other person in 
the community by virtue of our shared humanity. Thus, it is submitted 
that the constant humanising acts as outlined by Praeg (such as public 
officials coming to the aid of vulnerable groups) is an expression of the 
aforementioned shared humanity which in turn colours and informs our 
understanding of ubuntu. The approach adopted by Bilchitz is capable 
of providing a clear accountability standard for public officials (with 
regards to the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights) while 
embracing ubuntu will ensure that those same public officials are diligent 
in advancing socio-economic rights (so as to give effect to communal 
obligations that will forge a just and caring nation-state in the time to 
come).  
The inability to move directly from a recognition of fundamental rights to 
giving effect to such rights is acknowledged and defended by Bilchitz.809 
It is the aforementioned inability that warrants a critical distinction being 
drawn between ‘conditional rights’ and ‘unconditional rights’. 810  The 
transformation of conditional rights to unconditional rights (as shaped by 
the critical factors of scarcity, urgency, sacrifice, effectiveness and 
allocation) is acknowledged but it cannot be fully explored in this 
thesis.811 However, Bilchitz believes that there is a distinct possibility that 
securing rudimentary capabilities for all human beings (in a society 
defined by a moderate scarcity of resources such as South Africa) will 
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exhaust all of society’s resources in attaining the aforementioned 
capabilities.812 An examination of the capabilities approach is outside the 
scope of this thesis but it serves to demonstrate the need for the state to 
fully account as to the resources that it has at its disposal.  
It is submitted that the need to account is a central theme in this thesis 
in exploring the nature and extent of the duties owed by the state to 
advance the aspirational values and socio-economic rights as enshrined 
in the Constitution. Bilchitz correctly asserts that a society committed to 
treating human beings with equal importance will prioritise meeting the 
most urgent needs of vulnerable individuals first.813  Furthermore, the 
extent of the sacrifice that has to be endured by members of society is 
linked to the urgency of individual needs that are yet to be satisfied.814  
It should be noted that the courts in South Africa are expressly 
authorised to conduct judicial reviews. 815  Consequently, judges are 
empowered to scrutinise legislation or executive policies so as to confirm 
adherence with the relevant socio-economic provisions enshrined in the 
Constitution.816  Thus, judges in South Africa are obliged to provide 
interpretations of the provisions of the Constitution which anchor rights 
in respect of housing, food, water and health care. 817  However, the 
current reasonableness approach adopted by the Constitutional Court 
(in interpreting socio-economic rights) is not only predicated on an 
unconvincing theoretical foundation but it could also result in negligible 
material change in the lives of the most vulnerable people over time.818 
It is submitted that the aforementioned ‘negligible material change’ is 
indeed the lived reality of vulnerable groups in present day South Africa.  
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The two different thresholds of the minimum core obligation are further 
expanded upon by utilising section 26 (1) which provides for a right to 
access adequate housing as previously described.819  The first threshold 
is the more urgent concern as it seeks to safeguard an individual from 
threats to his/her survival (i.e. access to a rudimentary shelter that 
provides protection from inclement weather as well as offering access to 
running water and adequate sanitation).820 Consequently, the second 
threshold in the minimum core obligation approach is concerned with 
placing individuals in a position to live lives of value and this would as a 
rule entail the provision of housing that is tailored to give expression to 
the stated goals and purposes of individuals rather than crude, makeshift 
structures.821 In this regard the Preamble to the Constitution seeks to 
‘improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person’822 and the state is thus duty-bound (and therefore accountable) 
to give effect to this aspirational vision (as previously stated).  
In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (‘TAC’) the 
Constitutional Court held that section 27(1) ‘does not give rise to a self-
standing and independent positive right enforceable irrespective of the 
considerations mentioned in 27(2)’. 823  However, the aforementioned 
view can be embraced without rejecting the minimum core approach as 
the latter approach does not require the recognition of two rights.824 The 
reality is that what the minimum core approach does in fact require is for 
one to grasp that a specific right can be provided for at different levels.825 
Thus, the state could be compelled to urgently give effect to the minimum 
level of the specific right whilst seeking to progressively realise the full 
thrust of the same right over time.826 In addition, the minimum core 
approach is imbued with flexibility but for an unwavering insistence in 
                                                             
819 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 187.  
820 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 188. 
821 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007)188.  
822 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
823 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC) (hereafter 
TAC) para 39. 
824 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 207. 
825 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 208. 
826 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 208.  
137 
 
 
recognising that it is an abhorrent reality that fellow members of our 
society have to endure an existence in which their survival is under 
threat.827   
Kende describes828 the manner in which Bilchitz took issue with the 
statement by the Constitutional Court that it was not possible to ascertain 
the ‘minimum core’ of the right to housing in Grootboom 829 because 
Bilchitz believed that there were a number of key principles that were not 
in dispute.830  Kende also draws attention to Bilchitz’s belief that every 
person has a right to a toilet, running water and shelter from the elements 
and that Bilchitz consequently believed that the remedy of the court was 
flimsy and reinforced the flawed approach of the state in not prioritising 
the needs of people in desperate need.831 However, Kende believes that 
the criticisms of Bilchitz are flawed and lack perspective. 832  Firstly, 
Kende commends South Africa for placing socio-economic rights on the 
same footing with civil and political rights. 833   He views this as an 
extraordinary development in the international human rights law arena 
in light of the fact that South Africa has ‘virtually no history of a judicial 
role in such matters’. 834  Furthermore, Kende states that the UN 
Committee has only utilised the minimum core to evaluate national 
compliance with the ICESCR. 835  Kende contends that virtually no 
national judiciary has utilised the ‘rigid’ minimum core principle to confirm 
‘the illegal and remedial’ nature of conduct undertaken by their own 
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government.836 Kende believes that critics cannot offer ‘virtually any real 
world success in support of their position on their views on remedies’.837  
However, it is submitted that Kende’s views lack insight and fail to 
appreciate the manner in which a minimum core obligation approach can 
coax the state to deliver in terms of a clear standard and progressively 
give effect to the realisation of urgent socio-economic rights. It should be 
noted that one of the primary purposes of constitutional rights is to 
safeguard the fundamental rights of individuals by ensuring that they 
have access to shelter, food, water and health care at the very least.838 
Thus, it is incumbent upon a society, which should attach equal 
importance to every individual, to be unrelenting in its pursuit of bringing 
about an end to deplorable living conditions.839 A critical insight that 
should be emphasised is that amongst the aforementioned group there 
are individuals/groupings of people (that by virtue of enduring a 
particularly precarious existence) should be targeted to receive priority 
assistance which is consistent with the philosophy of the minimum core 
approach in first dismantling threats to survival.840  
The notion of weighted priority has two elements with the first concerned 
with emphasising that certain interests are prioritised by virtue of the 
critical value which we attach to them and that those same interests can 
only be blocked by compelling countervailing considerations that are in 
play.841 The second element is described by Parfit as the ‘priority view’ 
which holds that the benefits that accrue to people are of greater 
significance the more disadvantaged those same people are. 842 
However, it is critical to note that this view of weighted priority does not 
insist upon granting absolute priority to the interests of the most 
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marginalised people.843 Nonetheless, it does insist upon their specific 
interests receiving special consideration.844   
However, the minimum core obligation is perceived as demanding ‘too 
much’ as people who are in need have an individual right to insist upon 
immediate assistance from the government.845 Thus, Kende believes 
that Bilchitz is likely to endorse the view that each person in need ‘is now 
entitled to basic housing provision, which the government is required to 
improve gradually over time’.846  Furthermore, Kende states that giving 
effect to the minimum core obligation would not be feasible as catering 
for the immediate need of all that required housing would exhaust all of 
the resources earmarked for ‘basic health care, adequate education, 
food, and water’. 847  In addition, Kende believes that scholars have 
ignored the fact that members of the Constitutional Court ‘may not agree 
on a minimum core, or even whether one is desirable.’ 848   
It is submitted that Kende has failed to grasp the underlying philosophy 
of the minimum core obligation approach. The aforementioned approach 
serves to hold the state accountable to furnish the public with 
comprehensive information as to its resources available for the 
realisation of urgent socio-economic rights and to progressively realise 
those same rights (in terms of benchmarked plans) in the shortest 
possible time. It should be noted that the Constitutional Court is the 
guardian of the Constitution and should consequently have an unerring 
focus on facilitating the realisation of constitutionally guaranteed socio-
economic rights. Thus, the Constitutional Court should in fact provide 
determinate content for socio-economic rights for the benefit and 
guidance of the state (as well as the public) and in so doing honour the 
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relevant constitutional obligations as well as our contemporary 
international law commitments in terms of the ICESCR. 
However, Bilchitz believes that it may be necessary to cap the resources 
allocated to a specific individual in seeking to uplift him/her to meet the 
minimal survival threshold.849 This is because the attainment of minimal 
interests must make allowance for interests to be realised beyond the 
minimum core as a means of ensuring that individuals are able to pursue 
lives of value.850 Consequently, the attainment of the minimum core of a 
specific right must not be pursued at the expense of achieving the 
minimum core in relation to other rights.851 Thus, the minimum core 
approach, as proposed by Bilchitz, dovetails neatly with a pragmatic 
approach to governance in which the minimal interests of vulnerable 
people are embraced but not at the expense of casting more ambitious 
human projects to the periphery.852  
It should be noted that the Constitutional Court has adduced no evidence 
to substantiate its belief that the state is unable to make available 
rudimentary shelter, food, water and life-saving healthcare in a short 
space of time. 853  Consequently, it should be noted that the views 
expressed in TAC, as to the impossibility of effecting the realisation of 
the minimum core obligation by the Constitutional Court, 854 is indicative 
of despair at the extent of the problem.855 It follows that the Constitutional 
Court should demand that the state provides persuasive evidence as to 
its inability to give effect to its minimum core obligations across the board 
before adopting a rigid position regarding the impossible nature of the 
task faced by the state.856  
I am in complete agreement with Bilchitz as to the need for the 
Constitutional Court to demand that the state provides persuasive 
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justification (at the very least) for its stated position regarding its inability 
to comply with the minimum core obligation.857 There is a need to draw 
attention to the manner in which the Constitutional Court has 
demonstrated seemingly excessive deference to the other branches of 
government.858  It is my firm contention that the Constitutional Court 
should rather demonstrate an unwavering focus on holding the state 
accountable to give effect to the realisation of socio-economic rights in 
the present time and/or a definite time in the near future. This is 
consistent with the sentiments of Scott and Alston in avoiding a situation 
where the realisation of rights constantly ‘recedes into the future’859 
which is far removed from a nuanced understanding of the progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights by the state.  
The state should not be permitted to routinely place reliance on the 
‘scarcity of resources’ defence without adducing compelling evidence of 
the same paltry resources in addition to providing benchmarked sectoral 
targets to remedy its shortcomings in the shortest possible timeframe.860 
In this regard the Constitutional Court should demand persuasive proof 
whenever the state asserts that it is unable to meet the minimum 
subsistence needs of every person.861 Furthermore, the Constitutional 
Court is well placed to insist that the state provides evidence as to how 
it will in fact remedy the situation in the shortest possible time.862 Thus, I 
am in complete agreement with Bilchitz that the right in question should 
be fully articulated even if the state provides compelling proof that it does 
not possess the necessary resources.863 This will ensure that the state 
will be forced to act when additional resources become available.864  
In addition, it should be noted that the measures implemented by the 
state to give effect to a specific right will only be deemed reasonable if 
                                                             
857 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 214. 
858 Please see Section 3.6.5.1.  
859 Scott C & Alston P ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities’ SAJHR (2000) 227. 
860 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 215.  
861 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 215. 
862 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 215.  
863 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 216. 
864 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 216.  
142 
 
 
they are directed at (as well as capable of responding to) the ‘minimum 
core needs of the most vulnerable members of society’.865 Thus, what is 
essentially required is for the state to produce evidence that a modicum 
of effort has been made (at the very least) to secure the realisation of 
‘core minimum entitlements’.866 However, any policy instituted by the 
state to secure a specific right has to demonstrate the necessary balance 
and flexibility so as to provide for the needs of society as a whole rather 
than catering for only the most needy and vulnerable. 867  The 
aforementioned insights offered by De Vos are indeed sound but it is my 
contention that the Constitutional Court should demand a more exacting 
standard of the state in giving effect to the progressive realisation of 
critical subsistence rights as guaranteed in the Constitution. 
Consequently, this will ensure that the state prioritises the critical needs 
of vulnerable groups whilst being mindful of broader societal needs.  
Bilchitz believes that the minimum core obligation (with regards to 
healthcare) would include all measures that would safeguard individuals 
from all threats to their survival.868  Thus, this would entail not only 
providing primary healthcare but also compel the state to provide 
expensive medication as well as various medical treatments (e.g. heart 
transplants) where indicated. 869  Consequently, Bilchitz believes that 
giving effect to the minimum core obligation in the health-care domain 
could lead to the budget of the state being exhausted to the detriment of 
less expensive critical needs such as housing and nutrition.870  
It is my firm belief that Bilchitz erred in not adopting a suitably nuanced 
approach to the minimum core obligation in relation to healthcare. In this 
regard Bilchitz failed to demand that the state should account as to its 
available resources even if giving effect to the right in question was of 
such a scale that it seemingly threatened to overwhelm the resources of 
the state. Furthermore, it is fair comment that the state would not be able 
                                                             
865 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ SAJHR (2001) 273. 
866 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ SAJHR (2001) 273. 
867 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ SAJHR (2001) 273. 
868 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 221.  
869 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 221.  
870 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 221. 
143 
 
 
to fund every available medical treatment/procedure with immediate 
effect but it could demonstrate an unerring will in progressively giving 
effect to the right of access to healthcare. This in turn could be achieved 
by devising (and giving effect to) a benchmarked health plan with firm 
(and stretch) targets. In this regard it is encouraging that President 
Ramaphosa offered the following insight during his celebrated maiden 
State of the Nation Address on 16 January 2018:  
‘The time has now arrived to finally implement universal health 
coverage through the National Health Insurance. The NHI Bill is 
now ready to be processed through government and will be 
submitted to Parliament in the next few weeks. Certain NHI 
projects targeting the most vulnerable people in society will 
commence in April this year.’ 871  
However, it is submitted that it is only with the passing of time that one 
will be in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of NHI in meeting the 
pressing needs of vulnerable people (as related to access to healthcare) 
and whether there has been an enduring and positive shift in the 
accountability/political will of public officials (under the leadership of 
President Ramaphosa) in meeting the needs of vulnerable groups.  
In this regard Moellendorf states that ‘the cost of providing needed 
medical resources to all citizens, unlike the costs of providing universal 
housing and access to food and water, may be limitless since the costs 
of new technology are high and resource needs will continue to grow as 
new treatments become available’. 872  Furthermore, Moellendorf 
believes that ‘if the costs of providing needed medical resources to all 
citizens is limitless, then clearly available resources are insufficient to 
meet all claims and a system of rationing available resources is 
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needed’.873  However, it should be noted that the UN Committee has 
stipulated that access to food, water and rudimentary shelter is included 
as part of the minimum core of the right to health as sustenance and 
shelter are critical for individuals not to be exposed to threats to their 
health. 874   
Consequently, the principled minimum core, with specific reference to 
health care, is deemed to be unsuitable in as far as outlining a set of 
practical standards against which state action can be assessed.875 Thus, 
it is deemed necessary to employ the concept of the ‘pragmatic minimum 
threshold’ which provides for a select number of practical minimum 
standards which the state has to give effect to in health care as an urgent 
priority.876 The pragmatic minimum threshold is shaped by a number of 
factors of which four are ever so briefly mentioned in the text to follow.877  
The cost of the indicated treatment is a critical consideration. 878 
Secondly, the relevant resource constraints require careful 
consideration.879 Thirdly, there is a need to strike a balance between 
preventative and curative health-care interventions.880 Finally, there is a 
need to consider the effects of implementing a pragmatic minimum 
threshold in relation to giving effect to other critical needs in society.881  
It is of critical importance for the state to demonstrate an unerring focus 
on realising the minimum core obligation in health care (as a starting 
point) for all as a reflection of the just and caring nation-state being 
forged over time. Consequently, the state should at the very least 
provide a transparent account of its available resources and implement 
a benchmarked plan to progressively realise urgent health care rights in 
the shortest possible time. Thus, the public cannot (and should not) have 
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the expectation that a state with moderately scarce resources will 
provide cutting-edge medical treatment immediately and/or on demand. 
However, what can be demanded of the state is for it to demonstrate its 
accountability (and political will) by revealing the true extent of its 
available resources as well as the manner in which it has subsequently 
allocated those same resources to optimise the realisation of a critical 
subsistence right in terms of benchmarked sectoral plans. Furthermore, 
the aforementioned benchmarked plans should detail both targets as 
well as stretch targets (in the event that additional resources become 
available).     
It should be noted that the UN Committee has provided a definition of 
the pragmatic minimum threshold as part of the right to health care.882 
However, the obligations that are stipulated are significantly deficient in 
meeting even the basic survival needs of people.883 A case in point being 
the exclusion of live-saving health-care such as surgery and attending 
to the treatment of life-threatening illnesses that are not the 
consequence of epidemic outbreaks.884   
In conclusion, it should be noted that Bilchitz has proposed a 
philosophical theory of fundamental rights as a means to interpret and 
assess claims premised on socio-economic rights. 885  He rightfully 
asserts that the aforementioned theory ‘provides the normative 
underpinnings for a modified version of the minimum core approach886 
to socio-economic rights’. 887  Also, the theory provides a pivotal 
clarification in that the minimum core is properly defined as a conditional 
right that has its specific content shaped by the basic interests of 
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individual members in not being exposed to threats that put their survival 
at risk.888  Bilchitz rightfully believes that his modified version of the 
minimum core theory provides a robust and persuasive interpretation of 
the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution and is able to 
withstand an assortment of objections.889 In addition, Bilchitz holds the 
view that his philosophical theory is theoretically sound and provides an 
analytical framework that can be employed to give effect to practical 
solutions as to the content of socio-economic rights.890   
Furthermore, I am in agreement with Bilchitz that the state can prevent 
starvation as well as prevent death from prolonged exposure to the 
elements (by guaranteeing sufficient food and access to shelter 
respectively) in the near future if it elects to embrace the minimum core 
obligation.891 In this regard Bilchitz states that:  
‘This is not a utopian vision but one that is readily 
achievable. By taking socio-economic rights seriously, 
attending to the content thereof, and adopting appropriate 
institutional and enforcement mechanisms, it will be 
possible to ensure that the vision of a world without 
absolute poverty can be translated into reality’.892 
The accountability of public officials (as the duly appointed 
representatives of the state) should be evaluated against the 
progressive realisation of socio-economic rights as enshrined in the 
Constitution. It follows that the Constitutional Court has a critical role to 
play in ensuring that public officials have demonstrated the necessary 
accountability in devising and subsequently executing benchmarked 
sectoral plans that progressively give effect to the aforementioned socio-
economic rights. It follows that the minimum core obligation approach is 
favoured in this thesis as it is the embodiment of a philosophy which 
seeks to prioritise the critical needs of vulnerable groups as well as 
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casting light on the accountability of public officials in progressively 
giving effect to those same subsistence rights. Thus, it is submitted that 
the minimum core obligation approach dovetails neatly with the 
communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu in that interconnected and 
interdependent members would inevitably focus on first dismantling 
threats which placed the survival of fellow members in jeopardy.  
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3.6     CHAPTER 3 – PART B (SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) 
3.6.1  Introduction 
Chapter 3 (Part B) will focus on the socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court as well as the role of the Court as the guardian 
of the Constitution.  
Part B maintains an unwavering focus on the need for the Constitutional 
Court to provide the state with determinate content for key socio-
economic rights so as to ensure that the state has the necessary 
guidance in meeting the critical needs of vulnerable groups. The role of 
ubuntu is explored in Part B in relation to the manner in which ubuntu 
can make a critical contribution in augmenting the accountability of public 
officials. Thus, this chapter will serve to highlight the pressing need to 
give effect to the progressive realisation of constitutionally guaranteed 
socio-economic rights as a means to cast light on the nature and extent 
of the duties owed by the state to the public.  
It should be noted that there are striking parallels between the Preamble 
and the Bill of Rights in the Constitution (with specific reference to 
aspirational values and the attainment of socio-economic rights so as to 
create a sanctuary for all who dwell in South Africa) and the manner in 
which ubuntu has been defined in this thesis (i.e. the primacy of 
communal obligations) so as to facilitate the forging of a just and caring 
nation-state. Thus, if ubuntu can play a pivotal role in giving effect to the 
aforementioned just and caring nation-state (in which the 
interdependence and interconnectedness of members is acknowledged 
and celebrated) then it follows that ubuntu can make a meaningful 
contribution to the forging of social solidarity in South Africa. 
It is submitted that the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu serves to 
inform and colour the approach adopted in this thesis in focussing on the 
duties of the state (to meet the needs of vulnerable groups) as a means 
of forging a just and caring nation-state which gives effect to social 
solidarity ideals.   
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The analysis in this thesis will be confined to specific aspects of the 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court so as to 
maintain an unerring focus on the accountability of the state in giving 
effect to socio-economic rights. It is submitted that there is a pressing 
need to provide determinate content to socio-economic rights. It follows 
that it is only when the obligations of the state are clearly defined that 
one is well placed to demand that the state account for its failure to meet 
specific targets in the advancement of specific socio-economic rights.  
In this regard the Bill of Rights contains directly enforceable socio-
economic rights which will require judges ‘to scrutinise and reject many 
of the accepted practices and assumptions in relation to judicial 
review’.893 Thus, the Bill of Rights is only likely to realise its true potential 
if ‘judges will discover in themselves the courage and imagination to 
engage in these challenges’.894 De Vos believes that judges will find 
ample support in international human rights literature to sustain them on 
their journey to advance human rights in South Africa.895 It is submitted 
that the aforementioned insights by De Vos highlight the challenges that 
will have to be negotiated by the judiciary in giving effect to socio-
economic rights as enshrined in the Constitution.   
The inherent challenge in instituting litigation based upon individual 
rights is that it inevitably leads to scrutiny of the specific right rather than 
retaining a holistic perspective aimed at effecting an overarching 
allocation of resources which ensures that all individuals are treated with 
equal importance. 896  Also, Bilchitz notes that ‘where complex 
interlocking considerations arise, courts will often defer to those with the 
greatest competence in the area of budgetary allocation’.897 However, 
this should not be used as a decoy by the courts to evade their 
responsibility in ensuring that the allocation of budgets give effect to the 
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progressive realisation of constitutionally protected rights. 898  Thus, 
Bilchitz rightfully believes that an unwillingness on the part of the 
Constitutional Court to provide content for socio-economic rights has 
undermined the effectiveness and extent of possible practical 
outcomes. 899   Consequently, Bilchitz believes that the Constitutional 
Court has (more often than not) provided flawed and/or inadequate 
remedies in countering the rights violations inflicted upon vulnerable 
groups.900 
It is of the utmost importance that the Constitutional Court provides 
determinate content for socio-economic rights and scrutinises the 
relevant state policies against giving effect to those rights.901  It follows 
that the state should have more leeway in realising the second threshold 
as compared to the first threshold.902  Consequently, any defence raised 
by the state as to its inability to cater for even the first threshold (due to 
a purported scarcity of resources) should be carefully evaluated as it 
would inevitably threaten the survival of vulnerable groups.903   
The aforementioned scrutiny visited upon the state (as a consequence 
of claiming that it is unable to meet the first threshold regarding critical 
socio-economic rights) should be similar to the scrutiny that the state 
would have to endure if it claimed that it could not afford to host an 
election or provide a functioning court system. 904 In this regard it is 
improbable that more than a handful of countries could defend not 
implementing the first threshold. 905  Furthermore, the courts have 
demonstrated their willingness to adjudicate as to whether the state has 
given effect to constitutional guarantees pertaining to civil and political 
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rights.906 Thus, the same standard should be utilised (at the very least) 
by the Court in assessing the conduct of the state in giving effect to 
critical socio-economic rights.907 
Chaskalson P sought to emphasise the critical need for the Constitution 
to be interpreted ‘in the light of our own history and conditions with due 
regard to the aspirations articulated in it’. 908  In this regard the 
Constitutional Court has generally utilised a purposive approach in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights.909 However, the Constitutional Court has 
demonstrated reluctance to explore the reasons for the inclusion of 
socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights (including the fact that they are 
on an equal footing with traditional civil and political rights).910 Thus, 
determinate content of socio-economic rights has not been forthcoming 
from the Constitutional Court.911 The jurisprudence of the Court (relating 
to socio-economic rights) will consequently be analysed to highlight the 
manner in which the Constitutional Court has failed to demonstrate 
definitive insight as to the rationale for including those same rights in the 
Constitution.912 Also, the Court has omitted to provide the necessary 
content to socio-economic rights and its decisions are perceived as 
flimsy in the theoretical sense.913  
The approach of the Constitutional Court in adjudicating matters 
pertaining to socio-economic rights has insulated it from the harsh 
realities of hunger, homelessness and disease.914 Brand is correct in 
stating that this is due to the Constitutional Court focusing on whether 
good governance standards (e.g. legality, coherence and inclusivity) are 
apparent in the conduct of the state.915 However, the focus should rather 
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be on the deprivation endured by vulnerable groups as well as the 
demonstrable failure of the state to eradicate the aforementioned 
deprivation progressively over time.916 In this regard Brand supports the 
view of Michelman in that the most urgent challenge that poverty-stricken 
people endure is the poverty itself as evidenced by gnawing hunger, 
homelessness and/or disease rather than their relative position on the 
socio-economic ladder.917 Thus, the scourge of poverty consists of a 
number of absolute deprivations and that ‘… cause for concern is not 
found in some repugnant discrimination which may accompany a 
deprivation, but in the deprivation itself’.918 It follows that the fight against 
poverty should be viewed as giving effect to the creation of a society that 
seeks first and foremost to provide for the basic needs of everyone so 
as to shield everyone against unyielding deprivation.919  
I am in agreement with Brand that the approach adopted by the 
Constitutional Court in relation to the adjudication of socio-economic 
rights is disappointing. 920  However, Brand admits that he partly 
understands the rationale for the path followed by the Court.921 In this 
regard he refers to the nature of the relationship of the Court with the 
political branches (which he believes to be suitably explored by Roux922) 
as well as its formalist interpretation of the law as a rule.923 Thus, Brand 
fully supports the contribution by De Vos regarding the need for 
‘innovation in judicial method and mindset’ (as previously described) if 
the adjudication of socio-economic rights are to become an effective way 
of eradicating poverty.924  
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De Vos highlights the challenge of developing an enhanced 
understanding of the duties imposed by socio-economic rights without a 
definitive grasp of the manner in which the Constitutional Court has 
developed the concept of substantive equality.925 It is indeed necessary 
to embrace the belief that the right to equality (which is linked in 
perpetuity with human dignity) and socio-economic rights ‘are two sides 
of the same coin’.926 Thus, it should be noted that both equality and 
socio-economic rights have been enshrined in the Bill of Rights to bring 
about the realisation of the same objective (i.e. ‘the creation of a society 
in which all people can achieve their full potential as human beings, 
despite apparent differences created by race, gender, disability and 
sexual orientation, and despite differences in the social and economic 
status of such individuals’).927 Furthermore, Pierre de Vos believes that 
it is not only the realisation of the aforementioned objective that matters 
but also the manner in which the objective is realised so as to ensure 
that all conduct by the state (or other relevant party) can pass 
constitutional muster.928  
In conclusion, the right to equality must be understood as obliging the 
state to take steps towards forging a society in which individuals can 
achieve their maximum potential.929 Thus, the critical importance of the 
aforementioned contextual approach (in discerning the true nature of 
equality) makes it necessary for the courts to ascertain ‘the actual impact 
of an alleged violation of the right to equality on the individual within and 
outside different socially relevant groups in relation to prevailing social, 
economic and political circumstances’.930  
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3.6.2   An analysis of the Soobramoney case as a means to demonstrate 
the obligations of the state in facilitating the progressive 
realisation of critical socio-economic rights  
There is a specific focus on the Soobramoney931 judgment in this thesis 
as a means to accurately showcase both the obligations of the state as 
well as the consequences of the (subsequent) failure on the part of the 
Constitutional Court to hold the state to account. It is submitted that 
public officials that have embraced ubuntu would have done so much 
more in striving to stave off the threat to Mr Soobramoney’s life as a 
means to honour their communal obligations through giving effect to key 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Furthermore, the aforementioned 
case is of considerable academic interest as it explores the manner in 
which public officials that embrace ubuntu should assume responsibility 
for the well-being of vulnerable groups and strive to avoid the recurrence 
of the human tragedy described below.  
The Constitutional Court considered the right of access to health care in 
Soobramoney on 11 November 1997. 932  The appellant, Mr 
Soobramoney, was 41 years old, unemployed and had a history of heart 
disease as well as cerebro-vascular disease.933 He had suffered a stroke 
in 1996 and in the same year his kidneys had stopped functioning.934 His 
medical condition was deemed irreversible and he was diagnosed as 
being in the final stages of chronic renal failure. 935  It was common 
knowledge that his life could be prolonged by means of regular renal 
dialysis. 936  He had previously received renal dialysis from private 
medical service providers937 but subsequently sought assistance from 
the state-run Addington Hospital938 when his personal savings had been 
exhausted. The abovementioned hospital utilised a set policy/checklist 
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with regards to the specific provision of renal dialysis treatment.939  The 
primary requirement for admission (in terms of the aforementioned 
policy) was that the patient had to be eligible for a renal transplant which 
required any prospective patient to be free from vascular and cardiac 
disease. 940  Consequently, Mr Soobramoney was ineligible for renal 
dialysis treatment at Addington Hospital.941   
Mr Soobramoney appealed this decision with reference to section 11 
(‘the right to life’) and section 27(3) (‘No one may be refused emergency 
medical treatment’) of the Constitution.942  In this regard Moellendorf 
contends that a right to life, in the absence of additional specification, 
incorporates ‘a duty of non-interference and claim against those who 
interfere or would interfere’ but does not include an obligation to ‘provide 
the sustenance of life’.943 He believes that the aforementioned reasoning 
is consistent with the Constitutional Court’s understanding of the right to 
life in Makwanyane.944 Moellendorf states that no persuasive reason can 
be advanced to believe that a constitutionally protected right to life 
includes a right to life-sustaining medical treatment unless this is 
expressly incorporated in the formulation of the constitutional 
provision.945 However, Moellendorf is quick to assert that the claim of Mr. 
Soobramoney does in fact have a constitutional basis.946  Moellendorf 
consequently notes that Mr. Soobramoney should have appealed on the 
basis of section 27(1) as it would have compelled the court to consider 
‘what counts as reasonable legislative measures and how available 
resources are to be measured’.947  
The Constitutional Court nonetheless issued its ruling on 27 November 
1997 in which it denied Mr Soobramoney access to renal dialysis 
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treatment.948  It should be noted that Mr Soobramoney tragically passed 
away on the 29th of November 1997. The notion advanced regarding the 
death of Mr Soobramoney being both ‘just and tragic’949 is difficult to 
embrace as the Constitutional Court did not compel the state to adduce 
satisfactory evidence as to whether its resources were in fact insufficient 
to come to the aid of Mr Soobramoney. Furthermore, if the state had in 
fact adduced persuasive proof of extremely limited resources at its 
disposal (and had made every effort to come to the assistance of Mr 
Soobramoney without success) then one would be more inclined to 
speak of an unavoidable tragedy. Thus, it is submitted that it is more 
fitting to view the Soobramoney judgment as a failure to hold the state 
to account to the required standard in progressively realising socio-
economic rights as included in the Constitution.  
The Soobramoney judgment offers extraordinary insights regarding the 
accountability of the state in giving effect to subsistence rights as well as 
the overly deferential approach of the Constitutional Court in holding the 
state to account for the realisation of the aforementioned rights. 
Furthermore, it is of considerable interest that the Constitutional Court 
made no mention of ubuntu in the Soobramoney judgment even though 
there were such striking parallels with the earlier Makwanyane matter in 
which the death penalty was abolished.950 The reality is that the denial 
of dialysis treatment was tantamount to the imposition of a death 
sentence. Thus, the primary focus of this section of the thesis is to 
highlight the human tragedy that has unfolded over the better part of the 
past two decades. In addition, it is submitted that the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu should colour the decision-making of public 
officials in contemporary times so as to forge a just and caring society in 
which all people are treated as having equal worth. Consequently, this 
section will seek to demonstrate accountability failures on the part of the 
state (past and present) as well as highlight the flawed reasoning of the 
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Constitutional Court by analysing specific extracts of the Soobramoney 
judgment as follows:   
‘His life could be prolonged by means of regular renal 
dialysis…’ 951 
This case was ultimately concerned with a reasonable expectation (on 
the part of an unemployed and incapacitated member of a vulnerable 
group) that the state would come to his aid by protecting him from an 
imminent threat to his continued survival.   
Paragraph 8 (as previously quoted in the opening chapter of this thesis) 
struck an aspirational tone which (falsely) suggested that the judgment 
to follow would herald a new dawn in giving effect to the progressive 
realisation of the right to health care.  
Liebenberg believes that paragraph 8 of the Soobramoney judgment (as 
quoted in the opening passages of Chapter 1) is important as it confirms 
the definitive link between socio-economic rights and the ‘foundational’ 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 952  
Furthermore, it serves to emphasise that countering the effects of 
poverty and inequality (as well as transforming our society into one that 
is defined by human dignity, equality and freedom) is a pivotal 
constitutional purpose.953  The Constitutional Court refers to ‘… that 
aspiration will have a hollow ring’954  so as to acknowledge that the 
substantive realisation of socio-economic rights is critical to the success 
of our constitutional democracy.955  Furthermore, this serves to ensure 
that the aforementioned core constitutional values are keenly felt (as well 
as embraced) by the whole population. 956   The aforementioned 
observations by Liebenberg bolsters my previous assertion as to how a 
first reading of paragraph 8 of the Soobramoney judgment is misleading 
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(and ultimately disappointing) as it suggests that the rest of the judgment 
would break new ground in advancing access to healthcare rights. 
‘…Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the 
potential of each person.’957  
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court should have ordered the state 
to fully account for its failure to provide the applicant with the possibility 
of a life of purpose as provided for in the Preamble.  
‘The words “emergency medical treatment” may possibly 
be open to a broad construction which could include 
ongoing treatment of chronic illnesses for the purpose of 
prolonging life. But this is not their ordinary meaning…’958  
A purposive interpretation of the phrase ‘emergency medical treatment’ 
would and should be able to accommodate a situation in which a refusal 
by the state to provide the applicant with medical treatment would lead 
(without fail) to his death.959  
‘This court has dealt with the right to life in the context of 
capital punishment but it has not yet been called upon to 
decide upon the parameters of the right to life or its 
relevance to the positive obligations imposed on the state 
under various provisions of the Bill of Rights…’960  
It is logical to carefully develop the content of specific rights methodically 
as required by the circumstances of a specific case. Thus, one could 
appreciate the reluctance of the Constitutional Court to provide content 
to the right to life in Makwanyane as the primary focus in that case was 
whether the imposition of the death penalty could be deemed a cruel and 
unusual punishment.961 Furthermore, the death penalty was not viewed 
as a fitting punishment if one had regard for the (suitable) alternative of 
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life imprisonment.962  In this regard Justice O’ Regan held that the death 
penalty in Makwanyane breached both the right to life and the right to 
dignity in the Interim Constitution.963 Justice O’Regan emphasised that 
the right to life was more than just a formal requirement for giving effect 
to all other rights as it ultimately served to draw attention to the fact that 
it was a human life.964 Justice O’Regan held that the right to life was of 
no value without dignity as the right to life encapsulates human dignity.965 
Thus, it is indeed ironic that Justice O’Regan emphasised the sanctity of 
‘human life’ yet the Court refrained from providing any sort of 
determinate content to the right to life in Soobramoney when that was 
ultimately the right that had been placed in jeopardy as previously 
indicated.966   
It is fair comment that the Soobramoney matter may have focussed on 
the right of access to health care but it ultimately dealt with a life and 
death situation as the applicant was destined to suffer a painful death in 
the absence of critical medical treatment. The reality is that the rights 
entrenched in the Constitution would count for nought in the absence of 
sustaining the life of the rights-holder. In addition, it is necessary to draw 
attention to the grave assault on the dignity of Mr Soobramoney (in being 
refused the required medical treatment) which put an end to any 
prospects of enjoying a continued life of purpose with his family. In this 
regard reference should be made to the relevant text to follow regarding 
the quality of life that is enjoyed by patients receiving renal dialysis 
treatment.967  
Furthermore, Brand is correct in highlighting that the Constitutional Court 
interpreted the right not to be refused emergency treatment in 
Soobramoney in such a manner as to render it virtually obsolete.968  
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Firstly, the Constitutional Court defined ‘emergency medical treatment’ 
as tantamount to attending to a sudden catastrophe which necessitated 
immediate treatment to stave off serious harm or death. 969  This 
effectively excluded the applicant as he suffered from a chronic (yet 
ultimately fatal) condition. Secondly, the Constitutional Court employed 
a historical interpretative approach to highlight the manner in which 
people were denied access to life-saving treatment (on the basis of their 
race in the apartheid era) and that this provision ultimately sought to put 
an end to this deplorable practice and nothing more.970  Brand rightfully 
refers to the insights offered by Scott and Alston (discussed below) in 
that the aforementioned interpretation adopted by the Constitutional 
Court is rendered redundant as the self-same right (not to be refused 
access to emergency treatment on the basis of a display of mala fides 
or an irrational decision) already finds expression in section 27(1).971 
Finally, the Constitutional Court elected to avoid providing a substantive 
standard (in holding that the state is obliged to provide emergency 
medical services) which could have been supported by the text of the 
constitutional provision.972 Thus, Brand was correct in concluding that 
the court elected to endorse a ‘structural standard of non-arbitrariness’ 
rather than seek to define a substantive standard regarding the provision 
of emergency medical treatment.973   
‘In our constitution the right to medical treatment does not 
have to be inferred from the nature of the state established 
by the Constitution or from the right to life which it 
guarantees. It is dealt with directly in section 27…’974  
It is difficult not to dwell on the words of De Vos975 (about the need for 
the Constitutional Court to demonstrate courage in giving effect to socio-
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economic rights) as this passage of the judgment sought to deflect 
attention away from the primary issue in dispute (i.e. the right to life). 
‘The applicant suffers from chronic renal failure. To be kept 
alive by dialysis he would require such treatment two to 
three times a week…It is an ongoing state of affairs 
resulting from a deterioration of the applicant’s renal 
function which is incurable…’976  
It is of critical importance to note that the medical condition of the 
applicant was indeed incurable yet treatable. This consequently 
represents an exceptionally low accountability standard to demand of 
the state in advancing the core constitutional entitlements of vulnerable 
groups (in the absence of detailed information about the scarcity of state 
resources).         
‘At present the Department of Health in KwaZulu-Natal 
does not have sufficient funds to cover the cost of the 
services which are being provided to the public. In 1996-
1997 it overspent its budget by R152 million, and in the 
current year it is anticipated that the overspending will be 
R700 million unless a serious cutback is made in the 
services which it provides. The renal unit at the Addington 
Hospital has to serve the whole of Kwa-Zulu Natal and also 
takes patients from parts of the Eastern Cape…Guidelines 
have therefore been established to assist the persons 
working in these clinics to make the agonising choices 
which have to be made in deciding who should receive 
treatment, and who not. These guidelines were applied in 
the present case.’977   
In this regard Justice O’Regan believes that a fourth level of obligation 
can be identified in that a right may place an obligation upon the state to 
act rationally and in good faith and insist that the state justify its failure 
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to discharge an obligation.978 Thus, there must be ‘a good reason for the 
State not to respect, protect, promote and fulfil a right’.979  Justice O’ 
Regan subsequently referred with approval to Soobramoney in which it 
was held that the state had a duty to demonstrate that it acted rationally 
and in good faith under the circumstances.980 This in turn required the 
state to meet an evidentiary burden in placing evidence before the 
Constitutional Court (including the policy regarding the rationing of 
limited renal dialysis equipment as well as the applicable budget).981  
However, it is submitted that the Constitutional Court failed to insist upon 
the appropriate level of accountability to be assumed by the state 
regarding the progressive realisation of health-care rights. 
De Vos notes that the qualification ‘within its available resources’ 
highlights the robustness of the economy of a state which essentially 
determines the level and extent of its obligations with respect to the 
realisation of human rights. 982  However, the aforementioned 
qualification does not imply that unwavering deference should be 
displayed towards the state in its determination of what qualifies as a 
suitable allocation of resources.983 De Vos rightfully believes that to do 
so would be to defeat the purpose of the state having to account for 
duties owed to its people in realising human rights. 984  Also, the 
Constitutional Court should not display deference to the other branches 
of government to the extent that it would negate the duty of the state to 
realise critical socio-economic rights as enshrined in the Constitution.985  
Consequently, it is apparent that the Constitutional Court should not 
have confined itself to deliberations involving a provincial health budget 
as this was far removed from a reasonable interpretation of the ‘available 
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resources’ of the state.986 However, Liebenberg believed that it was 
perhaps not possible to consider the role of the national government as 
the only respondent cited was the provincial Minister of Health (and 
national government was consequently not a party to the 
proceedings).987 It should be noted that the policy guidelines utilised by 
the state hospital suggested that a fair procedure had been followed but 
this unravels when one seeks to find the substantive fairness of deciding 
who lives or dies on the basis of an innocuous checklist. However, what 
is of more concern is that the state was not called upon to account for 
how it was going to remedy the situation (in relation to meeting the needs 
of patients requiring renal-dialysis treatment and/or the progressive 
realisation of the right of access to healthcare) in the immediate 
future/foreseeable future. In this regard reference should be made to the 
insightful contribution by Fabian regarding the present-day availability of 
renal-dialysis treatment in South Africa.988  
‘…The nurse-patient ratio in the renal unit is 1:4.5 instead 
of the recommended ratio of 1:2.5’.989  
The Constitutional Court should have instructed the state to account for 
how it was planning to remedy the human resources deficit in the 
shortest possible time – this would have served as an able 
demonstration of the accountability of the state in relation to advancing 
a critical element in the progressive realisation of the right of access to 
healthcare. In this regard Robertson provides illuminating insights as to 
how an objective standard can be utilised to assess the performance of 
the state in giving effect to critical socio-economic rights.990 It should be 
noted that human resources can be analysed by quantifying both the 
number of people which work in a specific region as well as their 
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demonstrated competence level.991 A fitting example is cited in public 
healthcare where the amount of doctors and nurses required to 
adequately meet the needs of the population can be calculated. 992 
Consequently, the level of compliance with the resource obligation can 
be determined by following a proven process for ascertaining the 
required manpower and the actual deployment of that manpower.993  
‘There are also those who need access to housing, food 
and water, employment opportunities, and social security. 
These too are aspects of the right to…human life: the right 
to live as a human being, to be part of a broader 
community, to share in the experience of humanity. The 
state has to manage its limited resources in order to 
address all these claims. There will be times when this 
requires it to adopt a holistic approach to the larger needs 
of society rather than to focus on the specific needs of 
particular individuals within society.’994 
This extract highlights the need for the Constitutional Court to adopt the 
minimum core approach (as proposed by Bilchitz) so as to provide 
determinate content to socio-economic rights and prioritise the 
realisation of the aforementioned rights as a means to ease the plight of 
vulnerable groups. Also, the state should be obliged by the Constitutional 
Court to account for the manner in which it will give effect to urgent socio-
economic rights in the shortest possible time.  
‘…Some rights in the Constitution are the ideal and 
something to be strived for. They amount to a promise, in 
some cases, and an indication of what a democratic 
society aiming to salvage lost dignity, freedom and equality 
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should embark upon. They are values which the 
Constitution seeks to provide, nurture and protect for a 
future South Africa.’995  
It is fair comment that the Court lost sight of the distinction between rights 
and policy with reference to the aforementioned passage. 996  
Moellendorf believes that the Court, with reference to the 
abovementioned quote by Madala J, has in fact cast aside the primary 
justification for the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution 
in so far as the safeguarding of socio-economic rights is necessary to 
ensure that citizens ‘can act in ways protected by other rights’.997 
Furthermore, the difficulty in utilising the phrase ‘for a future South Africa’ 
is that the state has not been called to account as to its benchmarked 
targets (in respect of the realisation of socio-economic rights) in the 
present time nor in the foreseeable future. Thus, it serves to make a 
mockery of the ‘progressive realisation’ of critical subsistence rights. A 
case in point is the present-day consequences of the Constitutional 
Court not holding the state to account regarding access to renal dialysis 
treatment in Soobramoney in 1997.998 Thus, there is a clear need for 
detailed benchmarking on the part of the state (in giving effect to the 
realisation of socio-economic rights) so as to ensure that the state 
cannot practice ‘sleight of hand’ 999  in highlighting that additional 
resources cannot be allocated to meet specific healthcare needs 
because it has to contend with so many other urgent priorities. However, 
the state fails to provide any compelling proof that the allocated funds 
are in fact utilised to deal with those ‘other’ urgent priorities as outlined 
by the state.  
‘The fundamental issue is whether this Constitutional 
Court, as the guardian of the Constitution, as the protector 
of human rights and the upholder of democracy, should in 
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this case require a health authority, acting through its 
authorised medical practitioner, to adopt a course of 
treatment which in the bona fide clinical and incisive 
judgment of the practitioner will not cure the patient but 
merely prolong his life for some time…’1000 
The Constitutional Court failed to recognise and/or acknowledge the 
manner in which Mr. Soobramoney had been dehumanised in being 
refused urgent medical treatment on the basis of a checklist. Mr. 
Soobramoney was not just a renal dialysis patient but rather a human 
being with a family that cared for him. Furthermore, the additional quality 
time that he could have spent with them (while receiving dialysis 
treatment) could have been viewed as pursuing a life of purpose as well 
as providing him with an opportunity to come to terms with his mortality 
as per the insights offered by Justice Sachs.1001 In this regard reference 
should also be made to the text to follow in relation to ‘quality of life’1002 
as well as a newspaper report concerning the Soobramoney family.1003  
A defining feature of Soobramoney is the specific institutional role 
assumed by Dr. Naicker, in being the attending renal physician (as well 
as the President of the Renal Society at the time), who was in fact tasked 
to give effect to priority-setting (on a daily basis) in the relevant clinical 
setting at Addington Hospital. 1004   Thus, the presumptive deference 
owed to such an institutional actor is considerable (and ultimately 
confirmed in this case) as she was able to satisfy the Constitutional Court 
as to the maximum utilisation of scarce resources so as to benefit the 
maximum number of patients in a consistent and transparent 
manner.1005  
‘Perhaps a solution might be to embark upon a massive 
education campaign to inform the citizens generally about 
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the causes of renal failure…to prolong their life 
expectancy.’1006 
This is an excellent idea on the part of Justice Madala in highlighting the 
duty of the state to give effect to the dissemination of critical information 
to the public. However, the plight of the current crop of patients that 
require renal dialysis treatment should be addressed as a matter of 
urgency.  
‘In a case such as the present which engages our 
compassion to the full, I feel it necessary to underline the 
fact that Chaskalson P’s judgment, as I understand it, does 
not “merely toll the bell of lack of resources’’. In all the open 
and democratic societies based upon dignity, freedom and 
equality with which I am familiar, the rationing of access to 
life-prolonging resources is regarded as integral to, rather 
than incompatible with, a human rights approach to health 
care.’1007  
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court did in fact ‘merely toll the bell 
of resources’ as the state was never pushed to adduce compelling 
evidence of its supposedly depleted resources (nor sectoral plans that 
had been suitably benchmarked) to facilitate progressive realisation of 
socio-economic rights. It is difficult to embrace the abovementioned 
reasoning of Justice Sachs regarding the ‘rationing’ of access as this 
would suggest that the state had in fact properly accounted for all of its 
available resources. This would in turn imply that the state had sought 
to advance urgent socio-economic rights despite its scarce resources 
(as per the broad interpretation endorsed by international law which 
would certainly not be confined to a provincial health budget) and had 
come up short in giving immediate effect to the most pressing 
subsistence rights. Thus, the state would have no alternative but to 
undertake rationing measures. Furthermore, the state would be required 
to clearly articulate how it planned to reduce rationing measures (or even 
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cast aside those same rationing measures) in the time to come as a 
demonstration of its accountability in eradicating the deprivation endured 
by vulnerable groups.  
‘However the right to life may come to be defined in South 
Africa, there is in reality no meaningful way in which it can 
constitutionally be extended to encompass the right 
indefinitely to evade death…We can, however, influence 
the manner in which we come to terms with our 
mortality…’.1008 
The Constitutional Court should have maintained a clear and persistent 
focus on the realisation of urgent subsistence rights rather than 
undertaking a philosophical exploration of the manner in which one could 
come to terms with one’s impending death. It is submitted that the Court 
erred in not providing content to the right to life. It is further submitted 
that the aforementioned stance assumed by the Court, in effect, 
condoned the failure of the state to adequately account for its inability to 
realise critical subsistence rights of vulnerable groups in the shortest 
possible time/foreseeable future.  
‘…Important though our review functions are, there are 
areas where institutional capacity and appropriate 
constitutional modesty require us to be especially 
cautious…’1009  
The persuasive insight attributed to De Vos (regarding the courage 
required by the Constitutional Court to give effect to socio-economic 
rights) should be contrasted with the illuminating contribution by Roux 
regarding the Separation of Powers Doctrine.1010 
‘…If resources were co-extensive with compassion, I have 
no doubt as to what my decision would have been…’1011 
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The abovementioned words, as offered by the Constitutional Court, 
would in all likelihood have been of little comfort to Mr. Soobramoney 
and his family as he was effectively sent home to die. In this regard Mr. 
Soobramoney did in fact pass away just two days after the decision was 
handed down by the Constitutional Court (as previously described). 
Cameron believes that the decision rendered by the court (at the time) 
to be correct as Mr Soobramoney had elected to challenge a health 
policy that restricted renal dialysis to those patients that were likely to be 
successfully treated.1012 He believed that the court could not take the 
view that the government had failed to take reasonable steps to realise 
Mr. Soobramoney’s right of access to health care.1013 Neither could it be 
said that the distributional policy utilised by the relevant health personnel 
(to allocate dialysis treatment to those patients that had prospects of 
making a full recovery) was incorrect. 1014  Consequently, Cameron 
believed that the court’s decision was ‘agonising, but clear’. 1015 
However, the Soobramoney decision was criticised in part because the 
underlying values-based rationale employed by the Constitutional Court 
in the Makwanyane matter (in which the court had to consider the 
constitutionality of the death penalty as previously detailed) was in stark 
contrast with the rationale employed in the Soobramoney matter. That 
is, if one considers (as previously indicated) that the Court deemed the 
death penalty to be devoid of ubuntu yet the same Court condoned the 
refusal of renal dialysis treatment which effectively sentenced Mr. 
Soobramoney to death. 
It should be noted that the analysis of Soobramoney as well as 
Grootboom (as confined to the High Court decision) by Scott and Alston 
is of considerable academic interest as it is presented against the 
backdrop of exploring the ties between the Bill of Rights in the South 
African Constitution and international human rights law (as well as 
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foreign constitutional law).1016 Scott and Alston offer a detailed analysis 
of Soobramoney as a means to emphasise that the aforementioned 
judgment should only serve as ‘the first tentative step’ in shaping a 
positive relationship between the judiciary and legislature in South Africa 
‘as well as between the Constitution and its international analogues’.1017  
The authors are critical of the lack of discussion of international human 
rights law (with specific reference to positive rights in an environment of 
scarce resources) as well as ‘the urgency with which arguments were 
heard and digested’ in Soobramoney.1018 It is for this reason that the 
authors sought to pin their hopes on the impending (at the time) appeal 
of the Grootboom matter to the Constitutional Court as a gilt-edged 
opportunity to undertake a proper engagement with international human 
rights law pertaining to socio-economic rights.1019  
The Constitutional Court had subsequently referred to the manner in 
which interests that are connected to life (e.g. health) form part of the 
right to life.1020 However, the Constitutional Court ‘seemed to engage in 
a volte-face’ by failing to interpret the relevance of section 11 to the 
positive obligations borne by the state under the different provisions in 
the Bill of Rights (including section 27).1021 The Constitutional Court 
refers with approval1022 to an Indian Supreme Court constitutional case, 
Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity and Others v State of West 
Bengal and Another (‘Samity’), in which the Indian court held that the 
state had violated the right to life by failing to provide ‘timely medical 
treatment’ to a person that required such treatment. 1023 However, this is 
despite the fact that the Constitutional Court had elected to avoid a 
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nuanced discussion of the right to life (as enshrined in section 11) in 
Soobramoney.1024  
Mr Hakim Seikh, a member of Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity, 
which was an organisation of agricultural workers, had been seriously 
injured in a train accident.1025 However, Mr Seikh had been turned away 
from a number of public hospitals and ultimately ended up being treated 
in a private hospital.1026 The Samity case was viewed as an instance 
where emergency treatment ‘was available but denied’.1027 In this regard 
the Constitutional Court is perceived as invoking Samity as accurately 
representing the nature of the state action which the Constitutional Court 
would likely be willing to deem a violation of section 27(3).1028 Thus, the 
finding of the Constitutional Court could be read as ‘no one may be 
refused available emergency medical treatment from existing 
facilities’. 1029  Consequently, section 27(3) is deemed to only confer 
negative duties on the state and it should be interpreted to only 
encompass ‘state exclusion from existing and available resources’.1030  
The Constitutional Court is viewed as being hasty in seeking to draw 
support 1031  from the abovementioned Samity case as the arbitrary 
exclusion of Mr. Seikh from state health facilities was in fact just one 
aspect of the case.1032 In addition, the Samity judgment had a distinct 
focus on the ‘inadequacy of the emergency care network’ in the whole 
city as well as the critical shortage of resources even at those hospitals 
which had declined to treat Mr. Seikh.1033 Thus, the Indian Supreme 
Court issued remedial orders in terms of which the state had to embrace 
a number of positive obligations.1034 Furthermore, the state was ordered 
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to settle the medical expenses incurred by Mr. Seikh at the private 
hospital and he was also awarded a further sum of money ‘having regard 
to the facts and circumstances’.1035 Finally, it should be emphasised that 
more than half the written length of the judgment specifically focussed 
on ‘the remedial measures to rule out the recurrence of such incidents 
in future and to ensure immediate medical attention and treatment to 
persons in real need’. 1036  This serves to highlight that the choice 
exercised by the Constitutional Court (in referring to Samity) is indeed 
perplexing in light of the judgment that was ultimately handed down in 
Soobramoney. 
Scott and Alston refer to General Comment 3 which provides in part that:  
‘…The Committee is of the view that a minimum core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent 
upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party 
(to the Covenant) in which any significant number of 
individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential 
primary health care or basic shelter and housing, or the 
most basic form of education is prima facie failing to 
discharge its obligations under the Covenant’.1037 
It follows that every state should at least provide a core universal 
minimum as detailed in the abovementioned extract of General 
Comment 3.1038 Thus, it is indeed surprising that the concept of minimum 
essential levels was not discussed in Soobramoney (let alone deemed 
to have been met) in light of the nature of the health interests at stake 
and its centrality in giving effect to life itself.1039 The Constitutional Court 
could rightfully be viewed as approaching the specific issue in an ‘all or 
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nothing way’.1040 Thus, one either enjoyed the protection of section 27(3) 
in being provided with (available) emergency health services or one is 
found to be ‘entirely outside any constitutional imperative’ despite the 
fact that Mr Soobramoney’s life was in jeopardy in exactly the same way 
as an accident victim.1041  
Scott and Alston believe that the Constitutional Court would (likely) have 
been on solid ground in finding that providing life-prolonging renal 
dialysis treatment could not reasonably be viewed as forming part of the 
minimum core obligation in South Africa (in 1997).1042 In this regard it 
should be noted that a final determination (as to whether renal dialysis 
fell outside the ambit of the minimum core obligation) could only be made 
if the state had been ordered by the Constitutional Court to fully account 
as to its available resources. It is unfortunate that the Constitutional 
Court elected not to engage in this analysis and instead resorted to 
hiding behind the fact that ‘setting constitutional priorities would have 
allocation-of-resource impacts’.1043  However, the Constitutional Court 
missed the point entirely (when it deemed the setting of priorities to be 
the specific challenge) as the thrust of giving effect to constitutional rights 
is to set those same priorities for the state.1044  
I concur with Scott and Alston that positive rights and the minimum core 
obligation do in fact have a ‘significant prioritising function’. 1045 
Furthermore, the perspective of the Constitutional Court, that the 
progressive realisation of the rights to health for ‘everyone’ would be 
undermined by being delayed if the needs of Mr. Soobramoney and 
everyone in his position was prioritised,1046 is difficult to accept in the 
circumstances.1047 This is due to the fact that the Constitutional Court 
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‘was in effect treating the claim to treatment for urgent life-threatening 
conditions as having no more call upon society than any other health 
care claim’.1048  
The Soobramoney judgment was criticised for the ‘the thinness of its 
analysis’ but there is (seemingly) general agreement as to the finding of 
the Constitutional Court that there was no universal right to renal dialysis 
treatment under present conditions.1049 However, the need for the state 
to adequately account as to its available resources (before judgment can 
be passed as to what can be accommodated in terms of specific 
treatment offerings) remains a pressing concern. Cornell believed that 
our humanity as a people was lessened at the time of the passing of Mr 
Soobramoney.1050 However, it is my view that our humanity as a people 
was lessened at an earlier point in time when the collective failure, on 
the part of relevant public officials and state institutions to find a way to 
save the life of Mr Soobramoney, became apparent. Nonetheless, a 
timely intervention by big business and/or wealthy South Africans and/or 
ordinary communities so as to assist Mr Soobramoney and his family 
(and in so doing give effect to the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu 
in creating a just and caring society in which all people are treated as 
having equal worth) would have been a powerful revelation. In addition, 
this would have served as an illuminating display of our shared humanity 
while showcasing the failure of the state to come to the aid of a member 
of a vulnerable group.  
It is of crucial importance to highlight that the communal obligations’ 
focus of ubuntu is epitomised by public officials that demonstrate an 
unyielding focus on giving effect to the socio-economic rights as 
enshrined in the Constitution. It is submitted that the aforementioned 
‘unyielding focus’ on the part of public officials is an express 
acknowledgement of the accountability of those officials to come to the 
aid of vulnerable groups. Furthermore, it serves to highlight the definitive 
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link between ubuntu and the accountability of public officials in forging a 
nation-state in which our shared humanity (evidenced by continuous 
harmonising acts as per the insights of Praeg) is the most prominent 
feature.  
3.6.2.1 The appropriate allocation and subsequent utilisation of scarce 
resources by the state 
The Soobramoney decision requires specific scrutiny as the verdict 
rendered by the Constitutional Court was premised almost entirely on 
the scarcity of resources.1051  In this regard it should be noted that 
resource constraints is one of the pivotal factors in determining the 
unconditional obligations to be borne by the state regarding socio-
economic rights.1052  Nonetheless, it is critical that public officials should 
make every possible effort to come to the aid of vulnerable groups (that 
find themselves in perilous circumstances) so as to be viewed as 
discharging their obligations to give effect to constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. Furthermore, it is only when (diligent) public officials have 
discharged their obligations (as per the Constitution) that one can speak 
of public officials as having embraced the spirit of ubuntu in giving effect 
to communal obligations.  
The Constitutional Court in Soobramoney contemplated the claim in 
terms of section 27(1) and 27(2) within the confines of the budget of the 
provincial Department of Health in Kwa-Zulu Natal.1053 It should be noted 
that the Court at no time expressed its willingness to examine the 
budgetary allocation of health resources from the national sphere of 
government to the provincial sphere.1054 The Court is viewed as applying 
a ‘very deferential standard of review’ in respect of the political and 
medical decisions under consideration in this case.1055  However, it is 
correctly pointed out that (the realisation of) socio-economic rights could 
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offer no definitive guide to developing policy ‘if the scope of the rights in 
sections 26 and 27 are determined by the State’s pre-existing budgetary 
choices’.1056  Thus, it is indeed necessary to utilise a broader definition 
of ‘available resources’ if the ultimate goal of realising socio-economic 
rights is to guide policy rather than be dependent on it.1057   
A concern is noted in that the Constitutional Court has not adopted a 
definitive approach with regards to the affirmation of a right (and its 
content) even though the right in question was not capable of being 
realised at present. 1058  This is consistent with an approach that 
recognises that resource constraints in no way tamper with an individual 
having a conditional right but ultimately affects the inherent ability to 
realise that right.1059   However, this inability to realise the right is fittingly 
portrayed as a moral tragedy in that vulnerable people will be excluded 
from accessing shelter, food, water and critical (life-saving) health 
care. 1060   The reality is that resource constraints should feature in 
shaping the content of unconditional obligations rather than in 
determining the content of conditional obligations.1061  Consequently, the 
(present) unconditional obligations of the state should have due 
consideration for scarcity and other relevant factors.1062  It follows that 
the obligations of the state will increase if scarcity levels (of relevant 
resources) are reduced.1063   
Bilchitz notes that the fulfilment of obligations in certain instances (with 
specific reference to the right to health care) appears to be permanently 
out of reach. 1064  Consequently, the usefulness in identifying the 
minimum core obligation is questioned in those circumstances where it 
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is deemed impossible to attain.1065  However, it is my firm view that 
Bilchitz should guard against making the same mistake (which he had 
criticised the Constitutional Court for) by making the case for the state in 
relation to the scarcity of state resources without the state providing 
persuasive proof to that effect. Thus, the state should demonstrate its 
unerring political will in striving for the betterment of society by giving 
effect to healthcare rights (in terms of benchmarked sectoral targets) as 
part of the obligations owed to specific vulnerable groups.  
The Constitutional Court held in Soobramoney (as previously quoted) 
that: 
‘…If this principle were to be applied to all patients claiming 
access to expensive medical treatment or expensive 
drugs, the health budget would have to be dramatically 
increased to the prejudice of other needs which the state 
has to meet.’1066   
However, it is submitted that the expectation is not for the state to do 
everything at once but rather to demonstrate its determination in 
progressively realising urgent socio-economic rights in terms of 
benchmarked targets as shaped by the outer limits of its available 
resources.  
Chaskalson P is viewed as employing the narrowest definition of the 
term ‘scarcity of resources’ in Soobramoney by confining his discussion 
to the provincial health budget1067 in terms of which funds had been 
made available for renal dialysis as previously described.1068 However, 
this is at odds with the earlier ruling in the Final Certification case in 
which the Constitutional Court had to contend with the objection to 
include socio-economic rights in the Constitution on the basis that it 
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would lead to the judiciary dictating budgetary allocations. 1069  
Furthermore, there are two critical issues to be considered in the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights as related to the minimum core 
obligation philosophy.1070  The first (issue) being the pool of resources 
that can be viewed as being available for giving effect to socio-economic 
rights and, secondly is the manner in which these identified resources 
are to be allocated.1071   
Moellendorf has noted that the term ‘available resources’ is ambiguous 
in that:  
‘It may mean those resources that a ministry or department 
has been allotted and has budgeted for the protection of 
the right. Alternatively, it may mean any resources that the 
state can marshal to protect the right’.1072   
It should be noted that these two versions can be viewed as polar 
opposites and that the meaning of ‘available resources’ is to be found 
somewhere between these two versions. 1073  Furthermore, the 
Constitutional Court should not restrict its role in deliberating on rights 
claims to the rigid framework of existing budget allocations.1074  In this 
regard Moellendorf notes that: ‘Rather the court may pass judgment on 
these rights, as with other rights, that require a change in fiscal 
priority’. 1075  Furthermore, it should be noted that viewing ‘available 
resources’ in the narrowest possible terms would be tantamount to 
dismissing the considerable weight that is to be attached to (critical) 
rights.1076   
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It follows that there is a specific need to guard against the state not 
fulfilling certain rights through set allocations in the budget.1077  Also, it 
is necessary to draw a distinction between budgetary allocations that are 
carefully considered as compared to allocations that have not properly 
appreciated the critical urgency of the rights.1078  In addition, allocations 
that are brought about by the mismanagement of resources should be 
carefully analysed.1079  Furthermore, there is a definitive need for state 
budgets to be justified by way of cogent reasoning in the event that they 
are not able to fulfil relevant conditional rights.1080  Thus, the state should 
be expected to account for its allocation of budgets with reference to all 
of its ‘available resources’ with the latter term being defined as ‘all those 
(resources) that lie within the control of the state’.1081   
It should be noted that ‘available resources’ at the very least 
encapsulates all those resources owned by the state and can be 
included to form part of the budget so as to give effect to a purposive 
approach in interpreting the obligations that flow from socio-economic 
rights.1082 Furthermore, it is suggested that capital from foreign loans can 
ostensibly be included under resources available to the state.1083 The 
reality is that the executive (rather than the courts) is best placed to 
assess the extent of the foreign capital that can be acquired to give effect 
to socio-economic rights.1084  The role of the Constitutional Court (in this 
specific instance) would be to advise the state to consider foreign 
assistance in realising socio-economic rights and subsequently ensure 
that the state provides sound justification for their decisions relating to 
foreign aid.1085   
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The ICESCR provides that each state party should allocate the 
‘maximum of its available resources’ in giving effect to ICESCR rights as 
previously stated.1086  However, the phrase ‘maximum of its available 
resources’ is admittedly difficult to define and is consequently 
problematic when utilised as a measuring tool in assessing the extent of 
the compliance by the relevant state party in advancing ICESCR 
rights.1087  It should be mandatory for the State to go beyond the finite 
resources of the National Treasury in seeking to quell human suffering 
and drive human development.1088  Consequently, there is a definitive 
need to identify the outer limits of what could be defined as 
resources. 1089   It is apparent that resources are not confined to 
everything under the direct control of the state but the extent of the 
aforementioned ‘outer limits’ is up for debate. 1090   Thus, there is a 
demonstrated need to ascertain the extent of the resources that should 
be set aside for the advancement of ICESCR rights.1091  Consequently, 
it is necessary to ascertain the manner in which the compliance of the 
state (to discharge its resource allocation obligations) can be effectively 
undertaken.1092   
The contribution by Robertson augments the insights offered by 
Moellendorf and provides additional insight in relation to exploring the 
nature and extent of resources which are available to the state in seeking 
to realise the rights as provided for in the ICESCR.1093  It should be 
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emphasised that increasing the number of indicators that can be applied 
to domestic spending will as a rule increase clarity as to whether a state 
has discharged its obligations in allocating the maximum available 
resources to advance ICESCR rights.1094  Furthermore, the state could 
utilise its regulatory power (through the enactment of suitable legislation) 
to channel the flow of private funds in advancing ICESCR rights.1095  
However, the challenge of providing a true and comprehensive definition 
of ‘the maximum of its available resources’ is acknowledged. 1096  
Nonetheless, one must not lose sight of the urgency of ICESCR rights in 
safeguarding the lives of vulnerable groups and the need to ensure that 
socio-economic rights take their rightful place alongside civil and political 
rights.1097 
3.6.2.2 Brief overview of renal dialysis services in present day South 
Africa  
This section will serve to highlight the failure of the state to progressively 
realise access to the right to health (in relation to the provision of renal 
dialysis services) in South Africa. 
Fabian notes that the South African population has increased from 
40.436 million to approximately 52.275 million (between 1994 and 2012) 
while the treatment rate for end-stage renal disease (‘ESRD’) per million 
population (‘pmp’) has improved from 70 pmp in 1994 to 164 pmp in 
2012.1098 However, the treatment rate for the public sector in 2012 was 
virtually unchanged at 73pmp whilst the private sector (i.e. people 
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carrying medical insurance) had increased to 620pmp.1099 Furthermore, 
the number of public sector treatment centres offering renal dialysis 
increased from 26 to 28 (between 1994 and 2012) while the private 
sector sported an increase from 5 to 163 renal dialysis treatment centres 
over the same time period.1100 Both Limpopo and Mpumalanga had 
failed to establish any public renal dialysis facility since the advent of 
democracy until the date of publication of the relevant article in 2014.1101 
Also, Fabian highlighted the extremely limited public awareness 
regarding the rationing (without review) of renal dialysis treatment as well 
as the subsequent denial of treatment at public hospitals.1102 It is my 
view that the Soobramoney judgment should have been the starting 
point of an unerring focus on progressively rolling out renal dialysis 
services. Thus, there is an urgent need to dramatically increase public 
awareness as to the manner in which the state has failed to realise 
critical healthcare rights.1103  
It follows that one should reference the insights offered by Professor 
Naicker in that approximately 18 000 South Africans require renal 
dialysis treatment. 1104  She stated that dialysis machines cost about 
R200 000 each while the annual cost per patient receiving renal dialysis 
treatment was approximately R120 000 per year in the public sector.1105 
It was highlighted that public hospitals throughout the country were 
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unable to treat desperately ill patients and that the waiting list crises had 
become acute.1106 Thus, a number of patients had passed on by the time 
a treatment slot had opened up for them.1107 Furthermore, Professor 
Naicker had emphasised the need for smaller satellite treatment centres 
to open throughout the country so as to make renal dialysis more 
accessible to ordinary people.1108  It is submitted that one can draw 
powerful parallels between the contribution by Fabian and Professor 
Naicker (as cited above) in the manner in which the state has failed to 
give effect to the progressive realisation of access to healthcare in 
relation to renal dialysis treatment.  
It should be noted that Professor Naicker was a state witness in the 
Soobramoney matter in her capacity as the Head of the Renal Unit at 
Addington Hospital at the time. It is my contention that the present-day 
‘healthcare landscape’ could have been significantly different if the 
Constitutional Court had compelled the state to properly account as to 
its available resources (as well as provide benchmarked sectoral  
targets) in the Soobramoney matter so as to progressively realise the 
right of access to healthcare in the time to come. Consequently, it is my 
view that a number of those very same renal-dialysis satellite centres (as 
mentioned by Professor Naicker) could have opened across the country 
over the past two decades and in the process minimise the suffering of 
ailing patients/fellow members of the nation-state. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the present-day failure of the state to 
provide renal dialysis treatment on a significantly expanded basis as 
compared to what was on offer in 1997, serves to highlight the critical 
need for the Constitutional Court to embrace an oversight role. In this 
                                                             
1106 Merrmannsen K ‘Dialysis: a life-saver for thousands’ available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/lifestyle/dialysis-a-life-saver-for-thousands-
1831630, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
1107 Merrmannsen K ‘Dialysis: a life-saver for thousands’ available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/lifestyle/dialysis-a-life-saver-for-thousands-
1831630, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
1108 Merrmannsen K ‘Dialysis: a life-saver for thousands’ available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/lifestyle/dialysis-a-life-saver-for-thousands-
1831630, (accessed 17 June 2016).  
184 
 
 
regard the state should be compelled to demonstrate the necessary 
accountability in progressively realising socio-economic rights by 
prioritising assistance for those who face imminent threats to their 
survival.  
3.6.2.3 End stage renal failure as an expression of lived reality 
An exposure to the anthropology discipline has highlighted the 
importance of understanding the plight of specific vulnerable groups in 
their immediate surroundings. This will ensure that a vivid picture of their 
lived reality is captured with regards to the actual deprivation/hazards 
that they have to endure on a daily basis. It is submitted that the 
aforementioned anthropological insights should colour the perceptions 
and subsequent decision-making of public officials in faithfully giving 
effect to their duties (as enshrined in the Constitution) so as to come to 
the aid of the aforementioned vulnerable groups. It is further submitted 
that those same public officials would in fact give effect to the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu through coming to the aid of those same 
vulnerable groups.  
In this regard reference should be made to the unedited account of end-
stage renal failure (‘chronic renal failure’) as prepared by Dr Taufiq 
Abrahams and inserted as Annexure 1 at the end of this thesis. Dr 
Abrahams qualified as a medical doctor at the University of Cape Town 
in 1999 after which he worked in the public and private sector (both 
locally and in the United Kingdom) before opening his private general 
practice in 2003. I engaged with Dr Abrahams from September 2015 
onwards so as to develop a better understanding of how chronic renal 
failure presented medically as well as the manner in which it impacted 
on the lives of his patients (i.e. the perceived quality of life of both the 
patient as well as his/her loved ones). It is submitted that the account 
prepared by Dr Abrahams (and reproduced with his express permission) 
is the equivalent of ‘field notes’ as routinely prepared by anthropologists 
when immersed in an actual social field. The aforementioned field notes 
serve to shed light on the lived reality of members of a specific vulnerable 
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group (which is in fact a defining feature of this research) and seeks to 
compel the state to come to the aid of a specific vulnerable group 
through a targeted intervention strategy. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that a key purpose served by Annexure 1 is 
to sensitise public officials to the bitter reality of end stage renal failure 
as well as the numerous positive consequences of receiving ongoing 
renal dialysis treatment. In this regard the diligent public official will no 
doubt cotton upon the fact that the absence of suitable renal dialysis 
facilities for the public will inevitably lead to desperate suffering on the 
part of patients afflicted with end stage renal failure. The aforementioned 
Annexure serves to provide a different perspective by placing the 
reader/public official in the shoes of a patient that has had to endure end 
stage renal failure and inevitably seeks to enhance the quality of their 
life through accessing treatment that should in fact be readily available. 
It is indeed a distinctly human trait to seek to continue to live a life of 
purpose through negotiating life-threatening health challenges as best 
one can – this is despite the contrary view of Sachs J who believed that 
those amongst us who are gravely ill (and cannot secure the relevant 
treatment) should accept the inevitability of approaching death. 1109  It is 
submitted that it would be difficult for almost anyone to embrace the 
aforementioned philosophical perspective without protest (as proffered 
by Sachs J) if treatment for the same medical condition is in fact readily 
available at a price. It is further submitted that Annexure 1 serves to prick 
the conscience of the public official so that he/she can ultimately 
question whether they would want to endure a similar fate to that of Mr 
Soobramoney but for a decisive intervention by the state.  
It should be noted that the purpose served by the newspaper article 
described below is to shed light on the human tragedy visited upon 
vulnerable members of the nation-state through a lack of accountability 
on the part of the state. In addition, the failure of the Constitutional Court 
to hold the state accountable to the required standard (if the overarching 
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goal is indeed to shape a nation-state in which all people are treated with 
equal concern) is clearly demonstrated. The aforementioned newspaper 
article had highlighted that the family of the late Mr. Soobramoney had 
collected two thirds of the funds required to purchase a renal dialysis 
machine. 1110   The family donated the funds to a medical facility to 
commemorate the first anniversary of the passing of Mr Soobramoney. 
1111  The balance of the funds, as required for the purchase of the 
machine, was contributed by the abovementioned medical facility.1112  It 
should be noted that Mr Soobramoney’s final wish (before slipping into 
a coma) had been to urge his family to assist other renal dialysis patients 
by increasing the medical capacity on offer in South Africa through the 
acquisition of one additional machine. 1113  
It is indeed a tragedy (that two decades after the Soobramoney judgment 
was issued) that the state is yet to devise and disseminate a sectoral 
healthcare plan with benchmarked targets to progressively increase the 
availability of renal dialysis treatment (let alone health care rights in 
general). Thus, there is a clear need for the state to account for treatment 
checklists that seek to routinely exclude patients rather than provide 
urgent medical treatment for treatable conditions.1114  Furthermore, the 
notion of supposedly reasonable/impartial criteria to secure access to 
renal dialysis treatment makes a mockery of progressively giving effect 
to urgent subsistence rights in the absence of the state providing a 
detailed account of its available resources. In this regard reference is 
once again made to the preferred (and broadest) interpretation of 
‘available resources’ as a means to properly benchmark the obligations 
of the state in giving effect to critical socio-economic rights. It follows that 
the Constitutional Court has to assume a pivotal oversight role to ensure 
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that the state demonstrates the necessary accountability in 
progressively giving effect to socio-economic rights.     
3.6.3    An analysis of the Grootboom case in order to demonstrate the 
obligations of the state in alleviating the desperate plight of 
vulnerable people 
The Grootboom case dealt with the desperate plight of a group of 
homeless people that (eventually) sought refuge on a sports field with 
nothing but plastic sheets to shield them from the elements.1115 The 
aforementioned group had initially approached the High Court seeking 
an order compelling the municipality to give effect to their constitutional 
duties which they believed should include the provision of basic 
shelter. 1116  The High Court granted a measure of relief 1117  to the 
aforementioned group and the government subsequently appealed to 
the Constitutional Court. 1118 
A key drawback of the Grootboom judgment has been the nature of the 
orders issued by the Constitutional Court.1119  The first order issued by 
the Court made a settlement between the parties an order of court.1120  
The aforementioned settlement order provided for an undertaking that 
the Grootboom community would be furnished with temporary 
accommodation and that basic services (including running water and 
sanitation) would be made available.1121  However, the settlement order 
was believed to have only been implemented ‘to a certain extent’.1122  
Thus, those parts of the Court’s order that required once-off involvement 
                                                             
1115 Grootboom (2000) para 4.  
1116 Grootboom (2000) para 4. 
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parents with adequate basic shelter. In this regard the state was ordered to 
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on the part of the municipality were executed but those that required an 
ongoing commitment (e.g. refuse removal) were seemingly not 
fulfilled.1123  
The Constitutional Court handed down a second general order which is 
the one contained in the judgment and ordered the state ‘to devise and 
implement within its available resources a comprehensive and 
coordinated programme to progressively realise the right of access to 
adequate housing’.1124 The aforementioned programme was required to 
include measures such as an ‘accelerated land settlement 
programme’1125 to offer relief for people ‘who have no access to land, no 
roof over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis 
conditions.’ 1126  Thus, the Constitutional Court held that the housing 
programme of the state (with specific reference to the area under the 
control of the Cape Metropolitan Council) was not in keeping with the 
relevant requirements of the Constitution as ‘it failed to make reasonable 
provision for people in desperate need’.1127    
The Grootboom case serves to demonstrate how the absence of 
accountability on the part of the public officials (in giving progressive 
effect to constitutionally guaranteed socio-economic rights) can 
exacerbate the plight of vulnerable groups that find themselves in 
perilous circumstances. Furthermore, it highlights how embracing 
ubuntu (on the part of public officials) can serve to colour and bolster the 
progressive realisation of subsistence rights. It is submitted that 
providing vulnerable groups with access to adequate housing will serve 
as a catalyst in assisting people to live lives of value (as perceived by 
them). This in turn will ensure the forging of social solidarity ideals as 
those same vulnerable people (who have benefited from access to 
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housing on a priority basis) will reap the benefits of living in a just and 
caring nation state in which all people are treated as having equal worth.  
It is my submission that the illuminating insights offered by Waldron1128 
serve as a fitting introduction (as well as backdrop) to the Grootboom 
case in highlighting the deprivation endured by homeless people in 
South Africa. Waldron describes the challenges of being homeless in 
America yet his description captures the harshness of the present day 
lived reality of homeless people in South Africa.1129 It is submitted that 
the compelling insights offered by Waldron serves to reinforce the 
illuminating contribution by Brand in casting light on the perpetual 
suffering of vulnerable people.1130 
Waldron highlights his intention to describe the troubling reality of 
homelessness by utilising abstract legal principles rather than seeking 
to employ a communitarian ethic.1131  He adopts the aforementioned 
approach as a means to highlight how homelessness can erode the most 
basic principles of liberty in much the same way as torture and other 
violations of human rights.1132 It should be noted that the homeless 
person is ‘utterly and at all times at the mercy of others’ if he/she is on 
private property as he/she can be ejected at the behest of the property 
owner.1133 The manner in which South African law deals with present 
day eviction proceedings (i.e. the relevant property owner obtaining a 
court order prior to the eviction of people that have unlawfully settled on 
the land) is noted but the focus at present is to shed light on the nature 
and extent of deprivation as endured by homeless people. 
Waldron describes a ‘libertarian fantasy’ in which all land in a society 
could be held as private property and how this could lead to a situation 
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where a homeless person would literally not be allowed to be 
anywhere.1134 It should be noted that the aforementioned ‘libertarian 
fantasy’ is indeed outside the realm of possibility but it serves to 
emphasise the extent of the vulnerability of homeless people in finding 
a public place to inhabit without being threatened with fines and/or 
removal the next instant.   
The reality is that public property is the final refuge for vast numbers of 
homeless people.1135 However, there is an ever-increasing tendency to 
increase the regulation of the activities permitted at public property 
locations which almost inevitably leads to primal human tasks (e.g. 
urinating, washing, sleeping, cooking and eating) being prohibited.1136 
Thus, it should be apparent that this will have a disastrous effect on 
homeless people that ‘must live their whole lives on common land’.1137 
It should be noted that every human action has a spatial component.1138 
It follows that a (homeless) person who is not free to be in any place is 
in fact not free to do anything.1139 Thus, such a (homeless) person could 
be viewed as ‘comprehensively unfree’ if the libertarian paradise (in 
which all land is privately-owned) becomes a reality.1140 There is a need 
to demonstrate the fallacy of the belief that the homeless ‘are in the 
relevant sense free to perform the same activities as the rest of us’.1141 
The reality is tragically different as the homeless possess neither the 
‘means’ nor the ‘power’ to give effect to these freedoms. 1142  Thus, 
homelessness can in essence be defined as ‘consisting of 
unfreedom’.1143      
                                                             
1134 Waldron J ‘Homelessness’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 300. 
1135 Waldron J ‘Homelessness’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 301. Please see Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 2.  
1136 Waldron J ‘Homelessness’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 301. 
1137 Waldron J ‘Homelessness’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 301.  
1138 Waldron J ‘Homelessness’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 301. 
1139 Waldron J ‘Homelessness’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 301.  
1140 Waldron J ‘Homelessness’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 302. 
1141 Waldron J ‘Homelessness’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 302. 
1142 Waldron J ‘Homelessness’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 305. Please see Brand D 
‘What Are Socio-Economic Rights For?’ (2003) 35 - 36. 
1143 Waldron J ‘Homelessness’ (1992) UCLA Law Review 306. 
191 
 
 
Waldron describes how the act of urination is a ‘necessary and desirable’ 
function and it consequently follows that there is no law against 
urination.1144 However, urinating in public (outside of public restrooms) 
is generally prohibited and serves to highlight the desperate plight of 
homeless people in trying to find a way to do the abovementioned daily 
primal tasks. 1145  Waldron rightfully states that there is ‘nothing 
particularly dignified’ about sleeping or urinating but there is ‘something 
deeply and inherently undignified’ in being stopped from doing so.1146 
This leads Waldron to describe the aforementioned endless stream of 
indignities visited upon the homeless as tantamount to torture.1147 Thus, 
Waldron believes that we should bear collective shame as a people for 
enacting laws that seek to degrade our fellow human beings for want of 
a private property to call home.1148  
It is fair comment that the homeless are compelled to endure not only a 
lack of freedom but also hunger, adverse weather conditions as well as 
the ever-present threat of physical and emotional harm.1149 However, 
Waldron sought to focus on freedom as a means to highlight the 
calamitous consequences of forcing a class of persons to endure ‘all of 
the restrictions and nothing else, a class of persons for whom property 
is nothing but a way of limiting their freedom’. 1150  The insightful 
contribution by Waldron provides a fitting backdrop for an exploration of 
specific aspects of the Grootboom judgment (as detailed below) so as to 
bear in mind the numerous hazards and indignities that homeless people 
have to endure as a matter of course. The contribution by Waldron also 
serves to cast light on the manner in which ubuntu should be embraced 
by public officials (through giving effect to communal obligations) so as 
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to fashion a just and caring society by treating all people as having equal 
worth.  
The General Comments seek to provide content to the rights endorsed 
in the ICESCR (as previously detailed) and the UN Committee has 
stated that socio-economic rights possess a minimum core obligation 
which must be realised by state parties.1151 However, Justice Yacoob 
openly criticised the minimum core approach (as adopted by the UN 
Committee) and stated that it is not ‘necessary to decide whether it is 
appropriate for a court to determine in the first instance the minimum 
core of a right’.1152 In this regard it should be noted that Justice Yacoob 
did not in fact reject the minimum core approach – it follows that the 
Constitutional Court could endorse this approach in a contemporary 
context.1153 Justice Yacoob believed that the primary issue that had to 
be addressed by the Court was to ascertain the reasonableness of the 
measures adopted by the state to realise the rights enshrined in section 
26. 1154  Justice Yacoob held that the state had demonstrated the 
implementation of a housing programme of which the medium and long 
term goals were beyond reproach.1155 However, the Constitutional Court 
held that the state had not demonstrated the necessary reasonableness 
in devising a housing strategy which failed to offer relief to those that 
demonstrated urgent need.1156 Consequently, the housing programme 
of the state did not pass constitutional muster.1157    
Reasonableness is defined as including those decisions that are correct 
as well as those decisions that mark the space between that which is 
correct and that which falls short of being unpredictable.1158 It follows 
that judicial review makes allowance for a ‘margin of appreciation’ which 
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ensures that the original decision-making body retains a certain amount 
of latitude in making the decisions entrusted to it.1159 Consequently, the 
realisation of socio-economic rights by the legislature and the executive 
is no different.1160 Thus, the Constitutional Court has elected to counter 
concerns about the judicial review of socio-economics rights by adopting 
a reasonableness approach which readily demonstrates measured 
deference to the legislature and the executive.1161 However, the right 
enshrined in section 26 must be progressively realised by the state 
rather than adhering to a hollow notion of what constitutes reasonable 
conduct on the part of the state. 1162  Thus, the abovementioned 
deference owed to the executive and legislature is only concerned with 
granting them a certain amount of latitude in electing from a range of 
suitable mechanisms to realise the right in question.1163 However, that 
same deference owed to the Legislature and Executive should in no way 
impede the Constitutional Court from providing socio-economic rights 
with critical determinate content.1164   
Bilchitz believes that the reasonableness of state conduct must rightly 
be assessed against the ‘ends, purposes or obligations’ demanded by 
the Constitution.1165 Furthermore, the state is duty-bound to provide for 
the basic needs of its people - this entails a process of balancing all the 
relevant constitutional obligations to ascertain the preferred course of 
action which resonates with the primary constitutional values of dignity, 
freedom and equality.1166  
A legitimate concern is raised by Bilchitz in that the state is directed by 
the Constitutional Court in Grootboom to ‘provide relief’ 1167 which does 
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not offer guidance as to the specific obligations of the state.1168 Also, it 
does nothing to prevent the state from employing delaying tactics and/or 
stonewalling progress in providing for the needs of desperate people.1169 
In this regard a minimum core obligation approach would provide a clear 
benchmark in terms of the clear deliverables of the state regarding the 
provision of access to shelter/housing for people in dire need.1170  This 
would in turn promote legal certainty and augment the protection on offer 
for an extremely vulnerable segment of society.1171 Furthermore, the 
Constitutional Court did not impose a time limit on the state to devise a 
policy1172 to cater for the specific housing requirements of people in 
desperate need.1173 It is likely that the Constitutional Court would have 
insisted on a clear timeframe (within which the state had to devise the 
said policy) if the Court had embraced the minimum core obligation 
approach.1174 This is due to the fact that the urgency of the interest to be 
realised would have been the focal point of any discussion/deliberation 
founded on the minimum core obligation approach.1175  
The Constitutional Court’s concern in the Grootboom matter can 
reasonably be construed as being narrow in the sense that it focussed 
on ‘the logical consistency of the state’s housing policy’ as it did not 
specifically deal with people in a desperate situation that had nowhere 
to live.1176 The Court (unfortunately) elected not to apply a substantive 
standard which would have brought into focus the need for the efforts 
and expenditure of the state to reflect ‘the differing degrees of need’1177 
amongst the people that the state is meant to serve.1178 The manner in 
which the state had implemented the Grootboom court order seemed to 
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reflect the approach of the Constitutional Court in the sense that the 
provincial housing budgets as a whole did not reflect a pressing concern 
for those in desperate need. 1179  This was highlighted by nominal 
allocations (from the existing housing budgets) to address the plight of 
those in desperate need.1180 Thus, Brand refers with approval to the 
contribution by Pillay1181 who had analysed the flawed manner in which 
the Grootboom judgment had been implemented.1182  
Roux notes that the Grootboom decision obliged the government to 
focus on ‘the human interests at stake and sensible priority-setting’ 
without compelling the state to provide protection for every person 
‘whose socio-economic needs are at risk’. 1183  Furthermore, the 
Grootboom decision did not compel the state to prioritise its spending in 
a specified manner.1184 The reality is that the aforementioned decision 
provides the necessary authority for the state to merely demonstrate that 
its social and economic policies are sufficiently broad/diverse to cater for 
the needs of vulnerable people. 1185  However, the Legislature and 
Executive retain the power to consider the timing and/or sequencing in 
which it seeks to meet its diverse social obligations.1186 Thus, Roux is 
correct in emphasising that the state should be deterred if it seeks to 
allocate scarce resources to relatively privileged groups for whom such 
assistance is a tangible, additional benefit rather than an urgent 
need.1187  
It should be noted that the Constitutional Court rejected the arguments 
of the amici 1188 in relation to General Comment 31189 which sought to 
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1182 Brand D ‘What are socio-economic rights for?’ (2003) 50. 
1183 Roux T ‘Understanding Grootboom’ (2002) Forum Constitutional 41.  
1184 Roux T ‘Understanding Grootboom’ (2002) Forum Constitutional 41. 
1185 Roux T ‘Understanding Grootboom’ (2002) Forum Constitutional 41. 
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compel State Parties to ‘devote all the resources at their disposal first to 
satisfy the ‘minimum core content’ of the right to adequate housing.1190 
In this regard the Constitutional Court held that there was insufficient 
evidence adduced (in the proceedings) as to the minimum core content 
of the right of access to housing - especially in light of regional variations 
in housing requirements and the nature of the rural/urban divide. 1191  
Roux is critical of the cursory manner in which the Constitutional Court 
dealt with the ‘available resources’ element but he was not surprised in 
light of the decision by the Constitutional Court to distance itself from the 
minimum core philosophy.1192 He is justifiably concerned, as the manner 
in which resources are allocated is indeed critical, especially in a country 
with limited resources such as South Africa. 1193  Also, he voices his 
concern with the manner in which the Constitutional Court had left the 
executive and the legislature to decide1194 the most critical policy issues 
in Grootboom.1195 Roux believes that the most positive aspect of the 
Grootboom judgment was that a social programme would not only have 
be ‘reasonably designed, but also reasonably implemented’.1196  
Roux refers to the remedies suggested by Trengrove (in light of the 
empowering nature of section 172 (1) (b) of the Constitution) in a paper 
published two years before the Grootboom judgment. 1197  It aptly 
demonstrates that the court order that was ultimately issued in 
Grootboom fell woefully short of the expectation of a number of 
constitutional experts in advancing the realisation of critical socio-
economic rights.1198 The Constitutional Court should at the very least 
have ordered the state to return to the Court to provide a detailed plan 
as to the manner in which the housing needs of people (that had to 
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endure intolerable living conditions) would be progressively realised as 
a matter of urgency.1199 Roux rightfully points out that in the absence of 
the aforementioned enforcement mechanism (i.e. a suitably 
benchmarked sectoral plan devised by the state) that the order of 
constitutional invalidity only served to embarrass the state and nothing 
more.1200 Thus, the Constitutional Court had in fact issued a remedy 
without a sanction and it was consequently of no practical value to 
vulnerable people ‘whose socio-economic rights constitute their sole 
claim to citizenship’.1201  
3.6.3.1 The flawed implementation of the Grootboom court order(s) 
There is a specific focus on the work by Pillay as it provides definitive 
insight on the lack of accountability (and the absence of political will) on 
the part of the state to prioritise the needs of homeless people that find 
themselves in perilous circumstances. Also, it serves to demonstrate the 
need for the Constitutional Court to provide determinate content for 
socio-economic rights so as to be in a position to hold the state to 
account in giving effect to the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights. Furthermore, Pillay’s work highlights the need for the SAHRC to 
fully discharge its mandate regarding the monitoring and enforcement of 
socio-economic rights.1202 It is submitted that the SAHRC should have 
done more with regards to the monitoring (and enforcement) of the 
Grootboom judgment as discussed below. It is further submitted that 
public officials that are imbued with ubuntu will demonstrate the 
necessary accountability (in giving effect to socio-economic rights) as a 
means of paying homage to the deep-seated belief that all members of 
a just and caring nation-state are interconnected and interdependent.  
Pillay believes that the real-world impact of the Grootboom judgment on 
the housing situation of the actual Grootboom community (as well as 
other people who find themselves in a similarly desperate situation) has 
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been limited at best.1203 This is despite the fact that the judgment was 
‘hailed as a great victory for the homeless and landless people of South 
Africa’.1204 Nonetheless, Pillay acknowledges the significant contribution 
of the Grootboom judgment in developing the jurisprudence on socio-
economic rights as well as the nature of the positive duties borne by the 
state in giving effect to these rights.1205   
A shortcoming of the Constitutional Court’s general order is that it was 
declaratory in nature and it did not set down specific time frames within 
which the state had to act as previously described.1206 The net effect of 
the aforementioned shortcoming was that a year after the order had 
been issued there was little apparent change in the housing policy for 
people in desperate need/crisis situations.1207 In this regard the SAHRC 
had monitored the situation and tabled a report highlighting that it had 
taken a full year for the local administration (i.e. the City of Cape Town) 
and its provincial counterpart (i.e. the Western Cape Provincial 
Administration) to come to a decision as to where the ‘locus of 
responsibility’ lay with regards to giving effect to the terms of the 
Grootboom court order. 1208  Furthermore, the efforts of the 
aforementioned two administration entities was confined to devising a 
plan to bring about the permanent resettlement of the Wallacedene 
community.1209 Thus, it was readily apparent that there was a palpable 
lack of understanding that giving effect to the judgment required 
‘systemic changes to national, provincial and local housing programmes 
to cater for people in desperate and crisis situations’.1210  
However, the Constitutional Court elected not to play any role (both in 
the interim and general order) in supervising or overseeing the 
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implementation of the orders.1211 The Court had stated in the judgment 
that the SAHRC ‘had agreed to monitor and report on the compliance of 
the state with its section 26 obligations’.1212 However, the SAHRC was 
not required to report back to the Constitutional Court in the actual order 
issued by the Court.1213 Also, the SAHRC was seemingly focused on 
monitoring the implementation of the first order (in relation to the 
Grootboom community).1214 Thus, there was consequently a troubling 
absence of information as to whether ‘nationally and provincially there is 
compliance with the obligation to put in place and implement accelerated 
land release programmes’.1215 
The SAHRC submitted a Report to the Constitutional Court over a year 
after the issuing of the Grootboom judgment but the aforementioned 
Report did not provide information as to the efforts (on the part of the 
SAHRC) to ascertain whether (and to what extent) the three spheres of 
government had given effect to the court order.1216 Furthermore, the 
aforementioned Report did not provide information as to subsequent 
actions taken (by the state) to revise/augment the national housing 
programme to ensure its alignment with the Grootboom judgment.1217 
However, Pillay believed (at the time) that the Constitutional Court ‘does 
not regard itself as still seized’ with this matter in light of the lack of a 
public response (by the Constitutional Court) to the Report tabled by the 
SAHRC. 1218  Consequently, it is noted that a key challenge for 
organisations working in the field of housing rights is ‘monitoring and 
advocacy aimed at ensuring that the state’s housing programmes give 
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effect to the Grootboom judgment’ with a specific emphasis on providing 
for the needs of people in crisis situations.1219  
Pillay emphasises that for a remedy to be appropriate that same remedy 
must be effective.1220 In this regard Pillay refers to Fose v Minister of 
Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) in which the Court held that:  
‘In our context an appropriate remedy must mean an 
effective remedy, for without effective remedies for breach, 
the values underlying and the rights entrenched in the 
Constitution cannot be properly upheld or enhanced. 
Particularly in a country in which so few have the means to 
enforce their rights through the courts, it is essential on 
those occasions when the legal process does establish 
that an infringement of an entrenched right has occurred, 
it be effectively vindicated. The courts have a particular 
responsibility in this regard and are obliged to “forge new 
tools” and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to 
achieve this goal.’1221 
De Vos rightfully expressed his disappointment in the Grootboom 
judgment in that the individual applicants were not provided with 
relief.1222 De Vos sought to focus on the importance of the reasoning 
employed by the Constitutional Court in confirming the critical and 
indivisible link between the aspirational goals to be found in the equality 
guarantee of section 9 and the aspirational goals contained in the 
various socio-economic rights.1223 Furthermore, De Vos notes that the 
opening paragraph of the Grootboom judgment 1224 highlights that the 
primary purpose of the Constitution is to give effect to the achievement 
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of one overarching goal in creating a society based on the principles of 
equality, human dignity and freedom.1225  
De Vos asserts, by way of an example, that a finding by the 
Constitutional Court in Grootboom that a failure by the state to cater for 
the needs of the homeless is unreasonable (and consequently fell foul 
of section 26) could play a pivotal role in determining whether the 
inaction of the state would not also be considered an infringement of 
section 9(3) of the Constitution.1226 De Vos consequently believes that 
reading the different sections of the Constitution together in this manner 
will bolster the ‘transformative nature of the Constitution in general and 
of the right to equality in particular’.1227  
De Vos notes, with reference to section 26(2), that the Constitutional 
Court failed to furnish any interpretation of the positive obligation to 
‘promote and fulfil’ with respect to the right of access that would have 
permitted the applicants to benefit from individual relief.1228 However, De 
Vos argues that individuals cannot demand access to shelter or housing 
even though section 26 has created a right that can be enforced by 
individuals.1229 In this regard the individual merely has a right to demand 
that the state should implement measures to provide for the housing 
needs of those individuals that are unable to fend for themselves until 
such time as they can secure access to adequate housing.1230 Thus, in 
enforcing the right of access to housing (and with due regard for the 
transformative vision of the Constitution) the Constitutional Court is 
obliged to assess the conduct of the state as to whether any steps had 
been taken and whether those steps taken were appropriate.1231 The 
Court will ultimately focus on the reasonableness of the state’s plan (as 
well as the implementation of that plan) as a means to ascertain whether 
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the state had discharged its positive obligations in giving effect to the 
right of access to housing.1232  
The abovementioned commentary by De Vos is illuminating in 
describing the preferred approach of the Constitutional Court in focusing 
on the reasonableness of the conduct of the state in giving effect to key 
subsistence rights. However, the aforementioned approach (as adopted 
by the Court) is indeed flawed as it fails to prioritise the actual suffering 
endured by a vulnerable group. It follows that the Court should in fact 
determine whether the plan as devised (and subsequently implemented) 
by the state will in fact bring an end to the actual suffering endured by 
that same vulnerable group rather than focussing on a myopic 
assessment as to whether the conduct of the state is reasonable and 
logical in the circumstances.   
Scott and Alston provide telling insights regarding the manner in which 
socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution overlap with specific 
articles in the ICESCR.1233 In this regard section 26 (2) of the 1996 
Constitution is remarkably similar to Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR but for 
two differences.1234 Section 26(2) utilises the phrase ‘within available 
resources’ while the ICESCR states ‘to the maximum of available 
resources’.1235 It could ostensibly be argued that section 26(2) imposes 
a less exacting standard even though it is difficult to discern any practical 
difference between the two versions. 1236  In this regard Chenwi and 
Hardowar believe that the ‘obligation is not formulated in the same 
way’.1237 Chenwi and Hardowar point out that article 2(1) of the ICESCR 
obliges a state party to utilise the ‘maximum of its resources’ while the 
relevant provision in the Constitution provides for ‘within available 
resources’.1238  Consequently, it can be implied that the Constitution 
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does not oblige the state to provide anything over and above its available 
resources whereas the ICESCR is viewed as taking a stronger stand in 
relation to the use of resources.1239   
It should be noted that the aforementioned views of Chenwi and 
Hardowar is at odds with the views of Scott and Alston as endorsed in 
this thesis. In this regard Scott and Alston are correct in highlighting that 
the courts must consider international law when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights and it is apparent that the courts would be hard pressed to draw 
a negative inference in light of the word ‘maximum’ not being included in 
the relevant text.1240 The second difference is that the 1996 Constitution 
requires ‘reasonable…measures’ to be implemented while the ICESCR 
provides for ‘all appropriate means’.1241 Consequently, Scott and Alston 
rightfully view the aforementioned difference as negligible.1242  
Scott and Alston believe that the state is probably unable to resolve a 
wide-ranging social rights crisis in anything but the long term. 1243 
However, the state can certainly lessen the impact of the aforementioned 
crisis by ensuring that it adopts a set of objectives and policies that 
capture the nature and extent of its constitutional obligations (owed in 
terms of section 26) within a reasonable time period.1244 Furthermore, 
the aforementioned objectives and policies should prioritise the adoption 
of a minimum core content of the right to housing in the shortest time 
period possible.1245  
In this regard the Right to Adequate Housing provides insightful 
guidance on the manner in which an accountable state should strive to 
alleviate the intolerable living conditions of vulnerable groups (such as 
the Grootboom community).1246  The concept of adequacy in housing 
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delivery is in part determined by ‘social, economic, cultural, climatic, 
ecological and other factors’.1247  However, the concept of adequacy can 
be expanded in such a way so as to find application ‘in any particular 
context’ by embracing the following factors: Legal Security of Tenure; 
Availability of Services, Materials, Facilities and Infrastructure; 
Affordability; Habitability; Accessibility; Location and Cultural 
Adequacy.1248   
Scott and Alston believed that the contents of General Comment 4 (in 
relation to the Right to Adequate Housing) should be recognised as 
requiring special consideration (at the time) in the impending Grootboom 
appeal to the Constitutional Court.1249 This was deemed necessary as it 
was directly relevant to the issues being deliberated upon as well as the 
manner in which the UN Committee had employed the values of equality, 
dignity and security in exploring the notion of adequacy. 1250 
Furthermore, General Comment 7 was said to provide for the normative 
content of the right to adequate housing.1251  
It is indeed a tragedy that the Constitutional Court elected not to focus 
on the deprivation and suffering endured by the Grootboom community. 
The narrow focus adopted by the Constitutional Court (in ascertaining 
the reasonableness of both the state programme and its subsequent 
implementation) served to consign the suffering of a vulnerable group to 
the periphery while permitting the state to essentially skirt responsibility 
for progressively easing the plight of homeless people. It is submitted 
that the Constitutional Court should focus on the duties of the state in 
progressively realising the guaranteed socio-economic rights of 
vulnerable groups (as enshrined in the Constitution) rather than 
confining itself to ascertaining the reasonableness of state conduct. 
Thus, there is a pressing need for public officials to contemplate the 
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actual suffering and deprivation as endured by vulnerable groups. It is 
my contention that the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu draws 
attention to the aforementioned plight of vulnerable groups and will 
promote the accountability of public officials (in giving effect to socio-
economic rights) if ubuntu is fully embraced by those same public 
officials.  
3.6.4   An analysis of the TAC case so as to cast light on the plight of 
specific vulnerable groups and the pressing need for the state to 
address pervasive shortcomings in the health sector  
This thesis will seek to analyse specific aspects of the TAC1252 case as 
well as the pivotal contribution of the Treatment Action Campaign.  This 
will serve to demonstrate how the failings of the state can be remedied 
by civil society banding together and subsequently engaging in 
constructive dialogue and/or lobbying the state (in addition to litigation) 
as a means to secure access to constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
Furthermore, it is of critical importance for public officials to embrace 
their duties regarding the progressive realisation of subsistence rights 
(as enshrined in the Constitution) so as to ease the plight of vulnerable 
groups. It is submitted that ubuntu, understood as giving effect to 
communal obligations, can serve to colour and bolster the accountability 
of the ‘so-transformed diligent public official’ in coming to the aid of 
vulnerable groups. 
The TAC case dealt with the policy adopted by the South African 
government in making the antiretroviral drug, Nevirapine, available as a 
means to reduce the probability of HIV transmission from mother to child 
at birth.1253 In July 2000 the manufacturers of Nevirapine offered to make 
the drug available for 5 years at no cost to the state.1254 However, it was 
still not possible for people to secure Nevirapine in the public sector until 
May 2001 when a policy change provided for the utilisation of Nevirapine 
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at a limited number of research and training sites throughout South 
Africa.1255 
The Constitutional Court confirmed that the state had acted in an 
unreasonable manner in confining the availability of Nevirapine to the 
aforementioned pilot sites.1256 Thus, the Constitutional Court issued a 
mandatory order in the TAC matter (to extend the availability of 
Nevirapine beyond the test sites as well as to expand testing and 
counselling services) but elected not to retain an element of supervisory 
jurisdiction.1257  
Bilchitz believes that the enquiry mounted by the Court should have 
sought to ascertain the reasonableness of the measures adopted by the 
state to effect progressive realisation of the rights detailed in sections 
26(1) and 27(1).1258 This would in fact entail the Court pronouncing on 
the content of the rights detailed in section 26(1) and 27(1).1259 However, 
the Constitutional Court did not provide a description of what the right to 
healthcare in fact includes.1260  It is of paramount importance to provide 
content to socio-economic rights so that there is a clear benchmark 
against which to assess the measures adopted by the state to 
progressively realise the right in question.1261 Furthermore, the wording 
of the TAC judgment is indicative of the Constitutional Court adopting 
the point of view that the state had failed to discharge its positive 
obligations by not providing vital medication to patients. 1262  Thus, 
Bilchitz rightfully contends that the Constitutional Court should have 
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sought to provide some content to the right to healthcare to the extent 
permitted by the facts of the case.1263  
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court could counter concerns about 
paying undue deference to the other branches of government if it 
provided clear guidelines as to how the appropriateness of the policies 
of the state were to be assessed.1264 It follows that it could do so by 
providing determinate content of the rights in question rather than relying 
on the opaque notion of reasonableness.1265 The flawed nature of the 
court order in TAC was in part due to the focus of the Constitutional Court 
on assessing the reasonableness of the conduct of the state rather than 
a clear focus on the lives of babies that were at stake.1266 The Court had 
clear evidence that HIV could be transmitted by mothers breastfeeding 
their babies1267 yet failed to order the state to include the provision of 
infant formula feed 1268  as part of its comprehensive treatment 
strategy.1269 Bilchitz highlighted that this placed numerous babies at risk 
of contracting a life-threatening disease.1270   
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court elected not to retain supervisory 
jurisdiction in TAC (as previously described) which is difficult to 
understand in light of the obstructive approach adopted by the state in 
distributing ARVs to vulnerable people.1271 Thus, it is fair comment that 
this was an especially inopportune moment for the Constitutional Court 
to refer to the bona fides 1272 of the state.1273 In this regard the Court had 
stated that ‘…the government has always respected and executed the 
orders of the Constitutional Court. There is no reason to believe that it 
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will not do so in the present case’.1274 Furthermore, there was clear 
evidence in the months following the issuing of the court order that a 
number of provinces had not made any real effort to adhere to the court 
order.1275 Limpopo and Mpumalanga were identified as failing to cater 
for the increased availability of Nevirapine despite having the necessary 
capacity.1276  
Bilchitz believes that the Constitutional Court should have focussed its 
attention on developing the determinate content of the right (as well as 
maximising the effectiveness and reach of the subsequent order) in line 
with its mandate as the guardian of the Constitution rather than seeking 
to display excessive deference to the state.1277  Also, there is grave 
concern about the manner in which the state elected to implement the 
orders of the Constitutional Court in the absence of supervisory 
jurisdiction.1278  It should be noted that the Executive will only be in a 
position to appreciate what is expected of them if the judgment provides 
the necessary guidance regarding the content of the rights in question 
as well as the benchmarking of the objectives to be achieved.1279  
Nonetheless, Heywood believes that the decision handed down by the 
Constitutional Court in TAC serves to ‘validate’ the Constitution and 
provides the necessary assurance ‘to those who still suffer 
marginalisation and deprivation’ that the Constitution can bring about 
material changes and change their lives for the better.1280 Heywood 
states that the Treatment Action Campaign was invigorated by the 
recognition and acknowledgement by the Constitutional Court.1281 This 
serves to highlight the obligation of the state to provide for the 
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1275 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 163. 
1276 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 163. 
1277 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 163. 
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1280 Heywood M ‘Preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission in South Africa: 
Background, strategies and outcomes of the Treatment Action Case against the 
Minister of Health’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 279 (hereafter Preventing mother-to-child 
HIV transmission). 
1281 Heywood M ‘Preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission’ (2003) SAJHR 279.  
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dissemination of information to the public through engaging with its 
critical stakeholders (e.g. the public, NGOS and Chapter 9 Institutions 
such as the SAHRC) on an ongoing basis.1282 
Heywood refers to the opposition mounted by the state with the latter 
noting that breast feeding carried the risk of HIV transmission even for 
those children who had avoided infection through treatment with 
Nevirapine.1283 The state in effect argued that the persistent nature of 
the aforementioned risk (in the future) was reason enough to deny the 
Nevirapine therapy to women and children at this (earlier) point in time 
even though the benefits of Nevirapine were irrefutable.1284 However, 
the Constitutional Court declined to make an order relating to the supply 
of formula milk (as previously indicated). 1285  Furthermore, the 
Constitutional Court believed that it raised ‘complex issues’1286 and that 
there was insufficient evidence to defend an order that formula feed ‘be 
made available by the government on request and without charge in 
every case.’ 1287  Liebenberg notes that the complexities referred to 
include the risks to the infant using formula milk where the mother does 
not have access to clean water or the ability to bottle feed safely because 
of her personal circumstances.1288  
In conclusion, Liebenberg believed that the addition of the requirement 
of transparency (alongside the requirement of reasonableness) in TAC 
was to be welcomed. 1289  However, a programme could only be 
‘implemented optimally’ if all stakeholders were suitably informed.1290 
This served to demonstrate the lack of accountability and political will on 
the part of the state to prioritise the needs of a specific and extremely 
vulnerable group. It is submitted that public officials who embrace the 
communal obligations focus of ubuntu will recognise the pressing need 
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to come to the aid of vulnerable groups (in this instance HIV positive 
mothers and their children) in order to shape a just and caring nation in 
which all people are treated as possessing equal worth. Furthermore, it 
is only when vulnerable groups are freed from threats to their survival 
that we can speak (with any sort of authority) about forging a nation-state 
which is premised on social solidarity ideals.   
3.6.5   An overarching analysis of the socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence (Soobramoney, Grootboom and TAC) in the 
Constitutional Court 
The Grootboom case was ultimately about a state programme which did 
not cater for the urgent short term needs (i.e. basic shelter from the 
elements) of vulnerable people. 1291  Thus, it is more appropriately 
defined as an ‘inadequate provision’ by the state rather than an 
‘unreasonable exclusion’ by the state.1292 Similarly, the TAC case was 
not ultimately characterised as a discriminatory act by the state but 
rather that the state did not believe that it had an obligation to combat 
mother to child transmission (‘MTCT’) of HIV in South Africa.1293    
There are significant drawbacks in the Constitutional Court’s adoption of 
the reasonableness approach regarding the interpretation and 
subsequent implementation of socio-economic rights. 1294  
Reasonableness does not possess the content required to deliberate on 
cases concerning socio-economic rights and this inevitably leads to 
decisions that are not properly justified. 1295  The focus in the 
constitutional enquiry is reduced to a careful balancing of various factors 
rather than an unwavering focus on the urgent interests of vulnerable 
people.1296 The underlying rationale offered by the Constitutional Court 
                                                             
1291 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 168. 
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(for the content ascribed to reasonableness) is opaque.1297 Furthermore, 
a critical flaw in the reasonableness approach is that there is an absence 
of clarity as well as certainty in relation to the obligations owed by the 
state to vulnerable groups. 1298  Consequently, other branches of 
government are not provided with definitive guidance as to the nature 
and extent of the duties owed in giving effect to socio-economic 
rights.1299 In addition, it undermines the manner in which judges in lower 
courts deliberate in cases concerned with the same subject matter.1300   
The concept of reasonableness does not offer a suitable platform from 
which to ascertain whether a specific set of circumstances warrants an 
intervention by the Constitutional Court to scrutinise the decisions of 
other branches of the state.1301 Also, there is the likelihood of errors 
creeping into court deliberations. 1302  This is due to the fact that 
vagueness is inherent when one employs a reasonableness approach 
to conduct normative tasks that are conflated.1303 This is especially true 
where the Constitutional Court has highlighted numerous enquiries 
which could ostensibly be dealt with under the auspices of the 
reasonableness approach.1304  
It is submitted that the insight offered by Brand below captures my 
concern with the flawed approach of the Court in endorsing a 
reasonableness approach to evaluate the conduct of the state in 
progressively realising socio-economic rights as enshrined in the 
Constitution. The manner in which Brand insists upon the suffering of 
vulnerable groups being placed front and centre (rather than being cast 
to the periphery in favour of a misplaced focus on the reasonableness of 
state conduct) is fully endorsed in this thesis. The aforementioned 
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endorsement of Brand’s approach is predicated on the state taking a 
matter of fact approach in ascertaining the actual suffering endured by 
vulnerable groups and taking targeted action in the short to medium term 
to put an end to that same suffering.  
In this regard Brand believes that the Constitutional Court (in 
adjudicating a case involving socio-economic rights) is likely to be 
satisfied by the state demonstrating that it ‘will act in a manner consistent 
with good governance, and only that’ in tackling poverty and 
suffering.1305 However, the Constitutional Court is obliged to ascertain 
whether the state is ‘pursuing the correct, constitutionally prescribed 
goal with its policies’.1306 Consequently, the Constitutional Court is duty-
bound to ascertain to a fair degree the nature and extent of the 
aforementioned goal and this in turn obliges the Court to ‘describe these 
rights substantively and to determine what it is that the Constitution 
requires government to work towards’. 1307  Thus, Brand refers with 
approval to the work of Bilchitz in highlighting the need for the 
Constitutional Court to fix the substantive benchmark that the state has 
to attain (as a reflection of the ‘end goals’) while the state is empowered 
to exercise its discretion (within reason) to choose the manner in which 
to achieve those same end goals.1308  
Brand is justifiably critical of the approach of the Constitutional Court in 
Soobramoney as the court elected to focus on the limits imposed by 
sections 26(2) and 27(2) rather than the tangible substance of the rights 
themselves.1309 Brand highlights a similar approach on the part of the 
Constitutional Court in Grootboom in which the Court elects to focus 
primarily on the outer limits of the obligations borne by the state 
(regarding the provision of access to housing)1310 rather than focusing 
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on the specific, substantive content attributable to that same right.1311 
The Constitutional Court highlighted the supposed challenges in 
adequately defining the minimum core content of the rights involved (in 
both Soobramoney and TAC) as a seemingly key concern in rejecting 
the minimum core notion.1312  
However, the Constitutional Court does not enquire whether the policies 
of the state are likely to achieve the progressive realisation of the rights 
in question.1313 The reality is that the Court is not in a position to do so 
as it has never adequately defined the rights against which the 
reasonableness of the state policies could be measured.1314 Thus, it is 
my submission that the reasonableness approach of the Constitutional 
Court is deeply flawed as one cannot ascertain whether the state has 
discharged its duties (in giving effect to critical subsistence rights) if the 
standard against which the conduct of the state is to be measured does 
not offer the necessary clarity as to the core content of those same socio-
economic rights. It is further submitted that the aforementioned view is 
in keeping with the illuminating academic contributions by Bilchitz and 
Brand as to the defective nature of the reasonableness approach and 
the need for the Court to adopt a minimum core obligation approach – 
this will facilitate and strengthen the ability of the state to make a telling 
contribution in realising the critical subsistence rights of vulnerable 
groups.  
In addition, Brand rightfully believes that the Soobramoney judgment 
could plausibly be viewed as a ‘decision not to decide’.1315 In this regard 
the Constitutional Court had endorsed the supposedly neutral legal 
principles of honesty as well as rationality1316 and the manner in which it 
contrasted this with the ‘difficult decisions to be taken at the political level 
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to fixing the health budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon 
the priorities to be met’.1317 However, Brand is correct in stating that the 
Constitutional Court did in fact decide the fate of Mr. Soobramoney in an 
emphatic fashion (in light of his untimely passing shortly after the 
judgment was delivered as previously described).1318 In addition, the 
Constitutional Court in Grootboom sought to emphasise that it made its 
decision on the basis of objective legal reasoning rather than focusing 
on policy deliberations.1319 Furthermore, the Constitutional Court sought 
to deny any political considerations in its decision-making in TAC.1320 
However, the overriding concern raised by Brand is not so much that the 
Constitutional Court sought to avoid its political responsibility - he 
believes the Court cannot escape the aforementioned responsibility in 
any event.1321  Brand’s concerns are instead centred on the political 
philosophy employed by the Constitutional Court in arriving at its 
decisions.1322 He believes that the aforementioned philosophy is kept 
hidden and is consequently not offered up for scrutiny nor subjected to 
the inevitable debate as to its suitability for its intended purpose.1323  
In Grootboom the Court did not compel the state to revise and/or 
augment its housing programme so as to pass constitutional muster.1324 
However, the Court issued a mandatory order in TAC which ensured that 
the Court retained ‘jurisdiction over the matter if there is non-compliance 
with the order’ as previously described.1325 Thus, the applicants in the 
matter could approach the Court in the event that the relevant 
representatives of the state did not adhere to the terms of the court 
order.1326 It should be noted that the Constitutional Court elected not to 
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retain jurisdiction in the TAC matter.1327 Pillay emphasises her concern 
with the path chosen by the Constitutional Court in TAC in light of the 
fact that the applicants ‘(whose attorneys of record were the same 
attorneys who represented the amici curiae in the Grootboom matter) 
drew the attention of the Court in their argument before it to the 
difficulties experienced in implementing the Grootboom order’. 1328 
Consequently, a failure on the part of the Constitutional Court to craft 
effective orders (which compel the state to swiftly undo/revise 
unconstitutional practices) could result in the grim reality where the 
Constitutional Court fails to discharge its obligation to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights contained in the Constitution.  
De Vos believes that the Constitutional Court refrained from engaging 
with the challenging issues brought about by the inclusion of socio-
economic rights in Soobramoney and instead sought to emphasise that 
it would be ‘slow to interfere’1329 with rational decisions adopted in good 
faith by the relevant political institutions and medical authorities. 1330 
However, the Constitutional Court in Grootboom did not only focus on 
the rationality of state conduct (as in Soobramoney) but sought to 
emphasise that the state was required to act reasonably in discharging 
its constitutional obligations relating to socio-economic rights (as 
previously outlined).1331 Thus, De Vos opines that the aforementioned 
Soobramoney and Grootboom judgments are remarkably consistent if 
one embraces ‘the Constitutional Court’s transformative vision of the 
Constitution and its attendant acceptance of the substantive idea of 
equality’. 1332  He consequently believes that the Soobramoney and 
Grootboom judgments have a common thread in that they demonstrate 
the Constitutional Court’s understanding of the Bill of Rights (with 
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specific reference to the equality clause and socio-economic rights 
provisions).1333 It is for this very reason that the Constitution should be 
viewed as a transformative document which seeks to dismantle the 
pervasive social and economic inequalities on display in our society.1334  
De Vos notes that the applicant in Soobramoney had sought an order 
compelling the state to provide him with expensive dialysis treatment 
while there were desperately poor people in that same province that had 
extremely limited access to even primary health care treatment. 1335 
Furthermore, De Vos contrasted the situation of the applicant in 
Soobramoney with the desperate situation of the homeless applicants in 
Grootboom that had approached the Constitutional Court because the 
state had essentially ignored their plight and persisted in giving effect to 
a housing programme which failed to address those in desperate 
need. 1336  Thus, De Vos believes that it was inevitable that the 
Constitutional Court would reject the claim in Soobramoney whilst 
coming to the aid of the Grootboom community due to the reliance 
placed on a transformative vision of the Constitution by the Constitutional 
Court.1337 The aforementioned vision is viewed as depending upon ‘a 
contextual approach to the interpretation of the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights in particular’.1338  
It is important to acknowledge (as well as embrace) the persuasive 
reasoning employed by De Vos in highlighting the relative privilege of Mr 
Soobramoney in comparison to the homeless people in the Grootboom 
matter and the (supposed) inevitability of the decision(s) reached by the 
Constitutional Court. However, the Constitutional Court should have (at 
the very least) compelled the state to fully account (with regards to its 
available resources) in the Soobramoney matter in light of the urgency 
and importance of the constitutionally protected right that was placed in 
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jeopardy (i.e. the right to life). Consequently, De Vos believes that 
embracing the transformative nature of the Constitution will facilitate an 
understanding of how closely the right to equality and socio-economic 
rights are related and that the Soobramoney and Grootboom decisions 
are as much about securing a ‘specific contextual form of equality’ as 
giving effect to specific socio-economic rights.1339 
It is submitted that the insights offered by De Vos with regards to a 
‘specific contextual form of equality’ are critical in developing a better 
understanding of the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings which 
inform the decision-making of the Constitutional Court. This in turn 
serves as a fitting backdrop for the discussion by Roux below as related 
to the manner in which the separation of powers doctrine has in fact 
shaped the decision-making approach of the Constitutional Court.   
In conclusion, Kende believes that South African scholars are for the 
most part wrong in being critical of the decisions reached by the 
Constitutional Court in respect of the Court not defining the nature of the 
rights in question nor enforcing realisation of the rights.1340 He distances 
himself from the belief that the Court’s decisions will permit the state to 
delay the implementation of the rights as well as postpone the 
dismantling of the legacy of apartheid.1341 Kende takes the view that the 
ruling party (in enjoying a dominant majority in Parliament) and its 
President are better placed to bring about social transformation over 
time.1342 I do not agree with Kende’s insights as he fails to appreciate 
the extent of the transformative role envisaged for the Constitution (and 
by implication the Constitutional Court) and the manner in which the 
realisation of civil, political and socio-economic rights is aimed at 
dismantling the legacy of apartheid. Thus, the Constitutional Court must 
hold the state accountable to progressively realise the rights enshrined 
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in the Constitution as a means to prioritise the critical needs of vulnerable 
groups and forge a sustainable version of social solidarity.  
However, it is fair comment that the representatives of the state (i.e. the 
public officials) should supplement the efforts of the Constitutional Court 
by making every effort to come to the aid of vulnerable groups. This can 
be achieved through public officials devising policies and programmes 
with benchmarked sectoral targets so as to prioritise the needs of 
vulnerable groups through giving effect to constitutionally guaranteed 
subsistence rights. This in turn will serve as an embodiment of the 
communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu. This serves to emphasise that 
ubuntu (understood as giving effect to the primacy of communal 
obligations) can indeed mesh with an individual human rights regime in 
creating a just and caring society in which social solidarity ideals 
(understood as a celebration of our shared humanity despite any 
perceived differences) will take pride of place.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to emphasise that the accountability of 
public officials (in recognising that they are duty-bound to give effect to 
socio-economic rights) is of crucial importance in shaping an 
environment in which ubuntu can give rise to a constant stream of 
humanising acts (on the part of public officials) to ease the plight of 
vulnerable groups and in so doing strive to forge a just and caring nation-
state.  
3.6.5.1 An analysis of the Separation of Powers Doctrine with specific 
reference to the role of the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court is the key institution in evaluating the conduct 
of the representatives of the state (i.e. public officials) in progressively 
realising the socio-economic rights as enshrined in the Constitution. It 
follows that one has to have an intimate understanding of the manner in 
which Court makes its decisions. In this regard the contribution by Roux 
(in relation to the separation of powers doctrine from the perspective of 
the Court) is vital in shaping an enhanced understanding of the decision-
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making of the Court so as to be in a position to better understand how to 
progressively advance the subsistence rights of vulnerable groups. 
In this regard Roux provides definitive insight regarding the separation 
of powers doctrine from the vantage point of the Constitutional Court.1343 
He offers an illuminating account as to the obstacles that the Court has 
to continuously negotiate so as to safeguard its institutional security 
whilst striving to deliver sound legal decisions as well as bolster its public 
support base. 1344  Roux aims to provide theoretical insights into the 
relationship underlying legal legitimacy, public support and institutional 
security as a means to evaluate the record of the Constitutional Court 
between 1995 and 2006.1345  The legitimacy of judicial review is defined 
as the ability of the court to hand down decisions shaped by reasoning 
which is deemed acceptable to the legal community in which the 
Constitutional Court finds itself.1346 Public support is defined as the level 
of confidence which the population as a whole has in the Constitutional 
Court while institutional security is viewed as the ability of the 
Constitutional Court to stave off threatened or actual attacks on its 
independence.1347   
It is noted that a single political party has dominated the political 
landscape during the aforementioned period.1348 Consequently, Roux 
states, with reference to his theory, that the Constitutional Court could 
have focused its attention on its relationship with the political branch 
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while essentially ignoring its lack of public support.1349  Thus, Roux has 
an expectation that legal legitimacy (as defined by principled decision-
making) would be sacrificed in certain instances as a means to 
safeguard institutional security.1350 This was indeed the case (in the 
abovementioned time period) as the Constitutional Court has utilised the 
separation of powers doctrine to circumvent going head to head with the 
political branch and also embraced a number of ‘context-sensitive review 
standards’ in handling more routine cases.1351  
It is believed that the separation of powers ‘is one of the cornerstones of 
South Africa’s constitutional democracy because it regulates the 
exercise of public power’.1352  However, Pillay is correct in pointing out 
that the aforementioned doctrine does not detract from the duties borne 
by the Court to craft effective remedies in giving effect to key rights.1353  
Consequently, judges are expected to embrace their duties as protectors 
of the Constitution while being mindful of the need to display appropriate 
deference to the Legislature and Executive in developing policy and 
setting budgets. 1354  
Roux believes that a combination of pragmatism and principled decision-
making is likely to be the best way for a Constitutional Court in a fledgling 
democracy to bolster its legal legitimacy while safeguarding its 
institutional security.1355 Roux further believes that the Constitutional 
Court did just that (in employing a combination of pragmatism and 
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principle) in the aforementioned time period under review.1356 It should 
be noted that legal legitimacy, public support and institutional security 
are interrelated but not in an elementary or straightforward manner.1357 
The exact nature of the relationship between the three aforementioned 
concepts will change depending on the country under evaluation.1358  
However, a workable hypothesis is proposed in which there are two 
basic rules that define the nature of the relationship between the three 
factors. 1359  The first rule provides that it would be pointless for a 
Constitutional Court in a fledgling democracy to strive for legal legitimacy 
if the pursuit of that same goal served to sacrifice institutional 
security. 1360  Unless the price demanded for that same institutional 
security was set too high (i.e. if the Constitutional Court was forced to 
hand down a decision which would obliterate its reputation as a judicial 
institution that makes legitimate legal decisions).1361 The second basic 
rule concerning the aforementioned three factors is that public support 
normally leads to institutional security. 1362  However, the situation in 
South Africa deviates from the second basic rule as the dominance of 
the ruling party serves as a buffer against the lack of public support for 
the Constitutional Court.1363 Thus, the Constitutional Court is lauded for 
the substantive depth of its judgments and is perceived as being 
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relatively secure from political attacks even though it has limited public 
support.1364  
Roux refers to a Constitutional Court in a new democracy shaping its 
jurisprudence in run of the mill cases so as to forge greater discretion for 
itself by devising a context-sensitive review standard (as per the path 
chosen by the Constitutional Court in South Africa) which strengthened 
its ability to consider future cases ‘on their particular facts’.1365  
It should be noted that the notion of reasonableness makes allowance 
for the judicial review of decisions whilst remaining mindful that there is 
a ‘margin of appreciation’ which the decision-making body retains as a 
rule.1366  The aforementioned ‘margin of appreciation’ is necessary in 
giving effect to the separation of powers doctrine. 1367   This in turn 
galvanises the idea that the institution with the greatest competence will 
have the privilege of choosing between measures which fall within the 
range of that which can be construed as reasonable.1368  However, it 
should be noted that ‘reasonable’ qualifies the word ‘measures’ in the 
socio-economic provisions in the Constitution rather than the right 
itself.1369  Thus, the right in question offers more than a firm expectation 
that the state acts in a reasonable manner in giving effect to socio-
economic rights in society. 1370  Bilchitz offers a critical insight in 
emphasising that deference is not owed to the state (when articulating 
the nature and content of the right to access adequate housing) but 
rather to provide the state with a measure of discretion (i.e. a margin of 
                                                             
1364 Roux T ‘Principle and pragmatism’ International Journal of Constitutional Law 
(2009) 112. Please see Makwanyane (1995) paras 87 - 88.  
1365 Roux T ‘Principle and pragmatism’ International Journal of Constitutional Law 
(2009) 117. 
1366  Bilchitz D ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth’ South African Law Journal (2002) 
495. Please see sections 167(4), 167 (5), 169(a) and 172 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1367 Bilchitz D ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth’ South African Law Journal (2002) 
495. 
1368 Bilchitz D ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth’ South African Law Journal (2002) 
495. 
1369  Bilchitz D ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth’ South African Law Journal (2002) 
496. 
1370 Bilchitz D ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth’ South African Law Journal (2002) 
496. 
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appreciation) in choosing the manner in which it will discharge its 
obligation. 1371 Consequently, it should be clear that providing content to 
an obligation borne by the state is separate from the notion of 
reasonableness.1372    
Roux believes that the common thread running through Makwanyane 
and TAC was the manner in which the Constitutional Court was able to 
exploit the political context in Makwanyane (i.e. strong political support 
and limited public support) versus TAC (i.e. overwhelming public support 
and vigorous political opposition) to issue principled judgments and in 
the process bolster its institutional legitimacy.1373  
Kende is critical of scholars who advocated for the Constitutional Court 
to deliberate on questions which did not require resolution in the specific 
circumstances of the case.1374  Kende calls for careful consideration in 
light of the ground-breaking nature of the issues and that if ‘there is 
concern over both separation of powers and judicial competency, it 
makes sense for the Constitutional Court to act cautiously’. 1375   In 
addition, he believes that it is readily apparent that the decisions reached 
by the Constitutional Court in Grootboom and TAC ‘are major human 
rights victories which have improved the situation of many’. 1376  
However, Kende does concede that the ‘pragmatic approach’ employed 
by the Constitutional Court only provides the state with paltry guidance 
and that the Constitutional Court should have retained supervisory 
jurisdiction as part of the remedy in the relevant cases.1377   
                                                             
1371 Bilchitz D ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth’ South African Law Journal (2002) 
496. 
1372 Bilchitz D ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth’ South African Law Journal (2002) 
496. 
1373 Roux T ‘Principle and pragmatism’ International Journal of Constitutional Law 
(2009) 125.  
1374 Kende MS ‘A response to critics’ Connecticut Journal of International Law (2004) 
623. 
1375 Kende MS ‘A response to critics’ Connecticut Journal of International Law (2004) 
624. 
1376 Kende MS ‘A response to critics’ Connecticut Journal of International Law (2004) 
624. 
1377 Kende MS ‘A response to critics’ Connecticut Journal of International Law (2004) 
624. 
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However, Scott and Alston believe it is critical that the courts do not 
demonstrate an ‘undue willingness to concede this constitutional terrain 
to the government in the face of general arguments that the government 
has some plan in place and that it is making agonising, tragic 
choices’.1378 Furthermore, it is easy to be overwhelmed by the sheer 
magnitude of the challenges that have to be faced unflinchingly by South 
African constitutionalism in relation to new institutional paradigms as well 
as the marked deprivation endured by a disturbingly large amount of 
people.1379 The aforementioned insight offered by Scott and Alston is 
hard to fault in that the courts have been entrusted, through 
constitutional rights adjudication, to give effect to the values of dignity, 
freedom and equality which encapsulate not only the Bill of Rights but 
the entire Constitution.1380   
The manner in which the Constitutional Court dealt with Makwanyane 
and TAC should be contrasted with cases in which the Constitutional 
Court is viewed as compromising on principle (in light of a less than 
favourable political environment) and in so doing circumventing 
confrontation with the political branch.1381 Roux believes that the cases 
decided in this manner by the Constitutional Court are but a tiny 
proportion of the total number of cases heard.1382 However, he highlights 
the need for these decisions by the Constitutional Court to be recognised 
as pragmatic compromises rather than mistakes for two specific 
reasons.1383 The first reason being that a judge writing for the minority 
(Justice O’Regan) set out the principled position which the majority was 
                                                             
1378 Scott C & Alston P ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities’ SAJHR (2000) 268. 
1379 Scott C & Alston P ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities’ SAJHR (2000) 268. 
Please see Soobramoney (1998) para 8 as well as Brand D ‘What Are Socio-
Economic Rights For?’(2003) 35. Please also refer to Biney A ‘The historical 
discourse on African humanism’ (2014) 48. 
1380 Scott C & Alston P ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities’ SAJHR (2000) 268. 
Please refer to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1381 Roux T ‘Principle and pragmatism’ International Journal of Constitutional Law 
(2009) 117. 
1382 Roux T ‘Principle and pragmatism’ International Journal of Constitutional Law 
(2009) 117. 
1383 Roux T ‘Principle and pragmatism’ International Journal of Constitutional Law 
(2009) 117. 
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free to accept but elected not to do so.1384 The second reason being that 
a detailed analysis of the relevant decision highlights a palpable 
awareness on the part of the Constitutional Court of pressing political 
concerns and demonstrated efforts on the part of the Court to utilise 
‘technical legal devices to lessen the impact of these cases on its 
institutional security’.1385   
Bilchitz notes that fears had surfaced that the Court would ‘overstep its 
legitimate role’ by dictating policy to government.1386 In this regard he 
believes that the Court is alive to the aforementioned concerns (which is 
in keeping with the views of Roux) and should counter these concerns 
by providing definitive insight as to the litigation principles/standards that 
the Court would utilise in determining the obligations of the state.1387  
This in turn would ensure that there is clarity about the involvement of 
the Court in specific cases as well as highlight the extent of its ‘own 
decision-making powers’.1388  
However, Kende believes that the Constitutional Court demonstrated ‘its 
pragmatism and humility’ in Grootboom by compelling the state to 
adhere to the Constitution (in ordering that a reasonable part of the 
housing budget be allocated for those in desperate need of shelter1389) 
but sought to provide the state with a measure of discretion in permitting 
the state to allocate the precise portion of the budget for those in 
desperate need. 1390  It is submitted that Kende could be viewed as 
                                                             
1384 Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 (4) SALR 235 (CC) 
(hereafter Kaunda) paras 212 - 271. Please note that Justice Mokgoro concurred 
in the judgment delivered by Justice O’ Regan.  
1385 Kaunda (2005) para 19.  
1386 Bilchitz D ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: laying the 
foundations for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights (2003) 10 (hereafter Towards a reasonable approach 
to the minimum core).  
1387 Bilchitz D ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core’ South African 
Journal on Human Rights (2003) 10.  
1388 Bilchitz D ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core’ South African 
Journal on Human Rights (2003) 10. 
1389 Grootboom (2000) para 99.  
1390 Kende MS ‘A response to critics’ Connecticut Journal of International Law (2004) 
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displaying excessive deference to the state as the state is not called 
upon to account as to the allocation of scarce resources.   
It is my firm contention that one must not lose sight of the duty borne by 
the state to account for the progressive realisation of urgent socio-
economic rights as enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, the 
Constitutional Court should have an unerring focus on ensuring that the 
constitutional obligations borne by the state are in fact discharged in the 
shortest possible time.   
Bilchitz believes that the Court should ‘adopt a robust approach’ to 
compel the state to discharge its constitutional obligations in the event 
that the survival of people are threatened.1391  This in turn requires the 
Court at times to utilise a ‘form of supervisory jurisdiction over the 
implementation of its orders’.1392  In this regard the research by Pillay 
demonstrates that socio-economic rights could have an extremely 
limited impact if the Court does not strictly enforce those same 
guarantees as well as utilise suitable institutional mechanisms (e.g. 
supervisory jurisdiction). 1393  Thus, it should be emphasised that 
safeguarding the effectiveness and reach of socio-economic rights 
should counter any concerns about the legitimacy of the Court’s role (in 
relation to the separation of powers doctrine).1394  
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court is the guardian of the 
Constitution and it is duty-bound to ensure that the state remains 
accountable in progressively realising critical socio-economic rights as 
enshrined in the Constitution. It follows that the aforementioned core 
duties of the Constitutional Court should trump any routine pragmatic 
considerations (such as securing public support and/or bolstering 
                                                             
1391  Bilchitz D ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core’ South African 
Journal on Human Rights (2003) 24. 
1392 Bilchitz D ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core’ South African 
Journal on Human Rights (2003) 24. 
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Journal on Human Rights (2003) 25.  
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institutional security) as contemplated by the Court. Also, the 
Constitutional Court has to provide the relevant content of those same 
subsistence rights as a means of guiding the state in devising (and 
subsequently implementing) suitable benchmarked sectoral targets to 
bring the deprivation and suffering of vulnerable groups to an end in the 
shortest possible time.  
It is further submitted that a deep-seated understanding of the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu can make a meaningful contribution to the 
jurisprudence of the Court. Also, the transformative nature of the 
Constitution can be advanced by dismantling the legacy of apartheid 
through advancing the subsistence needs of vulnerable groups. This in 
turn will ensure that the Constitutional Court holds public officials (as the 
duly appointed representatives of the state) to a higher standard of 
accountability in giving effect to the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights in the shortest possible time. Furthermore, this will steer 
the Court to focus on the deprivation endured by vulnerable groups 
(rather than the reasonableness of state action) in giving effect to the 
progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. Nonetheless, the 
compelling contribution by Roux (in relation to the separation of powers 
in the South African context) demands scrutiny as it sheds light on the 
decision-making processes of the Constitutional Court as well as the 
contemporary challenges faced by the Court.  
3.7      Summary  
 
The pivotal role of the Constitutional Court has been analysed in this 
Chapter so as to demonstrate the pressing need for the Court to 
embrace an oversight role as well as to provide critical determinate 
content (in relation to socio-economic rights) for the benefit of the state. 
It is submitted that the aforementioned determinate content is of pivotal 
importance in facilitating the effective monitoring and enforcement of 
socio-economic rights. Furthermore, the minimum core obligation 
approach as endorsed by the ICESCR (and as advanced by Bilchitz) is 
explored in this Chapter as it is a crucial mechanism in pegging the 
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accountability of the state (at an appropriate level) so as to bring an end 
to the deprivation that is endured by vulnerable groups in as short a time 
as possible.  
The Soobramoney, Grootboom and TAC judgments of the Constitutional 
Court have not provided the state with the necessary guidance in 
formulating a suitable accountability standard in respect of the 
progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. In this regard the Court 
is at fault as it has failed to provide the state with critical determinate 
content for urgent subsistence rights (despite the incremental 
improvements on offer in the judgments moving in chronological order 
from Soobramoney through Grootboom to TAC).  
It is my firm belief that the Constitutional Court should endorse the 
minimum core obligation approach in assessing the accountability of the 
state in progressively realising subsistence rights as enshrined in the 
Constitution. In this regard the Constitutional Court should take 
cognisance of the ratification of the ICESCR by the state and the manner 
in which the minimum core obligation approach (as endorsed in the 
ICESCR) will find reception in our domestic law.  
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court is likely to have found it easier 
to order the state to account (as well as implement ongoing supervision 
of the state) in the AllPay and Black Sash cases (as compared to the 
Soobramoney, Grootboom and TAC cases) in light of the fact that the 
resources (as related to social grant funding) had already been allocated 
for that very purpose by the state. Thus, the Court was not ‘interfering’ 
with the allocation/prioritisation of existing state budgets but focussed 
instead on ensuring that the state gives effect to a key, constitutionally 
mandated duty (i.e. the uninterrupted payment of social grants to 
vulnerable people and children) in a manner which could withstand legal 
scrutiny. Furthermore, with reference to the illuminating insights as 
offered by Roux in relation to the separation of powers doctrine, it is 
submitted that the Court would likely have felt emboldened to demand 
that the state accounts for its dismal failure on an ongoing basis in 
relation to the AllPay social grant payments administration – this in no 
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small part is due to the vulnerability of the affected grant recipients and 
the overwhelming public support for a swift and decisive resolution to the 
debacle.   
It is further submitted that the Constitutional Court should embrace the 
utilisation of a nuanced understanding of ubuntu (i.e. the primacy of the 
communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu as espoused in this thesis). This 
will serve to facilitate a renewed focus on diligent public officials serving 
their communities/the nation-state through facilitating the progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights.  
It should be noted that social solidarity will be explored in the next 
chapter (i.e. Chapter 4) as a means of strengthening our understanding 
of how embracing diversity serves as an expression of our shared 
humanity. Furthermore, the anthropological concept of ‘lived reality’ will 
be explored more fully in Chapter 4 in order to highlight the nature and 
extent of the suffering endured by vulnerable groups so as to fashion 
suitable intervention programmes/laws to come to their aid in the time to 
come. In conclusion, it is submitted that unwavering accountability on 
the part of public officials (so as to advance the needs of vulnerable 
groups) is a critical factor in forging a sustainable version of social 
solidarity as described in the chapter to follow.            
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CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL SOLIDARITY - STANDING TOGETHER THROUGH 
CELEBRATING OUR DIFFERENCES 
4.1     Introduction 
The previous chapter sought to demonstrate that unwavering 
accountability on the part of public officials is pivotal in forging a just and 
caring society in which the needs of vulnerable groups are prioritised. It 
is submitted that the aforementioned accountability standard is owed to 
vulnerable groups in light of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. It is further submitted that the previous chapter sought to 
cast light on the pivotal role of the Constitutional Court in holding the 
state to account in giving effect to critical socio-economic rights. In this 
regard it was argued that the Court should embrace the minimum core 
obligation approach as a means to expedite the process by which the 
state provides vulnerable groups with access to subsistence rights. 
Furthermore, the previous chapters highlighted the critical role that a 
nuanced understanding of ubuntu could play in supporting an 
aspirational vision in which the legacy of apartheid is dismantled through 
the creation of a just and caring nation-state in which sustainable social 
solidarity ideals would feature prominently.  
Consequently, this chapter will seek to demonstrate that social solidarity 
is critical in forging a viable and sustainable nation-state in which 
differences are embraced as an expression of our shared humanity. In 
this regard the controversial integration debate in Denmark will be 
explored as a means to develop definitive insights as to how social 
solidarity is perceived in different quarters in present-day Denmark. 
Denmark will be compared to South Africa in order to better appreciate 
the similarities and differences in giving effect to accountability and 
social solidarity as well as to evaluate the role that ubuntu could play in 
forging social solidarity in South Africa. It is fair comment that Denmark 
and South Africa are decidedly different (in so many ways) yet it is my 
firm contention that Denmark remains an extraordinarily useful lens 
through which to provide a fresh perspective on social solidarity in South 
Africa. 
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It is submitted that anthropology provides a unique vantage point from 
which to analyse the manner in which social solidarity in Denmark (as 
well as ubuntu in South Africa) is a political construction and how its 
present day meaning has been shaped by the dominant political 
discourse (i.e. the distorted view of social solidarity in Denmark as 
signifying sameness [and nothing more] as contrasted with ubuntu and 
its intimate association with forgiveness and political reconciliation [and 
little else]).  
It is contended that both people living in abject poverty in South Africa 
as well as immigrants and refugees in Denmark can be defined as 
vulnerable groups. Thus, relevant anthropology themes will be explored 
as a means to provide a different perspective on how law is experienced 
on the ground.1395 In this regard possible mechanisms to facilitate the 
application and reach of law on the ground (as a means to more 
effectively address the plight of vulnerable groups) will also be 
evaluated. It is critical that addressing the needs of vulnerable groups in 
both Denmark and South Africa are viewed as urgent priorities by the 
respective states as treating everyone with equal concern (regardless of 
their differences) is pivotal in forging a just and caring society in which a 
contemporary version of social solidarity can find purchase. 
Identifying vulnerable groups is critical so as to ensure that the state can 
materially alter the lived reality of those same groups and create 
opportunities for living lives of purpose much the same like those 
enjoyed by fellow members of the nation-state. It is my submission that 
the aforementioned conduct of the state should be construed as treating 
all members of society with equal concern through providing a platform 
for all members to live lives of purpose even if this entails certain 
members requiring additional assistance (on the part of the state) so as 
to more effectively access an opportunity that is supposedly accessible 
to all members.   
                                                             
1395 Please recall that this thesis does not encompass a full anthropology research 
project as previously highlighted.  
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In addition, an analysis of Denmark (with specific reference to the 
political landscape regarding integration challenges) will colour our 
understanding of social solidarity with the latter concept so much more 
textured than the commonplace definition of standing together - the true 
measure of social solidarity is defined by how we can be so very different 
but still stand together. It is submitted that this nuanced understanding 
of social solidarity is of critical importance in both South Africa and 
Denmark. In this regard Eriksen advances a persuasive argument that 
our destinies are linked as ‘humanity, divided as it is by class, culture, 
geography and opportunities, is fundamentally one’.1396   
In addition, Praeg has sought to explore an understanding of solidarity 
that could strengthen (as oppose to undermine) the liberal democratic 
order.1397 In this regard Tshoose states that:  
‘The concept of ubuntu shares important characteristics 
with the concept of solidarity, both the modern social 
democratic and the Christian democratic variants of the 
European ideas of solidarity. First, all concepts of solidarity 
and ubuntu imply a demarcation of unfettered 
individualism and economic liberalism. Second, today, 
these concepts tend to emphasise that human beings are 
interdependent. All ideas of solidarity imply that the 
government shall have the responsibility for social 
protection against the hazards of life for its people, 
although the extent of that responsibility may vary.’1398  
Thus, there is a distinct overlap between social solidarity and ubuntu in 
that the interdependence and interconnectedness of people is prioritised 
over unchecked individualism. 1399  The abovementioned insights by 
Tshoose are indeed a succinct, insightful view of the inherent traits of 
                                                             
1396 Eriksen TH What is Anthropology (2006) 5. 
1397 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 71. 
1398 Tshoose CI ‘The emerging role of the constitutional value of ubuntu for informal 
social security in South Africa’ African Journal of Legal Studies 3 12-19 (2009) 19 
(hereafter The emerging role of the constitutional value of ubuntu). 
1399 Tshoose CI ‘The emerging role of the constitutional value of ubuntu’ African 
Journal of Legal Studies (2009) 19. 
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solidarity (whether in Denmark or in South Africa). It follows that social 
solidarity speaks to the state safeguarding its people from threats which 
is consistent with the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu in coming 
to the aid of those in dire need as a means of creating a just and caring 
society. This further strengthens the assertion advanced in this thesis 
that a scrutiny of specific aspects of Danish society can indeed yield 
tangible benefits in South Africa in relation to giving effect to sustainable 
social solidarity ideals.  
Praeg believes that the crux of the emancipation project in a given 
society can be summed up as fostering a climate of political freedom 
whilst providing for the socio-economic needs of its people.1400 This is in 
keeping with the primary thrust of this thesis in forging an accountable 
public service which strives to realise the critical subsistence rights of 
vulnerable groups as a means to fashion opportunities for lives of 
purpose. This in turn gives effect to the core teachings of ubuntu so as 
to create a society in which differences amongst interconnected and 
interdependent members are embraced by treating all members as 
possessing equal worth which in turn leads to the forging of sustainable 
social solidarity ideals.  
The aspirational values of the South African Constitution (with specific 
reference to the Preamble) outlines the need to ‘believe that South Africa 
belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity’.1401 However, this will 
only become a reality if we develop the necessary insight about what it 
means to forge a sustainable model of social solidarity in which all 
people are treated with equal respect. Thus, it is submitted that a scrutiny 
of social solidarity (as revised and contested at present in Denmark) will 
be of benefit in building a sanctuary for all who reside within the borders 
of South Africa.  
                                                             
1400  Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 147. 
1401 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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It should be noted that collective identities can indeed accommodate 
diversity and paradox.1402 Consequently, there is not a specific need for 
people to be virtually identical in order for them to identify and engage 
with each other in a pragmatic and meaningful fashion.1403 Furthermore, 
collective identification (in the form of national identities) offers sanctuary 
to various expressions of human diversity.1404 This assures people that 
can meet the minimal criteria (of membership) of a place to call home 
and act/engage/identify with each other without an unrelenting focus on 
all that supposedly divides us.1405 Thus, Jenkins rightfully believes that 
the creation of a sanctuary for all people living in a country with a diverse 
population (i.e. both Denmark and South Africa) is possible if the 
‘minimum membership requirements’ are set at the appropriate level.1406 
The aforementioned anthropological observations are nothing more than 
an expression of the 19th century ideology of folkelig danskhed (with 
folkelig denoting ‘popular’ or ‘of the people’ and danskhed denoting 
‘Danishness’) which sought to galvanise the Danish people in 
confronting the onslaught visited upon them by military disaster, internal 
inequality and political conflict.1407   
4.2     The manner in which social solidarity is understood and embraced 
in Denmark 
4.2.1   Introduction  
Denmark is recognised as a pioneer of social solidarity but the 
contentious present-day debate in Danish society about what constitutes 
a ‘real Dane’ provides valuable insight into the manner in which social 
solidarity is a political construction that is constantly being revised.1408 
                                                             
1402 Jenkins R Being Danish - Paradoxes of Identity in Everyday Life (2012) 309 
(hereafter Being Danish). 
1403 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 309. 
1404 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 309. 
1405 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 309. 
1406 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 309.  
1407 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 309. 
1408 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ in Olwig KF & Paerregaard 
K (eds) The Question of Integration: Immigration, Exclusion and the Danish 
Welfare State (2011) Introduction (hereafter “Strangers” in the nation). 
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The dominant political discourse in Denmark at present is that of ethnic 
Danes versus Danish citizens with immigrant links with the latter group 
cast as ‘the Other’.1409  
It is my firm view that the compilation of ethnographic case studies (as 
edited by Olwig and Paerregaard) represent a sterling contribution to 
understanding the lived reality of immigrants/vulnerable groups in 
Denmark (as well as Denmark’s critical role as a receiving society) rather 
than typecasting immigrants as an integration problem. In this regard the 
contributing authors are all anthropologists living and working in 
Denmark. The various ethnographic analyses discussed in this chapter 
are consistent with the enlightened philosophy and teachings on offer at 
the Anthropology Department at the University of Copenhagen which in 
turn resonates with my views regarding the (harsh) lived reality of 
immigrants in Denmark. Furthermore, please see the brief discussion by 
Morck as well as Wren1410 regarding biased academic research in which 
immigrants are routinely cast as a burden on the welfare system. It 
follows that the ethnographic cases described in this chapter seek to 
highlight the challenges endured by immigrants and refugees in 
Denmark as well as the obstacles presented by Denmark as the 
receiving society. 
The Danish Language Committee, an institution that is tasked with 
preserving records of the ordinary use/meaning of words in Danish 
newspapers and other public media sources, has highlighted that the 
word ‘integration’ has been utilised in the Danish language since the 19th 
century.1411 However, the meaning of the word ‘integration’ has changed 
over time (with specific reference to the last fifty years) to reflect an 
increasingly complex society.1412 The concept was subsequently utilised 
by politicians and social scientists from the 1990s onwards to reflect the 
                                                             
1409 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) Introduction. 
1410 Please see Section 4.2.3.2. 
1411 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 11. 
1412 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 11. 
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challenges encountered in seeking to include immigrants and refugees 
in the Danish welfare society.1413 
Jenkins categorises ‘white’ Danes as an ethnic group and refers to them 
as ‘ethnic Danes’ while explaining that his utilisation of inverted commas 
is a constant reminder that not all Danes embrace this expression.1414 
However, Jenkins highlights that he cannot suggest a better term to 
describe ‘the realities of everyday identification in Denmark’. 1415 
Consequently, any reference to ethnic Danes in this thesis is in fact a 
reference to ‘white’ Danes as per the approach adopted by Jenkins.1416 
In addition, an analysis of contemporary Danish politics casts light on the 
manner in which enacted laws have created an unwelcome distinction 
between ethnic Danes and Danish citizens.1417 This is far removed from 
the core teachings of social solidarity which ultimately seeks to ‘include’ 
rather than ‘exclude’.1418 It should also be noted that the concept of 
‘sameness’ adds a layer of complexity to the integration debate.1419  
It follows that a present day understanding of the concept of social 
solidarity in Denmark requires urgent revision so as to include all Danish 
citizens regardless of their backgrounds. 1420  Thus, the legitimate 
concern is raised that the requirement of national attachment 1421 for 
Danish citizens has decimated the previously sacred practice that all 
Danes are equal before the law.1422 This discussion will be expanded 
upon through the insightful contribution by Rytter1423 in highlighting the 
distinction drawn in law between ethnic Danes and Danish citizens with 
immigrant roots. 1424  However, it should be noted at the outset that 
                                                             
1413 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 11. 
1414 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 7. 
1415 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 7. 
1416 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 7. 
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1419 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) Introduction. 
1420 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) Introduction. 
1421 National attachment serves to determine whether ‘the total national attachment of 
a married couple consisting of a Dane and a foreign spouse is greater to 
Denmark than to any other country’. 
1422 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) Introduction. 
1423 Please see Section 4.2.3.5.  
1424 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) Introduction. 
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integration and social solidarity are perpetually linked in Danish 
society.1425 This is due to social solidarity being typecast (in dominant 
political discourse) as signifying sameness which has undermined the 
integration process for immigrants and refugees in Danish society.1426  
Furthermore, the Muhammed cartoon crisis (Muhammedkrisen)1427 will 
be examined as a means to highlight how the conduct of the Danish 
government (in failing to come to the aid of a vulnerable group of Danish 
citizens as defined by their immigrant roots) ably demonstrates the clear 
divide between ethnic Danes and those Danish citizens with immigrant 
roots.1428 The (ethnic) Danes have sought to focus their attention on the 
manner in which to ‘integrate’ a foreign population with values and norms 
which are viewed as primitive (by those same ethnic Danes) into a 
Danish society that is characterised by liberalism, egalitarianism and an 
advanced welfare society steeped in culture and tradition.1429 However, 
the strict policies adopted by Denmark against its immigrant population 
over the past few years is a marked departure from sentiments lauding 
it as an advanced welfare state and a liberal lifestyle haven.1430 This has 
in turn shaped its international profile as ‘one of the most anti-Islamic 
and anti-immigration nations in Europe’.1431  
4.2.2  The definition of social solidarity in a Danish context 
Integration is not a neutral concept in which different groups are linked 
but rather ‘an ideologically loaded concept, linked to Danish ideas of 
equality and belonging, which in turn are related to notions of cultural 
similarity closely associated with the Danish welfare state’.1432 Simmel 
was fascinated by the seemingly contradictory processes that fashioned 
                                                             
1425 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) Introduction. 
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the manner in which (dominant) discourse is shaped. 
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1431 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) Preface. 
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society into an integrated whole.1433 Olwig and Paerregaard support the 
view that group integration is brought about ‘through a constant 
oscillation between closeness and distance, intimacy and strangeness, 
imitation and differentiation. Strangers and difference are fundamental 
principles in any social interaction’.1434 Thus, a stark difference is noted 
between the past focus of integration (i.e. the starting point being that 
cohesion was fashioned through differences and internal conflicts) and 
the contemporary focus of integration (i.e. the manner in which divergent 
individuals and groups could be merged with a pre-existing entity).1435 It 
follows that anthropologists and sociologists of old were not focussed on 
‘whether’ integration occurred but ‘how’ it took place as evidenced by 
‘the nature of society’s cohesion’.1436  
It is submitted that ubuntu can in fact breach this divide in South Africa 
through its appeal to the interdependence and interconnectedness of 
people (regardless of their differences) living side by side in an ethical 
and caring society. In this regard Grillo believes that Denmark, as the 
receiving society, should find novel ways of engaging with ‘newcomers’ 
and shape its institutions to accommodate the needs of the 
aforementioned ‘newcomers’. 1437  However, the reality is somewhat 
different in Denmark as the state has enacted immigration policies that 
increasingly place the onerous burden of integration on immigrants and 
their offspring.1438   
In conclusion, I am in complete agreement with the insightful view, as 
advanced by Olwig and Paerregaard, that integration as an idea is best 
described as a broad challenge that is issued to all citizens in a given 
society rather than being confined to immigrants and refugees in that 
society.1439 Thus, all members of a just and caring society should strive 
                                                             
1433 Simmel G ‘On Individuality and Social Forms’ (1971)..   
1434 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 208. 
1435 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 208. 
1436 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 208. 
1437 Grillo R ‘Danes and others’ in Olwig KF & Paerregaard K (eds) The Question of 
Integration: Immigration, Exclusion and the Danish Welfare State (2011) 267 
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1438 Grillo R ‘Danes and others’ (2011) 267.  
1439 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 22. 
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to embrace the challenges of integration in order for sustainable social 
solidarity principles to take hold.  
4.2.3   Specific anthropology insights in relation to the challenges 
negotiated by immigrants and refugees in Denmark in 
contemporary times 
4.2.3.1 Background  
Ethnographic analysis is utilised in anthropology as a means to cast light 
on the critical issues of globalisation, immigration and integration in 
Denmark. 1440  Denmark is consequently defined as a more specific 
example of the shaping of the welfare state and the integration of its 
citizens in a time defined by numerous crises and seemingly perpetual 
uncertainty.1441 The challenges in the immigration sphere in Denmark 
has presented interested observers with an opportunity to analyse the 
manner in which a ‘close-knit north European society’ has reacted to the 
current forces of globalisation as well as the social and economic shifts 
that have flowed from that same process.1442  
It is submitted that a scrutiny of contemporary Denmark serves to 
highlight certain pitfalls that have to be avoided if social solidarity ideals 
are to flourish in South Africa. In addition, it serves to highlight that 
sameness is not in fact a prerequisite in forging social solidarity. In this 
regard difference amongst members can indeed be accommodated in 
fashioning a sustainable version of social solidarity.  
This section of work provides compelling insights as to the grave 
responsibilities of the state (whether in Denmark or South Africa) to 
create an environment suitable for a sustainable version of social 
solidarity to materialise by shaping a public discourse in which the 
accommodation of differences (rather than sameness) is celebrated. 
This chapter also serves to confirm that immigrants/refugees and 
Denmark (as the receiving society) need to participate in ongoing, 
                                                             
1440 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) Preface. 
1441 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) Preface. 
1442 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 1.  
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meaningful dialogue in order for a sustainable version of social solidarity 
to be forged. Furthermore, this chapter serves to highlight the manner in 
which the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu can in fact make a 
telling contribution to shaping social solidarity in South Africa through 
demonstrating that all members of the nation-state should be treated 
with equal concern and respect.  
It is believed that the constant focus on refugees and immigrants as 
being different to ethnic Danes has led to a determination to undertake 
the cultural integration of refugees and immigrants into Danish 
society. 1443  This has had the unfortunate consequence that a vast 
number of immigrants that have lived in Denmark for years (even 
generations) are still viewed as not yet belonging in Denmark.1444 The 
proof of the reluctance to acknowledge immigrants and their 
descendants as Danish is borne out by the widespread use of terms 
such as ‘second generation immigrant’ or ‘person of other ethnic 
origin’.1445  
The anthropological themes/ethnographic studies that are described in 
this chapter serve to emphasise the pivotal role that the Danish welfare 
institutions assume in the engagement between immigrants and 
refugees with Danish society. 1446  It is important to note that the 
anthropological concepts of similarity and difference are polar opposites 
in a conceptual sense.1447  However, it is nonetheless accepted that 
neither (position) makes sense without the other and that they can 
consequently be viewed as merging in the concept of identification.1448 
Furthermore, identity and/or identification can be defined within a ‘basic 
existential paradox’ in which we assume a position on our own as ‘self-
                                                             
1443 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 1. Please refer to 
Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 17 for a brief description of similarity and 
difference.  
1444 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 1. 
1445 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 1. 
1446 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 19. 
1447 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 17. 
1448 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 17. 
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conscious human individuals’.1449  This same self-consciousness first 
presents itself when we keep the company of others (who are exactly in 
the same position as we are as individuals).1450  Thus, identification 
bridges the divide between individuality and collectivity and assigns 
‘every one of us a name and place to stand on each side of that 
divide’.1451  The aforementioned insights offered by Jenkins resonate 
with me in that ubuntu can be utilised to play a pivotal role in shaping our 
identity as interdependent and interconnected members of a just and 
caring society/nation-state.  
Ethnographic studies in Denmark that have looked beyond the formal 
relations created by the engagement with the welfare system have shed 
light on the informal ties brought about by personal interactions in a 
variety of social settings.1452  Furthermore, the term micro-integration 
was coined to describe ‘the physical accommodation and social 
exchange involving strangers interacting’ at specific times and in specific 
places.1453  It is submitted that this is in keeping with the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu in seeking to forge ties between people living 
side by side. 
The values of ‘alikeness and equality’ abound in anthropological studies 
in Scandinavia with the cultural preference for ‘alikeness/similarity’ 
featuring prominently as it serves to emphasise that everyone is equal 
(which is a pivotal cultural notion). 1454  Thus, clear hierarchies or 
established authorities (which are no less prevalent in Scandinavia as 
compared to anywhere else) are often roundly ignored or denied.1455 
This has certainly assisted the Danes in forming and safeguarding the 
universalist welfare state (in the past) but the formulation of these same 
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values/cultural ideals in contemporary times (with the ushering in of 
globalisation as well as the influx of immigrants and refugees) is proving 
difficult to surmount as the Danish welfare state is not equipped to 
embrace a ‘multi-ethnic and multicultural everyday reality’.1456   
It is of pivotal importance to provide a basic overview (of key aspects) of 
Denmark so as to provide the necessary context for the ethnographic 
analyses to follow. In this regard Denmark has a population of 
approximately 5, 5 million people of which approximately 8% (440 000) 
is comprised of immigrants, refugees and their offspring (also described 
as second-generation immigrants). 1457  Denmark played host in the 
1960s and early 1970s to thousands of immigrants (who hailed from the 
Balkans, Middle East, Pakistan and North Africa) so as to fill posts for 
unskilled labour.1458  Denmark subsequently accepted (from the mid-
1970s onwards) a substantial amount of refugees from politically volatile 
regions including Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Iraq, the Balkans, Iran, Lebanon 
and Somalia.1459 It should be noted that the immigration of thousands of 
poor Polish and Swedish farm labourers to Denmark in the late 19th to 
early 20th century is often overlooked.1460 The total immigrant population 
in Denmark is relatively small (with reference to international standards) 
but it has resulted in the scrutiny of the self-understanding of Denmark 
‘as a culturally homogenous, egalitarian welfare society with deep 
historical roots in the Danish landscape’.1461  
Denmark blends traditional (i.e. farming cooperatives) and modern 
values (i.e. notions of solidarity as defined by the labour movement) in 
offering a helping hand to vulnerable people.1462 However, the reach is 
extended to include all of society as administered by national agencies 
in the public sector which are funded by general taxation.1463 The Danish 
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welfare state provides significant state support for a myriad of cultural, 
political and social organisations.1464 Consequently, a significant number 
of ethnic organisations and Muslim schools have benefitted from the 
aforementioned state support in recent decades.1465 The Danish welfare 
state provides ‘cradle to grave’ medical services as well as specialised 
care for the elderly and the disabled.1466  
The state also provides subsidised care and after-school programmes 
for children from the age of 6 months onwards.1467 The primary institution 
for shaping social integration in Denmark is day-care (also known as pre-
school.)1468 The only other institution which can stake a similar claim, 
with regards to assuming a prominent role in crafting social integration, 
is the public school.1469 It is estimated that 96% of all children between 
the ages of 3 and 5 are in day-care.1470 Day-school programmes are 
non-compulsory, early childhood programmes with vuggestuer 
(nurseries) for children between the ages of 6 months and 3 years.1471 
Bornehaver (pre-school) is for children between the ages of 3 and 6 
years (up to 7 on occasion) at the end of which compulsory schooling 
commences.1472 Furthermore, the state provides free education from 
nursery level right through to (and including) tertiary level.1473  
It should be noted that Dannelse is a ‘holistic pedagogic philosophy or 
ideology, at the heart of the Danish education and childcare systems, 
which simultaneously emphasises individual personal development as 
well as learning to fit in with the group’.1474 It is viewed as seeking to give 
equal weighting in the continuous interplay between individuality and 
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collectivity as well as difference and similarity as ‘being human is a 
paradoxical business’. 1475  The aforementioned insights regarding 
Dannelse conjures up interesting images of the interplay between the 
individual rights regime as per the South African Constitution and the 
communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu.  
Furthermore, Dannelse is viewed as the modern interpretation of the 
Grundtvigian 1476  philosophy of folkeoplysning (enlightenment of the 
people) in which everyone is an individual but no individual should stand 
out in stark contrast to the group. 1477  Thus, individual diversity is 
protected by embracing the belief that one should be similar to everyone 
else in key matters. 1478  In addition, the notion of hygge (loosely 
translated as ‘cosiness’) is a foundational and idealised Danish social 
ethos of ‘closeness, warmth, relaxation, informality and egalitarian 
mutuality’.1479  
The Danish flag, Dannebrog, emblazoned with a white cross on a red 
background, is viewed as representing the nation, the proud history of 
its people and the position of the royal family at the centre of national 
life.1480 It is apparent that the Danish royal house and Dannebrog, each 
in their own unique way, both ‘symbolise and are bound up with the 
legitimacy of the state and the nation’.1481 Dannebrog is on constant 
display in a variety of settings and plays a central role in a variety of 
events and social occasions.1482 Dannebrog is perceived as a fitting way 
to display respect for others as well as a powerful symbol of bonding in 
solidarity and fellowship.1483  It represents the concept of community 
whether it be within the intimate confines of a family or the ‘grand 
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historical abstraction of the nation’. 1484 It is submitted that ubuntu, 
understood as demonstrating an unwavering focus on communal 
obligations, can in time to come represent (in a South African context) 
those symbolic notions of Dannebrog that seek to foster social solidarity 
- understood as embracing differences amongst members rather than 
an unrelenting demand for sameness. 
The dominant perception of Denmark as a ‘culturally homogenous 
society’ (which was in existence prior to the influx of migrant workers and 
refugees starting in the 1960s) was principally shaped by significant 
social and economic developments that spanned the mid-18th to mid-
20th centuries rather than the shared ethnic roots of Danes and the 
uniform embrace of cultural traditions and societal norms.1485  
4.2.3.2 The lived reality of immigrants and refugees as compared to 
ethnic Danes 
This section of the thesis is critical to develop an understanding of the 
lived reality of vulnerable groups (i.e. refugees and immigrants) in 
Denmark. In this regard the significant obstacles that refugees and 
immigrants have to negotiate in present day Denmark will be described. 
It is submitted that we can extract valuable lessons in relation to shaping 
the lived reality of vulnerable groups in South Africa through employing 
an anthropological perspective to analyse the lived reality of refugees 
and immigrants in Denmark. 
The labelling of immigrants and refugees as an integration problem is 
not unique to Denmark.1486 Consequently, Denmark seems destined to 
undergo further decline into mutual hostility as the divide between ‘old 
Danes’ and ‘new Danes’ (with the latter group almost entirely comprised 
of individuals following the Islamic faith) displays no sign of closing.1487 
Furthermore, the renegotiation of danskhed (so as to include people that 
are not ethnic Danes as proper Danes) is a seemingly utopian 
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suggestion at present if one bears witness to the current realities of 
Danish politics (as well as global politics).1488   
An anthropological perspective, in relation to integration, would make it 
apparent that the aforementioned concept is not confined to the manner 
in which migrants are compelled to adjust/find their way in a new 
society.1489 Integration also refers to general mechanisms of adjustment 
that have to be endured/negotiated by all individuals in seeking to join a 
productive society.1490 Thus, a society cannot continue to function over 
time if individuals or groups do as they please with no regard for the 
wellbeing of the collective.1491  It follows that members of that same 
society must fashion an agreement about the manner in which they will 
live side by side as a means of creating a viable society.1492  
The abovementioned agreement does not insist upon cultural conformity 
but seeks to fashion a common understanding of the nature and extent 
of the cultural differences which can be accommodated in that 
society.1493 It is of critical importance to accept that the aforementioned 
common understanding will be altered over time as it responds to 
changing historical contexts.1494 The aforementioned accommodation is 
a critical insight in reconciling an individual human rights regime with the 
aspirational vision of forging a just and caring society in which 
interdependent and interconnected members live side by side through 
giving effect to the core teachings of ubuntu regarding the primacy of 
communal obligations. Thus, an anthropological analysis compels one 
to view ‘social communities and cultural ideas of belonging as 
constructions that are constantly challenged, contested and attributed 
with new meanings’.1495 The aforementioned analysis is of considerable 
                                                             
1488 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 305.  
1489 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 11.  
1490 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 11. 
1491 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 11. 
1492 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 12.  
1493 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 12.  
Please see Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 309. 
1494 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 12.  
1495 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 12. 
247 
 
 
interest as it sheds light on the manner in which the meaning of social 
solidarity will be persistently contested and redefined over time which is 
consistent with the views of Praeg in relation to ubuntu as previously 
described. 1496  Furthermore, it is necessary to emphasise that the 
integration debate has overwhelmingly focussed on the challenges 
presented by immigrants and refugees rather than exploring the 
difficulties posed by Denmark as a receiving society.1497  
Henkel believes that three factors have played a pivotal role in the 
progressive integration of Denmark. 1498  Firstly, the elevated position 
occupied by the Danish Lutheran Church as the state church has been 
an integral component of the Danish constitutional order since 1848.1499 
Secondly, the co-operative movement in Denmark made a telling 
contribution to the economic integration of Danish society. 1500  The 
cooperatives played a critical role in the development of a rapidly 
expanding agro-industry between 1850 and 1950 as well as shaping the 
food retail business and housing supply in urban areas.1501 Thirdly, the 
Kanslergade Agreement of 1933 created a shared political platform 
which would give rise to a social welfare state that would be of benefit at 
all social levels.1502 The aforementioned agreement served as a social 
model blueprint for a number of Western European countries after World 
War II. 1503  Unsurprisingly, Danish society was characterised by an 
extraordinary level of integration on the political, economic and social 
fronts in the wake of a single-minded focus on social consensus.1504  
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The adoption of a set of civic virtues, of Dankshed, is ‘thus 
simultaneously the likely result of this historical process of integration 
and the precondition for being recognised as a proper citizen of Danish 
society’.1505 Thus, Dankshed could be viewed as excluding anyone that 
is visibly different from ethnic Danes – it is submitted that this is (as a 
rule) the lived reality of refugees and immigrants in Denmark. In this 
regard the insight offered by Jensen as to Muslim refugees and 
immigrants being rendered visibly different through their Islamic attire 
(as discussed more fully below) neatly captures the conundrum of 
immigrants that want to participate on an equal footing with ethnic Danes 
in Danish society. It follows that their Islamic garb makes this virtually 
impossible as they are inevitably viewed as not being capable of being 
real Danes. 
The link forged between sameness, something possessed of substance 
and a resolute inner core is evident in the work of the Danish theologian 
and educator, Hal Koch.1506 Koch is best known for advocating a Danish 
vision of democracy (in the time following World War Two) which is still 
evident in contemporary Danish political culture.1507 Koch believed that 
democracy was not so much a version of a political system but rather 
embracing a way of life based on common values. 1508  His vision is 
imbued with Christian values and calls for a public awakening in which 
people are ‘socialised and educated into democratic thinking’.1509 Koch 
emphasised the need for dialogue (as a means to create a common set 
of values shaped by the inner constitution of people) in giving effect to 
democracy.1510 The concept of an ‘inner constitution’ is of considerable 
interest as it can be utilised to give effect to problematic nationalistic 
tendencies that exclude certain groups.1511 However, it is my view that it 
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can also be harnessed for positive change if that inner constitution is 
shaped by a communal obligations’ focus on the part of individuals in 
order to forge a just and caring nation-state in which all people are 
treated with equal importance. 
The notion of a culturally homogenous society is premised on the belief 
of a present day welfare state forged by like-minded people over a 
considerable period of time in realising the vision of a modern society 
noted for its egalitarianism and justice ideals.1512 However, politicians 
and the media conveniently ignore the increase in discrimination 
displayed against non-ethnic Danes as well as the underlying racism in 
xenophobic tirades directed at ethnic/religious minorities such as 
Muslims.1513 This serves to confine the challenges of integration to non-
ethnic Danes as opposed to including ethnic Danes in that same 
discussion.1514 Consequently, refugees and immigrants are faced with a 
virtually impossible task in seeking to integrate in Danish society as 
ethnic Danes would need to openly embrace engagement (on equal 
terms) with the aforementioned refugees and immigrants. It would in fact 
require the aforementioned open (and ongoing) engagement to facilitate 
the shaping of a society capable of accommodating difference (a certain 
amount of difference that is) whilst grappling with the creation of a 
platform so as to facilitate living lives of purpose for one and all.  
It is noteworthy that there have been a few Danish scholars that have 
been critical of the manner in which the media and politicians discuss 
the issues of immigration and integration.1515 However, a substantial 
component of Danish migration research is directed at ‘culturally 
problematic immigrants and refugees’.1516 This has led the migration 
researcher, Morck, to criticise fellow academics for perceiving 
immigrants and refugees as ‘problem cases’ for the Danish welfare 
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state.1517  It is fair comment that the perception has taken hold that 
immigrants and refugees are an onerous burden on the Danish welfare 
system. 1518  Wren has made the observation that Danish scholars 
exhibited ‘cultural racism’ when immersed in immigration and integration 
studies.1519  This form of racism was shaped by ‘the cultural bias of 
academic research, which has been very closely connected with public 
policy’ and this in turn has led to insufficient scrutiny of the critical role of 
the social structure of Danish society.1520  
It follows that there is a need to be mindful of the manner in which we 
shape the debate (for better or worse) in relation to politically-charged 
terms such as ‘integration’ (or ‘ubuntu’ for that matter). Also, the plight of 
vulnerable people (whether immigrants/refugees in Denmark or people 
living in abject poverty in South Africa) should be a pressing priority for 
their respective states which readily serves to add credence to the 
assertion that the integration/social solidarity debate in Denmark is 
indeed relevant in the South African context.  
The ‘barrier-building’ exhibited by Danish society towards immigrants 
and refugees cannot be understood by a superficial reference to ‘racist 
or xenophobic tendencies’ in Danish society.1521 In this regard Danes 
are finding it exceedingly difficult to embrace a refined understanding of 
Denmark as a welfare state (in the era of globalisation) in which 
interconnectedness and interdependence is taking hold.1522  
It is submitted that this is no different to the lived reality in South Africa 
in which ubuntu can serve to aid the negotiation of the challenges faced 
by interdependent and interconnected people living side by side in a 
pluricultural nation state. This can be achieved by demonstrating equal 
concern for all people in giving expression to sustainable social solidarity 
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ideals – this would as a rule entail providing for the needs of fellow 
members whose lives are placed at risk by virtue of an inability to access 
critical subsistence rights. 
It should be noted that ‘Danishness’ and ‘the welfare state’, as coloured 
by the historical development of Danish society and the present day 
welfare state immersed in a global village respectively, are 
‘inseparable’.1523 It should be apparent that ‘Danishness’ and the welfare 
state are diametrically opposed in certain instances yet remain firmly 
intertwined (and should be construed as interconnected).1524 This has 
the unfortunate consequence that immigrants and refugees will continue 
to be viewed as being alien to Danish society despite the best efforts of 
the welfare system to oversee the ‘integration’ of immigrants and 
refugees. 1525  Thus, a critical need is identified to safeguard and 
strengthen a social welfare society which is ‘based on a system of social 
solidarity that is closely connected with shared cultural values, in a 
globalising world of increasing interconnectivity and mobility’.1526 It is 
submitted that this mimics the appeal of the vision of an ubuntu-inspired 
public service, striving to realise the urgent subsistence rights of 
vulnerable groups, so as to fashion a nation-state in which social 
solidarity is forged through treating all people in South Africa as having 
equal importance regardless of their cultural background.    
The lived experiences of immigrants and refugees in Denmark are 
reminiscent of the trying circumstances that have to be endured by 
vulnerable groups in South Africa. The state (both in Denmark and South 
Africa) should seek to extend every protection to vulnerable groups as 
previously outlined. This can be facilitated by engaging in constructive 
dialogue (which serves to colour and shape the dominant political 
discourse) so as to ensure that adequate and appropriate service 
offerings are provided to vulnerable groups. This will facilitate the 
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creation of a society in which social solidarity is given expression through 
all people being treated as having equal worth. Furthermore, the 
lingering perception of immigrants and refugees as a ‘social problem’ 
has sought to disregard the desirable attributes that these groups 
possess.1527 However, it is true that the Danish welfare system has 
provided immigrants with substantial economic and social 
assistance.1528   
The Danish welfare society is capable of addressing challenges in 
education, health and housing but it falls woefully short in fashioning the 
social and emotional factors which can promote lives filled with purpose 
and promise for all.1529 Thus, immigrants and refugees (with non-Danish 
ethnic roots) are often viewed as ‘tantamount to being a problem case 
for the welfare system’.1530 Danish society has failed to confront the 
challenges of globalisation (as previously mentioned) and has instead 
focussed on ‘categories of cultural difference’.1531 Thus, the dominant 
public discourse serves to shape and consolidate the belief that ‘equality 
and cohesion are incompatible with immigration and heterogeneity’.1532 
Henkel refers to the work of Habermas in highlighting that the Danish 
majority, with reference to the role of Islam in society, has failed to make 
a critical distinction between its own cultural tradition and the political 
culture of Denmark.1533 The aforementioned cultural tradition is shaped 
by a historical experience shared by the majority whereas the political 
culture should be negotiated between all citizens. 1534  Thus, the 
distinction drawn between ‘the cultural tradition of a majority society and 
a country’s political culture is the structural condition for a democratic 
society under pluricultural conditions’.1535 The aforementioned insights 
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offered by Henkel provide extraordinary insight with regards to shaping 
a viable political culture in the rainbow nation that is South Africa. 
It is submitted that a scrutiny of the abovementioned ethnographic 
analyses serves to demonstrate the telling manner in which 
anthropology can colour our understanding of the lived reality of 
vulnerable groups (be it in Denmark or South Africa). This in turn will 
ensure that the relevant state has the necessary insight to meet the 
legitimate needs of vulnerable groups as a means to shape a society 
predicated on sustainable social solidarity ideals. 
4.2.3.3 The ideological tussle between the Danish Lutheran Church and 
Islam 
It is submitted that developing a nuanced understanding of the specific 
challenges endured by (Muslim) immigrants and refugees in Denmark is 
critical. That is, if one seeks to understand the manner in which the 
dominant public discourse in Denmark has sought to emphasise that 
sameness is a prerequisite for forging social solidarity in Denmark. It 
follows that this automatically excludes the visibly different Muslim 
immigrants and refugees.  
Nikolai Grundtvig (1783 -1872) led the Lutheran reform movement which 
cemented the prominent position of the Danish Lutheran Church 
(folkekirken) in Danish society. 1536  Grundtvig breathed life into a 
Christian-national sentiment that was embraced by all Danes (including 
the poor from rural areas).1537 The Danish Lutheran Church is supported 
by the Danish State and has a membership of approximately 4.5 million 
members.1538  
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion but the state is bound 
by the Constitution to support the Danish National Church.1539  Islam has 
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been viewed by the aforementioned Church as either a potential or 
actual threat to Danish society or alternatively (in select ecclesiastical 
circles) as an opportunity to reflect on the role of the Church in a 
changing society.1540 Dannelse is viewed as the modern interpretation of 
the Grundtvigian philosophy of folkeoplysning (enlightenment of the 
people as previously stated) in which everyone is an individual but no 
individual must stand out in stark contrast to the group. 1541  Thus, 
individual diversity is protected by embracing the belief that one should 
be similar to everyone else in key matters.1542 It is submitted that this is 
reminiscent of the benevolent coercion (which is ever-present in ubuntu) 
which regulates the conduct of members as a means to forge social 
solidarity.  
It is necessary to highlight that the ‘integration problem’ does not refer to 
European immigrants as such but rather to immigrants who are visibly 
different (as previously described) and display significantly different 
religious beliefs (i.e. mainly Muslim migrants).1543 It follows that talk of 
integration (both in Denmark and in Europe) is more often than not 
actually about the ‘immigrant problem’ which in turn is often code for ‘the 
Muslim problem’.1544  
The consensus model reigns supreme in the Church despite critical 
differences of opinion between clergy who discharge their duties in 
keeping with their respective (and varied) perceptions of the role of the 
Church as a public institution.1545 Thus, internal differences are rendered 
invisible and enable the forging of a community which is capable of 
including everybody.1546 However, the cherished ideals of homogeneity 
and consensus can only remain intact if the majority emphasise their 
similarities and actively seek to minimise perceptions of differences.1547  
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It follows that the present debate on ‘homogeneity and difference, 
consensus and conflict, social inclusion and exclusion, and the social 
practices with which this debate is connected’ substantially shape the 
conditions for integration in Danish society as well as how integration is 
subsequently safeguarded and/or contested.1548 It should be noted that 
this debate has been marred by increasing Islamophobia and it is hardly 
remarkable that it is now a commonly held belief that Danish culture is 
incompatible with a Muslim culture/Islam.1549 This provides insight with 
regards to ongoing debates as to the extent to which Muslims should be 
permitted to have separate Muslim cemeteries (or build mosques) and 
in so doing render visible the reduction of (ethnic) Danish public 
space.1550  
It is critical to note that cultural homogeneity as embraced by the Danes 
is characterised by individual freedom, personal choice and social 
engagement (rather than an insistence on conformity).1551 However, it is 
the aforementioned (three) values which the Danes believe are being 
undermined by immigrants and refugees as the latter groups have 
embraced religious (Islamic) beliefs that are viewed as extremist, 
oppressive, insist upon arranged marriages (more often than not viewed 
as forced marriages) and supposedly demonstrate excessive 
commitment to their families.1552 Consequently, this is contrary to the 
beliefs of numerous Danes who view the welfare state as being shaped 
by a national collective of people who have embraced a European way 
of life ‘based on respect for individual choice and autonomy as well as a 
sense of social solidarity’.1553 It is assumed that these values do not 
resonate with the beliefs of refugees and immigrants.1554 
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Sjorslev1555 has noted that the xenophobic rhetoric, aimed at Muslims, is 
a display of power rooted in the spoken word and has adverse 
consequences in real life.1556 Danes have (in everyday conversation) 
taken to replace the word ‘immigrant’ with ‘Muslim’ to depict anyone 
foreign to Danish society so as to emphasise that being Muslim excludes 
one from being Danish. 1557  Muslim immigrants are portrayed in the 
media as assuming a position which is diametrically opposed to the 
coveted Danish ideals of democracy, liberal views and progressive 
values. 1558  Thus, ethnic Danes that have converted to Islam are 
described as having ‘undergone fundamental and radical processes of 
transformation’ and their conversion is portrayed as ‘abdicating their 
Danishness’ or ‘emigrating from Danish society’. 1559  Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that approximately 3000 Danes have converted to Islam 
in the past four decades.1560  
Consequently, the categories ‘Danish’ and ‘Muslim’ are viewed as 
mutually exclusive which is consistent with the dominant political 
discourse.1561 However, this must be contrasted with Danish converts to 
Islam who illustrate the ‘quiet integration’ which occur in daily, 
commonplace interactions in Denmark.1562 In this regard Jensen shares 
insights gleaned from ethnographic cases involving different Danish 
converts and their respective ways of embracing lives as Muslims as well 
as their respective interactions with both ethnic Danes and Muslim 
immigrants. 1563  The aforementioned ethnographic study highlights 
‘multifarious identifications, continuities and relationships between 
Danish and Muslim identities’ that are in stark contrast with external 
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xenophobic rhetoric that depict converts as having discarded their 
Danishness on embracing Islam.1564  
The conversion to Islam is viewed as an ongoing process of cultural 
complexity as evidenced by the continuous interaction between various 
actors and cultural traditions which culminate in new identities being 
summoned forth.1565  The new Muslim identity assumed by the convert 
represents either rupture or continuity with the identity which was in 
place prior to the conversion. 1566  New converts tend to emphasise 
rupture yet over time lean towards continuity with the latter representing 
a fusion of identities. 1567  Consequently, the ‘polarisation’ which 
manifests between Muslim and Danish identities does not endure in the 
‘quiet integration of lived lives’.1568 Thus, an illuminating insight is offered 
in which the conversion to Islam should not be viewed as a rupture but 
could instead be viewed as an example of integration.1569 
It is submitted that a deep-seated understanding of the challenges 
endured by Muslim immigrants and refugees should serve to sensitise 
public officials as to the plight of specific vulnerable groups and how to 
assist those same vulnerable groups to live lives of purpose. This can in 
fact be achieved by creating opportunities for dialogue and meaningful 
participation in shaping a nation-state in which social solidarity principles 
will flourish. Thus, it is my firm belief that an understanding of the 
concepts of sameness and difference (with reference to visibly different 
vulnerable groups) as well as inclusion and exclusion (as explored in 
section 4.2.3.5) can play a pivotal role in augmenting the accountability 
of public officials in South Africa. This can be brought about by nurturing 
the social conscience of the aforementioned officials - in order to ensure 
that vulnerable groups are treated with equal concern and that 
vulnerable groups are as a rule considered (and included) when devising 
                                                             
1564 Jensen TG ‘To be Danish and Muslim’ (2011) 113.  
1565 Jensen TG ‘To be Danish and Muslim’ (2011) 114. 
1566 Jensen TG ‘To be Danish and Muslim’ (2011) 117. 
1567 Jensen TG ‘To be Danish and Muslim’ (2011) 117.  
1568 Jensen TG ‘To be Danish and Muslim’ (2011) 117. Please see Jenkins R Being 
Danish (2012) 309. 
1569 Jensen TG ‘To be Danish and Muslim’ (2011) 117.   
258 
 
 
projects that aim to strengthen social solidarity principles in the nation-
state. 
However, the Muhammed cartoons as published in a Danish newspaper, 
Jyllands-Posten, on 30 September 2005 served to highlight the 
simmering tensions between safeguarding (a version of) the freedom of 
expression and a clear disregard for Muslims in Denmark and elsewhere 
in the West.1570 The cartoon crisis is routinely described as a vigorous 
debate regarding the freedom of expression.1571 However, the analysis 
by Henkel1572 offers a richly textured examination of the critical issues 
that defined the controversy (including the challenges of integration) 
which is far removed from the notion of Denmark as one of the pioneers 
of social solidarity.1573  
The blunt refusal to recognise Muslims as part of Danish society is the 
critical factor in making sense of why the publication of the Muhammed 
cartoons courted controversy and brought about an ill-natured crisis.1574 
Henkel seeks to persuade the reader to assume the view that the 
complex events in question could best be described as a ‘transitional 
drama’ which was concerned with ‘an ongoing struggle for 
recognition’.1575 The aforementioned struggle was not only confined to 
the acceptance/recognition of Muslims as legitimate citizens/residents in 
Danish society but also the recognition of legitimate societal demands 
levelled against Muslims by Danish society.1576 In addition, it sought to 
ascertain ‘the forms of identity that can mutually be recognised as 
Danish’.1577  However, Henkel believes that a solution to the ethno-
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religious conflict can only be brought about by fashioning a novel/revised 
blueprint premised on mutual understanding and recognition.1578  
Jyllands-Posten (newspaper) published twelve ‘Muhammed cartoons’ as 
previously requested from members of the Danish National Association 
of Cartoonists.1579 Henkel believed that the publication of the cartoons 
had exacerbated the palpable tension which had been building up over 
time as Muslims had been viewed with ever-increasing suspicion since 
the September 2001 attacks in the United States. 1580  Furthermore, 
Muslims felt that their legitimate demands had not been acknowledged 
by Danish society and the state.1581  
It is important to note that Jyllands-Posten had briefed the cartoonists to 
provide images of the Prophet Muhammed - the cartoons which were 
subsequently submitted varied in style and content.1582 A number of the 
cartoonists did in fact render offensive images of a volatile and 
misogynistic Oriental but some cartoonists elected to submit ‘non-
confrontational’ pictures.1583 The twelve cartoons were published side by 
side with commentary provided by the journalist, Fleming Rose, in which 
he had highlighted that the brief issued to cartoonists was to protest the 
acquiescence of the Danish public to unreasonable and unacceptable 
demands made by Muslims.1584 Rose believed that it was the duty of the 
press to dismiss religious sensitivities out of hand so as to resist the 
imposition of these same concerns on Danish society. 1585  Henkel 
believes that the cartoon crisis could be viewed as a test of the nature 
and limits of Danish civility.1586  
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The publication of the cartoons in Jyllands-Posten unleashed a frantic 
debate about whether the newspaper had the right to publish them.1587  
Or, whether in fact, it had a civic duty to publish the cartoons so as to 
give effect to (a particular version of) the ‘freedom of expression’.1588 The 
aforementioned debate explored the manner in which (and to what 
extent) the sensitivities of the Muslim minority should be acknowledged 
and whether the (offensive) cartoons should consequently be withdrawn 
and the newspaper should issue an apology. 1589  Furthermore, the 
debate sought to ascertain whether the cartoons could properly be 
perceived as an acceptable form of debate or an act of defamation.1590 
Henkel offers an illuminating insight in depicting the debate as an 
exploration of the alternative ways of living and particular moral 
sensitivities which could muster approval as properly belonging to 
Danish society.1591  
It should be noted that there were no definite decisions taken with 
regards to whether the newspaper was correct in publishing the cartoons 
nor whether the state had an obligation to protect the interests of a 
minority group.1592 However, the reality is that Jyllands-Posten emerged 
as the ‘victor’ in the sense that it commanded extraordinary public 
support and the Danish government elected not to intervene.1593 In this 
regard the discipline of anthropology has outlined the concept of ‘inaction 
is also an action’ which appears to be an excellent portrayal of the 
conduct of the Danish government with regards to the cartoons crisis.1594 
This served to confirm that the plight (and sensitivities) of a vulnerable 
minority group in Denmark was seemingly of limited concern to the 
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Danish government. 1595  It is my considered opinion that this is no 
different to the failure of the state to make a material difference in the 
lives of vulnerable groups in South Africa - it sends a powerful message 
to vulnerable groups in particular as to what in fact constitutes a pressing 
priority for the respective governments of Denmark and South Africa.  
The cartoons were deemed to be particularly offensive as they managed 
to blend the derogatory portrayal of Muslims with a critical assault on the 
most respected figure in the Islamic world. 1596  Consequently, it is 
believed that the cartoons achieved iconic status ‘in that they both 
represented Western non-recognition of Muslim sensibilities and 
dramatically performed this non-recognition’. 1597  The Muslims in 
Denmark were placed in an extremely difficult position, as they had to 
assume a position in the openly hostile debate concerning the cartoons, 
which entailed staking a claim as to the legitimacy of a Muslim identity in 
Denmark.1598 Ultimately, the Muslims had to demonstrate that they could 
embrace a ‘Danish’ way of life.1599 I am in complete agreement with the 
aforementioned insights by Henkel as it should be readily apparent that 
the cartoon crisis highlighted the vulnerability of Muslim immigrants and 
refugees as a minority group – this included being subjected to a 
constant barrage of hate speech yet being compelled to adhere to a 
course of (protest) action that did not put at risk the overarching goal for 
Muslim immigrants and refugees to be accepted as full/proper members 
of the Danish-state.  
Henkel believes that there is a clear need for ethnic Danes and Muslims 
in Denmark to devise a blueprint through which they could consider and 
acknowledge each other’s demands.1600 Thus, an updated version of the 
Kanslergade Agreement of 1933 (as previously mentioned) is required 
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so as to ensure that mutual demands are properly recognised and 
embraced in the decades to come.1601 This will ensure that a Muslim can 
be recognised as a Muslim-Dane by the majority society in Denmark so 
as to enhance ‘life chances’ for Muslims as well as promote social 
solidarity for Danish society as a whole.1602  
A bitter irony which is evident is that Muslim minorities are subjected to 
extraordinary pressure to adhere to clearly defined versions of secularity 
which serves to undermine the stated Danish position of permitting every 
citizen to pursue their specific purposes and goals (and on which basis 
it assumes the supposed moral high ground).1603 It is submitted that the 
South African Constitution is well suited to the task of forging social 
solidarity amongst people from all walks of life if the state exhibits the 
requisite political will and adheres to a suitable accountability standard 
in progressively giving effect to interdependent and interconnected civil, 
political and socio-economic rights.       
It is indeed disappointing that a substantial part of Danish society has 
not drawn (or has elected not to draw) the critical distinction between 
freedom of speech (which is indeed capable of being limited) and hate 
speech as directed at a marginalised group in society. It follows that the 
drawing of the Muhammed cartoons were commissioned and 
subsequently published with the clear intention of causing grave offence 
to Muslim immigrants as well as to fan anti-Muslim sentiment. In 
conclusion, it serves to highlight the pressing need to celebrate diversity 
within our respective borders.  
    4.2.3.4 The troubling influence of right wing political parties in Denmark 
It is necessary to have a clear understanding of the rise of the right wing 
in Denmark and the manner in which this has diminished the prospect of 
living lives of value on the part of a specific vulnerable group (i.e. Muslim 
immigrants and refugees). In this regard the right wing has sought to fan 
suspicion of Muslim immigrants and refugees ever being able to assume 
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a position in Denmark on an equal footing with ethnic Danes. 
Furthermore, this section serves as a warning for public officials in South 
Africa to put an end to blatant discrimination aimed at (specific) 
vulnerable groups by remaining committed to forging a constitutional 
democracy as envisaged by the Constitution. It follows that the 
aforementioned vision would encompass a just and caring nation (in 
which all members would be treated with equal concern and respect) 
and in which social solidarity ideals would flourish.1604  
A Ministry of Integration was established in 2001 by the newly-elected 
government which consisted of the Venstre Party and the Conservative 
Party but also required the support of the ultra-nationalist danskfolkeparti 
(Danish People’s Party).1605 The Danish People’s Party has played a 
pivotal role in driving an anti-immigrant agenda which was seen to 
contribute to the Muhammed cartoon crisis.1606 It assumed a prominent 
role in the wake of the 2001 general elections and ushered in an era in 
which stringent immigration laws and anti-Muslim rhetoric would take 
centre stage. 1607  The Danish People’s Party had an extraordinary 
showing at the 2015 Danish election polls (consistent with its growing 
support base since the 2001 elections) which speaks volumes about the 
direction of mainstream politics in Denmark.1608  
The ‘problem of integration’ has evolved since 2001 in that the public 
discourse has assumed a narrower focus by specifically targeting 
Muslim immigrants in Denmark.1609 By 2005 the anti-Islamic rhetoric in 
the media had intensified to the extent that Muslim immigrants were 
labelled as ‘belonging to the Middle Ages’, ‘barbarians’ and 
‘irreconcilable with Danish values’.1610 It should be noted that the Danish 
government has expressly articulated its assumption of the pivotal link 
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between participation in the labour market and the integration of 
immigrants.1611 Thus, Bertel Haarder, the former Minister of Integration, 
stated in Politiken newspaper that:  
‘Refugees (those that have recently gained asylum) have 
difficulties getting up in the morning. They simulate illness 
and get doctors to make false (sick) certificates. They are 
not at the disposal of the labour market. They should be 
put to work like skinning mink or looking after pigs, they 
don’t mind that. They must take the dirty, routine and 
poorly paid jobs. No work is too bad’.1612  
The abovementioned quote highlights the ‘us-them’ dichotomy which is 
consistent with the blinkered views of the majority of Danes. 1613 
Furthermore, it displays deep-seated suspicions of the work ethic of 
immigrants as well as a blatant disregard for Muslim beliefs.1614  
The Danish People’s Party has garnered international attention for its 
xenophobic utterances yet it has consistently sought to demonstrate its 
unwavering support for the Danish welfare state.1615 In this regard it is 
keen to emphasise its support for vulnerable groups such as the elderly 
while agitating for reduced support for large families (in the mistaken 
belief that immigrants comprise the majority of the target group).1616 This 
serves to highlight the manner in which the welfare system can be 
exploited to further a nationalist agenda. 1617  Furthermore, 
Sammenhaengskraft (the power to hold together) has been utilised as a 
catchphrase by right wing parties in Denmark to conjure images of 
‘cohesiveness’ in the public discourse regarding the welfare state and 
immigrants (or more specifically the threats posed by the 
immigrants).1618 Thus, it is both ironic and deeply troubling that the true 
                                                             
1611 Sjørslev I ‘The paradox of integration’ (2011) 80. 
1612 Politiken (Newspaper) 7 October 2003.  
1613 Sjørslev I ‘The paradox of integration’ (2011) 80. 
1614 Sjørslev I ‘The paradox of integration’ (2011) 80. 
1615 Jöhncke S ‘Integrating Denmark’ (2011) 32. 
1616 Jöhncke S ‘Integrating Denmark’ (2011) 32. 
1617 Jöhncke S ‘Integrating Denmark’ (2011) 32. 
1618 Rubow C ‘Religion and integration’ (2011) 110.  
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nature of social solidarity (in standing together regardless of our 
perceived differences as we are ultimately not all that different) has been 
cast aside in contemporary (mainstream) political discourse in 
Denmark.1619  
It is submitted that this is the lived reality of Muslim immigrants and 
refugees in contemporary Denmark. This in turn provides telling insights 
as to the manner in which the state should actively guard against adding 
to the burden endured by vulnerable groups in South Africa through 
forging an enlightened (and all-encompassing) understanding of social 
solidarity.  
4.2.3.5 The inclusion and exclusion of specific groups in contemporary 
Denmark 
The concepts of inclusion and exclusion (as detailed in this section) are 
deployed so as to frame debates/discourse in a manner which routinely 
exclude Muslim refugees and immigrants when reference is made to 
(full) members of the social welfare state of Denmark. It is submitted that 
it is critical to develop an intimate understanding of inclusion and 
exclusion if the goal is to safeguard the legitimate expectations of 
vulnerable groups whether in Denmark or South Africa. It should be 
noted that the deployment of the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu 
is as a rule inclusive in nature and consequently seeks to acknowledge 
and address the urgent needs of fellow (vulnerable) members of society.  
It should be noted that the prevalent understanding of integration in 
Denmark (in which new pieces are meshed with the pre-existing fully 
formed whole as previously indicated) is decidedly different from 
integration as understood in the social sciences which is one of how a 
society ‘is held together’.1620 This latter version entails an exploration of 
how a specific society was fashioned and the social mechanisms which 
                                                             
1619 Rubow C ‘Religion and integration’ (2011) 110.  
1620 Jöhncke S ‘Integrating Denmark’ (2011) 33. 
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make that very society able to perform and achieve a measure of 
durability.1621  
There is a definitive link between the way in which present day Danish 
society is formulated and its development (over an extended period of 
time) as a welfare state.1622 A central theme in the Danish welfare state 
is that the goods of a society should be distributed for the benefit of all 
and as a means of promoting widespread equality.1623 The assumed 
differences between people are negligible (even if people present with a 
variety of needs and demonstrate a range of capabilities) and will be of 
no consequence if everyone contributes to the commonwealth as people 
‘are, fundamentally, alike’ as previously described.1624  However, this 
belief in equality and equivalence is linked to the unwavering belief of 
Denmark as a culturally homogenous society.1625 Therefore, it is only 
applied as a rule to ethnically Danish people.1626  
This in turn has shaped a widely held belief amongst ethnically Danish 
people that only they (as opposed to immigrants and refugees) can fully 
comprehend (as well as appreciate) the rights and duties which flow from 
being a critical component of the Danish welfare system.1627 Immigrants 
and refugees are consequently labelled as being substantially different 
(in terms of their culture, financial status and education levels) so as to 
effectively undermine their ability to make a meaningful and sustained 
contribution to a welfare society which requires perpetual redistribution 
of goods. 1628  This results in the stigmatisation of immigrants and 
refugees as (supposedly) exploiting the resources of the welfare state 
without making a contribution to it.1629 However, it is an entirely different 
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matter whether there is any actual evidence to support these damning 
allegations.1630  
Nonetheless, there is a need to draw a distinction between the process 
of integrating and the state of integratedness with the latter describing 
the specific extent of transformation in a given society.1631 It is submitted 
that this section of the work is capable of providing public officials with 
critical insight as to whether the conditions on the ground (i.e. the political 
landscape) are conducive for shaping a sustainable social solidarity 
project by virtue of the legitimate concerns of specific vulnerable groups 
receiving the necessary acknowledgment and support. Furthermore, 
integration is possessed of a normative element as it is perceived as a 
socially desirable aim which depicts harmony and agreement amongst 
members of a given society.1632 In addition, integration encompasses 
the concepts of coherence and cohesion.1633 Coherence is comprised of 
the complex social relations between the members of a society whilst 
cohesion colours those same social relations with meaning so as to bring 
about enduring social relations.1634 This is in keeping with a key focus in 
this thesis, in pursuing a sustainable version of social solidarity in South 
Africa, through the progressive realisation of critical subsistence rights 
of vulnerable groups as a means to demonstrate that all citizens have 
equal worth.  
Immigrants in Denmark who strive to be recognised as being fully 
integrated have the unenviable task of not only ‘feeling Danish’ but must 
also ‘do Danish’ by faithfully adhering to a myriad of demands as 
prescribed by the welfare state.1635  This seems to indicate that the 
concept of ‘integration’ is not defined with the requisite clarity to render 
it suitable for analysis.1636 Furthermore, it is not possible to reduce the 
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1632 Jöhncke S ‘Integrating Denmark’ (2011) 34.  
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question of integration to an ‘either-or’ as it would be simplistic in the 
extreme to depict a society as either integrated or not integrated.1637 It is 
for the aforementioned reasons that Luhmann sought to discard the 
concept of integration and instead focussed on inclusion and exclusion 
in a variety of social systems (e.g. the education sector as well as the 
labour market).1638 This was due to there being no single constituted 
‘society’ as such but rather different social systems characterised by 
clear forms of communication and exchange mechanisms. 1639  Thus, 
inclusion and exclusion are viewed as ‘simultaneous and mutually 
dependent processes’ and seek to shed light on how in practice 
individuals and groups are included and excluded from engaging in give-
and-take processes in a specific social system.1640  
The abovementioned approach has a distinct advantage when analysing 
integration as it highlights the manner in which policies (that are deemed 
to advance integration) are just as likely to exclude individuals and 
groups while catering for inclusion by merely framing ‘integration 
problems’ and their solutions in particular ways.1641 It is submitted that 
the aforementioned approach promotes a better understanding of the 
specific circumstances of vulnerable groups. This echoes the sentiments 
of Praeg who had noted the existence of power relations that dictated 
which people were allowed to be part of the conversation.1642 In addition, 
it is interesting to contemplate the concepts of inclusion and exclusion 
as related to the plight of specific vulnerable groups in South Africa (e.g. 
the manner in which desperate, homeless people in the Grootboom 
matter were excluded from the state housing programme in the Western 
Cape).  
                                                             
1637 Jöhncke S ‘Integrating Denmark’ (2011) 35. 
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1639 Luhmann N ‘Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft’ (1997) 619. 
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Political parties across the full spectrum have recognised that the Danish 
welfare state is a permanent fixture even though amendments (to 
specific welfare benefits and/or conditions) are enacted from time to 
time.1643 This unwavering support for the welfare state is seen as a 
manifestation of the extent to which social solidarity, as an ideal 
encompassing the belief that ‘we are all in the same boat’, resonates 
with Danes.1644 Consequently, the general sentiment (from a Danish 
perspective) towards the welfare state is that of a compelling social 
construction (and a notable political achievement) that has made a 
crucial contribution in shaping an integrated society.1645   
It is difficult to resist the temptation to contrast the social construction of 
the Danish welfare state (and its vast social security net) with the 
ushering in of a new dawn in South Africa in which the Constitution (with 
its entrenched socio-economic rights provisions) serves as a beacon of 
light in bringing about a united nation premised on a firm belief that all 
people have equal worth. It is submitted that the concept of ‘equal worth’ 
encompasses an obligation on the part of the state to prioritise the 
systematic dismantling of the deprivation endured by vulnerable groups 
(so as to shape a just and caring nation-state). Thus, the related 
contribution by Bowler et al1646 in re-imagining and/or re-inventing South 
Africa as a sanctuary for all who reside within its borders is of 
considerable academic interest as well as a compelling human interest 
story.  
Social class remains a reality in contemporary Denmark (as there is a 
limit to the extent of redistribution that is possible within society) and 
there are accordingly extremely poor and exceedingly wealthy people 
separated by a huge middle class.1647 Furthermore, the poorest/most 
marginalised grouping in Danish society has a disproportionately large 
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number of people from ethnic minorities.1648 Thus, the ‘ideologies of 
harmony’ finds application in the Danish welfare state in that the faith 
displayed in consensus was borne out by the middle class (that routinely 
benefitted from the welfare state) whilst simultaneously ensuring that all 
talk of class differences was drowned out.1649   
The Danish parliament had passed social policy legislation which sought 
to reduce tangible benefits for certain immigrant individuals and their 
families as a means of lessening the appeal of Denmark for non-working 
immigrants.1650 The ‘introduction benefit’ and ‘start assistance’ provided 
immigrants with cash relief at significantly reduced levels in contrast to 
benefits provided to Danes.1651 It was of grave concern that both of the 
aforementioned benefits fell below the official EU poverty level but were 
vigorously defended by the state on the basis of ‘giving incentives to 
immigrants to start working and becoming integrated into Danish 
society’.1652 This is in itself a tragic indictment on the part of the state in 
reinforcing prejudicial beliefs about the (supposed) lack of work ethic on 
the part of immigrants and refugees - especially in the absence of taking 
into account the reciprocal responsibilities of Denmark as the receiving 
society with regards to facilitating integration. 1653  It follows that the 
Danish welfare state ‘is not just a piece of social and economic 
engineering but it is in fact a project of cultural construction of social 
relations and values’.1654  
It is believed that the contemporary challenge is to find a way to give 
expression to the rallying call ‘Denmark for the Inhabitants’ as a means 
of ensuring tangible benefits for every person in Denmark.1655 In the 
same vein a rallying call ‘South Africa for the Inhabitants’ can indeed 
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become a reality. That is, if diligent public officials (who are primed to 
give effect to the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu) demonstrate 
an unwavering focus on the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights as enshrined in the Constitution. 
It should be noted that the damaging perception of immigrants and 
refugees as a problem group is emphasised by the widespread belief 
that Denmark is a culturally homogenous national community as 
previously indicated.1656 This belief is strengthened by the frequent use 
of kin images such as ‘the family of Denmark’ when referring to Danish 
society.1657 The adoption of the aforementioned kin images by Danes 
serves to make an unequivocal statement about the need for ‘shared 
blood ties and biological descent’ as mandatory requirements prior to 
staking a legitimate claim to a Danish national identity and enjoying full 
membership in society.1658 Thus, the idea that immigrants and refugees 
are required to join the family of Denmark  (through marital and kin bonds 
grounded in Denmark) has played a pivotal role in the passing of laws to 
enforce tougher restrictions on the rights to marry a spouse from their 
country of origin.1659 The discriminatory effect of the aforementioned 
laws are (somewhat) concealed in the neutral language which is 
employed in detailing the period of residence in Denmark as well as the 
national affiliation of immigrants and refugees. 1660  Thus, the Danish 
immigration regime makes it difficult for foreigners as well as Danish 
citizens (especially those with immigrant roots) to secure family 
reunification with non-European spouses.1661  
The relevant legislation (as related to family reunification) served three 
specific purposes.1662 Firstly, it sought to impede transnational arranged 
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marriages amongst Turkish and Pakistani immigrants.1663 Secondly, it 
was aimed at bolstering security in the aftermath of the September 2001 
attacks by restricting the flow of non-European immigrants (with a 
specific focus on keeping Muslim immigrants at bay).1664 Finally, it was 
believed that the twinning of the abovementioned objectives would 
facilitate the improved integration of immigrants and refugees that were 
already settled in Denmark. 1665  In addition, five conditions were 
introduced with regard to securing family reunification including age, 
accommodation, financial assistance, collateral and national attachment 
(i.e. the ambit of the relevant law was widened to include Danish citizens 
that sought to marry foreign spouses as opposed to [previously] only 
being applicable to foreigners living in Denmark).1666  
The abovementioned requirement as related to national attachment, 
which is of particular interest in exploring the contemporary Danish 
welfare state, is calculated by the immigration authorities making a 
determination as to ‘whether the total national attachment of a married 
couple consisting of a Dane and a foreign spouse is greater to Denmark 
than to any other country’.1667 The national attachment requirement is of 
concern as a distinction is drawn between the majority of ‘authentic’ 
Danes and the minority of ‘not-quite-real’ Danes. 1668  The 
aforementioned ‘not-quite-real’ Danes are comprised of immigrants and 
refugees (as well as their respective descendants) who have made 
Denmark their home and secured citizenship in the past 50 years or 
so.1669  
The abovementioned requirement of national attachment has cast aside 
the previously sacred practice that all Danes are equal before the 
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law.1670 Danish citizens with parents born elsewhere find it exceptionally 
difficult to meet the requirement of national attachment as they have no 
family ties going back a number of generations. 1671  The obvious 
inference drawn from giving effect to the notion of national attachment is 
that there is a ‘disparity between the Danish nation and Danish citizens’ 
as Danish citizens of immigrant origin are not perceived as ‘real’ 
Danes.1672 In this regard kinship images have been ushered in which 
exclude certain Danish citizens without good cause by utilising a valid 
legal principle (i.e. the requirement of national attachment). 1673  It is 
submitted that laws which are seemingly neutral but ultimately create a 
hierarchy amongst (equal) members of a society will sow division and 
undermine any social solidarity project aimed at recognising and 
addressing the legitimate concerns and needs of all members of society.  
Furthermore, it serves to highlight that one cannot dismiss the lingering 
notion that certain citizens have ‘more rights to and ownership of the 
benefits of the welfare state than others’ by virtue of their ‘natural’ ties to 
the Danish nation.1674 The national attachment requirement also points 
to a contemporary focus on ‘ethnic nationalism’ by the Danish welfare 
state (i.e. an emphasis on hierarchical and exclusionist tendencies) as 
opposed to previously advocating ‘civic nationalism’ which promoted 
egalitarianism and inclusion in public and political discourse in 
Denmark. 1675  The aforementioned ‘ethnic nationalism’ focus of the 
Danish state is of extreme concern in light of the manner in which the 
plight of vulnerable groups will in all likelihood have to endure the 
dismissal of legitimate concerns as well as increasing isolation. 
It is fair comment that a clear majority of Danes support the strict 
immigration regime.1676 However, the European Court of Justice had 
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previously raised concerns in Metock1677 about the Danish immigration 
regime which was viewed as impeding the free movement of labour 
within the European Union due to its onerous legislation in relation to 
family re-unification.1678 
Furthermore, Sjorslev1679 explores the critical role of grammar in the 
public debate on immigrants and refugees in the Danish welfare 
state.1680 Specific categories of ‘social inequality’ and ‘cultural difference’ 
have become so embedded in present day Danish language that they 
come across as ‘natural’ in everyday life.1681 An interesting comparison 
is drawn with the German/Nazi society in the 1930s in that the current 
public debate on immigrants and refugees in Denmark mimics the 
vocabulary used by the Nazis to promote social exclusion not only in 
speech but also in practice.1682 The ‘Final Solution’ as proposed by the 
Nazi regime will be discussed in due course through a brief exploration 
of the work of Hannah Arendt.1683  
Sjorslev rejects integration as an analytical term and proposes that an 
overarching (abstract) view of the numerous political consequences of 
integration (in the relevant social and political context) should be 
pursued.1684 It is persuasively argued that cultural constructions are not 
only indicative of the lived reality but also actively shape the formation of 
specific social orders.1685 However, the particular manner in which these 
cultural constructions are analysed or find application can differ 
significantly.1686 Consequently, this makes it possible for most Danes to 
affirm that Denmark is culturally homogenous as the definitive meaning 
of cultural homogeneity is hardly ever fully articulated but for a routine 
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reference to a shared ethnic background.1687 Thus, integration is not a 
neutral concept as Danish debates over the past few decades bear 
witness to an extremely politicised field encapsulating the ideas and 
conduct covered by the aforementioned concept.1688  
A case in point is the manner in which the concept of integration has 
morphed in Denmark over time with specific reference to the 
contemporary discourse pertaining to Muslim immigrants. 1689  It is 
necessary to emphasise that it is not being suggested that the shift in 
the meaning of key concepts will inevitably spark a dangerous series of 
events.1690 However, negative consequences are inevitable.1691 There is 
indeed a legitimate concern that the meaning and intention of crucial 
concepts will be rendered difficult to define with any degree of 
precision.1692  Thus, there is consequently a distinct possibility that the 
‘paradox of integration’ may be portrayed as a noteworthy and positive 
concept yet it could be deployed to specifically exclude a target group 
(e.g. Muslim immigrants).1693 The Danish cultural values that make the 
‘paradox of integration’ possible is referred to as ‘heavy culture’ which 
are defined as cultural models that profoundly influence thinking and 
values in largely unseen ways.1694 In addition, the notion that equality 
connotes sameness has extraordinary significance in Scandinavia.1695 
Thus, there is a firmly rooted Danish notion of a suitably enhanced inner 
core that serves as the point of origin for democratic and egalitarian 
values which truly capture Danishness1696 (and which immigrants are 
meant to imbibe so as to become fully integrated).1697   
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It is submitted that the aforementioned notion of a ‘suitably enhanced 
inner core’ is of extreme concern as it provides a seemingly innocent 
perspective on the values endorsed by all (proper) Danes. However, it 
deliberately excludes specific vulnerable groups on the basis of 
perceived differences which negatively impacts the ability of members 
(of those same vulnerable groups) to affirm their status as citizens of 
equal standing. In this regard Foucault offers a penetrating insight 
concerning discourse in which knowledge is comprised of ‘social praxis, 
forms of subjectivity and power relations’.1698 Thus, Foucault believes 
that discourses ‘are forms of power that circulate in a social field’.1699 I 
am in complete agreement with the aforementioned insights (as offered 
by Foucault) as the dominant public discourse in Denmark primarily 
casts light on the myopic (and often xenophobic) views of ethnic Danes.  
It follows that integration can be viewed as a ‘heavy’ concept as per the 
previous description offered by Sjorslev.1700 In this regard it is apt to refer 
to the double-bind as described by Bateson in which he mused that: ‘You 
are not ready to become integrated until you are like us, and you will not 
prove that you are like us until you are integrated’.1701  This illustrates 
the seemingly impossible dilemma faced by Muslim immigrants and 
refugees that are keen to assume their rightful place in Danish society 
(i.e. to be on an equal footing with ethnic Danish citizens). 1702 
Consequently, the grammar of encompassment finds application in the 
current context where a certain group deems a different group to be 
basically ‘like us’ but have yet to be so transformed.1703 Furthermore, 
dichotomous grammar is also on display in that a certain group makes a 
marked distinction between themselves and another group which is best 
described as ‘us-them’.1704  
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However, it is important to grasp that the ideology of immigration in 
Denmark is underpinned by two implicit, resolute beliefs which is related 
to ‘heavy culture’ as previously discussed.1705 Firstly, there is the belief 
that there is something of substance into which the immigrant must be 
integrated.1706 Secondly, there is a distinct dividing line between ‘us’ (i.e. 
ethnic Danes) and ‘them’ (i.e. Danish immigrants). 1707  The 
aforementioned (twin) insights portray a disturbing lived reality in that 
refugees and immigrants in Denmark are treated as second class 
citizens - the aforementioned abhorrent treatment is for all intents and 
purposes endorsed by the state through failing to come to the aid of 
vulnerable groups so as to create a platform for all members to pursue 
lives of value.  
The abovementioned (implicit) beliefs have fundamentally shaped the 
public discourse regarding integration/immigration in Denmark and is 
assumed to be self-evident on the part of the majority of Danes.1708 
Thus, integration is imagined as being rather than acting. 1709 
Furthermore, current conceptions of what it means to be Danish (as 
shaped by common values and a strong inner constitution) plays a 
pivotal role in shaping the public discourse concerning real Danish 
culture and perceived threats against it. 1710  It follows that this 
complicates the possibility of integration if the process is shaped by inner 
values rather than by simply observing the laws of the land.1711 In this 
regard the previous description of the work by Hal Koch (as related to 
the core values of Danish citizens) deserves a special mention in that 
the state could routinely discriminate against refugees and immigrants 
as not possessing the requisite inner core which resonates with Danish 
values. It follows that this would make it virtually impossible for refugees 
                                                             
1705 Sjørslev I ‘The paradox of integration’ (2011) 83.   
1706 Sjørslev I ‘The paradox of integration’ (2011) 83.   
1707 Sjørslev I ‘The paradox of integration’ (2011) 83. Please see Jenkins R Being 
Danish (2012) 309. Please also see Coertze RD ‘Ubuntu and nation building’ 
South African Journal of Ethnology 24(4) (2001) 115. 
1708 Sjørslev I ‘The paradox of integration’ (2011) 83.   
1709 Sjørslev I ‘The paradox of integration’ (2011) 83.   
1710 Sjørslev I ‘The paradox of integration’ (2011) 88. 
1711 Sjørslev I ‘The paradox of integration’ (2011) 88. 
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and immigrants to assume a place in society on an equal footing with 
ethnic Danes.  
It is indeed necessary to explore the power of language in the South 
African context so that the feel-good, vacuous claims of ubuntu are 
discarded and replaced with an unwavering commitment to prioritise 
communal obligations as a political choice. Furthermore, concepts that 
are routinely utilised by the state such as the ‘boundless forgiveness of 
ubuntu’, ‘scarce resources’ and ‘sharing of obligations’ (without the 
attendant concept of ‘sharing of resources’ in the context of 
progressively giving effect to socio-economic rights) should be 
interrogated in light of the abovementioned contribution by Sjorslev (and 
Foucault) regarding the power of language and dominant political 
discourses respectively.  
The Danish people are viewed as the founding members of 
contemporary Danish society and therefore treated as the proprietors of 
the country (which is indicative of the entitlement developed over a 
history spanning the past three centuries).1712 A dual configuration of 
demos (all citizens) and ethnos (everyone of Danish descent) exacts a 
moral obligation to engage in society on both ‘older’ and ‘newer’ 
members of Danish society but the nature and extent of the participation 
is dependent upon whether you are an ‘older’’ or ‘newer’ member.1713 
Research (regrettably) demonstrates that the best efforts on the part of 
immigrants to ‘do as Danes’ is either ignored or alternatively rejected.1714 
Immigrants are never ‘quite right’ or ‘quite enough’.1715  
However, Jenkins registers hope in the belief that Danes and immigrants 
will find a way to live together in relative harmony by giving in to ‘the 
                                                             
1712 Anderson S ‘The obligation to participate: micro-integrative processes of civil 
sociality’ in Olwig KF & Paerregaard K (eds) The Question of Integration: 
Immigration, Exclusion and the Danish Welfare State (2011) 231 (hereafter The 
obligation to participate).  
1713 Anderson S ‘The obligation to participate’ (2011) 231. 
1714 Anderson S ‘The obligation to participate’ (2011) 253. 
1715 Anderson S ‘The obligation to participate’ (2011) 253. 
279 
 
 
pragmatics of Danish everyday life over time’.1716 This is despite the 
current ‘us-them’ conflict which has been brought about by an increased 
demand on the part of Danes for immigrants to ‘integrate’.1717 In this 
regard Jenkins believes that ‘Danish Culture’ and Danishness are ‘not 
endangered species’ which require protection by the state as they are 
‘moving, ever-changing and complex ways of life’.1718 
Furthermore, Grillo asserts that the integration of both citizens and 
foreigners into a specific society are as ‘vague and fuzzy’ in other 
countries (such as Britain) as compared to the lived experience in 
Denmark.1719 However, the ideal of integration has a special resonance 
within the Scandinavian territories due to the intimate and powerful link 
between the notions of sameness and equality.1720  
 4.2.3.6 Summary 
The critical role of the dominant political discourse in shaping society 
should be acknowledged. Furthermore, integration and social solidarity 
are seemingly linked in perpetuity in the Danish political landscape. It is 
critical that the concept of social solidarity should not be confined to an 
expression of ‘sameness’ – social solidarity should instead encompass 
how differences amongst people can be accommodated in an 
enlightened understanding of what constitutes a Danish citizen in the era 
of globalisation.  
It is consequently of considerable interest to note that ‘ethnic Danes’ 
define people as belonging to their nation through pragmatic observance 
which is characterised by learning to speak Danish, respecting the law 
and self-identification (in relation to citizenship and feeling that one is at 
home in the country).1721 It follows that the aforementioned model of 
                                                             
1716 Jenkins R ‘Integration of the folk and by the folk’ in Olwig KF & Paerregaard (eds) 
The Question of Integration: Immigration, Exclusion and the Danish Welfare State 
(2011) 264 (hereafter Integration of the folk). 
1717 Jenkins R ‘Integration of the folk’ (2011) 264. 
1718 Jenkins R ‘Integration of the folk’ (2011) 264.  
1719 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 23. 
1720 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 23. 
1721 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 310.  
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collective identification does not require exclusive homogeneity and 
highlights that it is possible to imagine a future in which ‘non-coercive 
mutual adjustment and accommodation is possible’ if the politics is 
favourable. 1722  The aforementioned insights concerning collective 
identification provide critical insight into key factors that should be 
considered in devising and implementing a (pluricultural) nation-building 
project in South Africa as discussed below. 
It is submitted that celebrating/embracing differences amongst citizens 
should feature prominently in contemporary public discourse in Denmark 
as a means to reverse the tide against prevalent exclusionist and 
xenophobic tendencies. It is further submitted that a society which sets 
the membership bar at the appropriate level as previously discussed (i.e. 
in ensuring that there is a common understanding amongst all members 
as to the minimum conditions required to create a society predicated 
upon sustainable social solidarity principles) provides a critical insight as 
to shaping a new tomorrow, for one and all, whether it be in Denmark or 
South Africa. 
4.3     The manner in which social solidarity is understood and embraced 
in South Africa 
4.3.1   Introduction  
Bowler endorses the view of Praeg in which the logic of interdependence 
is deemed central to the concept of a constituted community.1723 This 
has expanded from precolonial communities (which could be viewed as 
the first instance) to encapsulating the community of the nation-state that 
is South Africa (which could be viewed as the contemporary 
instance).1724 Thus, ubuntu is viewed as informing the ‘post-apartheid 
national project’ in a manner which has provided us with an alternative 
(but most welcome) ‘translation of sameness’. 1725  The shift to the 
                                                             
1722 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 310. 
1723 Bowler DA 'Concluding Reflections’ (2014) 201. 
1724 Bowler DA 'Concluding Reflections’ (2014) 201. 
1725 Bowler DA 'Concluding Reflections’ (2014) 201. Please see Coertze RD ‘Ubuntu 
and nation building’ South African Journal of Ethnology 24(4) (2001) 115. 
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imagined community of the South African nation in the present time is 
indicative of an attempt to shift ubuntu ‘from its precolonial habitus to a 
postcolonial habitus’.1726 The aforementioned shift is predicated on a 
belief that the transcendental element of ubuntu can shape/forge a 
united South Africa. 1727  In this regard the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court has highlighted the definitive link between ubuntu 
and social solidarity in that ubuntu fosters closeness, understanding and 
mutual support amongst people.1728 Thus, giving effect to ubuntu could 
serve as an extraordinary and unique catalyst for social harmony.1729  
Justice Mokgoro rightly contends that:  
‘ubuntu values of collective unity and group solidarity are 
translated into the value of national unity demanded by the new 
South African society. The collective unity, group solidarity, and 
conformity tendencies of ubuntu can promote a new patriotism 
and personal stewardship crucial to the development of a 
democratic society’.1730  
The aforementioned concept of ‘personal stewardship’ dovetails neatly 
with the view advanced in this thesis that public officials who embrace 
the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu will execute their duties in a 
manner which will make a meaningful contribution to ease the suffering 
of vulnerable groups. This would in turn lay the foundation in forging a 
united nation-state in which all people are treated with equal respect.  
In addition, Justice Mokgoro is viewed as supporting an approach to 
building democracy by shaping ‘a new shared public world’ in which 
every voice is heard and no group is cast to the periphery.1731 In this 
regard the anthropological discussion (with regards to inclusion and 
exclusion1732) is of specific relevance in relation to which voices are in 
                                                             
1726 Bowler DA 'Concluding Reflections’ (2014) 204. 
1727 Bowler DA 'Concluding Reflections’ (2014) 204. 
1728 Bowler DA 'Concluding Reflections’ (2014) 204. 
1729 Bowler DA 'Concluding Reflections’ (2014) 204. 
1730 Mokgoro Y ‘Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa’ (1997) 320. 
1731 Cornell D & Muvangua N Ubuntu and the Law: African Ideals and Postapartheid 
Jurisprudence (2012) Introduction 8.  
1732 Please see Section 4.2.3.5. 
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fact heard. This in turn, echoes the sentiments of Praeg regarding who 
is in fact permitted to join the conversation as previously described. 
Furthermore, this is in keeping with the state adopting a critical 
stakeholder engagement strategy so as to engage in constructive 
dialogue with the most vulnerable groups as a means of forging a just 
and caring society in which all people are treated with equal concern.  
It should be noted that ubuntu, as an ethical concept, ‘is always integral 
to a social bond’ and seeks to ‘encapsulate the moral relations 
demanded by human beings who must live together’.1733 Thus, Cornell 
makes an astute observation in highlighting that:  
‘the aspirational aspect of ubuntu is that we must strive 
together to achieve a public good and a shared world so 
that we can harmonise our individual interests… It is 
ubuntu’s embeddedness in our social reality that makes it 
a transformative ethic at its core’.1734  
However, the translation of any praxis (founded upon a precolonial logic 
of interdependence) into a philosophy will be characterised by an ever-
present element of coercion.1735 Praeg emphasises the extent to which 
the South African liberation struggle was premised on our inherent 
interdependence and fostering of shared ideals (i.e. solidarity was given 
expression in the rallying call of ‘an injury to one is an injury to all’).1736  
This line of thinking is developed by depicting gruesome necklace 
murders as the ultimate expression of the logic of coercion where certain 
members had betrayed the collective will of the people. 1737  Praeg 
consequently views solidarity as the sum total of the praxis of love, 
                                                             
1733 Cornell D & Muvangua N Ubuntu and the Law: African Ideals and     
Postapartheid Jurisprudence (2012) Introduction 8. 
1734 Cornell D & Muvangua N Ubuntu and the Law: African Ideals and   
       Postapartheid Jurisprudence (2012) Introduction 8. 
1735  Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 175. 
1736  Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 175. 
1737  Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 175. 
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sharing and work while coercion comes to the fore where ‘differences of 
opinion’ can be construed as a ‘betrayal of belonging’.1738 
Ubuntu offers so much more than just being limited to an appeal to its 
indigenous roots as it also presents us with the ‘philosophical project of 
solidarity’ as well as an opportunity for radical transformation.1739 Thus, 
public officials that have embraced ubuntu will seek to discharge their 
communal obligations and consequently strive to give effect to the 
realisation of urgent subsistent rights as a means to forge a just and 
caring society which will resonate with social solidarity ideals. 
Consequently, it is submitted that public officials that fail to discharge 
their obligations (as per the aspirational values/rights enshrined in the 
Constitution’s Preamble and Bill of Rights respectively) could be viewed 
as exhibiting a ‘betrayal of belonging’. 
4.3.2   Ubuntu as a driver of social solidarity (also understood as nation-
building) in South Africa 
Ubuntu should be given serious consideration as it is a South African 
ideal which offers rich promise in promoting human solidarity. 1740 
Furthermore, there is a need to embrace the pivotal role that ubuntu can 
play as both an ethical and legal value in South Africa.1741 Cornell argues 
for the legalisation of ubuntu (understood as an acceptance of the ethical 
and legal potency of ubuntu in a constitutional democracy) so as to 
galvanise belief in the importance of African philosophy/values in 
postcolonial societies as well as demonstrate the unique nature of 
African philosophy.1742  
Ubuntu is an African ideal which has the potential (and should in fact be 
utilised) to inform us universally about how to live together in a 
community founded upon ethical principles and shaped by a clear vision 
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1740 Cornell D ‘Ubuntu and Subaltern Legality’ (2014) 170. 
1741 Cornell D ‘Ubuntu and Subaltern Legality’ (2014) 169. 
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of our interdependence. 1743  Thus, the starting point (as previously 
described) in mounting a credible defence of ubuntu is to note that it is 
indeed a pivotal ideal and value ‘in the day-to-day life of South Africa, 
which is also precisely why it is so contested’.1744 Thus, the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu (as advanced in this thesis) can fulfil a critical 
role in present-day South Africa as it can mesh with a human rights 
regime and serve as a catalyst in the forging of sustainable social 
solidarity ideals. 
Cornell offers insights regarding the manner in which ubuntu can be 
deployed to wage war against racist Western modernity on 
philosophical, political and juridical grounds.1745  There is a critical role 
to be played by ubuntu in resisting anti-black racism that is prevalent in 
existing politics and philosophy through ‘whiteness’ being ever-present 
in every mainstream philosophical notion/idea/ideal.1746  Thus, ubuntu 
should be viewed as supporting a vision of a novel humanism that is at 
the forefront of a sustained philosophical, political and ethical attack on 
racism.1747   Consequently, the racist assertion that ubuntu (by virtue of 
its meaning being contested and/or deemed vague) has no role to play 
in informing present day morality and legal jurisprudence should be 
dismissed out of hand.1748   
Coertze believes that ubuntu has become bound with ‘human rights, 
dignity and nation-building as part of nationalist teleology’. 1749  In 
addition, Marx believes that the state is engaging in ‘a convulsive attempt 
at nation-building’ rather than ‘developing and implementing reform 
programmes’.1750 Furthermore, Bowler believes that ubuntu has been 
inserted ‘within the rhetoric-laden discourse of nationalism, 
                                                             
1743 Cornell D ‘Ubuntu and Subaltern Legality’ (2014) 169. 
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unquestionably employed and imbued with the promise of a future that 
sounds much like utopia’. 1751  It follows that there are significant 
obstacles that will need to be negotiated in order to successfully 
undertake a nation-building project. 1752  The first obstacle is that 
belonging is thwarted by the absence of ‘a collective construction of a 
democratic South Africa’.1753 A critical (second) obstacle is that ubuntu 
as praxis was not about forging a community but required total 
immersion in that community by rendering the logic of interdependence 
visible in all engagements within that community.1754 It is consequently 
challenging to devise a comprehensive nation-building project (as 
coloured by ubuntu philosophy) due to the fragile nature of being and 
belonging as experienced by South African citizens.1755  
Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind the workings of the ‘political 
economy of obligation’ and the ‘logic of interdependence’, which are 
ever-present in the communal obligations that flow from ubuntu, in 
negotiating a path to a just and caring society.1756  This once again 
demonstrates the need for the state to be held accountable in realising 
the urgent subsistence rights of vulnerable groups in South Africa as a 
means to have meaningful discussions about nation-building.  
Coertze issues a warning in defining nation-building as the ‘situation 
where a state authority through a process of directed cultural chance, 
sometimes even forcibly, strives to promote a conscious sense of 
national identity’.1757 Thus, a nation-building project informed by ubuntu 
would seek to impose a value system that would nurture allegiance to 
the nation, strive to secure equal citizenship and seek to promote 
conformity in the manner in which individuals conduct themselves.1758 
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Consequently, this is where danger could ostensibly be lurking as 
citizens would be expected to act in a manner dictated by ubuntu (or 
more specifically as prescribed by the architects of the nation-state 
project).1759 This could play out as citizens being compelled to act in a 
certain manner ‘without thinking too much’.1760  
The primary concern with the abovementioned strict conformist version 
of the nation-building project is that vigorous public debate regarding ‘the 
material conditions for the possibility of really being and belonging 
together’ is stifled and/or avoided. 1761  Furthermore, a key concern 
regarding the nation-building project is noted as follows:  
‘In a nation so divided, fragmented and, in some instances, 
splintered, there is little commonality to be found, whether 
in being or in experience. To be effective as renewed 
praxis, ubuntu would have to be engineered to those 
interests that cannot be anything but common’.1762  
It is for the abovementioned reasons that there has been a persistent 
focus on communal obligations, as a core and uncontested part of 
ubuntu, so as to draw attention to the urgent subsistence needs of 
vulnerable groups that will have to be realised as part of forging a united 
and sustainable nation-state - that is, a just and caring nation-state in 
which all members are safeguarded against threats to their survival and 
have the possibility of exploring lives of purpose.  
4.3.3  Case law pertinent to the overlap between ubuntu and social 
solidarity in South Africa 
There is a pressing need for constructive dialogue (as well as ongoing 
information dissemination in our constitutional dispensation) in 
promoting understanding between landowners (i.e. the state and private 
landowners) and homeless people. The aforementioned understanding, 
if shaped and coloured by the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu, 
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will ensure that the urgent needs of vulnerable groups are prioritised by 
the state as a means to foster social solidarity in South Africa.  
4.3.3.1  A brief analysis of the Port Elizabeth Municipality case in order to 
cast light on the obligations of the state in engaging with specific 
vulnerable groups  
Himonga, Taylor and Pope believe that the judgment delivered in Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (‘PE Municipality’)1763 should 
be heralded as ‘a new dawn for ubuntu-based jurisprudence’.1764  It is 
considered to be the most important case since Makwanyane as related 
to the utilisation of ubuntu.1765   
An application for eviction was lodged by the Port Elizabeth Municipality 
against various occupants that had illegally occupied private land.1766 
The aforementioned occupants had expressed their willingness to 
relocate if the Municipality was able to secure suitable, alternative living 
arrangements on their behalf.1767 However, it should be noted that the 
Municipality remained adamant that there was no obligation on its part 
to secure alternative accommodation for the occupants. 1768  The 
Constitutional Court had to consider whether leave to appeal should be 
granted to the Municipality1769, whether the eviction order (as set aside 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal) should be resurrected 1770  and/or 
whether the Municipality was compelled to secure alternative 
accommodation.1771 The Constitutional Court ultimately dismissed the 
application for leave to appeal.1772 Furthermore, the eviction order was 
refused as the Constitutional Court highlighted the need for an applicant 
in an eviction order application to demonstrate that reasonable efforts 
                                                             
1763 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) 
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had been made to secure alternative accommodation.1773 This in turn 
entailed demonstrating that consultation/mediation efforts had taken 
place with the occupants in question as a means to ensure that the 
pressing challenges of vulnerable groups had been articulated and 
considered.1774  
The Court was obliged to strike a balance between the rights of the 
property owners and the rights of the occupiers relating to access to 
housing and to protection from being unlawfully evicted from their 
dwellings. 1775  In this regard sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution 
(regarding property rights and housing rights respectively) and the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act1776 
(‘PIE’) served to provide the constitutional and statutory point of 
reference in undertaking the balancing act.1777 Thus, Justice Sachs held 
that the aforementioned sections of the Constitution and PIE rendered it 
necessary to balance the interests of property owners and unlawful 
occupiers in a ‘principled way’ so as to promote ‘the constitutional vision 
of a caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared 
concern’.1778 The aforementioned quotation is viewed as resonating with 
the ethical and politico-ideological elements of ubuntu and in so doing 
compels the Constitutional Court to promote reconciliation by striving to 
improve the lived reality of all people in South Africa.1779   
The Constitutional Court further held that: 
‘…The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of 
the majority of the population, suffuses the whole 
constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a 
communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill 
of Rights, which is nothing if not a structured, 
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institutionalised and operational declaration in our evolving 
society of the need for human interdependence, respect 
and concern.’1780  
The aforementioned description offers an enlightened view of ubuntu in 
that it recognises the interconnectedness and interdependence of 
people living side by side. Thus, Justice Sachs believes that the need to 
treat homeless people with dignity and respect is to be emphasised as 
eviction orders and forced removals violate not only the dignity of the 
homeless but also impact on the rest of society in eroding our moral 
worth.1781  
Port Elizabeth Municipality marked the advent of the Court’s approach 
in emphasising close ties between ubuntu and restorative justice even 
though the latter term did not appear in the judgment as such. 1782 
Furthermore, it spawned compelling ubuntu-based jurisprudence 
relating to eviction matters.1783 In this regard Keep and Midgley note that 
the contribution of ubuntu (in eviction matters) is hardly a surprise in light 
of the fact that ubuntu is at its core concerned with communal relations 
and ‘dignity through others’.1784 Furthermore, Justice Sachs highlighted 
that it was necessary for bona fide engagement between the relevant 
parties to take place so as to secure ‘mutually acceptable solutions’ to 
legal disputes. 1785  In this regard he stated that it was no longer 
constitutionally permissible to view people as ‘faceless and anonymous 
squatters’ that should ‘automatically…be expelled as obnoxious social 
nuisances’.1786 Consequently, Justice Sachs stated that courts should 
proceed with caution and restraint when making a determination whether 
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a specific eviction is just and equitable in the absence of proof that all 
reasonable steps had been taken to conclude a mediated solution.1787   
It is my firm view that having a housing programme deemed reasonable 
by a court (both in catering for a range of stakeholders/residents as well 
as its subsequent implementation) will not address the deprivation 
endured by vulnerable groups. It follows that the state will have to 
maintain an unerring focus on progressively realising the right of access 
to housing for vulnerable groups. Furthermore, it is my contention that 
one cannot speak about forging social solidarity/nation-building with any 
sort of (moral) authority when fellow members of the nation-state are 
staving off threats to their survival.  
4.3.4  Conclusion  
The critical role of dialogue (in which all members of society are included 
in the ‘conversation’) cannot be underestimated as a means to highlight 
the interconnectedness and interdependence of all people in society so 
as to forge a sustainable nation-state which draws heavily on social 
solidarity principles. Also, the aforementioned insight should serve to 
prick the social conscience (as well as shape the approach) of every 
public official that has embraced ubuntu. This will ensure that any 
engagement with vulnerable groups is viewed as engaging with partners 
of equal standing in which the latter group may well have a superior 
insight/perspective/approach/solution to an existing challenge in 
comparison to that same public official.  
The abovementioned insights are critical in shaping the conduct of a 
public official heeding the call to embrace his/her membership of an 
ethical community (as well as subsequently safeguarding and 
strengthening that same membership) through prioritising the needs of 
vulnerable groups. In this regard the need for constructive dialogue 
between public officials (which includes ongoing information 
dissemination on the part of the state) and the very people that they are 
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meant to serve cannot be emphasised enough in striving to create a just 
and caring society. 
The abovementioned insights regarding membership of an ethical 
community is an apt description of the aspirational goal to be pursued in 
order to forge and sustain social solidarity ideals as explored in this 
chapter.  In addition, Chapter 5 will explore various anthropology themes 
as a means to provide insight regarding the concept of ‘lived reality’ and 
the manner in which law is applied and/or revised and/or resisted on the 
ground. The aforementioned concept of ‘lived reality’ serves to draw 
attention to the plight of vulnerable groups. It is further submitted that the 
exploration of the aforementioned anthropological themes will serve to 
inform the nature and extent of the (communal) obligations owed to 
vulnerable groups by the relevant public officials as a means of 
promoting accountability as well as forging social solidarity. Thus, public 
officials that have discharged the aforementioned communal obligations 
would have in fact given effect to a nuanced understanding of ubuntu.  
It is submitted that the various ethnographic case analyses of the social 
welfare state of Denmark (as described in this chapter) provide a critical 
point of reference in highlighting the manner in which South African 
public officials should seek to come to the aid of specific vulnerable 
groups – this can be achieved by developing a clear understanding of 
their lived reality whilst remaining mindful of the need to treat all 
members of society with equal concern and respect. 
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CHAPTER 5: ANTHROPOLOGY THEMES, COMMUNAL OBLIGATIONS 
AND THE ‘LIVED REALITY’ OF VULNERABLE GROUPS 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter sought to explore the manner in which a 
sustainable version of social solidarity can be fashioned through an 
awareness of the manner in which differences amongst people can be 
accommodated. This chapter serves to demonstrate the manner in 
which anthropology can improve our understanding of the reception (as 
well as the reach) of law by offering illuminating insights into the lived 
reality of people living side by side. However, it should be noted at the 
outset that this chapter does not represent comprehensive 
anthropological research but rather seeks to highlight the manner in 
which an appreciation of anthropology themes can augment our 
understanding of the likely reception of law in any given environment.   
The literal translation of ‘anthropology’ (as derived from ancient Greek) 
is the study of humanity.1788 Anthropology offers a number of critical 
insights relating to the ‘human condition’ which remain relevant in a 
variety of settings.1789 It can be persuasively argued that anthropology is 
necessary to develop an understanding of the contemporary world.1790 
Anthropology provides a ‘perspective on humanity’ in which all 
assumptions about human societies are probed and similarities as well 
as differences are laid bare.1791 It endorses an approach in which the 
human world is simultaneously surveyed from both ‘a global and a local 
angle’. 1792  Anthropology also seeks to develop an understanding of 
culture, society and humanity through studies of local life as well as by 
way of comparison.1793  
It is my view that anthropology, as a discipline, has a certain open-
endedness which is far removed from the legal certainty that is routinely 
                                                             
1788 Eriksen TH What is Anthropology (2006) 9. 
1789 Eriksen TH What is Anthropology (2006) 3. 
1790 Eriksen TH What is Anthropology (2006) 3  
1791 Eriksen TH What is Anthropology (2006) 6 
1792 Eriksen TH What is Anthropology (2006) 6  
1793 Eriksen TH What is Anthropology (2006) 7. 
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demanded by the legal profession. However, I am in agreement with the 
renowned anthropologist, Richard Jenkins, that one of the most 
important contributions that anthropology can offer, in strengthening our 
understanding of the human world, is to render the familiar and the 
everyday less familiar or to cast in a different light that which we believe 
to know with absolute certainty.1794 It is important to note that one should 
not expect definitive answers from anthropologists as they do not 
routinely concern themselves with normative questions.1795 Thus, the 
primary focus of an anthropologist is to clearly articulate what is 
happening on the ground.1796 Furthermore, anthropology attaches great 
importance to concepts and values (as do other academic disciplines) 
but what sets it apart from other disciplines is its singlemindedness in 
understanding concepts as they find application in our everyday 
world.1797 Consequently, the ‘lived experience’ is of crucial importance 
when undertaking an anthropological analysis in any specific 
environment.1798   
The concept of ‘lived reality’, as utilised in anthropology, is well suited to 
cast light on the manner in which vulnerable groups in South Africa have 
to endure intolerable hardship. This is epitomised by bearing witness to 
the seemingly never-ending deprivation of vulnerable people as outlined 
by Brand1799 as well as the undignified existence of homeless people as 
outlined by Waldron.1800 Thus, an understanding of ‘lived reality’ also 
speaks to the manner in which the lives of vulnerable people can be 
fundamentally changed through critical interventions by the state. This 
in turn dovetails neatly with the transformative nature of the South 
African Constitution in seeking to dismantle the legacy of apartheid 
through the progressive realisation of critical socio-economic rights. 
                                                             
1794 Jenkins R Being Danish (2012) 142. 
1795 Grillo R ‘Danes and others’ (2011) 272. 
1796 Grillo R ‘Danes and others’ (2011) 272. 
1797 Grillo R ‘Danes and others’ (2011) 272.  
1798 Grillo R ‘Danes and others’ (2011) 272.  
1799 Please see Section 3.6.1. 
1800 Please see Section 3.6.3. 
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The critical role of dialogue is recognised in anthropology studies so as 
to develop an intimate understanding of the various stakeholders (and 
their respective needs) in society. Thus, the exploration of certain 
anthropological concepts in this Chapter will provide insight regarding 
the reach of law as well as an opportunity to assess suitable 
mechanisms to promote dialogue and information dissemination so as 
to educate vulnerable groups as to their subsistence rights. This will 
ensure that those same vulnerable groups are placed in a position to 
hold public officials accountable in the realisation of critical socio-
economic rights. 
It is my firm view that an exploration of relevant anthropological concepts 
will deepen our understanding of the (communal) obligations owed to 
vulnerable groups by public officials as provided for in the Bill of Rights 
in the Constitution. It is further submitted that it is tantamount to 
embracing a nuanced understanding of ubuntu (as advanced in this 
thesis) if the aforementioned public officials discharge those same 
obligations. This will in turn lead to the forging of a viable and sustainable 
nation-state in which all people are treated as having equal worth 
regardless of their perceived differences.  
5.2     Anthropology strengthens our understanding of our lived reality 
and informs the manner in which law can make a more meaningful 
impact in society 
My personal experience, in relation to my previous role as the nodal point 
for all anti-corruption criminal investigations (at a state-owned enterprise 
between 2010 and 2015), revealed that implicated employees as a rule 
had working knowledge of the relevant legislation yet those same 
employees failed to adequately discharge their work responsibilities. The 
aforementioned criminal investigations shed light on the perceived 
limitations of law in an environment where professional accountability 
was virtually absent as previously stated. Furthermore, the seemingly 
dominant mind-set was one of self-enrichment. Any ‘official’ duty 
performed by a public official for a member of the public was far too often 
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seen as a special favour (both by the public official as well as the relevant 
member of the public) rather than as a duty owed to the public.  
My corruption investigations were focused primarily on tracking 
misappropriated corporate social investment funds that had been 
earmarked for erecting physical infrastructure in the educational sector 
in rural areas of the Eastern Cape. 1801  It is submitted that the 
aforementioned crimes (as committed by corrupt public officials) served 
to exacerbate the palpable anger and despair within those communities 
on the back of (numerous) failed undertakings on the part of public 
officials to facilitate the progressive realisation of critical socio-economic 
rights.  
My sojourn (as a visiting PhD Researcher) in the Department of 
Anthropology at the University of Copenhagen (between February 2015 
and September 2015) provided me with an extraordinary and nuanced 
perspective of accountability, integration and social solidarity as 
experienced in Denmark. I was also exposed to the manner in which law 
is implemented, interpreted, revised and resisted on the ground as well 
as the perceived limitations of law. Furthermore, my understanding of 
supposedly simple and/or settled concepts in law was put to the test 
through an engagement with anthropology material. The 
abovementioned sojourn was identified as an essential component of my 
research as ubuntu is utilised in a political environment and it 
consequently demands a working knowledge of anthropology, political 
philosophy and law. 
In this regard the anthropological concept of ‘abandonment’ 1802  is 
identified as a means of understanding how perpetual neglect on the part 
of the state (in failing to advance the pressing socio-economic needs of 
                                                             
1801 Please see https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-10-03- 
petrosa-boss-in-court-over-r6om-fraud/, (accessed 5 January 2017). 
Please also see https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/94966/mom-embezzled-
petrosa-sentenced/, (accessed 5 January 2017).  
1802 The concept was explored in discussions with one of my key mentors, Professor 
Henrik Vigh, during my sojourn at the Anthropology Department at the University 
of Copenhagen in 2015.  
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vulnerable groups) can lead to a crippling sense of hopelessness and 
despair amongst the aforementioned groups. This resonates with my 
criminal investigations experiences in the poverty-ridden Eastern Cape 
communities in which the prospect of ‘living lives of value’ was far 
removed from the harsh reality of negotiating survival on a near daily 
basis.1803  
Furthermore, there has also been ongoing engagement with a medical 
doctor 1804  as a means to develop insights regarding renal dialysis 
treatment in patients diagnosed with end stage renal failure (as dealt 
with in Soobramoney1805) so as to draw attention to the lived reality of a 
specific vulnerable group. It is submitted that this thesis aims to prick the 
conscience of public officials (so as to strive to ease the burden of long-
suffering vulnerable groups) through progressively giving effect to the 
socio-economic provisions in the Constitution.  
5.3      A brief analysis of the Report on the Banality of Evil1806 as a 
means to augment our understanding of what constitutes a 
diligent and ethical public official 
The controversial book by Hannah Arendt provides extraordinary 
insights as to the duties that can legitimately be expected from diligent 
and ethical public officials as opposed to Nazi officials. It also casts light 
on the manner in which public officials should demonstrate an unerring 
commitment to give effect to the just laws of the land (e.g. the laws 
enshrined in the South African Constitution) as a means to forge an 
ethical and just society.   
                                                             
1803 Please refer to Section 5.5 which briefly examines the perpetual deprivation 
endured by vulnerable groups in both South Africa and Uganda.  Please see 
https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-10-03-petrosa-boss-in-
court-over-r6om-fraud/, (accessed 5 January 2017). Please also see 
https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/94966/mom-embezzled-petrosa-sentenced/, 
(accessed 5 January 2017). 
1804 Please see Section 3.6.2.3 as well as Annexure 1.  
1805 Please see Section 3.6.2. 
1806 Arendt H Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (2006) 
(hereafter Banality of Evil). 
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The book is centred on a description of the trial proceedings of Adolf 
Eichmann who had played a pivotal role in giving effect to the Final 
Solution (i.e. the extermination of the Jewish people) as devised by the 
Nazis. 1807  Eichmann was in charge of logistics (as related to the 
transportation of Jews to concentration camps).1808 He was captured by 
Mossad (Israeli Secret Service) in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 11 May 
1960.1809  Eichmann subsequently stood trial in the District Court in 
Jerusalem on 11 April 1961.1810  
The book courted controversy from the outset for depicting Eichmann as 
an efficient but ‘banal’ bureaucratic criminal which was far removed from 
the common portrayal of Nazi officers as cruel and vindictive 
monsters.1811 The term ‘banality’ only appears on the last page of the 
book but it is an implied theme that can be traced throughout the 
book.1812 Eichmann was charged with committing crimes against the 
Jewish people, crimes against humanity and war crimes for the whole of 
the Nazi regime period in terms of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators 
Punishment Law of 1950.1813  
The judges deemed Eichmann to be a ‘perpetual’ liar as they found it 
difficult to accept that an ‘average, “normal” person, neither feeble-
minded nor indoctrinated nor cynical, could be perfectly incapable of 
telling right from wrong’.1814 The position assumed by the court had the 
unfortunate consequence of obscuring the most pressing moral (and 
legal) challenge in the court matter.1815 Arendt noted that Eichmann 
could certainly be considered ‘normal’ within the ranks of the Nazi regime 
but that it would in fact take an ‘exception’ in the Nazi regime to exhibit 
                                                             
1807 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 12. 
1808 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 12. 
1809 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 21. 
1810 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 21. 
1811 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 12. 
1812 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 12. 
1813 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 21.  
1814 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 26.  
1815 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 26. 
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what could properly be depicted as normal behaviour.1816 Nonetheless, 
the court held that Eichmann did in fact know what he was doing at all 
material times and that he was legally responsible for his actions.1817  
It should be noted that the relentless attention to detail exhibited during 
the implementation of the Final Solution was attributed to a common 
belief (at the time) in Germany that to be a law-abiding citizen entailed 
not only observing the relevant laws but to conduct oneself in a manner 
as if one was ‘the legislator of the laws that one obeys’.1818 This led to a 
deep-seated conviction that going beyond the call of duty was the 
expected standard.1819 The aforementioned (unwavering) commitment 
to duty would indeed be a commendable trait on the part of public 
officials if the laws of the land were in fact of a just nature - as is the case 
with the South African Constitution.  
A poet and author, Abba Kovner, took the witness stand in the Eichmann 
trial and made mention of Sergeant Anton Schmidt of the German Army, 
who had assisted members of the Jewish underground (including the 
aforementioned witness) with forged papers and military trucks without 
any expectation of payment. 1820  He provided the aforementioned 
assistance for a period of five months between October 1941 and March 
1942 at the end of which he was arrested and executed.1821 Arendt 
contemplated just how different things would have been if there were 
many more individuals/officials/soldiers that could have resisted the 
temptation to murder, steal and feign ignorance while their Jewish 
neighbours were carted off to their destruction and only ever offered to 
intervene for the sole purpose of turning a profit (i.e. exceptions to the 
rule such as Sergeant Schmidt).1822  
                                                             
1816 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 27. Please see Zulu P A Nation in Crisis (2013) 
30 for a description of ‘coherent value consensus’.  
1817 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 90. 
1818 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 137. 
1819 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 137.  
1820 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 230. Please see Zulu P A Nation in Crisis (2013) 
30. 
1821 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 230.  
1822 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 231. 
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The death penalty was imposed on Eichmann on 15 December 1961.1823 
The review proceedings commenced in the Court of Appeal (Israel’s 
Supreme Court) on 22 March 1962. 1824  The aforementioned review 
proceedings were concluded within a week and on 29 May 1962 the 
Court of Appeal confirmed all the findings of the lower court.1825 Arendt 
believed that the confused and feeble utterances by Eichmann in the 
gallows spoke to the ‘fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of 
evil’. 1826  Eichmann is deemed to have displayed ‘sheer 
thoughtlessness’, which is far removed from stupidity, and which 
ultimately set him on a course to becoming ‘one of the greatest criminals 
of that period’. 1827  Furthermore, if the aforementioned conduct of 
Eichmann could be viewed as banal (and more so in the absence of 
seemingly vile and demonic character traits) that in no way could or 
should be equated with what is viewed as ‘commonplace’.1828  
Arendt believes that it is in the nature of a totalitarian government (and 
perhaps the workings of every bureaucracy) to transform people into 
cogs in a machine so as to dehumanise them.1829 However, it should be 
clear that ‘manifestly criminal orders’ must not be complied with nor 
executed.1830 Nonetheless, it is apparent that Eichmann was on the 
receiving end of ‘superior orders’ despite the contrary findings of the 
Court of Appeal.1831  Thus, Arendt believes that it would have been 
challenging to impose the death penalty if the logic of ordinary Israeli law 
had found application.1832 This is because the issuing of ‘superior orders’ 
(despite their unlawfulness being manifest) can ‘severely disturb the 
normal working of a man’s conscience’.1833 It is my firm contention that 
                                                             
1823 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 231.  
1824 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 231.  
1825 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 231. 
1826 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 231.  
1827 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 287.  
1828 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 287.   
1829 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 289. Please see Makwanyane (1995) para 224 in 
which Justice Langa highlights the manner in which ubuntu could counter the 
‘dehumanisation’ as outlined by Arendt.  
1830 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 289. 
1831 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 289. 
1832 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 292.  
1833 Arendt H Banality of Evil (2006) 292. 
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public officials in South Africa that embrace ubuntu will indeed be able 
to counter the abovementioned desensitising effects of bureaucracy 
through giving effect to constant humanising acts in facilitating the 
progressive realisation of (constitutionally guaranteed) socio-economic 
rights.  
An analysis of the banality of evil was included in this thesis so as to 
draw attention to the critical role to be played by every public official in 
giving effect to the (just) laws of the land for the benefit of the public. 
There is a very real need for each and every one of our public officials 
to be ‘the exception to the rule’ (in the mould of the heroic Sergeant 
Schmidt) so as to expedite the realisation of critical subsistence rights 
on behalf of vulnerable groups. There is a further need to guard against 
‘indifference’ even ‘thoughtlessness’ (as described by Praeg and Arendt 
respectively) when executing your duties (as a public official) so as to 
prioritise the urgent needs of vulnerable groups. It follows that public 
officials that give effect to our Constitution (which is founded upon the 
principles of human dignity, equality and freedom1834 [and is far removed 
from abhorrent Nazi laws]) will serve as the bedrock in forging a just, 
caring and united nation-state.  
5.4      An analysis of the semi-autonomous social field as a means to 
bolster our understanding of how law is experienced on the 
ground 
The insights offered by De Vos in the text to follow serve to bolster my 
assertion regarding the importance of the contribution by Sally Falk 
Moore in relation to the semi-autonomous social field. 1835  De Vos 
believes that it is of critical importance to highlight the shortcomings of 
legislation or state policies which aim to realise the transformative goals 
of the Constitution but neglect to consider the social and economic 
                                                             
1834  In this regard please recall that Section 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 provides that ‘The state must respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.’ 
1835  Moore SF ‘Law and social change: the semi-autonomous social field as an 
appropriate subject of study’ 7 Law & Society Review 719 (1973) (hereafter The 
semi-autonomous social field.) 
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context within which the aforementioned legislation and state policies 
have to take effect.1836 This is especially true in the event that those 
same laws and policies disregard the plight and specific circumstances 
of particularly disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.1837  
It follows that the pivotal importance of sociological analysis is brought 
to the fore in accurately predicting the consequences of legislative 
innovations.1838 There are a vast number of laws that surround any given 
social field but there are in fact only a limited number of critical laws 
and/or rules that drive bargaining, competition and unique exchange 
processes in a specific social field.1839 The prevalence of binding rights 
and obligations (that are not legally enforceable) serve to emphasise that 
legal rules are often a minor component in a specific social complex.1840 
The reality is that the likelihood of state action/intervention is often far 
removed as compared to other pressures and inducements within a 
specific social field.1841  
It should be noted that the belief, that the application of law in a given 
society is universal, is a myth.1842 The reality is that most rules of law are 
described as being (theoretically) applicable to all people but those same 
laws affect only a limited number/a certain category of people in a limited 
number of circumstances.1843 A general scrutiny of the law and social 
change highlight the need for the legislature to be aware that the 
components of a social field that are visible (or are deemed to be 
susceptible to legal innovation) are often the formal parts of the social 
system.1844 However, the informal meshing of economic and educational 
advantages (as well as an enviable network of contacts) will be that 
                                                             
1836 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ SAJHR (2001) 266.  
1837 De Vos P ‘Grootboom’ SAJHR (2001) 267.  
1838 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 730. 
1839 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 730. 
1840 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 729.  
Please see Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 65 in which communal obligations 
flow as a rule from ubuntu and benevolent coercion (in terms of which members 
are pressured to conform to community ideals) is ever-present.  
1841 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 729.   
1842 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 729. 
1843 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 734. 
1844 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 741.  
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much more difficult to dismantle through legislation and will in any event 
be that much more durable over time.1845 Thus, legislation aimed at 
bringing about ‘formal equality of opportunity’ is deemed to not be 
equivalent to ‘long held social position’.1846 This is consistent with the 
observation by Cornell that the ‘playing field’ was not level to begin with 
(at the advent of democracy) if one considers the markedly uneven 
distribution of wealth and privilege in South Africa.1847  
It is critical to ascertain whether the law to be promulgated will in fact 
make a difference and/or produce the intended effect in relation to the 
intended target group.1848 It is noted that the law (as related to state 
enforcement) is but one of many factors that influence the decisions and 
conduct of people as well as the relationships that they forge in 
society.1849  Thus, it is only when law is analysed in the context of 
everyday social life that critical links between law and social change will 
surface.1850 The belief exists that law can bring about social change and 
it is this very reason (or a variation thereof) that provides the rationale 
for the enactment of legislation.1851 Thus, it is necessary for both the law 
and the social context in which it operates to be subjected to scrutiny.1852 
It is submitted that anthropology can provide illuminating insights as to 
the manner in which law and social conditions are inextricably linked. It 
is further submitted that it is indeed necessary to have a nuanced 
understanding of the lived reality of vulnerable groups so as to ascertain 
the manner in which the utilisation of law can bring about welcome and 
sustainable socio-economic advancement.  
                                                             
1845 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review. 
1846 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review. 
1847 Cornell D ‘A Call for a Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2012) 328.  
1848 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 721. 
1849 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 743. 
1850 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 743. 
Please see Section 5.6 for illuminating insights in relation to Intersectionality 
theory so as to develop a broad understanding of the key challenges negotiated 
by specific vulnerable groups. 
1851 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 719.  
1852 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 719. 
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The social field, as selected by an anthropologist, is analysed in relation 
to its semi-autonomy with the latter term defined as ‘the fact that it can 
generate rules and customs and symbols internally, but that it is also 
vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the 
larger world by which it is surrounded’. 1853  Furthermore, the semi-
autonomous field also has the capability to insist upon compliance with 
its rules which could include the utilisation of coercive methods.1854 It is 
fair comment that the formal legal institutions have the upper hand in 
deploying the legitimate use of force but the same cannot be said for 
other effective forms of inducement or coercion.1855 It is accepted that 
the individual belongs to a number of smaller, organised social fields that 
are wedged between the body politic and that same individual.1856 The 
aforementioned smaller social fields have their own distinctive customs 
and rules as well as specific mechanisms to induce compliance and/or 
coerce members.1857   
A scrutiny of semi-autonomous social fields provides persuasive proof 
that the various processes that render internally generated rules 
effective are often the immediate forces that prescribe the mode (and 
level) of compliance or non-compliance with state-made legal rules.1858 
Furthermore, a semi-autonomous field is defined by the absence of 
autonomy and isolation as well as being capable of generating rules and 
exacting conformity.1859 The enactment of innovative legislation so as to 
introduce change inevitably invades the social fields within the 
boundaries of the state.1860 However, innovative legislation often fails to 
fully (or even partially) succeed in their stated purposes and often result 
in unplanned and unexpected (and even unwanted) consequences.1861 
                                                             
1853 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 720. 
1854 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 720.  
1855 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 721.  
1856 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 721.  
1857 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 721. 
Please see Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) at 24 and 65 in which members of a 
specific community are pressured to conform to communal rules.  
1858 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 721. 
1859 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 722. 
1860 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 723.  
1861 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 723. 
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This is due in part to the new laws being foisted upon existing social 
arrangements in which an assortment of binding obligations are already 
in existence.1862  
Legislation is often promulgated to shape the existing social 
arrangements in a specific manner but it often happens that the existing 
social obligations trump the enacted legislation.1863 It follows that a court 
or legislature ‘can make custom law’ while a semi-autonomous social 
field ‘can make law its custom’.1864 The latter happens when people in a 
social field are able to render a specific law operative by threatening its 
enforcement as a means to ‘mobilise the coercive force of 
government’.1865  
An understanding of the semi-autonomous social field is pivotal in 
ascertaining the likely reception of law (as well as its potential 
effectiveness) on the ground in any given environment. It follows that 
diligent and committed public officials should seek to become intimately 
acquainted with the anthropological concept of ‘lived reality’ as a means 
to ascertain the critical needs of vulnerable groups in South Africa. This 
will ensure that the state is well placed to cater for those same vulnerable 
groups with targeted interventions (including legislation which 
specifically caters for the aforementioned vulnerable groups). 
5.5      The lived reality of HIV positive people in Uganda and South 
Africa  
This section offers penetrating insights regarding the lived reality of 
vulnerable groups and it is consequently of relevance in both a Ugandan 
and South African context. It also offers a measure of hope in light of the 
resilience of the people in exploring new ways of living as well as bearing 
testimony to the unwavering political will of the Ugandan state. 
                                                             
1862 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 723. 
Please see Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) at 24, 65 and 175. 
1863 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 723 
1864 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 723. 
1865 Moore SF ‘The semi-autonomous social field’ (1973) Law & Society Review 744. 
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Susan Reynolds Whyte,1866 the editor of Second Chances - Surviving 
AIDS in Uganda (‘Second Chances’), has compiled a series of 
extraordinary accounts regarding the human tragedy visited upon the 
Ugandan people by AIDS.1867  An exploration of the anthropological 
themes encountered in the book highlight the manner in which the 
Ugandan government demonstrated extraordinary leadership and 
political will. This is in stark contrast to the deplorable conduct of the 
South African government (as led by President Thabo Mbeki at the time) 
in failing to come to the assistance of HIV Positive people in a meaningful 
manner.  
The observations of Natrass provide definitive insight as to the shameful 
conduct on the part of the state in dealing with the Aids crisis in South 
Africa.1868 Natrass, an economist by training, sought to understand why 
the South African government had taken ‘such a tragically wrong turn on 
AIDS’ in the late 1990s by refusing to provide anti-retroviral therapy 
(‘ART’ or ‘ARV’) to HIV-positive mothers (so as to prevent infecting their 
babies) on the basis that it was not affordable.1869 It should be noted at 
the outset that the South African government would have saved money 
by implementing Mother to Child Transmission Prevention as ARV 
prophylaxis was significantly more cost-effective than treating AIDS-sick 
babies.1870 
Furthermore, the lack of political will on the part of the South African 
government, in dealing with the AIDS pandemic, was justifiably criticised 
as compared to other developing countries which often had significantly 
more challenges to negotiate.1871 Uganda is in fact one of the countries 
identified by Natrass as performing better than expected in relation to 
                                                             
1866 Professor Susan Reynolds Whyte was one of my key mentors during my sojourn 
at the University of Copenhagen in 2015. 
1867 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ in Whyte SR (ed) Second Chances: Surviving 
AIDS in Uganda (2014) (hereafter The First Generation). 
1868 Natrass N ‘Mortal combat: aids denialism and the struggle for antiretrovirals in 
South Africa’ (2007) (hereafter Mortal Combat). 
1869 Natrass N Mortal Combat (2007) 3. 
1870 Natrass N Mortal Combat (2007) 3. 
1871 Natrass N Mortal Combat (2007) 6.  
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the difference between predicted and actual ARV coverage. 1872  The 
aforementioned (actual) coverage in Uganda was credited to political 
support at the highest level.1873 It strongly suggests that unwavering 
political will on the part of the state, so as to ease the plight of a 
vulnerable group (i.e. HIV positive patients), can make an extraordinary 
difference in progressively realising access to critical health care rights. 
Uganda is described as exemplary (in comparison to other African 
countries with South Africa being an obvious example) in light of its swift, 
comprehensive approach in seeking to combat AIDS. 1874  The 
enlightened stand on AIDS adopted by President Yoweri Museveni 
secured phenomenal donor support and Uganda was transformed into 
a country that played host to numerous global health interventions.1875 
This was in stark contrast with citizens of other eastern and southern 
African states that had extremely limited exposure to information 
campaigns and AIDS projects.1876 It should be noted that people secured 
access to ART from a variety of sources in Uganda as opposed to most 
other countries where ART is almost always provided through 
government facilities.1877 Thus, the ethnographic study which culminated 
in the publication of Second Chances had engaged with interlocutors 
from 7 different treatment sites in Uganda in order to more accurately 
reflect conditions on the ground in Uganda.1878 However, it is critical to 
note that the Ugandan government was instrumental in raising 
awareness of the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS through a stream of 
information campaigns (as described below) which served as a catalyst 
for people to seek treatment as and when it became available. 
Furthermore, the approach of the Ugandan government (in swiftly 
acknowledging the extent of the crisis as well as welcoming partnerships 
                                                             
1872 Natrass N Mortal Combat (2007) 6.  
1873 Natrass N Mortal Combat (2007) 6.  
1874 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 4. 
1875 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 7. 
1876 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 7. 
1877 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 7. 
1878 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 7. 
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with international donor agencies) attracted substantial funding for both 
treatment and training. 
The first generation to receive ART in Uganda benefitted tremendously 
from comprehensive information campaigns and a myriad of AIDS 
projects which took place well before the advent of effective ART 
provisioning had occurred. 1879  The aforementioned approach by the 
Ugandan government highlights the importance of a state disseminating 
critical information as a means to prioritise the needs of vulnerable 
groups. It is submitted that the South African state should have adopted 
a similar approach as a means to facilitate the progressive realisation of 
urgent health care rights (in keeping with its constitutional obligations 
and ICESCR commitments).  
The provision of ARVs between 2000 and 2010 in Uganda ensured that 
thousands of people in Uganda (who should have perished from AIDS) 
were offered a ‘second chance’ at life.1880 They are deemed to be the 
first generation in that they have made positive gains on the back of 
increased ART availability and a proliferation of programmes which have 
provided both treatment and support. 1881  Furthermore, this is a 
generation that is viewed as understanding AIDS as a fatal disease 
which had ended the lives of their loved ones after protracted and 
debilitating suffering.1882  
There are three distinct yet meshed themes which underpin the 
approach in understanding HIV positive Ugandans in their lived 
reality.1883 The first theme being that of a generation which has had the 
benefit of ART provision and supplementary care.1884 The second theme 
is sociality which seeks to ascertain the manner in which social relations 
have been shaped by the disease and how sociality has subsequently 
                                                             
1879 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 4. 
1880 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 1. 
1881 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 1. 
1882 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 1. Please see Biney A ‘The historical 
discourse on African humanism’ (2014) 48 which highlights the perpetual suffering 
of vulnerable groups/communities in Africa. 
1883 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 2. 
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changed as a result. 1885  Sociality provides for the exploration of 
everyday interactions which happen outside of the gaze of ‘health-policy 
makers’ but which are deemed critical to forge a comprehensive 
understanding of healthcare. 1886  The third theme is that of second 
chances which seeks to ascertain how patients receiving life-saving ART 
utilised ‘the stay of execution’ and how it has affected their view of the 
present as well as the promise which the future holds. 1887  Second 
chances seeks to focus on matters that go beyond medical treatment 
and ‘biological survival’ by concentrating on ‘well-being’ or ‘improved 
being’ at the very least.1888  
Second chances is comprised of the elements of reprieve, conversion, 
contingency and reflection.1889 A reprieve is a stay of execution (i.e. the 
routine consumption of ART keeps death at bay) and constitutes a 
critical building block of a ‘second chance’.1890  However, a reprieve does 
not automatically translate into a different life.1891  Conversion suggests 
embarking on a new and better life pathway as brought about by being 
gifted a second chance through ART.1892 In Uganda there is strong 
resonance with conversion/salvation (as embraced by the Christian 
faith) which is characterised by being born again and seeking to pursue 
a life of devotion and purity.1893 In this regard there is a clear focus on 
the rollout period of ART when it first became freely available and 
ordinary people bore witness to its effects.1894  
Contingency (or chanciness) is viewed as potentially the most important 
element of second chances despite the fact that it is often 
                                                             
1885 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 2.   
1886 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 2. 
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1888 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 18. Please see Bilchitz D Poverty and 
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highlighting the minimum core obligation approach in relation to subsistence 
rights.  
1889 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) I8. 
1890 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014)18. 
1891 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014)18. 
1892 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 19. 
1893 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 19. 
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overlooked. 1895   The lived reality for most Ugandans is that of an 
uncertain future due to crippling poverty, poor health infrastructure and 
the glaring absence of state welfare mechanisms.1896  The preferred 
word in Ugandan English is ‘gambling’ to denote an uncertain future due 
to the absence of any sort of economic security.1897  Meinert defines 
contingency/gambling as the transition ‘from certain death to uncertain 
survival’.1898 The interpersonal dependencies that characterise Ugandan 
sociality are a critical avenue in seeking to reduce chanciness. 1899  
However, this is in itself premised on a less than ideal situation in that 
your situation at any given time is essentially tied to those that you are 
dependent on and any setback suffered by the latter is certain to have 
material consequences (in every sense of the word) on the wellbeing of 
all dependents.1900 It is submitted that the aforementioned interpersonal 
dependency is in fact the lived reality of grant recipients in South Africa 
who have had to endure ongoing uncertainty as to whether SASSA 
would give effect to its obligations in a timeous fashion - the 
aforementioned uncertainty is compounded by the fact the social grant 
as a rule has to not only cater for the specific needs of the grant recipient 
but also has to meet the needs of a number of people dependent on the 
aforementioned grant recipient. 
Reflection is brought about by a new lease on life (as granted by ART 
provision) in which people can contemplate anew aspects of their lives 
such as family life, sexual partnerships and children.1901  The critical 
distinction between ‘a living and a life’ is explored in which ‘a living’ 
suggests an adequate livelihood while ‘a life’ speaks to ‘a social 
existence of reciprocity and respect’.1902   
                                                             
1895 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 20. 
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discourse on African humanism’ (2014) 48. 
1897 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 20. 
1898 Meinert et al ‘Tests for Life Chances: CD4 Miracles and Obstacles in Uganda’ 
Anthropology and Medicine 16, No 2. 195-209 (2009) 196. 
1899 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 21. 
1900 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 21. 
1901 Whyte SR ‘The First Generation’ (2014) 21. 
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Whyte rightfully believes that generations, sociality and second chances 
encourage a hands-on approach that coax one to analyse how history, 
social relations, consciousness and subjectivity are intertwined in a 
specific place at a specific time. 1903  It should be noted that the 
abovementioned themes represent ‘modes of asking, rather than 
absolute answers’ concerning a process which is constantly revealing 
more of itself with the passing of time.1904 
The present ethnographic study (i.e. Second Chances) highlights the 
definitive links between the text (a clear focus on the disease) and the 
context (other health challenges as well as the pitfalls of life in 
general).1905 In this regard there are striking parallels between the lived 
reality of vulnerable groups living in Uganda and South Africa 
respectively and there is consequently a demonstrated need for the state 
to display an unwavering commitment in coming to the aid of those very 
same groups. It is submitted that the concept of ‘contingency’ has a 
special resonance (both in Uganda and South Africa) in relation to 
vulnerable people living in abject poverty. Thus, the aforementioned 
concept serves to coax public officials (that have embraced ubuntu) to 
facilitate the realisation of critical socio-economic rights so that South 
Africa, as a just and caring nation, can proudly proclaim that all people 
within its borders are treated with equal concern.  
It should be noted that Heywood believes that the endorsement of 
denialist views by President Mbeki increasingly influenced (as well as 
determined) health policy.1906 Heywood notes that those same views 
prevented the government from discharging its constitutional obligations 
regarding the progressive realisation of access to health services (with 
specific reference to women and children living with HIV). 1907  The 
affidavit of Doctor Andrew James Grant (Acting Medical Superintendent 
of Bethesda Hospital) was included as part of the Replying Affidavit 
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Annexure in the TAC case – a telling excerpt from the aforementioned 
affidavit reads as follows:  
‘…Doctors at this hospital have bought Nevirapine with 
their own money and are already administering it to 
patients who are confirmed to have HIV and who give 
informed consent…It is an easy drug to administer and we 
have seen no side effects on this regime (except extreme 
gratefulness)’.1908   
It is my view that this seemingly simple observation regarding ‘extreme 
gratefulness’ should in fact take pride of place in a just and caring society 
which strives to alleviate the suffering of vulnerable groups. 
Furthermore, the constant humanising acts demanded by ubuntu (as per 
the insights offered by Praeg regarding the primacy of communal 
obligations) is reflected in the manner in which the abovementioned 
medical personnel came to the aid of an especially vulnerable group.  
The Treatment Action Campaign was formed as an independent 
organisation in 1999 and its first campaign sought to compel the 
government to offer MTCTP cover.1909  In this regard the TAC case 
demonstrates what is in the realm of possibility if civil society is united in 
striving for the realisation of urgent socio-economic rights. It follows that 
civil society has a critical role to play in undertaking constructive dialogue 
with public officials (as well as targeted lobbying if so required) as a 
means to hold public officials to account and facilitate the realisation of 
urgent socio-economic rights.  
The Treatment Action Campaign played an instrumental role in the 
reduction of the cost of ARVs with the cost of annual treatment for South 
Africa’s first-line highly active antiretroviral therapy (‘HAART’) regimen 
being pegged at US$ 10439 per person in 2000 as compared to US$182 
in May 2005.1910 The number of HAART patients in the public sector in 
                                                             
1908 Heywood M ‘Preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission’ (2003) SAJHR 294.  
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South Africa increased from approximately 7000 in mid-2004 to more 
than 200 000 towards the end of 2006.1911  Natrass highlighted how 
South Africans accounted for 25% of people receiving ARVs in sub-
Saharan Africa in 2005 when a comparative analysis highlighted that 
South Africa should have secured a significantly higher percentage of 
people receiving ARVs in the aforementioned region.1912  However, it is 
tragic to note that only 35% of the people (of the original planned 
number) were covered by HAART in South Africa by September 
2006.1913  
It is estimated (for the period 1999 to 2007) that the utilisation of ARVs 
assisted in the prevention of 250 000 people from becoming infected 
with HIV than would have been the case in their absence.1914  However, 
the aforementioned figure could have been significantly higher if ‘political 
will at the national level’ had resembled that which was on display in the 
Western Cape.1915  Thus, it is estimated that a further 171 000 HIV 
infections could have been prevented over the same period.1916 The 
basic intervention programme prevented 247 000 AIDS deaths for the 
period 1999-2007 and the MTCTP programme prevented a further 67 
000 AIDS deaths over the aforementioned period.1917 Furthermore, the 
HAART roll out programme prevented an additional 257 000 AIDS 
deaths over the same period despite the regrettable delay in the onset 
of the programme.1918  However, an additional 343 000 AIDS deaths 
could have been prevented if MTCTP and HAART had been rolled out 
nationally at the same rate as in the Western Cape.1919 Consequently, it 
is the abovementioned infections (171 000) that could have been averted 
as well as the AIDS deaths (343 000) that could have been prevented 
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that provide insight as to the true extent of the human tragedy.1920 The 
aforementioned tragedy was caused by failed political leadership (i.e. a 
demonstrated failure of accountability and an absence of political will) as 
illustrated by the inexplicable endorsement of AIDS-denialism/pseudo-
science by President Mbeki.1921   
The Treatment Action Campaign played a critical role in information 
dissemination (as well as grassroots mobilisation) through ongoing 
engagement with vulnerable groups so as to facilitate a right of access 
to healthcare. 1922  In this regard Sipho Mthathi was tasked with 
formalising and consolidating the treatment literacy initiatives which 
culminated in the establishment of the Treatment Literacy Project in 
2002. 1923  The aforementioned literacy project provided for the 
production of ‘fact sheets and posters about HIV disease, ARVs and 
CD4 count monitoring which are distributed at national, regional and 
local workshops run by treatment literacy practitioners’. 1924  The 
Treatment Action Campaign empowered patients to develop a better 
understanding of the disease as well as the associated monitoring tests 
so as to enable those same patients to effectively engage with medical 
staff regarding treatment regimens and possible side effects. 1925 
Furthermore, the Treatment Action Campaign successfully utilised the 
language of medical science in their workshops in order to optimise the 
information offering to vulnerable groups.1926  
It is my firm view that anthropology can make a critical contribution to the 
reception of law on the ground as it facilitates a clear and coherent vision 
of the lived reality of people and what is in fact required to introduce 
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meaningful and sustainable change. A case in point is the manner in 
which an in-depth understanding of the specific plight of black women in 
remote rural regions of South Africa could provide definitive insight as to 
specific services and/or interventions (e.g. health-care, nutrition and 
housing) which are in fact required. In this regard it is submitted that 
anthropology played a critical role in providing Ugandan 
authorities/international donor agencies with critical information as to the 
(altered) lived reality of Ugandans receiving treatment as well as where 
to direct future funding/treatment efforts to maximise the (positive) 
impact of treatment programmes.  It is further submitted that 
anthropological accounts of extraordinary success stories in Uganda 
served as a catalyst to attract even more international donor funding as 
donor agencies had a justifiable expectation that funds so directed would 
go that much further (in an environment in which the Ugandan state was 
a willing partner).    
The abhorrent response by the state to the Aids pandemic in South 
Africa is offered up as compelling proof of the state failing in its duty to 
meet the needs of its most vulnerable citizens and in the process 
confirming the seemingly abstract nature of African Humanism in a 
contemporary context.1927 Consequently, it is submitted that the limited 
resources of the state serve to emphasise the need for unwavering 
political will (on the part of the state) in order to maximise the reach and 
impact of critical health interventions in South Africa in the shortest 
possible time. 
5.6     An exploration of Intersectionality so as to develop a nuanced 
understanding of the challenges negotiated by specific vulnerable 
groups 
It is submitted that an understanding of Intersectionality will enable public 
officials in South Africa to develop illuminating insights as to the specific 
circumstances and conditions endured by vulnerable groups and 
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facilitate targeted intervention programmes to come to the aid of those 
same vulnerable groups. 
Intersectionality, as devised by Kimberle Crenshaw, is a hands-on 
analytical tool that has its roots in Black feminism and Critical Race 
Theory.1928  The term was coined to highlight the ‘marginalisation of 
Black women within not only anti-discrimination law but also in feminist 
and anti-racist theory and politics’.1929  
Intersectionality theory is at its core concerned with agitating for 
beneficial social change. 1930  Crenshaw initiated a two-pronged 
intervention which sought to expose as well as break down those 
instances of marginalisation. 1931  The aforementioned instances of 
marginalisation were to be found ‘within institutionalised discourses that 
legitimised existing power relations (e.g. law)’ whilst simultaneously 
shedding light on how discourses of resistance (e.g. feminism and anti-
racism) could in fact function as sites ‘that produced and legitimised 
marginalisation’.1932 In this regard Crenshaw provided an example of the 
subtle manner in which law had traditionally defined ‘the contours of sex 
and race discrimination through prototypical representatives i.e. white 
women and African-American men, respectively’. 1933  Thus, the 
aforementioned anti-discrimination approach confined the scope and 
reach of institutional transformation, sought to reduce both ‘the 
understanding of and advocacy around racism and patriarchy, and 
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1933 Carbado & Crenshaw & Mays et al ‘Intersectionality’ (2013) Du Bois Review 304.  
316 
 
 
undermined possibilities of meaningful solidarity by placing resistance 
movements at odds with each other’. 1934  
It should be noted that Intersectionality as a theory is never completed 
nor exhausted by previous analyses or movements as it always remains 
an analysis-in progress. 1935  Furthermore, the reach and scope of 
Intersectionality has been expanded so as to analyse a broad range of 
issues as well as legal and political systems both in the United States as 
well as further afield.1936  
The insights offered by Intersectionality are consistent with the views of 
De Vos in that the more vulnerable and economically disadvantaged a 
group is, the more likely it is for the courts to find that the state had a 
constitutional duty to focus on the pressing needs of that community.1937 
De Vos utilises a fitting example (of black women in rural areas of South 
Africa requiring access to health care services) to emphasise that 
legislation enacted by the state in the health care services arena, which 
failed to take into account the urgent needs of those rural women, would 
likely be deemed ‘constitutionally suspect’. 1938  I am in complete 
agreement with the aforementioned views of De Vos in relation to 
relevant legislation being viewed as ‘constitutionally suspect’ if it failed 
to address the critical needs of destitute black women in rural areas. In 
this regard it is submitted that Intersectionality serves to identify each 
and every one of the harsh conditions/inequalities that are brought to 
bear upon specific vulnerable groups (e.g. black women in rural areas) 
and can ensure that critical concerns/hazards are properly identified. 
This will ensure that diligent and committed public officials have deep-
seated knowledge of how best to assist a specific vulnerable group.  
Furthermore, there is a need to distinguish between thinking 
‘intersectionally’ and contemplating intersecting categories as per the 
insight offered by Crenshaw as follows:  
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‘Black women sometimes experience discrimination in ways 
similar to white women’s experiences; sometimes they share very 
similar experiences with Black men. Yet often they experience 
double discrimination - the combined effects of practices which 
discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And 
sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black women - not 
the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black women’.1939  
This clarification of the crucial yet simple term ‘as’ in discrimination law 
does not cease with Black women but requires a constant return to a 
detailed analysis of the specific group in question as immersed in a 
specific set of circumstances. 1940  Thus, it is submitted that 
Intersectionality theory is an extraordinary tool to better understand the 
harrowing, specific circumstances of vulnerable groups in South Africa 
(e.g. black women in poverty-stricken rural areas or homeless people 
that find themselves in perilous circumstances). It follows that the state, 
if it were to utilise Intersectionality theory, would be able to fashion tailor-
made interventions so as to bring an end to specific forms of 
discrimination/deprivation as endured by the vulnerable group in 
question.  
5.7     The manner in which a nuanced understanding of Panopticism 
can colour our understanding of the shaping of accountable 
public officials 
The Panopticon (as devised by Bentham)1941 serves as a starting point 
for an extraordinary exploration by Foucault regarding punishment and 
discipline.1942  The Panopticon is ultimately concerned with exploring 
accountability in that the subject exercises the necessary discipline so 
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as to give effect only to the right choices.1943 Foucault describes the 
Panopticon in the following manner:  
‘at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a 
tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open 
onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheral building is 
divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width 
of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, 
corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on 
the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end 
to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a 
supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a 
madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a 
schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe 
from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the 
small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They 
are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which 
each actor is alone, perfectly individualised and constantly 
visible. The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial duties 
that make it possible to see constantly and to recognise 
immediately. In short, it reverses the principle of the 
dungeon; or rather of its three functions - to enclose, to 
deprive of light and to hide - it preserves only the first and 
eliminates the other two. Full lighting and the eye of the 
supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately 
protected. Visibility is a trap’.1944  
It should be noted that the individual is confined to a cell and is visible to 
the supervisor from the front but he has no contact with his fellow 
prisoners due to the presence of side walls on either side of each cell.1945 
The individual (prisoner) is rendered visible by the positioning of his cell 
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in relation to the central tower yet he has to endure lateral invisibility.1946 
The aforementioned invisibility is deemed to guarantee order. 1947  
It should be noted that Bentham believed that power should be visible 
and unverifiable.1948 In this regard the prisoner is constantly confronted 
with the imposing outline of the central tower from which he/she is 
observed yet it cannot be confirmed whether he/she is being observed 
at any given moment.1949 Nonetheless, the prisoner knows that he/she 
may be observed at any given moment.1950 The Panopticon is viewed as 
a machine that brings about the ‘homogenous effects of power’ 
regardless of the task that it has been deployed to give effect to in a 
specific instance.1951  
The imagery is fascinating if one imagines inserting a public official in 
one of the cells in the Panopticon so as to demonstrate the rendering of 
true discipline under the guise of general yet unverifiable surveillance. 
However, the fact that the public official can be seen but cannot see 
implies that he is ‘the object of information’ but never a subject in 
communication.1952  This marks a point of departure in this thesis with 
the seductive Panopticon imagery as ongoing dialogue between the 
public official and the public is necessary in order to shape a 
(contemporary) constitutional democracy in which all of us can find a 
home and enjoy a dignified existence. However, public officials that 
diligently discharge their constitutional obligations, as if they are under 
constant but unverifiable surveillance, serves as the key appeal of the 
Panopticon. Nonetheless, the composition/structure of the Panopticon 
has so much to offer in visualising/conceptualising a society in which 
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public officials discharge their duties diligently as if they are under the 
(possibly ever-present) watchful eye of society at large.  
Foucault believes that those that are subjected to a field of visibility (and 
have an awareness that they are being so observed) as a rule assume 
responsibility for the constraints of power and modify their behaviour 
accordingly.1953 The aforementioned behaviour modification is effected 
so as to ensure that their conduct faithfully conforms to the contours of 
the established power constraints.1954 This is accomplished without the 
need for the external observer/power to make its presence felt through 
physical confrontation.1955      
It should be noted that an observer (in the central tower/observation 
tower in the Panopticon) can follow a number of individuals with nothing 
more than a casual glance but he/she can in turn be viewed by any 
member of the public that enters the observation tower.1956 Thus, it 
follows that public officials can be held accountable for their conduct in 
the following manner:  
‘the seeing machine was once a sort of dark room into 
which individuals spied; it has become a transparent 
building in which the exercise of power may be supervised 
by society as a whole’.1957  
Furthermore, the Panopticon is viewed as a discipline mechanism that 
seeks to improve the exercise of power by fashioning ‘a design of subtle 
coercion for a society to come’ in which the exceptional discipline 
practised of old gave way to generalised surveillance.1958  
It is submitted that ubuntu as a political choice implies an acceptance of 
that same coercion in striving to give effect to communal obligations as 
a reflection of our interconnectedness and interdependence as a people 
                                                             
  1953 Foucault M Discipline and Punish (1977) 202. 
  1954 Foucault M Discipline and Punish (1977) 202. 
  1955 Foucault M Discipline and Punish (1977) 203.  
  1956 Foucault M Discipline and Punish (1977) 207. Please see 
https://www.utilitarianism.com/panopticon.html, (accessed 12 January 2018). 
1957 Foucault M Discipline and Punish (1977) 207. 
1958 Foucault M Discipline and Punish (1977) 209. 
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living side by side in a nation-state.  There are striking parallels between 
the coercive edge of ubuntu and the surveillance of the individual in 
his/her cell in the Panopticon in that both seek to discipline the conduct 
of the individual (styled in this thesis as a diligent public official) for the 
greater good of society.     
The Panopticon offers compelling insights regarding the possibility that 
a public official could be effectively placed under general (yet 
unverifiable) surveillance (whether it be by his/her supervisor, the public 
at large or the Constitutional Court). It is submitted that behaviour so 
modified is indeed likely to promote the accountability of public officials 
in South Africa by progressively giving effect to critical subsistence rights 
as enshrined in the Constitution. It follows that the Constitutional Court 
could enter the observation tower of the Panopticon and bear witness to 
the manner in which one and every public official (i.e. the state) gives 
effect to the aforementioned subsistence rights. This serves to 
demonstrate the critical role to be assumed by the Constitutional Court, 
in providing overarching surveillance of the state in progressively 
realising constitutionally guaranteed rights, as a means to fulfil its 
mandate as the guardian of the Constitution.1959  
The reality is that a public official should always conduct himself/herself 
in a manner which is beyond reproach. However, in the absence of the 
Panopticon one could rely on ubuntu (if so embraced by diligent public 
officials) to faithfully reproduce the effects of the Panopticon. In this 
regard the conduct and decision-making of a public official is shaped at 
every turn by the overarching communal obligations owed to society in 
seeking to create (as well as sustain) a just and caring nation-state.  
5.8      Summary 
This chapter served to highlight how anthropology themes can provide 
extraordinary insight as to the lived reality of vulnerable groups in South 
Africa. Furthermore, this chapter sought to demonstrate that an 
                                                             
1959 Please see sections 167(4), 167 (5), 169(a) and 172 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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accountable public official would defy unjust laws/practices so as to 
come to the aid of vulnerable groups. This chapter also served to 
highlight the inner workings of semi-autonomous fields which dictated 
that public officials should exercise caution in promulgating legislation in 
the absence of drawing on anthropological data – the aforementioned 
data is required to develop a clear understanding of the conditions on 
the ground so as to maximise the impact and reach of legislation. This 
will ensure that the most pressing needs of vulnerable groups are 
identified, suitably prioritised and subsequently realised. It is submitted 
that this is consistent with the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu 
which can serve to inform and colour the duties of public officials to ease 
the plight of vulnerable groups in South Africa.  
In addition, this chapter sought to emphasise the debilitating effects of 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic in both South Africa and Uganda through an 
anthropological lens and served to highlight how political will on the part 
of the state can significantly alter the lived reality of vulnerable groups. 
Furthermore, this chapter cast light on Intersectionality theory as a 
means to develop a clear understanding of the lived reality of vulnerable 
groups so as to ensure that the state was better placed to assist those 
same vulnerable groups with targeted intervention programmes. This 
chapter also served to highlight the manner in which generalised 
surveillance of public officials could assist in ensuring that public officials 
give effect to their constitutional obligations without fail. In this regard the 
critical role of the Constitutional Court, in providing oversight of the 
conduct of the state in progressively realising socio-economic rights, is 
emphasised. In closing, it is submitted that the chapter to follow will 
provide concluding remarks as well as a list of recommendations.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1     Introduction 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate the definitive link between the 
accountability of public officials in giving effect to socio-economic rights 
(as enshrined in the Constitution) and ubuntu (understood as embracing 
the primacy of communal obligations). Furthermore, it cast light on how 
the realisation of the aforementioned socio-economic rights will serve to 
forge social solidarity through striving to treat all people as having equal 
worth.  
There are indeed certain aspects of ubuntu which are contested and/or 
not fully defined but the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu (as 
advanced in this thesis) is widely accepted and acknowledged as one of 
its core features. Thus, the starting point in mounting a credible defence 
of ubuntu is to note that it is indeed a pivotal ideal and value in South 
Africa.  
It is submitted that the state is duty-bound to give effect to the 
aspirational values as well as socio-economic rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. Thus, public officials that embrace ubuntu, which is 
denoted by an unwavering focus on communal obligations, will diligently 
perform their duties (as provided for in the Constitution) as a means to 
create a just and caring society.  
The minimum core obligation approach, as adopted by the ICESCR and 
subsequently modified by Bilchitz, is endorsed in this thesis for taking a 
firm stand in acknowledging that it is unacceptable for any human being 
to have to live without the means to maintain his/her survival. It follows 
that the state must do everything possible to remedy the aforementioned 
situation and that we should be ‘intolerant’ of anyone having to endure 
such deplorable living conditions. It is submitted that the aforementioned 
insights by Bilchitz are consistent with the communal obligations’ focus 
of ubuntu in striving to forge a just and caring nation-state in which 
everyone is treated with equal respect and concern. 
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6.2     Anthropology 
Anthropology can make a telling contribution in developing a refined 
understanding of the application of law through augmenting our 
understanding of the lived reality of vulnerable groups that have to 
endure seemingly perpetual deprivation. 
The anthropological concepts of inclusion and exclusion are of critical 
importance in understanding the harsh living conditions that are endured 
by vulnerable groups in South Africa. 1960  The aforementioned 
anthropological concepts reflect the sentiments of Praeg who had drawn 
attention to the existence of power relations that dictated which people 
were permitted to be ‘part of the conversation’.1961  Furthermore, an 
anthropological analysis compels one to view ‘social communities and 
cultural ideas of belonging as constructions that are constantly 
challenged, contested and attributed with new meanings’. 1962   The 
aforementioned analysis is of considerable interest as it sheds light on 
the manner in which the meaning of social solidarity, which is viewed as 
an integral part of the Danish political landscape, will be persistently 
contested and redefined over time.1963  This is consistent with the views 
of Praeg in relation to the nature of ubuntu which too will be contested 
and redefined in the time to come.  
It should be noted that anthropology provides insight regarding the ways 
in which members of a specific society must fashion an agreement (in 
relation to the manner by which they will live side by side) as a means of 
creating a viable society. 1964   This agreement does not insist upon 
cultural conformity but seeks to fashion a common understanding of the 
nature and extent of the cultural differences which can be 
accommodated in that society.1965  This is in keeping with a key focus in 
this thesis in crafting a sustainable version of social solidarity in South 
                                                             
1960 Please refer to Section 4.2.3.5. 
1961 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 15.  
1962 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011)12. 
1963 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011)12. 
1964 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 11. 
1965 Olwig KF & Paerregaard K ‘“Strangers” in the nation’ (2011) 11. 
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Africa through the progressive realisation of critical subsistence rights of 
vulnerable groups. It is submitted that the aforementioned realisation of 
socio-economic rights will place all people in a position to live lives of 
purpose which will ably demonstrate that the state has due regard for 
the equal worth of each and every person. 
It should be noted that diligent public officials will do everything possible 
to progressively realise the subsistence rights of the most vulnerable 
groups in the nation-state. This will inevitably lead those same public 
officials to seek out the best possible mechanisms to give effect to the 
aforementioned critical rights in the shortest possible time. 
Consequently, it is contended that embracing the real world application 
of anthropology will ensure that those same public officials develop an 
intimate understanding of the lived reality of vulnerable groups. This will 
ensure that public officials are in a position to alleviate the suffering of 
vulnerable groups – this in turn can be achieved through decisive 
interventions (including promulgating legislation and/or devising the 
optimal manner in which scarce resources are to be allocated) to meet 
the needs of specific vulnerable groups.  
6.3      Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
The pivotal role of the Constitutional Court has been analysed so as to 
demonstrate the pressing need on its part to provide critical determinate 
content in relation to socio-economic rights. It is submitted that the 
aforementioned determinate content is of pivotal importance in 
facilitating the effective monitoring and enforcement of socio-economic 
rights.  
It is submitted that the Soobramoney, Grootboom and TAC judgments 
of the Constitutional Court has not provided the state with the necessary 
guidance in formulating a suitable accountability standard in respect of 
the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. In this regard the 
Court has failed to provide the state with critical determinate content for 
urgent subsistence rights (despite the incremental improvements on 
offer in the judgments moving in chronological order from Soobramoney 
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through Grootboom to TAC).  It is my firm view that the reasonableness 
approach of the Constitutional Court is indeed flawed as one cannot 
ascertain whether the state has discharged its duties (in giving effect to 
critical subsistence rights) if the standard against which the conduct of 
the state is to be measured does not offer the necessary clarity as to the 
core content of those same socio-economic rights. In this regard the 
Constitutional Court has confined itself to assess the manner in which 
the policies of the state have been ‘conceived and applied’ rather than 
seeking to ascertain what those same policies are likely to achieve in the 
quest for the progressive realisation of rights.1966 Thus, Brand is rightfully 
critical of the manner in which the Constitutional Court has portrayed 
itself as apolitical in the adjudication of socio-economic rights and 
highlighted that the Constitutional Court had expressly stated its role as 
‘an impartial regulator rather an active participant’ in Soobramoney, 
Grootboom and TAC. 1967   
The Constitutional Court should approach its judicial review function with 
a firm resolve in a present-day context so as to ensure that the state is 
called upon to account for the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights as a matter of urgency. The state should be compelled to account 
with specific reference to the broadest possible definition of ‘available 
state resources’ so as to demonstrate its accountability (as well as 
unwavering political will) in giving effect to critical subsistence rights. In 
this regard it is of pivotal importance to emphasise that the scarcity of 
resources does not dilute the rights a person has but rather affects the 
capacity of an individual to realise those rights.1968 It is hoped that the 
moral tragedy in Soobramoney will serve as a catalyst/an ever- present 
reminder for the Constitutional Court to strive to ensure that all 
vulnerable groups are treated with the necessary concern. Nonetheless, 
the UN Committee acknowledges that there are circumstances in which 
                                                             
1966 Soobramoney (1998) para 29. Please see Grootboom (2000) para 41 as well as 
TAC (2002) para 36.  
1967 Brand D ‘What are socio-economic rights for?’ (2003) 49.  
1968 Bilchitz D ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core’ (2003) SAJHR 
15. 
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a specific state will be able to prove that it is not capable of giving effect 
to the minimum core obligation.1969  However, the Constitutional Court 
must demand compelling proof on the part of the state in the event that 
the latter claims that it is unable to provide the minimum core obligation 
as related to key subsistence rights. 1970 
It is fair comment that the Constitutional Court should display appropriate 
deference to the Executive and the Legislature as required by the 
separation of powers doctrine. However, this should not in any way 
undermine the ability of the Constitutional Court, as the primary guardian 
of the Constitution, to ensure that the state progressively realises the 
enshrined socio-economic rights in the Constitution as a matter of 
urgency. Thus, it is of paramount importance to draw specific attention 
to the manner in which the Constitutional Court has modified its 
approach (in response to the continued failure of the state to meet its 
constitutional obligations) by focussing on the primary thrust of section 
195 in the AllPay and Black Sash cases. This is a step in the right 
direction in light of the documented shortcomings of the Constitutional 
Court to hold the state to the required standard (of accountability) in the 
Soobramoney, Grootboom and TAC cases. Furthermore, it is indeed 
encouraging that the Constitutional Court has explored the possibility of 
enforcing adverse cost orders against grossly negligent and/or 
obstructive public officials in their personal capacity as per the AllPay 
and Black Sash cases.  
The Constitutional Court should embrace the minimum core obligation 
approach as endorsed by the ICESCR (and as subsequently advanced 
by Bilchitz) as it is a crucial mechanism in pegging the accountability of 
the state at an appropriate level so as to bring an end to the deprivation 
endured by vulnerable groups. Furthermore, it is prudent for the 
Constitutional Court to utilise the minimum core obligation approach in 
light of the ratification of the ICESCR by the Republic of South Africa. 
                                                             
1969 General Comment No. 3: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838b2.html, 
(accessed 1 August 2016). 
1970 Bilchitz D ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core’ (2003) SAJHR 
18.  
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This will facilitate the shaping of critical determinate content (consistent 
with our international law obligations as per the General Comments 
prepared by the UN Committee) for socio-economic rights and ensure 
that benchmarked sectoral targets are devised, subsequently 
disseminated by the state to the public and ultimately achieved so as to 
alleviate the suffering of vulnerable groups. Furthermore, it is of 
paramount importance for the Constitutional Court (as the guardian of 
the Constitution) to embrace an oversight role in ensuring that the state 
progressively realises constitutionally guaranteed socio-economic rights 
in as short a time as possible.  
6.4     Ubuntu as a driver of accountability and social solidarity 
It is important to bear in mind that ‘what is unique about Ubuntu is not 
any epistemological, ontological or even axiological specificity, but 
simply the fact of its being an actualised communitarian praxis of the 
humanising’.1971 The aforementioned insight furnished by Praeg serves 
to emphasise the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu as well as its 
extraordinary utility in contemporary South Africa.  
It is necessary to explore the political environment within which ubuntu 
has been deployed so as to draw attention to the manner in which the 
definition as well as the nature of ubuntu is contested and revised on a 
continuous basis. It is critical to have intimate knowledge of the political 
landscape within which ubuntu is deployed so as to counter distortions 
(e.g. the limited contribution that ubuntu could make in a constitutional 
democracy) that are likely to creep into contemporary public discourse. 
It follows that public officials should have the necessary insight with 
regards to the manner in which concepts are defined and contested in a 
political environment – this will ensure that ubuntu is utilised in a manner 
which will in fact promote the progressive realisation of critical 
subsistence rights.  In this regard the distinction drawn by Praeg 
between ‘ubuntu’ as a living practice and ‘Ubuntu’ as an abstract 
philosophy is illuminating in exploring the political landscape. 1972 
                                                             
1971 Praeg L Report on Ubuntu (2014) 20. 
1972 Please refer to Section 2.4. 
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However, it is submitted that the core component of ubuntu as defined 
in this thesis (i.e. the primacy of communal obligations) should remain at 
the forefront of future revisions of ubuntu as it is the embodiment of 
ubuntu as a living praxis.  
The underlying objective of this thesis has been to explore and confirm 
the manner in which ubuntu, understood as an unwavering focus on 
communal obligations, can promote the accountability of public officials 
in order to fashion a just and caring nation-state in which social solidarity 
ideals will flourish. Thus, it is submitted that ubuntu can serve to shape 
the conduct of public officials and state institutions (in fostering a deep-
seated awareness of the primacy of communal obligations) and in so 
doing prioritise the needs of vulnerable groups. Furthermore, embracing 
the values and spirit of ubuntu (on the part of public officials) will promote 
accountability by impacting on the manner in which each and every 
decision is taken so as to reflect a sincere concern for the wellbeing of 
all members of the nation-state. Thus, ubuntu is well suited to promote 
accountability by shaping a vision of shared obligations in order to 
pursue the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights as enshrined 
in the Constitution.  
In addition, it is submitted that communal obligations is at the heart of 
ubuntu and it is subsequently well placed to make a significant 
contribution in our constitutional democracy in light of its ability to mesh 
with a human rights regime. Thus, the state is duty-bound to give effect 
to socio-economic rights which is in effect in keeping with the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu (in recognising the interdependence and 
interconnectedness of members living side by side in a just and caring 
nation-state). In this regard the state should provide benchmarked 
sectoral targets (in relation to the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights) as a demonstration of the accountability owed to the 
public.  
It should be noted that social solidarity was explored in this thesis in 
order to develop a nuanced understanding of how embracing diversity 
serves as an expression of our shared humanity. Furthermore, the 
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anthropological concept of ‘lived reality’ was analysed in order to 
highlight the nature and extent of the suffering endured by vulnerable 
groups so as to fashion suitable laws to come to their aid. Thus, it is my 
contention that a display of unwavering accountability on the part of 
public officials in prioritising the needs of vulnerable groups (which is 
consistent with the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu) is a critical 
factor in forging a sustainable version of social solidarity in South Africa. 
It is critical to emphasise that ubuntu, re-imagined as a philosophy in 
which the individual views his/her freedom as ‘an act of responsibility to 
the community’, is not premised on an individual embracing ‘uniformity 
or sameness’ in a specific community.1973 Ubuntu in fact serves to inform 
and colour the exploration of the possible transformation of an individual 
(in this instance a public official) that elects to embrace his membership 
of an ethical community.1974 The aforementioned insights are critical in 
shaping the conduct of public officials who heed the call to embrace 
membership of an ethical community (as well as subsequently 
safeguarding and strengthening that same ethical community) through 
prioritising the needs of vulnerable groups. The need for constructive 
dialogue (as well as giving effect to ongoing information dissemination 
on the part of the state) between public officials and the very people that 
they are meant to serve, is emphasised in order to create a just and 
caring nation-state. 
The abovementioned insights regarding membership of an ethical 
community is an apt description of the aspirational goal (in forging and 
sustaining social solidarity ideals) as explored in this thesis. In addition, 
various anthropology themes have been analysed as a means to provide 
insight regarding the concept of ‘lived reality’ and the manner in which 
law is applied and/or revised and/or resisted on the ground. It is 
submitted that the aforementioned concept of ‘lived reality’ serves to 
draw attention to the plight of vulnerable groups. It is further submitted 
that developing an intimate understanding of the manner in which law is 
                                                             
1973 Bohler-Mϋller N ‘Ubuntu jurisprudence’ (2012) 369. 
1974 Bohler-Mϋller N ‘Ubuntu jurisprudence’ (2012) 370. 
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experienced on the ground will ensure that laws are enacted that will 
provide the intended recipients (i.e. vulnerable groups) with the required 
assistance. The exploration of the aforementioned anthropological 
themes serves to inform the nature and extent of the (communal) 
obligations owed to vulnerable groups by the state which in turn 
promotes the accountability of the state as well as the consequent 
forging of social solidarity.  
Consequently, it is my firm contention that ubuntu is well suited to make 
a critical contribution in promoting the accountability of public officials as 
well as bolstering social solidarity. Furthermore, the ethical and legal 
potency of ubuntu 1975 in South Africa serves to demonstrate why ubuntu 
should be utilised in shaping a sanctuary in which all people (regardless 
of their perceived differences) are treated with equal respect. It follows 
that this will be achieved by prioritising the urgent needs of vulnerable 
groups through the progressive realisation of the aspirational values and 
socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, the minimum 
core obligation approach (in prioritising urgent socio-economic rights as 
enshrined in the Constitution) dovetails neatly with the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu which also seeks to emphasise our 
interconnectedness and interdependence as members living side by 
side in a just and caring nation-state. Thus, diligent public officials (i.e. 
those officials that have demonstrated an unwavering focus on 
discharging their constitutional obligations) could in fact be viewed as 
embracing a nuanced understanding of ubuntu. 
Furthermore, this body of work has sought to maintain a specific focus 
on the manner in which ubuntu could transform the lived reality of 
vulnerable groups as a means to make a meaningful contribution to the 
betterment of society. It is my firm contention that the communal 
obligations’ focus of ubuntu conjures forth an attainable vision for 
creating a just and caring society in which all people are treated as 
having equal worth. However, the expectations of ubuntu (in forging a 
                                                             
1975 Cornell D ‘Exploring ubuntu-tentative reflections’ available at 
www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281, (accessed 17 June 2016). 
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just and caring society) should be tempered in the absence of an 
economic transition to fundamentally transform the deplorable living 
conditions and deprivation endured by vulnerable groups.  
6.5      Recommendations 
6.5.1  The manner in which legislation is formulated and subsequently applied 
should take into account relevant anthropological insights in relation to 
the lived reality of specific vulnerable groups. There is a pressing need 
to engage in meaningful dialogue with specific vulnerable groups so as 
to ascertain key concerns as perceived by them (as opposed to public 
officials making assumptions about the critical concerns endured by 
those same vulnerable groups). In this regard working knowledge of 
anthropological themes (such as Intersectionality and semi-autonomous 
fields et al) on the part of public officials can make a pivotal contribution 
in informing and colouring the thinking of public officials as to the plight 
of specific vulnerable groups.  
 It is not necessary for anthropological research to be done prior to giving 
effect to a specific intervention by the state. However, it is submitted that 
adequate exposure to anthropology will inform and sensitise how public 
officials see the world around them. It is further submitted that this could 
lead to public officials making a meaningful and sustainable difference 
in the lives of specific vulnerable groups in securing access to key socio-
economic rights. It follows that this will contribute to the most urgent 
needs of vulnerable groups in the community/nation-state being 
identified, suitably prioritised and subsequently realised. It is my firm 
belief that this is consistent with the communal obligations’ focus of 
ubuntu in serving to inform and colour the duties owed by public officials 
to vulnerable groups in South Africa.  
6.5.2   It is my firm contention that ubuntu, understood as an unwavering focus 
on communal obligations, should be utilised in creating a just and ethical 
society. Ubuntu, being a value with ethical and political potency, should 
be deployed to give effect to communal obligations (which does in fact 
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entail the sharing of resources) as a means of creating a law-abiding and 
caring nation-state.  
It is necessary to emphasise that ubuntu is indeed capable of meshing 
with a human rights regime as enshrined in the Constitution. 
Consequently, it is submitted that the coercive edge of ubuntu (which 
serves to cast light on the conformity demanded by a philosophy 
premised on the primacy of communal obligations) should be embraced 
by the Constitutional Court in so far as it does not imperil core individual 
rights as enshrined in the Constitution. It is further submitted that an 
effective way for the Court to embrace ubuntu (while in no way sacrificing 
legal certainty) is through giving effect to the minimum core obligation 
approach as advanced by Bilchitz – the minimum core obligation will 
ensure an unwavering focus on the progressive realisation of the 
subsistence rights of vulnerable groups which mirrors the primary thrust 
of ubuntu in coming to the aid of interconnected and interdependent 
members of the community/nation-state who face imminent threats to 
their survival. Consequently, the minimum core obligation can contribute 
to bolstering economic equality through an awareness of how the 
provision of basic goods can improve the quality of lives of vulnerable 
groups.1976 
6.5.3   Bilchitz rightfully believes that both political equality as well as a certain 
measure of economic equality is required to forge a ‘decent society’.1977 
In this regard the Constitutional Court has a critical role to play in 
facilitating the formation and sustainability of the aforementioned ‘decent 
society’ by ensuring that the state progressively realises critical 
subsistence rights as enshrined in the Constitution.  
It is submitted that the Court should utilise ubuntu to provide a nuanced 
understanding of the manner in which communal obligations can take 
pride of place (alongside core individual rights) in a constitutional 
democracy. In addition, the Panopticon provides an illuminating insight 
as to the manner in which generalised surveillance can regulate the 
                                                             
1976 Bilchitz D ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth’ (2002) SALJ 500. 
1977 Bilchitz D ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth’ (2002) SALJ 500. 
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conduct of public officials so as to reflect unerring diligence and 
accountability in shaping a just and caring nation-state. In this regard it 
is submitted that the Constitutional Court should assert its legitimate 
authority by undertaking the overarching surveillance of the state in 
relation to progressively giving effect to socio-economic rights through 
careful scrutiny of the accountability/conduct of public officials (as 
representatives of the state). 
It is submitted that possible allegations of the Constitutional Court 
undermining the separation of powers doctrine (in undertaking the 
abovementioned overarching surveillance) can be summarily dismissed. 
The aforementioned dismissal can be condoned on the basis that the 
focus of the Constitutional Court (as the guardian of the Constitution) is 
to facilitate the progressive realisation of the socio-economic rights as 
enshrined in the Constitution. It follows that the Constitutional Court 
should confine itself to ascertaining whether the course of action adopted 
by the state is in all likelihood going to progressively give effect to the 
aforementioned subsistence rights as a matter of urgency. It is further 
submitted that this should in fact be the preferred approach on the part 
of the Constitutional Court – the focus on the reasonableness of state 
conduct has had limited impact (in giving effect to subsistence rights) as 
it demands too little of the state in giving effect to critical subsistence 
rights as enshrined in the Constitution. In this regard the Constitutional 
Court should heed the General Comments as prepared by the UN 
Committee (in light of the ratification of the ICESCR by the Republic of 
South Africa) so as to ensure that there is proper alignment between 
relevant domestic legislation and our international law commitments. 
This will ensure that the favoured (but flawed) approach of the 
Constitutional Court, in ascertaining the ‘reasonableness of state 
conduct’ in giving effect to the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights, will in all likelihood be augmented so as to mirror the outputs of 
the minimum core obligation (in relation to critical subsistence rights) as 
endorsed by the ICESCR (and subsequently advanced by Bilchitz).  
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In addition, it is submitted that there is a pressing need for the Republic 
of South Africa to ratify the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. This is 
necessary so that the public can benefit from additional mechanisms to 
drive the accountability of the state in displaying an unwavering focus on 
the progressive realisation of critical subsistence rights in the shortest 
possible time. Also, the ability of vulnerable groups to lodge individual 
complaints with the UN Committee (under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR) is a critical mechanism to promote the accountability of the 
state in making every effort to prioritise the needs of vulnerable groups.  
6.5.4  The role of the SAHRC needs to be revisited as it is well placed (by virtue 
of its constitutional mandate in receiving Reports from various state 
entities on an annual basis1978) to do so much more in holding the state 
accountable in relation to the progressive realisation of subsistence 
rights. Furthermore, the SAHRC should play a critical facilitation role 
between the state, NGOs and vulnerable groups. In this regard it is 
submitted that the SAHRC can assume a crucial role in shaping the 
content of mandatory Reports that are to be prepared for submission to 
the UN Committee by the Republic of South Africa (in light of the 
ratification of the ICESCR).  
Furthermore, it should be recalled that the Constitutional Court had 
sought/secured the assistance of the SAHRC in the Grootboom case so 
as to observe the implementation of the court order by the state as 
previously described. The SAHRC subsequently submitted a Report to 
the Constitutional Court to raise key concerns in relation to the 
implementation of the aforementioned court order. It follows that the 
possibility of the SAHRC periodically submitting a comprehensive 
Report to the Constitutional Court (as informed by the Reports furnished 
by the various state entities) should be explored so as to highlight 
progress achieved by the state in relation to the progressive realisation 
of socio-economic rights.  
                                                             
1978 Section 184(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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In addition, the SAHRC should demonstrate a clear focus on information 
dissemination by the state so as to educate vulnerable groups about 
their constitutionally guaranteed socio-economic rights. In this regard 
valuable lessons can be extracted by the SAHRC (as well as relevant 
NGOs) from the manner in which the Treatment Action Campaign had 
compiled and prepared literature packs so as to provide vulnerable 
groups with critical information (in relation to the HIV virus and effective 
treatment protocols) and as a means of driving social mobilisation. It 
follows that the contents of a ‘socio-economic rights literature pack’ as 
prepared by the SAHRC could focus on the content of critical 
subsistence rights in the Constitution, the likely consequences of the 
recent ratification of the ICESCR and the need for the ratification of the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. In addition, the ‘socio-economic rights 
literature pack’ could also provide vulnerable groups with guidance in 
relation to effective and co-ordinated social mobilisation strategies to 
engage with (and lobby) local public officials so as to hold them to 
account in terms of benchmarked socio-economic rights targets. In this 
regard the SAHRC could promote ongoing, constructive dialogue 
between all critical stakeholders in society (e.g. the state, the public, 
independent watchdogs and NGOs) in striving to create a society in 
which social solidarity is given expression through treating all people as 
having equal worth. 
It is submitted that the SAHRC could make an extraordinary contribution 
(to the betterment of society) by adopting a more robust approach in the 
monitoring and enforcement of the realisation of socio-economic rights 
by the state.   
6.5.5 Public officials should participate in (mandatory) induction training as 
well as (mandatory) annual refresher training. It was my experience, as 
the nodal point for criminal investigations at a state-owned enterprise, 
that induction/annual refresher training was an essential facet of 
promoting diligence and ethical behaviour amongst public officials – this 
served to ensure that the required level of accountability was clearly 
articulated and emphasised.  
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It is critical to emphasise in the abovementioned training that civil, 
political and socio-economic rights are interdependent and 
interconnected as this serves to augment the understanding of public 
officials that each and every one of them can make a critical contribution 
to their respective communities (which in turn fortifies the nation-state as 
a whole). The training should also serve to highlight that the progressive 
realisation of critical socio-economic rights is dependent on all public 
officials (in all spheres) discharging their duties diligently so as to ensure 
that the limited resources of the state are appropriately allocated and 
subsequently utilised in the optimal manner. In this regard the public 
officials should receive dedicated training as to the critical role of Section 
195 in shaping and informing their approach and conduct in serving the 
public. Furthermore, the possibility of attracting adverse cost orders in 
their personal capacity should be emphasised (as a deterrent to 
unacceptable conduct as per the AllPay and Black Sash cases) in the 
induction/annual refresher programmes of senior public officials.  
The training should also serve to prick the (social) conscience of public 
officials so as to acknowledge the privilege of serving the public as a 
privilege and honour in the mould of Cicero. The training programmes 
also provide an ideal environment for public officials to develop a 
nuanced understanding of the communal obligations’ focus of ubuntu 
and how it meshes (as well as reinforces) the realisation of the 
aspirational values and socio-economic rights in the Constitution. 
It is submitted that the SAHRC should provide this training in light of its 
core mandate as well as being well placed to consider how to augment 
the shortcomings of the state in light of the Reports received from various 
state entities on an annual basis.  It is further submitted that the SAHRC 
can seek overarching approval from the Constitutional Court as to the 
contents of the training material. Furthermore, the SAHRC/Constitutional 
Court should direct that public officials should not aim for mere 
compliance with benchmarked sectoral targets but should be coaxed to 
attain stretch targets in light of the critical role of subsistence rights in 
fundamentally transforming the lives of vulnerable groups.  
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It will be exceedingly difficult to change the mindset of public officials (so 
as to embrace the serving of the public as a privilege) as borne out by 
my legal compliance and criminal investigative experience. It will indeed 
be a formidable challenge to create an environment in which public 
officials will display an unerring focus in giving effect to constitutionally 
guaranteed rights (and in so doing advance the communal obligations' 
focus of ubuntu). However, it is my submission that one must seek to 
provide the necessary framework/environment to promote such positive 
change amongst public officials in light of the seemingly permanent 
deprivation endured by fellow (vulnerable) members of our nation-state. 
If anything, the dismal failure of the state in meeting the basic needs of 
vulnerable groups (since the advent of democracy in South Africa) 
serves to highlight the need for the introduction of a suitable catalyst to 
bolster the accountability (as well as fortify the political will) of public 
officials. Thus, it is my firm contention that the mandatory training for 
public officials should emphasise the critical role that ubuntu could play 
in being a catalyst in creating the critical momentum – the point at which 
the state (as represented by public officials so transformed) will of its 
own volition begin to demonstrate an unwavering determination to 
materially transform the lives of vulnerable groups through a progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights in the shortest possible time.   
6.5.6  It is necessary to explore the illuminating insights offered by 
Robertson 1979  in highlighting the voluntary use of private resources 
which could be channelled by the state through the possible facilitation 
of land reform measures as well as raising taxes payable in the 
inheritance, property and net wealth spheres as previously 
described.1980  It follows that a wealth tax (as well as significant tax 
deductions for charitable donations) should be considered so as to 
ensure that all citizens with the necessary means could make a suitable 
                                                             
1979 Please see Section 3.6.2.1 at pages 180 -181 for insight as to the underlying 
philosophy of the state in contemplating the utilisation of certain funding 
mechanisms so as to meet the pressing needs of vulnerable groups.  
1980 Robertson R ‘Measuring state compliance’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 
700.   
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sacrifice in giving effect to constitutionally guaranteed socio-economic 
rights. In this regard Bilchitz rightfully believes that the extent of the 
sacrifice that has to be endured by members of society is linked to the 
urgency of individual needs that are yet to be satisfied.1981   
It is my firm belief that ubuntu can play a meaningful role in assisting 
citizens with the necessary means to embrace the abovementioned 
sacrifices (i.e. discharging communal obligations as a means to ease the 
suffering of vulnerable groups) so as to forge a nation-state based on 
sustainable social solidarity principles. However, the aforementioned 
collection of revenue by the state (which should be ring-fenced for 
exclusive use in socio-economic rights realisation) should in no way 
dilute nor obscure the primary obligation, as borne by the state, to 
progressively give effect to constitutionally guaranteed rights/ICESCR 
commitments as a matter of urgency.  
6.6     Summary 
The underlying objective of this thesis has been to articulate the manner 
in which ubuntu, understood as an unwavering focus on communal 
obligations, could in fact promote the accountability of public officials in 
South Africa (as well as foster social solidarity) by facilitating the 
progressive realisation of constitutionally guaranteed socio-economic 
rights. Thus, it is of the utmost importance to recognise that ubuntu, 
suitably defined and properly contextualised, is indeed capable of 
making a telling contribution (in so far as promoting the accountability of 
public officials and forging social solidarity) in the constitutional 
democracy that is South Africa.  
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court has a critical role to fulfil in 
undertaking overarching surveillance to hold the state accountable to 
give effect to the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights in 
terms of benchmarked sectoral plans as prepared by the state (and 
subsequently reviewed and approved by the Constitutional Court). It 
follows that public officials which display the necessary diligence and 
                                                             
1981 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 86.  
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commitment in meeting the needs of vulnerable groups reflect the 
aspirational vision of forging a just and caring society.  
In closing, it is my firm submission that this body of work has sought to 
maintain an unerring focus on transforming the lived reality of vulnerable 
groups so as to make a meaningful contribution to the betterment of 
society.  
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Annexure 1 
 
Please note that this is an unedited medical report, as prepared by a medical 
doctor, to provide frank details of the lived reality of a patient receiving renal 
dialysis.1982  
End Stage Renal Failure (ESRF) is a disease process that deprives both the 
patient and the family members that care for them of ‘quality’ of life. 
Kidney disease and ultimately ESRF has various causes and can afflict 
individuals at any age. It may often afflict individuals in the prime of their lives 
as has been demonstrated in the recent death of Jonah Lomu. 
Signs of renal failure (and hence those present in ESRF) include, amongst 
others: 
• Fever 
• Malaise 
• Rash 
• Loss of appetite 
• Vomiting 
• Abdominal pain 
• Muscle cramps and pain 
• Swelling of tissues 
• Headache 
• Insomnia 
• Dry skin 
• Itching 
                                                             
1982 Please note that the necessary background information for Annexure 1 is 
provided at Chapter 5.8. 
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• Irritability 
• Changes in mental alertness 
Individual symptoms as well as the rate of deterioration will vary from patient to 
patient, and would be influenced by the age of the individual and co-morbid 
conditions that they may suffer. 
Access to adequate healthcare facilities and personnel are essential in ensuring 
that the suffering of the patient as well as the suffering and anguish of the family 
caring for the patient, are adequately addressed. As with so many things in 
South Africa this is directly linked to the socioeconomic setting of the patient. In 
my experience, patients from poorer economic areas who suffer from renal 
disease often consult with several healthcare providers prior to getting 
adequate treatment, at which stage they are more likely to be at end stage renal 
failure and requiring dialysis. 
It is impossible to exactly determine by how much the lifespan of an individual 
would be increased should they start on dialysis as each case of ESRF would 
differ. However, there is no denying that the ‘quality of life’ of the individual 
would be greatly increased in this time period when compared to those patients 
who are not granted dialysis. This improvement in ‘quality’ is also shared by the 
family members who care for patients on dialysis. 
In my experience as a GP, all patients with ESRF who have the opportunity to 
access dialysis and in so doing prolong their lives and improve their ‘quality’ of 
life are always eager to accept this form of therapy if they have the monetary 
means to do so. 
I recently had a patient (who we will call Mrs X) who, at the age of eighty, was 
diagnosed with ESRF and was given the choice of dialysis. In her late 70’s she 
had suffered a stroke and was subsequently confined to wheelchair during the 
days and required constant assistance with all her activities of daily living. Her 
main carer was her youngest daughter (who was neither married nor had 
children) and on occasion one of Mrs X’s granddaughters assisted in this task. 
Her carer would see to all her needs which would include waking up repeatedly 
at night to comfort Mrs X. Needless to say this was an arduous task and I would 
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often find myself concluding my consultations with them by praising her 
daughter, who by the second year of caring for her frail mother looked 
permanently physically exhausted but somehow always managed to stay 
cheerful, and thanking her daughter for making my job easier by her caring for 
her mother so diligently. 
Mrs X was very fearful of returning to hospital again since having suffered her 
stroke a few years before. She had always expressed to me her wish to be at 
home surrounded by her family, should her health deteriorate further. Mrs X 
had a large family, many of whom lived in other provinces, and thus most of her 
time was spent alone with her daughter at their family home. 
Towards the middle of last year, after suffering a bout of urinary tract infections, 
it was noted that Mrs. X’s renal function had deteriorated markedly. Based on 
the blood results she was now clinically in ESRF. Given her age and co-
morbidity her life expectancy as a result of this diagnosis was only a few weeks 
at best. Her daughter had noted that her mother had become more restless, 
was complaining more of abdominal and muscle pain as well as complaining of 
pruritus (itching of her skin), in recent days. She also noted that her mother was 
not able to sleep well and was generally more irritable. This had put a great 
emotional strain on Mrs X’s daughter and she was worried that she would not 
be able to enjoy the usual bitter-sweet relationship with her ailing mother, 
especially now that she had reached the final stages of life.     
I explained to Mrs X’s daughter that at this stage the only thing that may improve 
her mother’s ‘quality’ of life, was dialysis. Despite coming from a ‘previously 
disadvantaged community’ Mrs X was fortunate that her son had put her on his 
medical aid and thus she was able to access dialysis at a private facility. I 
arranged for Mrs X and her daughter to consult a renal physician to explain all 
the aspects of dialysis prior to making any further decisions on how to proceed. 
I was aware of Mrs. X’s ‘hospital phobia’ and I felt that if she was fully informed 
of all the benefits of dialysis her anxieties would be allayed. Despite her age, 
her physical state and her phobia of hospitals, Mrs X (and her daughter) in 
consultation with her extended family, unanimously decided to proceed with 
dialysis. 
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Mrs X attended regular dialysis sessions over the ensuing 3 months. She later 
passed away peacefully in her sleep whilst at home. 
After Mrs X’s passing her daughter came to see me to thank me for all my care. 
She was most grateful that Mrs X had dialysis as this had afforded her the time 
to contact all her family, both near and far. Mrs X had been well enough, both 
physically and emotionally, whilst on dialysis to interact with all visiting family 
members prior to her death. Mrs X’s family had also expressed that dialysis had 
afforded her the best ‘quality’ of life before her death. In so doing they had been 
in a better position to deal with the loss of the ‘heart’ of the family. 
There is no doubt in my mind that the ‘quality of life’ that is afforded to both the 
sufferer of ESRF and the family members who care for them, through the 
opportunity of accessing dialysis in the final stages of their lives, is something 
that should be made available to all sufferers of this disease no matter what 
their socioeconomic standing may be. 
